Syria one year after Assad: Forming an interim government

December 2025 marked one year since Bashar al-Assad, president of Syria from 2000, fled and a rebel offensive captured the capital, Damascus. This brought Syria’s 13-year civil war to an end, though the political transition remains disputed, and some violence and fighting has continued into 2026.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of one of the major rebel forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, was declared Syria’s transitional president in January 2025 and an interim constitutional declaration came into effect in March.

This briefing sets out the nature of Syria’s transitional government, the appointment of a parliament in October 2025, and continuing tensions in 2026 with Kurdish groups in the northeast on the future of the region’s autonomy.

1.1 Who are the major domestic actors? Territorial control remains disputed

While Assad has been removed from power, and new authorities led by the leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group have been established, there is no single armed force in Syria and the country entered 2026 with a continuing risk of violence and instability.

In addition, the interim government does not have complete control over its own forces. This lack of control contributed to the extensive violence in coastal areas in March 2025 in which Alawite minorities were targeted.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Turkish-backed groups and Kurds are main actors

As shown in the map below, as of December 2025, interim forces, primarily those of the former HTS group, controlled most of Syria’s west and population centres, including the capital Damascus and second city, Aleppo.

The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) retained control of much of the northeast, while the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) control areas on the northern border (with these two often in tension).

The Middle East Institute’s Building Syria’s new army (June 2025), and section 2 of the Commons Library briefing on Syria after Assad (updated July 2025) provides an overview of the three major armed groups.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, 1 December 2025, © Institute for the Study of War and American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. See updated maps on the Institute’s website.

In January 2026 the interim government extended control

While the interim government has sought to unify all militias and armed groups within a single structure, the process is ongoing for the SNA and has largely stalled with the SDF (see section 1.4). There are also small separate Druze and Alawite armed groups.

Following a January 2026 offensive by the interim government forces and an agreement with the SDF, the interim government has now extended its control over large parts of northeastern Syria previously held by the SDF. This is shown in the below map, which focuses on the northeast regions. At time of writing, a formal ceasefire has not yet been agreed.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, 19 January 2026, © Institute for the Study of War and American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. See updated maps on the Institute’s website.

Islamic State/Daesh

While holding extensive territory in Syria from 2014 to 2017, Islamic State/Daesh activity is now low, with the group’s activity centred on Africa.

However, detained Islamic State fighters and families remain in camps in what were SDF-controlled areas (see the above map) and which are now being transferred to interim government control. The US warned up to 200 detainees escaped in the January 2026 fighting (see below, section 1.4)

Up to 7,000 detainees are now intended to be transferred to Iraq, under US supervision. Other Islamic State detainees in northeast Syria, numbering around 2,000, will remain in the region. UN agencies are intended to take over the management of camps housing families of those associated with Islamic State. The US has reiterated its call for governments to repatriate their citizens from Iraq and Syria.

1.2 Who are the interim leaders? Developments within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Since Assad’s flight, an interim government has been declared in Syria, led by the HTS leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. HTS was one of the opposition groups which captured Damascus in December 2024. It had previously governed the Idlib province in northwest Syria.

HTS has its origins in Al-Qaeda although it says it broke from the group in 2016. Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, had participated in the insurgency against US and UK coalition forces in Iraq in the 2000s.

Many observers consider the HTS leadership and Sharaa to have evolved significantly since the group was first established, while acknowledging its human rights violations when governing Idlib (PDF).

De-listing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist group

In November 2025, the UN Security Council removed the terrorist designation against Sharaa, while he himself has now visited capitals in the Arab Gulf, the United States, Russia, France and addressed the UN General Assembly.

Both the United States and United Kingdom have de-listed HTS as a proscribed terrorist group. The UK Government said the decision reflected the re-establishment of diplomatic ties to discuss combating Islamic State, migration and other issues. It says it “no longer assesses HTS to be an alias of [Al-Qaeda]”. The government will keep this decision under review.

Syrian criticism of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Sharaa

While Sharaa’s international standing has changed significantly, his new government is not without local criticism.

In addition to violence affecting minorities and the unresolved status of Kurdish and Druze populations, BBC Monitoring analysts note a continuing campaign of criticism by Jihadist groups against his governance and that this opposition may, in time, pose a risk to his support base. Criticisms include Syria joining the global anti-Islamic State coalition in November 2025.

In 2025, increasing protests in favour of greater autonomy were also held in Alawite and Druze areas, following earlier sectarian violence.

Kurdish groups in Syria also criticised the constitutional declaration issued in April 2025 as “obstructing a democratic transition”, as well as the interim government’s response to the earlier sectarian violence.

1.3 What happened with the selection of a parliament? Provisions for a parliament

The March 2025 constitutional declaration provides for the establishment of a “People’s Assembly”. Much power remains with the president. A third of the members will be appointed by the interim president, with the remainder selected by local committees.

Selection of members and results

In October 2025 meetings to select two-thirds of the 210 parliamentarians by local electoral colleges were held. There were an estimated 7,000 electors. Factors cited for the absence of fuller elections include security concerns and the high number of displaced Syrians.

Only six women and a small number of minorities were selected. This included four or less representatives from Kurdish, Alawite, Turkmen, Ismaili and Christian communities. Women made up 14% of the 1,500 candidates.

The interim president is expected to appoint more women and those from minority groups to the parliament.

Kurdish and Druze areas have not yet participated

Areas outside interim government control, including the Kurdish-controlled northeast and Druze areas in the south, did not participate in the selection and their 10% share of seats in the parliament remain vacant.

The Kurdish authorities described the poll as “exclusionist” and said the results should not be recognised.

Analysis of the results and future risks

Analysts do not expect rapid democratisation in Syria as it emerges from its civil war but have highlighted risks because of the non-participation of Kurdish and other areas.

The Chatham House think tank has argued that the relative lack of power for the parliament, and the non-participation of Druze and Kurdish areas, risks undermining its legitimacy as it seeks to govern.

Analysis by the Royal United Services Institute also notes that while many parliamentarians will be at least sympathetic to Sharaa, most came from groups and localities not associated with HTS-ruled Idlib province during the civil war. It views how the Kurdish seats are filled as key to Syria’s future—arguing if they are not filled by leading figures from the Syrian northeast (see section 1.4), it will result in the “de-facto federalisation of Syria”.

Commentary by the Arab Centre Washington DC argues that while Syrians “may not expect rapid democratization, […] they expect visible relief”. This makes the issues of sanctions, sectarian violence and humanitarian aid paramount for future stability (see the separate Library briefings on religious minorities and the humanitarian situation in Syria, published December 2025).

1.4 What is the situation for the Kurds in north‑east Syria? Interim government seeks unified state and army

As interim president, Sharaa has said Syrian “unity is a red line”, and that all armed groups must come under central control.

Integration agreements have been signed with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) (though some with opposition) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (first in March 2025, then reiterated in October 2025, and potentially under a new deal in January 2026).

Talks on Kurdish integration struggled in 2025

Talks on the SDF integrating into the single Syrian armed force by the end of 2025 stalled, resulting in Turkey reportedly threatening military action.

Turkey argues elements of the SDF are linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, with whom it has recently reached a ceasefire agreement. The PKK is a proscribed terrorist group in Turkey, as well as the UK and US.

The interim Syrian government and Turkey are also against Kurdish requests to maintain their autonomy within Syria, in the self-declared Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). This was established during the civil war. Many of Syria’s oil fields are found in the region.

Kurdish leaders have criticised the political transition, saying they want a secular state with less power for the interim president and greater protections for Kurds. They committed in the March 2025 agreement to several steps to integrate the region with central authorities, though issues such as wider regional autonomy and Kurdish rights were unresolved.

Fighting in early 2026 and potential new deal

In January 2026, fighting between the interim government forces and the SDF occurred in Aleppo (displacing around 150,000 people) and across north eastern Syria. In a rapid change of control, as of mid-January interim government forces now hold many strategic points, oil fields, and camps holding Islamic State fighters and their families.

On 18 January 2026 a new 14-point agreement was announced between the SDF and interim Syrian authorities. The SDF has four days to establish a plan to implement the agreement. It says it is “full[y] commit[ed] to the ceasefire”.

The deal includes the SDF ceding territorial control over Deir al-Zour and Raqqa provinces, integrating the Hasakah province (retained by the SDF) into the central government, and Kurdish-led forces becoming part of a single Syrian armed force (fighters joining as individuals, rather than as units). Oil fields and external borders will also now be administered by the interim authorities. All non-Syrian PKK fighters are to leave the country.

Under the agreement, Kurdish language and other cultural rights are to be protected, though Kurdish leaders been critical of this, saying the commitments must be implemented through a permanent constitution. Interim President Sharaa said that reform efforts will include “all components of the Syrian people”.

Many of the areas ceded to the interim authorities have both Arab and Kurdish populations (PDF).

The Turkish government has said the SDF should now disarm and disband. Analysis for Al-Monitor notes that the SDF’s weakening will be of concern to Israel, which has sought a decentralised Syrian neighbour post-Assad.

Analysis by International Crisis Group notes these were “difficult terms” for the SDF and argues it would be in the interim government’s “best interests” to “implement the integration terms […] as generously as possible” for Kurdish groups. The Berlin-based European Center for Kurdish Studies also notes that Kurdish integration could “help dilute the Islamist character of Syria’s new government”.

Chatham House analysis argues that diplomats must now support “processes that turn these openings into durable agreements”, otherwise there is a risk of long-term instability, the think-tank citing post-2003 Iraq or post-2011 Libya as examples of this.

The US and UK have called for a Syrian-led transition

The United States has been the main partner to the SDF in combating Islamic State/Daesh and continues to maintain troops in the AANES. However, the status of troops is under review.

In January 2026 Tom Barrack, the US special envoy for Syria, said that “the original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired”, with interim authorities now committed to containing the group. Previously, in 2025, he had said that the US administration will “not support a separatist outcome” for Syria but also that a new “architecture,” short of federation, will give minorities more autonomy.

In 2026, the UK Government has welcomed the January ceasefire and called for a “resumption of negotiations to deliver a lasting political settlement”. It says any political transition must be “inclusive”. The government has also called for a “robust transition plan for securing and managing the [Islamic State/Daesh] camps and detention facilities”.

1.5 What accountability mechanisms are in place? Human rights violations under Assad

Tens of thousands of Syrians were arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared during the civil war, primarily by the Assad regime, with the Syrian Network for Human Rights estimating the figure at 181,000.

Estimates of the number of people killed during the conflict range from 300,000 to 600,000. The Assad regime is also blamed for the use of chemical weapons on several occasions.

During the civil war, HTS, SNA and SDF were also all accused of human rights violations.

National commissions established in 2025

In May 2025, the interim authorities established commissions for missing persons and transitional justice. These are tasked with identifying the fates of missing persons, providing legal and other support, and holding perpetrators to account. However, monitors such as Human Rights Watch have noted gaps in the local legal framework. These include not criminalising war crimes or forced disappearance, and not providing for the protection of witnesses.

The UK Government has welcomed the establishment of the commissions, and called on the interim authorities to work with the UN and civil society to ensure they are “inclusive, comprehensive and transparent”. In 2025, the UK has pledged around £1.4 million to support transitional justice in Syria.

The interim authorities have charged some Assad regime figures with war crimes, though Assad himself remains in Russia. Some regime figures are also in Lebanon.

Legal activity outside Syria

No new proceedings at international courts like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or International Criminal Court (ICC) have commenced since the fall of Assad. While Syria is not a member of the ICC, the interim authorities invited its prosecutor to visit Syria in January 2025. An ICJ case on the prevention of torture, begun in 2023, continues.

French, Swedish, American and German jurisdictions are currently dealing with cases that involve members of the Assad regime.

1.6 What are the UK’s views on the transition?

As set out above and in the other briefings in this series on Syria one year after the fall of Assad, European and North American governments have welcomed the establishment of the new authorities, though stressed they must protect human rights. Actions have included lifting sanctions and de-listing the HTS as a terrorist group.

On the political transition specifically, the UK Government has:

• welcomed the appointment of an interim parliament, but said later appointments must make it “fully representative of Syria’s communities” andthere should be a “clear timeline” for elections in areas where these have not taken place.
• backed the constitutional declaration’s provisionson “freedom of expression, freedom of belief and women’s rights” and said it would encourage a greater separation of power between the legislative, judiciary and executive branches in its talks with the interim government.
• called for “swift” progress towards implementation of the agreement between the SDF and interim government.
• backed a Syrian-led transition

1.7 Further reading General actions of the interim government

• Commons Library briefing,Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025. Sections 4.2 to 4.4 provide more on the actions of the interim authorities, including the constitutional declaration of March 2025.
• Project on Middle East Political Science, Syria after Assad, December 2025.

Actors and armed groups in Syria

• Washington Institute,Forging Syrian national unity is key to regional peace, October 2025
• Emirates Policy Center,Negotiations to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army: A road to peace or war?, November 2025
• BBC Monitoring,Analysis: No breakthrough for Islamic State in Syria, a year after Assad’s fall, December 2025
• Middle East Institute, How Damascus and the SDF came to blows in Aleppo — and what might come next, January 2026
• Center for Strategic and International Studies, How Syria can succeed in integrating the Kurds, January 2026
• Institute for International Political Studies, Al-Sharaa’s offensive against the SDF reshapes the balance of power, January 2026

The Assembly and wider transition

• Italian Institute for International Political Studies,Syria’s first post-Assad parliament, October 2025
• Foreign Policy,Sharaa’s democratic test, November 2025
• Deutsche Welle,One year after Assad’s fall: What has Syria achieved?, July 2025
• Center for Strategic and International Studies,Syria’s promises and challenges one year after Assad’s fall, December 2025
• Carnegie Endowment,A year later, what is your assessment of the Assad downfall? [experts respond], December 2025
• Amnesty International,Syria: A year after Assad’s fall, the rights of survivors and families must guide transition, December 2025
• Washington Institute, Kurdish collapse in Northeast Syria? Key things to watch, January 2026

1.8 Other Library briefings on Syria: One year after Assad

Other Library briefings published in December 2025 and January 2026 cover aspects of Syria and its global relations a year after Assad’s fall:

1) Humanitarian situation and reconstruction

2) The situation for religious minorities

3) UK and international relations

The Library briefing, Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025, provides an introduction to post-Assad Syria, the key local and international actors, and the UK response.