What is misinformation?

Misinformation is information that is false or inaccurate. Disinformation usually refers to false or inaccurate information is created or spread deliberately.

This article looks at the challenges posed by misinformation and approaches to address it in Parliament and the government. It is part of the Common’s Library’s good information toolkit, which reviews the strategies and criteria for spotting misinformation and working out what information can be relied upon.

Concern about misinformation

There is widespread concern that misinformation is spreading rapidly online and offline, and that this might have a damaging effect on democracy and social wellbeing.

Although misinformation is not new, recent attention has focused on how online media platforms make false information easier to spread, both intentionally and unintentionally. A 2024 report on misinformation and trusted voices from the Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee said that the internet allows anyone to “find an audience willing to hear” their message. It said the internet had “democratised the information environment” and given people agency to find information, but that they aren’t fully in control of the information they use because of the way algorithms and editors sort and rank information in search engines and social media.

In the UK, there is cross-party consensus that online misinformation is a problem. For example, in June 2023, the then Conservative government said social media and other technologies have made spreading misinformation “easier, quicker and cheaper than ever before”. It also described misinformation as a threat to “social cohesion, community and national identity”. In November 2024, the Labour government’s Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology called disinformation on social media “one of the most serious issues of our time”.

Harms of misinformation

Concern about misinformation often comes from the assumption that misinformation can cause people to make or support decisions that go against their own beliefs and interests, or the interests of society as a whole.

While research suggests that misinformation can influence people’s beliefs and how they say they would act in a given situation, it is not clear how much misinformation can change people’s behaviour.

However, in recent years there have been several examples where the spreading of misinformation appears to have been associated with harm in the UK, as explained below.

Vaccination and autism

In 1998, a study published in the Lancet medical journal (which is now discredited) led to controversy over the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine. The study suggested a link between MMR, autism and a bowel condition.

The study’s lead author, Andrew Wakefield, was barred from practising medicine because of professional misconduct following a fitness to practice hearing at the General Medical Council (GMC). The Lancet retracted the paper in February 2010, saying it had become clear that several elements of the paper were incorrect.

Since the 1998 study, there has been extensive research supporting the safety of the MMR vaccine and finding no evidence of a link between the vaccine and autism.

However, the rate of MMR vaccination declined sharply in the years following the study’s publication, which evidence suggests was an important factor in later outbreaks of measles in the UK. For example, in an outbreak in Swansea in 2013, the people most at risk of infection were aged 10 to 18 years; this group also had the lowest MMR vaccination rate and would have been due for their routine childhood MMR vaccinations around the time of the 1998 study’s publication. Analysis of the vaccination data found that the outbreak area also had high circulation of newspapers that campaigned against the MMR vaccine in the early 2000s.

Although the MMR vaccination rates in the UK have recovered since the early 2000s, misinformation about vaccines and autism continues internationally. It especially proliferated during the covid-19 pandemic, when uncertainty around the disease and its vaccines contributed to increasing vaccine hesitancy.

Rioting and unrest in summer 2024

On 29 July 2024, there was a mass stabbing at a dance class in Southport, Merseyside, in which three children were killed and eight were injured (along with two adults). In the days after the attack, there were an estimated 29 demonstrations and riots across the UK, with some participants attacking mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers.

The attacker, Axel Rudakubana, was arrested at the scene and he was later convicted on 16 charges, including murder and attempted murder. However, he was 17 years old at the time of the attack, so his identity was not released to the public once he was charged (reporting restrictions are usual for under 18s). In the absence of official information about the attacker, false information began to circulate on social media about his identity, claiming that he was a migrant or a refugee. In fact, he was born in the UK.

Some of these claims were amplified by accounts on X (formerly Twitter) with millions of followers and were seen millions of times. Posts on platforms such as TikTok, Facebook and Telegram encouraged those outraged by the attacks to protest on a street in Southport near a mosque.

Demonstrations and riots began on 30 July and continued even after the court lifted reporting restrictions so the press could report Mr Rudakubana’s identity. Some demonstrations targeted mosques and hotels thought to be housing asylum seekers, with reports of participants chanting “anti-Islamic invective” and racially motivated attacks on Black and Asian people.

Although some of those attending the demonstrations were reportedly connected with far-right groups such as the English Defence League (now defunct) and Patriotic Alternative, BBC Verify reported that the demonstrations were organised in a decentralised way, largely by far-right social media influencers rather than formalised leaders of political organisations. Ofcom found there was a “clear connection between online activity and violent disorder” (PDF) following the attack.

By September over 1,200 people had been arrested in connection with the riots, and as of December 2024, over 400 people had been sentenced for their involvement. The most common offence for those sentenced was violent disorder, but other offences included possession of a knife or sharp object, assaulting emergency workers, racially aggravated offences (such as harassment and criminal damage) and publishing written material to stir up racial hatred.

Since the attack, Jonathan Hall KC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said that “if the police do not take the lead in providing clear, accurate and sober details about an attack like Southport, others will”. His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services also said the police need to respond “rapidly and effectively” to disinformation that might influence and mobilise public disorder.

These assessments appear to have influenced the decision of Merseyside Police to announce within two hours the nationality and ethnicity of the man who drove a car into crowds during the Liverpool FC victory parade in May 2025.

Challenges of misinformation in Parliament

Parliamentarians are public figures, decision makers and communicators. This makes misinformation a particular challenge:

• As public figures, they may become the subject of misinformation themselves.
• As decision makers, they must learn what problems their constituents and the public have and their preferences about how to solve them; if the public or sections of it are misinformed, they may press for decisions that are less likely to address societal problems to their satisfaction.
• As communicators, they may be approached by constituents who have encountered misinformation and are seeking answers or action; these can be particularly difficult conversations if the constituent is emotionally invested in a false claim or conspiracy theory.

Character smears and election misinformation

In the run-up to the 2024 general election, there were several reported ‘deepfakes’ involving prominent candidates, and there was concern that deepfakes might influence the outcome of the election. Deepfakes are images, audio, and video that have been doctored, usually using artificial intelligence (AI) tools.

Doctored footage circulated in which Wes Streeting, later the Health Secretary, appeared to call fellow Labour candidate Diane Abbott a “silly woman”, and in which another Labour candidate (Luke Akehurst) appeared to insult his electors. Although evidence suggests that deepfakes did not affect the outcome of the election, concerns remain that misinformation could make people less confident in what is real and what is fake online. Others have highlighted the spread online of sexually explicit deepfakes of MPs (usually women) and its effect on their wellbeing and the intimidation of candidates at elections.

Knowingly publishing false information about a candidate’s conduct or character is illegal (under the Representation of the People Act 1983), as is sharing real or fake intimate images without the consent of the subject (under the Sexual Offences Act 2003). More recently, the Online Safety Act 2023 and Data Use and Access Act 2025 introduced new offences related to misinformation and deepfakes (see below).

Undermining democracy and trust in institutions

There has been much concern around how misinformation might damage democracy. For example, the 2026 Global Risks Report from the World Economic Forum identified misinformation as one of the highest risks to global stability over the next 10 years. It said misinformation “corrodes public discourse” by increasing political polarisation, worsening grievances, hardening beliefs, reducing critical thinking and amplifying extreme views.

Researchers disagree on the exact effects of misinformation on democracy. However, one possible effect is that misinformation introduces errors into public discourse, which might make it harder for decision makers to solve problems to the satisfaction of the public. Although people reasonably disagree on what problems there are and how to solve them, misinformation may lead to people supporting policies that they would not support if they used better information.

In a democracy, decision makers seek to take the view of their constituents and the public into account in their decisions. This involves receiving information from the public about what problems exist and people’s attitudes towards them. This is often mediated by institutions, such as the media, charities, campaign groups, think tanks and political parties, which coordinate public discussion and deliberation.

But misinformation can disrupt this process. If citizens are misinformed, they may advocate policies that they believe will solve public problems but which are unlikely to succeed and which they would not support if they were better informed. Decision makers may then adopt these policies because they want to represent the will of the public. Alternatively, misinformation may cause decision makers to misjudge public opinion and adopt policies that the public does not support.

Philosophers of epistemic democracy say that democracies are valuable and legitimate not just because their processes are fair (for example, because every person gets one vote) but because they are able to make good decisions that solve social problems. For example, some philosophical models suggest reasons why democratic decision making should outperform non-democratic decision making, such as because it incorporates more diverse perspectives and can propose more potential solutions to problems. Misinformation, however, can undermine these mechanisms of democratic decision making and lead to poorer decisions.

Evidence suggests that when people perceive their democracies are not able to address societal problems, they lose trust in democracy and in the institutions that mediate it.

While any kind of misinformation can unintentionally undermine decision making, deliberate misinformation may intentionally aim to undermine democratic processes for political or economic gain.

Responding to misinformation from constituents

MPs have discussed the difficulty of responding to misinformation that has been shared with them by constituents who believe it.

In a debate on online filter bubbles in 2024, MPs expressed the feeling that “all Members will have received communications from constituents that were completely and utterly false”, for example, about medicine (particularly vaccines) and immigration. Leading the debate, John Penrose said he expected it to become more difficult over time to distinguish what is real and what is “completely made up” online.

MPs have also discussed being targeted by fake social media accounts in coordinated misinformation campaigns around divisive issues, which are often the subject of misinformation.

Lack of knowledge about how Parliament works can also lead to misinformation. For example, in 2023 an article suggested that “500 MPs back Israel’s bombing of Gaza” because they had not signed an early day motion calling for the government to demand a ceasefire. The Labour MP Yasmin Qureshi responded to explain that signing or not signing an early day motion is rarely a definitive statement of an MP’s position on an issue and that she did support a ceasefire.

What strategies are there to address misinformation?

Strategies proposed to reduce misinformation include:

• independently fact-checking information and providing evidence to refute false claims: for example, as done by news organisations (such as the BBC in the UK and Associated Press in the US)
• moderating online forums to label false statements, remove them if they violate content rules, or suspend accounts found to be publishing them (Meta, which owns Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, employs third-party fact checkers to identify false information, although it has ended this programme in the US)
• running media literacy campaigns to educate people about how to identify misinformation (the government said in 2024 that there were over 170 media literacy initiatives across the UK that year)
• ensuring that reliable information is readily available before potential misinformation is published (known as ‘pre-bunking’)

What are governments and others doing about misinformation?

Some governments and international organisations have taken actions to prevent and mitigate misinformation. These include raising awareness of the dangers of false information and regulating online spaces.

Guide for MPs and candidates

In 2024, the then Leader of the House of Commons, Penny Mordaunt, commissioned a guide for MPs and general election candidates to help them spot conspiracy theories (PDF), a form of misinformation.

The guide was written by the Antisemitism Policy Trust (with contributions from other organisations) and included information on conspiracy theories related to antisemitism, global institutions, covid-19, QAnon, 5G networks and 15-minute cities.

It highlighted the risk of conspiracy theories spreading not only among the public but also among “government or other public officials”, and Penny Mordaunt said in a press release that one of the aims of the guide was to “safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes”.

Legislation

In the UK, the Online Safety Act 2023 established a new offence of sending information known to be false with the intent of causing “non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience” without a reasonable excuse (this came into force on 31 January 2024).

The act also requires social media companies to take down illegal content when they become aware of it, and the telecommunications regulator Ofcom has been responsible for enforcing this since March 2025. Ofcom can fine companies up to £18 million or 10% of their qualifying worldwide revenue (whichever is greater) if they breach the act.

Misinformation would count as illegal content if it amounts to an offence where “the victim or intended victim is an individual (or individuals)”. The act also requires category 1 services (social media platforms with large numbers of UK users) to remove content, including misinformation, that violates their own terms of service.

The act includes an enhanced duty not just to remove but to prevent users from coming across “priority illegal content”, which includes disinformation carried out on behalf of a foreign power. Real or fake intimate images shared without the consent of the subject also count as priority illegal content (although other types of deepfake do not). The Data Use and Access Act 2025 created additional offences of creating or soliciting sexually explicit deepfake images without the consent of the subject (on top of the existing offence of sharing such images).

The Online Safety Act also requires Ofcom to set up an advisory committee on addressing misinformation on regulated online services. The committee is chaired by Lord Allan of Hallam, who is on the board of Ofcom, and had its first meeting in May 2025.

Media literacy

In November 2025, the government announced that it would include a stronger focus on media and digital literacy in the national curriculum for schools from 2028/29, including in citizenship, computing and English lessons.

In April 2024, Ofcom published a three-year media literacy strategy. It says that by 2027 it aims to:

• support research into media literacy to learn what initiatives work best to improve people’s ability to evaluate information
• work with online platforms and broadcasters to promote media literacy, such as by designing their services so users can better navigate information
• commission programmes specifically targeting groups “where the need is greatest” and work with schools and other organisations to support media literacy education

Parliamentary libraries and POST

Parliament has three research and information services:

• House of Commons Library
• House of Lords Library
• Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST)

These services publish impartial information on policy and current affairs, providing parliamentarians and their staff with the tools, resources, and expertise necessary to navigate an increasingly complex and contested information environment.

The two parliamentary libraries also operate confidential requests services, which allow members of each House and their staff to send questions and request bespoke research from our policy and statistics specialists. For example, Commons Library researchers can help MPs and their staff understand the origins of a claim, assess its credibility, and formulate an appropriate response.

Committee inquiries

UK parliamentary committees have held several recent inquiries relating to misinformation and disinformation, including two which began in the 2024 Parliament:

• Disinformation and ‘fake news’ (which reported between 2017 and 2019)
• Online harms and disinformation (2020)
• Misinformation and trusted voices (2024)
• Social media, misinformation and harmful algorithms (2025)
• Disinformation diplomacy (ongoing)

Criticism of actions to prevent misinformation

Some have criticised interventions intended to address misinformation as restricting freedom of speech.

For example, the civil liberties group Big Brother Watch said the subjectivity in how misinformation is defined may allow governments and institutions to censor speech they don’t like. It said: “It is not possible, or desirable in a democratic society, for any institution, organisation or government to act as an absolute arbiter of truth.”

Others have pointed to instances where something initially labelled misinformation was later proven to be true (or partly true). For example, a news story just before the 2020 US presidential election alleged that the Democratic candidate Joe Biden was incriminated by information leaked from his son Hunter’s laptop. Some US intelligence officers signed a letter warning it had “the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation”, after which some social media companies blocked links to the news story. When the leaked information proved genuine (although not incriminating for Joe Biden), some called the response to the leaked emails a partisan cover up. In January 2025, President Trump revoked security clearance for the officers who signed the letter, saying they “wilfully… manipulate[d] the political process and undermine[d] our democratic institutions”.

In evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry into disinformation diplomacy, Dr Jon Roosenbek of King’s College London suggested that governments and social media companies could intervene when information is “inauthentic” (for example, posted by a fake account or algorithmically generated) rather than false. He said that this could address online misinformation without harming freedom of speech.