Lebanon 2025: Plans to disarm Hezbollah

What is the general situation in Lebanon?

In recent decades, Lebanon has experienced extensive periods of armed conflict and instability, with an often-weak central state.

The World Bank has also described Lebanon’s economic downturn since 2019 as one of the world’s worst. Lebanon’s confessional political system (based on a range of political and religious groups and alliances) has also complicated achieving a political settlement and reforming the state.

Conflict has included civil war and foreign intervention (notably from Israel and Syria) from 1975 to 2005. This period was followed by conflict in 2006 between Iran-backed Hezbollah (a non-state group proscribed by the UK as a terrorist organisation) and Israel and again in 2023-24. While a ceasefire was agreed between in November 2024, Israel continues to target Hezbollah sites in 2025, the Lebanese Armed Forces do not control all of Lebanon, and Israel maintains its forces at five sites in the country’s south.

The Commons Library’s Lebanon: Introductory country profile, March 2025, provides background and further reading on Lebanon.

In 2025, two plans have been announced:

• The UN Security Council has voted for the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to end by December 2026. UNIFIL has been in place in southern Lebanon from 1978 to support the extension of Lebanese state authority over the area. The UK has been among those to warn a quick draw-down of troops risks creating an opening for Hezbollah, while the United States has argued Hezbollah was sufficiently degraded during its conflict with Israel from 2023 and poses less of a risk.
• The new Lebanese government has agreed a plan to disarm Hezbollah and for the Lebanese Armed Forces to be the sole Lebanese armed force. Disarming Hezbollah is in line with the Taif Accords of 1989, agreed at the end of the civil war, and UN Security Council resolutions passed in 2004 and 2006. Hezbollah rejects calls for its disarmament and wants Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

This page provides information on plans to disarm Hezbollah. The Library has published a separate page on plans for UNIFIL.

What is Hezbollah?

Hezbollah is a non-state Shia military and political group, which emerged in the 1980s during Lebanon’s civil war. Hezbollah is a designated terrorist organisation in the UK and United States. The European Union designates Hezbollah’s military wing a terrorist organisation but not its political wing. Hezbollah is subject to sanctions from the UK and others. Iran has long been its primary backer and supporter.

Hezbollah fought Israeli forces during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, in 2006 and in the 2023-24 conflict. It also fought in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad in the country’s civil war before he left the country in December 2024. Hezbollah also has ties with Hamas in Gaza.

The group has also participated in Lebanese elections since 1992, in alliances with independents and parties such as Amal, another Shia party, and it first entered the Lebanese cabinet in 2005. In the 2022 elections, Hezbollah and its allies won 62 of the 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament. In 2025, alongside Amal, Hezbollah named four of the new government’s 26 ministers, though did not back the new Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam.

The Commons Library research briefing, Iran’s influence in the Middle East, provides an overview of Hezbollah and its relationship with Iran.

What plans have been announced? Plans to disarm Hezbollah in earlier agreements

In the Taif Accords of 1989, agreed near the end of Lebanon’s civil war, all armed and militia groups in Lebanon were to be disbanded, leaving the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the sole Lebanese armed force. However, Hezbollah did not disarm, arguing that the accords did not apply to them. Subsequent UN Security Council Resolutions (see the appendix at the base of this page) also reiterated that all non-state armed groups in Lebanon must disarm.

Statements by the Lebanese Government in 2025

On coming into office in January 2025, the new Lebanese President, Joseph Aoun, said that disarming Hezbollah would be an aim of the state. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has said that disarmament (together with Israeli withdrawal from the five military positions it still maintains in southern Lebanon) “must be achieved through negotiation” and disarmament is “the goal […] not the starting point”.

In August 2025, the new Lebanese Government requested that the LAF draw up plans to establish a monopoly over all weapons and arms in Lebanon by December 2025. This followed international pressure, particularly from the United States, to do so.

US proposals, reportedly discussed by the cabinet, were for a four-stage process. This includes the LAF deploying across Lebanon, Israeli withdrawal, and an economic conference to support reconstruction in Lebanon.

Plans reviewed by the Lebanese Government in 2025

In September 2025, the Lebanese cabinet reviewed the LAF’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. This reportedly includes five stages, but with no set deadlines.

Hezbollah-affiliated cabinet ministers did not participate in proceedings in protest.

The Lebanese Information Minister, Paul Morcos, said that the plan may require “additional time [and] additional effort” due to restrictions on the capacity of the LAF and the range of tasks required to be undertaken (including disarming Palestinian factions—see below).

The minister also said that “any progress towards implementing the [plan] remains contingent upon the commitment of the other parties, primarily Israel”. These include Israel halting its military operations and withdrawing from Lebanon, as set out in the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has reportedly withdrawn from most of southern Lebanon, as also set out in the agreement.

Israel continues to hold five sites in southern Lebanon and in 2025 has taken military action targeting Hezbollah, including in the capital Beirut. Israeli Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, has said that “Israel will continue to remove any threat to our citizens” from Hezbollah.

The Lebanese Government has also called for economic support from the international community to support its plan.

Disarming armed Palestinian groups in 2025

Separately to the plan to disarm Hezbollah, in May 2025 Lebanon began a programme to disarm Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (the country hosts around 500,000 refugees). The campaign follows a meeting between the new Lebanese President, Joseph Aoun, and the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, in which they agreed that the LAF should have “exclusive possession” of weapons and that they would work together to counter extremism.

There has been recurrent fighting between armed Palestinian factions in refugee camps and some refugee camps were also targeted by Israel during the 2023-24 conflict. Media reports suggest that disarmament may lead to Lebanon granting greater rights to Palestinian refugees in the country. Analysis for Arab Center Washington DC notes that both the Lebanese state and Palestinian Authority have limited authority over the armed groups.

What has been the reaction in Lebanon?

Hezbollah has said it will not disarm so long as Israeli forces remain in Lebanon and that any disarmament would weaken Lebanese defences against Israel. In August 2025, Hezbollah’s leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, warned that implementation of the “American-Israeli order [to disarm]” may “lead to civil war and internal strife”. However, Hezbollah expressed approval of the plan reviewed by the cabinet in September 2025 for being “gradual” and “conditional on Israel's commitment”.

The Amal party, which is allied to Hezbollah, has criticised the proposal as “surrender” and said that Israel was not adhering to the 2024 ceasefire agreement to withdraw.

Other Lebanese leaders have criticised Hezbollah’s response. The Lebanese Prime Minister described the threat of civil war as “completely unacceptable” while the leader of Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, said that Hezbollah has submitted Lebanon to “Iranian diktats” and instead backed LAF protection.

President Aoun has warned not progressing with the plan would risk US and international support, including for Lebanon’s economic recovery, and suggested Israel may increase its attacks on Lebanon.

What has been the international reaction?

The United States has welcomed the Lebanese Government announcement and said that the LAF “must fully commit and act now to fully implement the government’s decision”. It warned that the Lebanese Government’s “credibility” rested on “match[ing] principle with practice”.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that “Hezbollah must be disarmed and Israel would prefer that the Lebanese Army to do that job, but no one should doubt that Israel will do what it has to do to enforce the understandings of the ceasefire and defend our security”.

The Israeli Government has previously said that it will remain at five sites in southern Lebanon “indefinitely”. Following the Lebanese Government’s decision, it said that it was open to a “phased reduction of [Isreal Defence Forces] presence in coordination with the US-led security mechanism”. This is a reference to the monitoring mechanism established under the November 2024 ceasefire.

Iran, which has long been a major supporter of Hezbollah, has said that Hezbollah will “never be disarmed”, that the plan serves Israeli objectives, and it would back the decision Hezbollah takes. The Lebanese Foreign Minister has criticised Iran for its comments in support of Hezbollah as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty.

The UK Government has not responded to the announcement but has previously said that it expects Hezbollah and Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon and for them to adhere to the 2024 ceasefire agreement. It has called for UNSC 1701 (2006) to be implemented and said that the UK would support the LAF “as the only legitimate military force in Lebanon”.

What is the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces to implement the plan? Strength of LAF and Hezbollah

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual study of armed forces globally, as of 2025 the LAF has around 60,000 personnel. Most are deployed outside southern Lebanon, with the 2024 ceasefire envisioning that 10,000 will ultimately be deployed to the south. The LAF has very limited naval and air forces.

In contrast, the IISS estimates that there have been up to 40,000 Hezbollah fighters concentrated in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is estimated to have a significant stock of missiles and some anti-aircraft systems. However, Hezbollah’s stockpiles were degraded during the 2023-24 conflict and, while numbers are uncertain, several thousand of its fighters were killed. This included its former leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

Hezbollah has also lost international support, particularly with the fall of Assad in Syria in December 2024. With the loss of Syria, Iran lost its direct land route to rearm and re-equip Hezbollah, though media reports suggest that Iran is continuing to use the route.

The IISS notes that the LAF is reliant on outside support to maintain its effectiveness and to support the modernisation of its equipment, notably from the United States (its largest donor—see below) and Qatar. Particular issues have included paying and raising salaries for its personnel during Lebanon’s economic crisis. Analysis by a retired LAF General for the Washington Institute argues that the LAF, particularly its navy, does not have the capacity in the short term to replace UNIFIL as it draws-down.

Nonetheless, the LAF is widely seen as a counterbalance to Hezbollah and is one of Lebanon’s most trusted institutions, according to public polling.

Challenges of disarming

There are multiple challenges to disarming Hezbollah, though many foreign policy analysts argue that the group (as well as Iran’s position in the region) is now the weakest it has been for some time.

Analysis for the Emirates Policy Centre sketches out potential paths for Lebanon, including one of gradual disarmament combined with increased Hezbollah participation in the state, or Hezbollah delays to disarmament and the continuation of Israeli military action.

The Arab Center Washington DC argues that the loss of the land route with Iran through Syria will curtail the amount of money and number of missiles Iran provides to the group, and Hezbollah is now more isolated within Lebanese politics. However, it notes that integrating Hezbollah fighters into the LAF, if possible, will have an economic cost beyond the capacity of the Lebanese Government and will also likely require UNIFIL support.

Engelsberg Ideas notes that integration of Hezbollah fighters into the state may be difficult, as Hezbollah’s objectives and support for Iran contradict other Lebanese groups that are seeking to advance Lebanese sovereignty and they partly blame Hezbollah for bringing conflict to Lebanon.

Analysis for the Washington Institute argues that “the potential for deadly sectarian conflict is real”, and that Israel will be expected to withdraw from its positions and reduce the number of air strikes. It suggests funding for the LAF should be among the leverage points that foreign states use to encourage the Lebanese Government to continue with the disarmament plans.

Parliamentary elections are due in May 2026. If Hezbollah and its allies perform well, this may halt any attempt at disarming. Analysis for the Washington Institute argues that international backing should be given to other political parties to isolate Hezbollah in the next parliament.

What international support is provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces?

At an international conference in October 2024, several states pledged US$200 million to support the LAF. The additional funds were to help “with health care, fuel, small equipment”, support the recruitment of 6,000 more personnel, and enable the deployment of additional forces to southern Lebanon.

The United States is the largest donor to the LAF, and provided more than US$3 billion from 2006 to January 2025, including to pay LAF salaries. In 2025, further support was announced after the Lebanese cabinet endorsed the plan to disarm Hezbollah. This will support the LAF to dismantle weapons caches and military infrastructure of non-state groups, including Hezbollah.

From 2009 to May 2025, the UK has provided £115 million of assistance to the LAF. This includes support for border security to counter smuggling, military accommodation and the delivery of training, and personal protection equipment. Following the 2024 ceasefire, the UK Government said it would launch a “major package” of assistance for the LAF, including training of LAF recruits and new equipment.

Other recent announcements of support include US$60 million by Qatar to pay LAF salaries. Qatar has also provided food and military vehicles.

Saudi Arabia has often been hesitant to support Lebanon, reflecting the strength and influence of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in the country (all three of whom it has opposed). Analysts note that increased economic support may be forthcoming if progress is made in isolating Hezbollah.

The European Union has announced €12.5 million to help the LAF with reconstruction in southern Lebanon after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Ireland has also proposed the EU launch a training mission for the LAF.

Carnegie Endowment argues that support for the LAF is “Europe’s best bet”.

Appendix: What are UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004)?

Negotiations on a settlement have centred on the full implementation of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701. The resolution was made in 2006 following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. The resolution includes that:

• the Lebanese Government extend its control over all Lebanese territory
• that there will “be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon […] in the country”
• both Israel and Lebanon support a permanent ceasefire and a long term solution, including “full respect for the blue line” (a temporary line set in 2000 to mark Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, it is not a formal border) and the establishment of an area between the Blue Line and the Litani River “free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UN Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFIL] […]”
• there would be no foreign forces in Lebanon without the government’s consent and no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon unless authorised by its government

The resolution has never been fully implemented.

A related UNSC resolution, 1559 (2004), remains in place. This calls for respect for Lebanese sovereignty, disarmament of all armed groups aside from the LAF and UNIFIL, support for territorial integrity, unity, and Lebanese political independence under the sole authority of its national government.