Syria one year after Assad: Religious minorities

December 2025 marks one year since Bashar al-Assad, president of Syria from 2000, fled and a rebel offensive captured the capital, Damascus. This brought Syria’s 13-year civil war to an end. However, the political transition remains disputed, and some violence continues.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of one of the major rebel forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, was declared Syria’s transitional president in January 2025 and an interim constitution declaration came into effect in March.

This briefing describes the violence reported against religious minority groups in Syria, transitional government actions, and the UK and international response.

1.1 Who are Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities?

While Arab Sunni Muslims constitute most of Syria’s population, there are many ethnic and religious minorities (the below is not exhaustive, and the figures are often based on pre-conflict estimates):

• Kurds are the country’s largest ethnic minority, constituting around 10% to 15% of the population. Most are Sunni Muslims. During the civil war, the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) was established in northeast Syria. Negotiations on its relationship with the transitional authorities remain ongoing.
• Alawites are a branch of Shia Islam and constitute around 10% to 15% of the population. President Bashar al-Assad was a member of the Alawi community.
• Christians constitute up to 10% of the population, though numbers are estimated to have fallen over the last decade.
• Druze number around 3% and are concentrated in southern Syria.

1.2 What violence has been reported?

Since Assad fled, there have been several major acts of violence targeting and involving minority communities.

March 2025 violence against Alawites

In March 2025, around 1,400 people, mostly civilians, were killed in violence in coastal regions in western Syria. Alawites were the primary targets and conflict monitors reported instances of “revenge attacks”.

Reuters news agency and rights monitor Amnesty International alleged that some militias affiliated with the interim Syrian authorities, as well as the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, participated in the violence.

The transitional authorities established an investigation, which reported in July. This said that pro-Assad “remnants” had caused the violence and that some members of interim government forces did commit violations, but as “individuals” and under “no official authority”.

The Independent UN Commission Syria Inquiry reached a similar conclusion that some interim forces participated in the violence, and raised concerns for a lack of central control over them.

The violence in March followed earlier reports of “door-to-door interrogations and select executions” against Alawites carried out by forces affiliated with the transitional government, according to the US Commission on Religious Freedom.

Violence and discrimination against Alawites have also been reported in Damascus. In November 2025, there were also violent tensions between Alawites and Bedouin in Homs (Syria’s third largest city).

April and July 2025: Druze and Bedouin

On 29 and 30 April, sectarian violence in a Damascus suburb largely populated by Druze reportedly killed at least 100 people, including security forces.

Extensive violence was also reported in mid-July in the southern Suweyda province between Druze and Bedouin armed groups, with some violence ongoing. Interim government security forces also intervened.

The UN estimated that around 187,000 people were displaced by mid-August and the UK-based Syrian Network for Human Rights estimated that around 1,000 civilians and militants were killed in July.

The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, Volker Türk, reported that interim government security forces, and Druze and Bedouin armed groups, were responsible for “widespread violations and abuses, including summary executions and arbitrary abuses”.

Interim President Sharaa said those responsible for the violence would be “held accountable” and that the Druze would be “protected”.

In 2024/25, Israel has launched a series of military actions in southern Syria, citing protection for the Druze and its demand that southern Syria (on the border with Israel and the occupied Golan Heights) remains demilitarised. While some Druze leaders have rejected Israeli support, others have welcomed it as part of a move towards greater autonomy or independence.

June 2025: Christians

In June 2025, a Christian church in Damascus was targeted in a suicide attack, which reportedly killed 25 people and injured 63. It was reportedly the largest attack on Christians in Syria since 1860.

A Sunni Muslim group, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, potentially linked to Islamic State/Daesh, were blamed for the attack.

1.3 How is the interim government responding? Constitutional declaration

In March 2025 a constitutional declaration was issued. It will be in place for five years, at which point elections are planned.

The declaration describes Islam as the “main source of legislation” and that the president must be a Muslim (the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is a Sunni Muslim).

Analysts have noted concerns from minorities that the constitution refers to protecting the three “heavenly religions” (PDF) (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and for not explicitly mentioning other faiths. Kurdish groups have also criticised the naming of the state as the “Arab” republic.

However, while freedom of religion and belief is not more expressly defined, the Lebanon-based Carnegie Middle East Center think tank notes that under the declaration, Syria will implement “all rights” in the international treaties it has signed. This includes freedom of religion and belief.

Representation of minorities in government

The cabinet of the interim government was announced in March 2025. While senior positions are held by those associated with the interim president, it contains representatives from Christian, Alawite, Druze and Kurdish communities.

However, neither the Kurdish nor Druze ministers are from the leading groups for their communities, in the Kurdish northeast or Druze Suweyda.

A new parliament is still being formed, with an expectation that the remaining third of members to be appointed by the interim president will include more from minority groups.

In the indirect election of the other members in October, few from minority and religious groups were chosen (few women were also selected). This, in part, reflects the decision to postpone elections in areas outside interim government control, namely in Kurdish and Druze provinces.

Tensions in centralising power and armed forces

The interim government does not have a monopoly on the use of force, nor does its authority extend across Syria. It has cited the absence of state institutions as one reason for continuing outbreaks of violence and in 2025 has sought to integrate Syria’s major armed groups under a single command.

While it has reached preliminary agreements on unifying the armed forces of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and Druze groups, these have not proceeded far. Kurds and Druze continue to push for greater autonomy within the new Syrian state and to retain their separate forces, given sectarian tensions and uncertainty.

Islamic State/Daesh, jihadist groups and remnants of pro-Assad groups also remain active and claimed some involvement in the violence. The interim government joined the global anti-Daesh/Islamic State coalition in November. In the main, however, Islamic State activity is low in Syria.

Investigations and accountability

In November 2025, the first trials of around a dozen people involved in the March violence began. The interim government’s prosecutor general has brought charges against around 565 people, including both members of the interim army and pro-Assad groups. Further charges and trials are planned.

A 13-point roadmap was agreed for Suweyda in September, following American and Jordanian mediation. It includes commitments for accountability and for those displaced to return.

Some members of the interim army have since been detained over the violence.

Analysis from policy forum Just Security argues that the local courts lack transparency and have overlooked the sectarian nature of the violence, instead focusing on revenge-killings (many Alawites being associated with the Assad regime).

In response to Alawite and Druze concerns about the independence of interim government courts, the roadmap includes a request for the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate the violence.

Society and education

The interim authorities have also faced criticism for changes to the school curriculum, including the removal of material on pre-Islamic religions in Syria. The changes remain under review. There have also been tensions between teaching the Syrian or Kurdish curricula in the Kurdish-controlled north east, with Christian schools temporarily closing as a result.

In October, the interim government announced Christmas and Easter will be included as official holidays. Some Islamists criticised the policy.

1.4 What is the UK and international response? UN Security Council presidential statements

In 2025, the UN Security Council has issued two presidential statements on behalf of all its members (including the UK), condemning sectarian violence.

In March the Council condemned the “widespread violence” and “mass killings of civilians, particularly among the Alawite community”, while in August it “strongly condemn[ed] the violence perpetrated against civilians in Suwayda which has included mass killing”.

In both cases, the Council called for accountability, welcomed the statements from interim Syrian authorities condemning the violence, and said all Syrians must be protected.

UK Government statements

The UK Government, echoing the positions of others in Europe and the US, has said it will judge the new Syrian authorities “by their actions” and will continue to push for freedom of religion or belief in Syria.

The UK Government has raised concerns directly with the Syrian interim authorities, including through visits to Syria of the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer and the then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy.

New UK sanctions in December

In December 2025, the UK Government announced that four individuals and three armed militias would be sanctioned for their involvement in the March 2025 violence and participation in Assad-era human rights violations. The sanctions involve an asset freeze, travel ban and director disqualification.

UK prioritisation of freedom of religion or belief

Syria is one of the priority countries for UK international work on freedom of religion or belief. The government is funding programmes to document human rights abuses and support the trial of those committing sexual violence in conflict.

Following the July violence, the UK Government announced £1.7 million in aid to support the response in Suwayda. This provided emergency health support to displaced people and specific support for women and girls.

1.5 Further reading Introduction to Syria’s minority groups

• Minority Rights Groups, Syria.
• BBC News, Guide: Syria's diverse minorities, 2011

Reports on violence and tensions in 2025

• Commons Library, Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025, section 2.2. Includes further information on the violence and reading on religious minorities.
• US Commission on Religious Freedom, 2025 annual report: Syria (PDF), April 2025
• US Commission on Religious Freedom, Religious freedom and US policy in post-Assad Syria, July 2025
• BBC Monitoring, Analysis: Mixed signals of moderation and religious conservatism in new Syria, December 2025 (requires a free account, which can be opened for parliamentary staff).
• Washington Institute, Christians in the new Syria: accepted, but at-risk, December 2025

1.6 Other Library briefings on Syria: One year after Assad

Other Library briefings cover aspects of Syria and its global relations a year after Assad’s fall:

1) Forming a new government

2) Humanitarian situation and reconstruction

3) UK and international relations

The Library briefing, Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025, provides an introduction to post-Assad Syria, the key local and international actors, and the UK response.