Yemen in 2025/26: Changing balance of power in the south

Since 2015, Yemen has been divided between the Iran-backed Houthis in the north and an internationally recognised government, now known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), in the south. While the main Houthi–PLC frontlines have been largely frozen since a ceasefire in 2022, there was a rapid reordering of PLC forces from December 2025 to January 2026.

In December 2025, the Yemen separatist group, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which was part of the PLC, expanded its control over non-Houthi controlled southern Yemen. It announced plans for an independence referendum within two years. However, in January 2026 a PLC counter-offensive recovered of all the STC’s territorial gains and STC ministers were expelled from the PLC. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has backed the STC, also withdrew its remaining forces from Yemen in January 2026.

The Iran-backed Houthis have been largely unaffected by these events. However, following the Israel/US strikes on Iran from February 2026, the group has threatened to intervene in support of Iran, as they did in support of Hamas in Gaza from 2023 to 2025 by attacking Red Sea shipping. Some Houthi missiles and drones were launched against Israel on 27 and 28 March.

This briefing looks at the changing balance of power within PLC Yemen and the STC’s actions. It also discusses aid, especially in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

What are the origins of the conflict in Yemen?

The immediate origins of the conflict lie in the Arab Spring of 2011, discontent with the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled unified Yemen since its creation (it had previously been divided into separate states), and a series of failed transitions (including failed talks on federalisation, regional autonomy and sharing resources and power).

Saleh stood down in 2012, and was replaced by his deputy, Abdu Mansour Hadi. The armed conflict is generally held to begin in 2014, when the Houthi group (in alliance with Saleh) captured the capital Sana’a. The conflict was internationalised with the entry of a Saudi-led coalition in 2015, in support of Hadi. The Houthis later broke off their alliance with Saleh, and he was killed in 2017. Hadi ceded power to the PLC in 2022. This was in response to divisions between groups in non-Houthi areas of Yemen and their external backers.

Although different parties control the north and south, the conflict does not centre on attempts to divide Yemen into two separate states, as existed before 1990 (the Houthis in the north are not seeking a separate state).

Who are the main actors in Yemen?

There is a range of armed and political groups in Yemen:

• The Houthis (Ansar Allah): a Zaydi Muslim movement, led by the Houthi family. Based in the north, it holds Sana’a and controls the majority of Yemen’s population. Iran provided little support during the Houthi’s conflicts with Saleh from 2004 and 2010, but it has subsequently given increasing aid. The group is subject to a UN arms embargo.
• Presidential Leadership Council (PLC): the internationally recognised government of Yemen, replacing Hadi in 2022. An eight-member body, formed of Saudi or UAE-backed figures. It included the STC until 2026 (see below). Analysts view the PLC as fractured, hindering its effectiveness and leadership.
• Southern Transitional Council (STC): a separatist group founded in 2017 and whose current status is uncertain. It had been backed by the UAE. In 2018, it had captured most of the temporary capital, Aden.
• Islah party, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform: the major Sunni political movement in Yemen. The UAE view the party as too close to the Muslim Brotherhood, a link it denies. Saudi Arabia backs its politicians.

The three most important external actors are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran:

• Saudi Arabia led a military coalition in support of Hadi from 2015. The coalition has now split and Saudi Arabia has increasingly disengaged militarily from the conflict. It continues to support the PLC.
• UAE was part of the Saudi-led military coalition but withdrew most of its forces in 2020 and the remainder in January 2026 following the failed STC action. It had supported the STC and other armed groups.
• Iran has provided rhetorical and, over time, increased military support for the Houthis, as part of its regional alliance network.

The US and UK supported the Saudi coalition from 2015. The UK is penholder for Yemen at the UN Security Council, meaning it takes the lead on council work.

What are the major developments in 2025/26? Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and conflict with Israel

From November 2023 onwards the Houthis launched attacks in the Red Sea against commercial and naval ships in response to the Israel–Hamas conflict. In response to Houthi action, an international coalition was launched to protect shipping. The UK and US also conducted air strikes.

The UK and US strikes are set out in the Library briefing, UK and international response to Houthis in the Red Sea 2024/25. The UK’s most recent and sixth air strike was in April 2025, while the final US strike was on 6 May 2025.

Israel has separately targeted the Houthis, which had launched drone and missile strikes against Israel from 2023 to 2025. An Israeli strike killed the Houthi Prime Minister in August 2025. Israel has not formally announced an end to its strikes against the Houthis. The Houthis had said if the Israel–Hamas framework agreement of October 2025 does not hold, it will resume its attacks.

While the Houthi attacks ended in October 2025, sea traffic through the Red Sea has not recovered to pre-2023 levels and some shipping lines have already been avoiding it since the 2026 Israel/US-Iran conflict. Although Houthi have attacked Israel during the Israel/US–Iran conflict, it has not, to date, renewed its attacks on shipping.

Yemen’s PLC has described the Houthi attacks on Israel as risking “exacerbating humanitarian […] conditions […] in a country already suffering from one of the worst humanitarian crises”. The UN’s special envoy for Yemen said that “escalatory action risks drawing Yemen into the regional war” and called for restraint.

Rapid rise and fall of the STC’s territorial control

Since a national ceasefire in 2022, frontlines in the Yemen conflict have been stable. While the ceasefire agreement itself lasted only six months, intensive Houthi–PLC/STC fighting has not resumed.

Since 2022, within PLC areas, the STC had continued to expand control and in December 2025 said it had entered and taken control of several south-eastern provinces. No extensive fighting was reported. The STC said it would focus on consolidating its control and an independence referendum by 2028.

However, in January 2026 a counter-offensive by the PLC resulted in a rapid reversal of territorial control. This offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, culminated in the removal of STC ministers from the PLC and the group’s apparent dissolution on 9 January (some members dispute this and there have been protests backing the group). While the PLC has appointed a new government, it continues to face economic pressures, an absence of negotiations with the Houthis, and a lack of a unified armed force.

UAE–Saudi tensions and UK and US response to the STC

In response to the STC offensive, UK and US ambassadors to Yemen reiterated their support for a negotiated settlement and the role of the PLC. The Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, called for dialogue, as did the United States.

The events strained relations between the two leading Arab Gulf states, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which backed opposing sides within the PLC. Both called for restraint. In January the UAE announced it would withdraw its remaining forces. Analysts judge, however, it is unlikely to fully disengage.

Houthis restrict and hinder aid groups in the north

The Houthis in the north have also continued to restrict the operation of aid groups, and detained staff from several aid agencies, including those of the UN. The UN Security Council, including the UK, has jointly called for their release. The Houthis have accused staff of spying for Israel and the West. As a result of the action, the UN has relocated its main offices to Aden. The World Food Programme is expected to end its work in Houthi areas in March 2026.

Houthi–PLC peace talks have not progressed

The UN special envoy and Oman continue to seek to mediate an end to the conflict, and analysts have argued that the STC action in 2025 was perhaps an attempt to pre-empt the resumption of Saudi–Houthi talks. The UN special envoy has previously proposed a roadmap for the country. This would include a temporary ceasefire before a wider negotiated settlement.

Update log

31 March 2026: Updated with STC losses in the south (section 2) and added a note on Houthi participation in the Israel/US-Iran conflict of 2026.