Syria one year after Assad: UK and global engagement

December 2025 marked one year since Bashar al-Assad, president of Syria from 2000, fled and a rebel offensive captured the capital, Damascus. This brought Syria’s 13-year civil war to an end, though the political transition remains disputed, and some violence and fighting has continued into 2026.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of one of the major rebel forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, was declared Syria’s transitional president in January 2025 and an interim constitutional declaration came into effect in March.

This briefing describes how global and regional powers have been engaging with the new authorities in Syria and shaping its future. The UK has re-established diplomatic ties, and like the European Union and United States, has removed many of its sanctions to support reconstruction. All continue to stress the need for an inclusive and Syrian-led political transition.

1.1 International rivalries in Syria’s civil war

While the Syrian civil war’s origins lay in domestic discontent as part of the wider Arab Spring, foreign influence in Syria played an important role in shaping the civil war and explaining its longevity.

Both Iran and Russia intervened militarily in support of Assad, while Turkey supported rebel groups in northern Syria. Direct American and European military action was limited, following domestic political opposition to intervention, but they contributed to the territorial defeat of Islamic State/Daesh between 2014 and 2017. Some US forces continue to be based in areas of Syria.

The Library timeline on the Syrian civil war provides an overview of the 2011 to 2024 period.

Due to diverging international attitudes towards Assad, the UN Security Council was often paralyzed during the conflict, with China and Russia opposed to resolutions targeting the Assad regime.

This paralysis raised questions for the international community’s ability to prevent human rights violations, including forced disappearances.

While a UN political process aimed to end the civil war, talks between Iran, Turkey, and Russia instead became the dominant channel, under what was termed the Astana process.

Iran’s influence in Syria has now been weakened substantially with the fall of Assad, while Russia is now only one of several actors.

In 2025, Russia is now seeking influence and position alongside Turkey, Israel, the Arab Gulf states and the United States. Sharaa himself has been seeking to establish ties for Syria beyond Assad’s long-standing allies.

1.2 How did the UK approach change in 2025? UK opposition to Assad, 2011 to 2024

At the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the UK called on Assad to step down. The UK withdrew its diplomatic staff from Syria in 2012 and the embassy closed in 2013. As a member of the EU, the UK imposed a range of sanctions against the Assad regime.

As set out in section 3 of the Library briefing, The Syrian civil war: timeline, UK aid and statistics, in 2013 the House of Commons voted against military action against Assad. It backed action against Islamic State/Daesh in Syria from 2015.

The UK continued to support a UN-led peace process, but like other European states its influence was increasingly limited to sanctions and humanitarian aid. Assad’s foreign military backers, Iran and Russia, became the dominant actors, as well as Turkey for some opposition groups.

Like the US and EU, UK opposition was also unable to halt Assad’s rehabilitation in the Middle East, which culminated in his re-entry to the Arab League in 2023 (the League being a collection of Arab states).

UK diplomatic engagement after Assad’s fall

In December 2024, the UK Government cautiously welcomed the declaration of the interim authorities, but Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer warned that “we must not make the mistake of thinking that what comes next [in Syria] is necessarily going to be different and better”.

In the year since, the UK has deepened its engagement with the interim government. UK ministers have visited Syria, and formal diplomatic ties have been re-established. While the UK does not have an embassy, the Syrian embassy to the UK was reopened in November 2025.

Writing in December 2025 to mark a year since Assad’s fall, Middle East Minister Hamish Falconer said that while challenges remain, “the UK wants this new Syria to succeed”:

There remain significant challenges ahead for Syria […] the enduring ISIS [Islamic State] threat […] [and] outbreaks of sectarian violence across Syria have deepened divisions.

A stable and flourishing Syria with investment and business opportunities is in all our interests. So too is an inclusive Syria that recognises the voices and needs of all citizens and a Syria that contributes to regional and global security.

Reducing UK sanctions

In April 2025 the government announced it would amend its Syrian sanctions regime. Sanctions against Assad figures would remain, but wider economic sanctions are to be lifted to support reconstruction and Syria’s re-integration into the regional economy.

During the Commons debate on the amendments in May, Minister Stephen Doughty said that the retained measures will be “used as a responsive tool, targeting those who bear responsibility for repression and human rights abuses”, including in post-Assad Syria.

The UK action was in parallel to similar moves by the EU and US.

In October 2025 the UK also removed the terrorist designation from Hayat al-Tahrir (HTS) group, saying it was no longer an alias of Al-Qaeda.

Shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, has called for the UK to apply more conditions to the relief of sanctions, citing sectarian violence in 2025, and said the decision on HTS “should have only been done if there was overwhelming evidence”.

New UK sanctions in response to 2025 violence

In December 2025, six individuals and three organisations were sanctioned in response to their involvement in the coastal violence earlier in 2025 and Assad-era violations. Other sanctions against Assad-era figures remain in place.

Statements on specific aspects of the transition

The UK Government has called for an inclusive and Syria-led transition and been critical of sectarian violence. For more on these issues and the UK response, see the separate Library briefings on Syria’s minorities and forming an interim government, published in December 2025 and January 2026.

1.3 What are the US priorities? Lifting sanctions and restoring diplomatic ties

In November 2025, President Donald Trump said that his administration would “do everything we can to make Syria successful”. Like the UK, the United States has progressively removed its sanctions and de-listed HTS as a terrorist organisation.

In May 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that while HTS has a “tough history”, “if Syria is unstable, the region is unstable”. He said that there was a risk of renewed civil war if authority cannot be established in Syria and regional states cannot invest in Syria, because of US sanctions.

Arab Gulf states have long called for the removal of sanctions, citing them as a block on investment and trade with Syria.

Syria has been allowed to reopen its embassy in Washington DC. The US has cited security threats (not from the interim authorities) as a reason why the US embassy in Syria had not reopened.

In December 2025, US legislation permanently removed the Caesar sanctions. Introduced in 2019, third countries and companies could be sanctioned by the United States if they engaged with Syrian authorities. Under the 2025 Act, the US President must regularly inform Congress of Syrian progress on issues such as protecting the rights of minorities.

Five US requests of Sharaa

US policy has been centred on five requests made of Sharaa in May 2025:

1 Sign onto the Abraham Accords with Israel.

2 Tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria.

3 Deport Palestinian terrorists.

4 Help the United States to prevent the resurgence of ISIS [Islamic State].

5 Assume responsibility for ISIS detention centres in northeast Syria.

Analysis for the Washington Institute think tank notes that Syria has made progress on points 3 and 4 (Syria joined the global coalition against Islamic State in November and has conducted a joint military operation with the US), but only some progress on point 2, and none on the remainder.

Changing approach to combating Islamic State/Daesh

US forces remain in Syria, primarily in the northeast, to combat Islamic State. A planned draw-down in 2025 was reportedly paused due to concerns for stability. The US is also withdrawing troops from neighbouring Iraq over 2025 and 2026. In January 2026 the US envoy for Syria, Tom Barrak, said that “the US has no interest in long-term military presence” in Syria.

The US has also backed the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a group to combat and contain Islamic State/Daesh. However, following the decision of the interim Syrian government to join the global coalition against Islamic State in 2025 and the withdrawal of the SDF from many parts of northeastern Syria in January 2026, Tom Barrack has said:

the original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired, as Damascus [referring to the interim Syrian authority] is now both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities.

1.4 What is the status of Russian bases? Russia as Assad’s ally

Like Iran, Russia was a long-standing ally of Assad. It intervened militarily in support of his regime in 2015, in a move then widely seen as turning the conflict in Assad’s favour. Syria gained additional strategic importance for Russia with the establishment of a naval and air base on the Mediterranean.

Ongoing negotiations on military bases

While Iran’s influence in Syria has greatly decreased, Russia has so far been able to retain its bases in the country (albeit with a reportedly very small footprint).

Sharaa himself visited Moscow in October 2025 and suggested he would honour past agreements between the two countries. However, his foreign minister has also suggested that some issues, including bases, remain under discussion.

Analysts have warned that the window of opportunity to exclude Russia from post-Assad Syria is now closing. However, given Syrian engagement beyond Assad’s allies, Russia is unlikely to be the dominant power it once was.

1.5 What is the future of Israel-Syria ties? Military action and Israeli objectives

While Israel welcomed the fall of Assad as part of a wider weakening of Iran’s “axis of resistance” (including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza), from December 2024 it has launched hundreds of airstrikes and some ground incursions in the country to destroy Assad-era weaponry, maintain a demilitarised buffer zone, and to protect Syria’s Druze minority.

Analysts argue Israel is seeking a decentralised and weak neighbour to remove any threat to Israel, it being sceptical of the new Syrian leadership.

Challenges to reaching a new security agreement

Syria, like many Arab states, lacks a peace agreement with Israel after the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1948 to 1973.

While the US has expressed hope that Israel and Syria will establish diplomatic relations (the two came close in the 1990s) or a security pact, the interim Syrian authorities have said there will be no security agreement with Israel until it withdraws from the occupied Golan Heights.

Israel has reiterated its demand for a buffer zone and retaining the Heights.

For more on the status of the Heights, see 3.4 of the Library briefing on Syria after Assad, updated in July 2025.

In January 2026 a more limited agreement to establish a dedicated communication cell was reached. Through the cell, interim Syrian authorities and Israel will “facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities”, under US supervision.

The agreement followed a statement by President Trump in December 2025 that “Israel [must] maintain a strong and true dialogue with Syria” and that “nothing” should “interfere with Syria’s evolution into a prosperous state”. The statement followed Israeli military action near the Golan Heights in November.

1.6 How is Turkey shaping Syria? Turkey backed rebel groups

Analysts widely described Turkey as a major winner from the Syrian civil war, though it primarily backed the Syrian National Army, and not HTS, which it had designated a terrorist group.

Since the fall of Assad, Turkey has offered security support to the interim authorities as well economic investment.

Turkish priorities and Kurdish autonomy

In addition to Syrian stability, Turkish priorities are arranging the return of Syrian refugees from the country (which totalled 3.7 million at their peak) and supporting a centralised Syrian state.

Turkey is opposed to the Kurdish-led autonomous area in north-east Syria and its separate army, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), elements of which it says are tied to terrorist activity by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey.

The Library briefing, Syria one year after Assad: Forming an interim government, has background on the Kurdish northeast.

In 2025, Turkey and the PKK reached a ceasefire agreement and the PKK is expected to disarm. Turkey has said Kurdish forces in Syria must now integrate into a single Syrian armed force, a process that stalled in 2025. Turkey has called for a further agreement on the SDF, reached in January 2026, to be implemented, and for the SDF to disarm and disband.

Threat of military action continued in 2025

In December 2025 Turkish officials reiterated calls for the SDF to integrate into the interim government army, with local media suggesting a deadline of 31 December before military action was taken. The Turkish Foreign Minister said in December 2025 that “there can only be one army, one command structure” in Syria, but there can be “different understandings” in the local administration.

In January 2026, Turkish officials suggested they would be willing to provide support for military action by the interim Syrian government, if requested.

There had been several suggestions or reports of Turkish or Turkish-backed military action in 2025.

1.7 Further reading Overview of key international actors

• Commons Library, Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025. Sections 3 and 5 provide an overview.
• Arab Gulf States Institute, Linchpin: Syria becomes a locus for regional cooperation and competition, July 2025
• Carnegie Endowment, The new struggle for Syria, November 2025
• Engelsberg Ideas, A new Syria struggles to be born, December 2025

Specific countries

• China: Chatham House, Why China is hesitant to support Syria’s new government, September 2025
• European Union: European Council on Foreign Relations, The road ahead: Six ways Europeans can urgently support a stable Syria, May 2025
• Israel: Arab Gulf States Institute, Is Israel’s Syria policy making Gulf states nervous?, September 2025 and Washington Institute, Prospects for Syria-Israel relations, January 2026
• Arab states: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Regional reactions to the transition in Syria, March 2025
• Russia: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, A post-Syria era? The future of Russia’s Mediterranean engagement, December 2025
• Turkey: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Turkey-Syria relations: The outcome of long-term cooperation, October 2025
• United States: Washington Institute, Trump meets Sharaa: Writing a new chapter in US-Syria relations, May 2025 and Carnegie Endowment, The US and the emerging security order in Eastern Syria, December 2025

1.8 Other Library briefings on Syria: One year after Assad

Other Library briefings published in December 2025 and January 2026 cover aspects of Syria and its global relations a year after Assad’s fall:

1) Forming a new government

2) Humanitarian situation and reconstruction

3) The situation for religious minorities

The Library briefing, Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025, provides an introduction to post-Assad Syria, the key local and international actors, and the UK response.