The UAE exits OPEC and Saudi-UAE tensions in 2026

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) share many common features, both being oil-rentier, Sunni-majority monarchical states (oil-rentier states derive most of their revenues from oil and gas production).

Both also have strong security ties with the US, high levels of trade with China, a shared concern for Iranian influence in the Middle East and the country’s nuclear programme, a joint interest in restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining the same in the Red Sea, and hostility to Muslim Brotherhood influence abroad.

However, the two are increasingly commercial rivals and pursuing some distinct foreign policies. This briefing provides an overview of five issues of divergence. It also provides a summary of current UK–Gulf relations.

Emiratis and Saudis are now competing

The UAE and Saudi Arabia are both “middle powers” seeking greater strategic autonomy for their governments in a Middle East where US influence is less prevalent. Their foreign policy shifts have partly been in response to uncertainty over the US security commitment to the region. This has followed successive US administrations pivoting to Asia, and recent questions about the limits on the US ability to defend the Middle East against Iran.

Economic competition has also increased as both countries simultaneously diversify their economies away from oil (the UAE is further ahead on this, with the non-oil sector representing 77% of its gross domestic product (GDP), compared with 55% of GDP in Saudi Arabia). Despite this rivalry, they remain major trading partners.

Divides on Sudan, Yemen, oil production, Iran and Israel

When vying for regional influence, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have supported opposing armed groups in several of the region’s fragile and conflict-affected states. Their judgements of the relative threats posed by Israel and Iran to regional stability also differ: the UAE has established security ties with Israel but Saudi Arabia now likely judges Israel to be the greater threat to stability.

Their actions may contribute to more fragility but also potentially a new balance of power and security ties. This briefing covers five areas relating to this theme:

1. Sudan’s civil war: Saudi Arabia backs the country’s armed forces. The UAE has been accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, though it strongly denies this. Both are seeking to mediate an end to the conflict.
2. Yemen’s civil war: they have backed opposing elements of Yemen’s internationally recognised government against the Iran-backed Houthis. In 2025, UAE-backed forces captured most of southern Yemen, but a Saudi-backed offensive in January 2026 quickly recovered the territory.
3. Oil production: in 2026, after nearly 60 years of membership, the UAE said it would withdraw from OPEC (the coordinating organisation for major oil producers). Saudi Arabia is OPEC’s leading producer.
4. Iran: both are critical of Iran, but in 2026 the UAE’s criticisms of Iran and response to Iranian attacks have been the strongest in the Gulf.
5. Israel: in 2020, the UAE established diplomatic ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Security and economic ties have since deepened.

This is not the first rift in the Arab Gulf

These issues do not represent the first rifts between Arab Gulf states: a Saudi-led blockade against Qatar, backed by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, was in place from 2017 to 2021. This reflected opposition to Qatar’s Al Jazeera news network, its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatari ties to Iran.

Integration between the six-strong Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), founded in 1981, has also remained limited. This is partly due to concern about Saudi dominance, which, in terms of population and economy, remains by the far the largest of the GCC members. Tensions over OPEC are also not new.

Saudi Arabia is expanding ties with others

Some analysts have proposed that the Saudi–UAE divide represents the beginnings of new regional alignments, with one centred on deepening Israel–UAE ties and the other ties between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

However, these are far from clear cut: the UAE has been critical of Israeli action in Gaza and the West Bank, while Saudi Arabia remains open to recognising Israel if a Palestinian state is established. Despite agreeing a mutual defence pact in 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are likely to remain focused on their immediate neighbours (Pakistan on India and Saudi Arabia on Iran). Saudi Arabia had also been experiencing tensions with Turkey over its support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011.

A significant shared driver of new partnerships has been a desire to hedge against instability and develop credible security and other partnerships beyond the United States (though Gulf–US security cooperation and US base presence remains extensive).