UK-EU summit

The UK-EU joint summit on 19 May 2025 was the first UK-EU summit since the UK left the EU at the end of January 2020. The UK was represented by the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, and the EU by the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and the President of the European Council António Costa.

The summit followed the reset in UK-EU relations since the Labour government took office in July 2024. UK priorities for the reset included a new UK-EU security pact and a ‘sanitary and phytosanitary’ (SPS) agreement. An SPS agreement is an agreement on food and agricultural standards and is viewed as important by the UK government in order to reduce trade barriers between the UK and EU.

For further background on the UK-EU reset, government statements, the EU response and commentaries, see House of Commons Library, Resetting the UK's relationship with the European Union

The outcomes of the UK-EU summit on 19 May 2025 were set out in three documents:

1. An EU-UK Joint Statement which sets out a new Strategic Partnership between the UK and EU.
2. A Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK United Kingdom, adopted as a non-binding political framework of cooperation.
3. A “Common Understanding between the European Commission and the United Kingdom” setting out areas of initial agreement between the UK and EU to work together across a range of policy areas, but which will need to be finalised in further negotiations or agreement texts.

The Joint Statement outlines a new Strategic Partnership between the UK and EU. It says that this will build on foundations provided by the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), with both the UK and EU reaffirming their commitment to the “full, timely and faithful implementation” of these agreements.

The Joint Statement is a wide-ranging document which sets out the areas in which the EU and the UK have shared strategic interests. It establishes new structures for regular engagement between the EU and the UK at all levels – leaders, ministers and senior officials. It envisages that there will be an annual summit to oversee the implementation of existing agreements between the EU and UK and to “drive progress” in the areas identified in the separate Common Understanding.

The Security and Defence Partnership is intended to strengthen cooperation, facilitate regular high-level dialogue in areas of strategic interest to the EU and the UK, and reinforce the European contribution to NATO. It underlines the importance of NATO as the cornerstone of collective defence for the UK and its NATO allies.

The Partnership will be based on dialogue and consultation mechanisms including the six-monthly foreign and security policy dialogue between the EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy and the UK Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, as well as an annual, dedicated, defence and security dialogue at official level. The UK will be invited to attend EU high level meetings, including meetings of the EU Council of Ministers, as appropriate.

The UK and EU will maintain “flexible and scalable engagement” on areas of shared interest. These include support to Ukraine, the coordination of sanctions, regional security, conflict prevention and mediation, countering hybrid threats, countering foreign interference, counter-terrorism, economic security and climate change.

On defence, the Partnership envisages greater cooperation in the field of CSDP (the EU’s common security and defence policy). The UK will consider participating in EU civilian and military crisis management operations, upon the invitation of the EU. Both parties will also explore the possibility for further military cooperation, and the UK will be invited to observe or participate in CSDP exercises. The UK will also have access to the EU's new rearmament funding instrument (SAFE).

As with the security and defence partnerships the EU concluded with Norway, Japan and South Korea in 2024, the UK-EU security and defence partnership is a non-binding political framework of cooperation.

The Common Understanding reflects the outcome of exploratory talks between the European Commission and the UK in a wide range of areas, but will need to be fleshed out in further negotiations and agreed texts. These include the following areas:

Under the TCA negotiations on access to waters after June 2026 were to take place on an annual basis. The Common Understanding notes that the UK has agreed to maintain existing levels of EU access to its waters for a further 12 years until 30 June 2038. EU Member States reportedly insisted that continuation of these arrangements was essential for agreement to be reached on the reset of UK-EU relations in other areas.

TCA provisions on energy cooperation were also due to expire on 30 June 2026, unless the EU and UK agreed to renew them. The Common Understanding however notes that the EU and the UK have agreed that these provisions should be extended “on a continuous basis”.

The UK and EU are aiming to take the necessary steps to formalise the agreements on fisheries and energy within a month of the summit.

The Common Understanding states that the EU and UK will work towards “a balanced youth experience scheme on terms to be mutually agreed”.This would involve a dedicated visa path for young people which would apply for a limited period of time, with overall numbers to be agreed at a level acceptable to both sides.

The European Commission had proposed an EU-UK youth mobility scheme in April 2024 but this had been rejected by the then Conservative government and Labour opposition. Since entering office in July 2024, the Labour government had also reiterated it had no plans for such a scheme and restated its opposition to any return to UK-EU freedom of movement, though there were reports that the government would be willing to compromise on the plan if there was a cap on numbers entering the UK under the scheme.

The UK government’s explainer on the UK-EU summit outcome stresses that the UK and EU have “agreed that any scheme will be time limited, on terms to be mutually agreed, and that the overall number of participants must be acceptable to both sides”. It also states that the UK “has been clear that any scheme should be in line with the UK’s existing schemes including participants having no access to benefits and no right to bring dependents”.

The Common Understanding also states that the EU and UK will “work towards” associating the UK with the EU’s Erasmus+ programme (offering education and training placements across the EU), with the financial terms to be agreed in a way that ensures “a fair balance as regards the contributions of and benefits to the UK”.

The Common Understanding states that the EU and UK will work towards a SPS agreement so that “the vast majority of movements of animals, animal products, plants, and plant products between Great Britain and the EU” can be undertaken without certificates or controls.

The agreement would align SPS rules in Great Britain with those that apply in Northern Ireland under the Windsor Framework. An EU-UK SPS Agreement would be based on dynamic alignment with EU SPS rules, meaning UK rules would have to be aligned with EU rules, with any changes in EU rules requiring UK rules to change in the same way. This would however give “due regard to the UK’s constitutional and parliamentary procedures” and there would be some limited exceptions.

Commentaries on a potential UK-EU SPS agreement have indicated that the EU would be unlikely to agree to an agreement that substantially reduces border checks unless there was UK agreement to dynamic alignment.

As part of any agreement, the UK would have to make a financial contribution. The SPS agreement will have joint governance and dispute resolution mechanisms, including an independent arbitration panel “that ensures the Court of Justice of the European Union is the ultimate authority for all questions of European Union law”. A dispute process with these features is already provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement. This differs from the dispute mechanism of the TCA, which does not provide for a role for the CJEU.

In announcing the potential SPS agreement and the plan to link UK and EU emission trading schemes (see below) the government has highlighted the potential benefits of removing barriers to trade, making trade cheaper and easier and creating savings for business and consumers. The Conservative and Reform parties have attacked the agreements as a "surrender to the EU" and leading to the UK becoming a "rule-taker from Brussels."

The Common Understanding states that the EU and UK will work towards establishing a link between carbon markets through an agreement linking the UK’s Emission Trading Scheme (UK ETS) with the EU’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The TCA includes a commitment for the UK and EU to consider linking their carbon pricing systems and the UK government said in early 2025 that it was looking to take this forward.

An agreement to link the UK ETS and EU ETS would be based on dynamic alignment with relevant EU rules, a financial contribution, consultation and decision-shaping procedures, a role for the EU Court of Justice, and a joint governance mechanism similar to the arrangements that would apply under an EU-UK SPS Agreement.

The Common Understanding states that the EU and UK will seek to “reinforce cooperation” under the TCA in areas such as mutual legal assistance, extradition, the exchange of information relating to terrorism and other serious crimes, the exchange of fingerprint data, DNA and other biometric data, the exchange of criminal records, and cooperation with Europol. They will also explore difficulties in obtaining electronic evidence in cross-border cases.

The Common Understanding also envisages closer UK-EU cooperation to tackle irregular migration, people smuggling, and the prevention of irregular Channel crossings. This would include “work to share best practices and operational information on key issues like returns to third countries, and to explore possible deterrence mechanisms and other innovative solutions, in line with national, EU and international law”.

This would be underpinned by “closer cooperation across key networks” such as the European Migration Network, the EU Agency for Asylum, Frontex, and Europol’s Migrant Smuggling Centre and the relevant UK authorities.