Iran protests 2026: UK and international response

On 28 December 2025, protests began in Iran, initially sparked by economic grievances. They subsequently spread and became among the largest in recent years. Monitors assess that the majority of protests ended around mid-January 2026.

The regime launched a violent response to the protests. However, an internet shutdown from 8 January and existing restrictions on foreign media access has meant it has been difficult to assess the degree of violence and spread of the protests. Internet access remains limited, as of late January.

This briefing sets out the situation in Iran, assessments on the significance of the protests, and the international response, including that of the UK Government, which has condemned the violence and has announced new sanctions. In 2026, this will include legislation targeting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

How extensive were the protests?

The protests reflect their immediate origins being in Iran’s weakening economy, with the first protests occurring among Iran’s shopkeepers on 28 December 2025. They subsequently spread, with students and other Iranians joining the protests, as well as in other regions across Iran.

The Commons Library briefing Iran: What challenges face the country in 2026? (9 January 2026) provides background on Iran’s weakened domestic and international position as it enters 2026.

Demands of protests

Iran analysts noted a wide range of demands by protesters. These included demands for economic reforms, but others recalled demands from previous rounds of protests including an end to Iranian support for armed groups in the Middle East and for the restoration of the monarchy through Reza Pahlavi (his father having lost power in the 1979 revolution).

There are many opposition groups, operating both within Iran and abroad. However, these groups are not united and offer competing claims of representation and leadership. As set out in the Atlantic Council’s The fractured opposition to the Islamic Regime (2023) and the US Institute for Peace’s Profiles: Iranian Opposition Groups (2020) their popularity within Iran is also uncertain.

Reza Pahlavi, who is the son of the last Shah and who is based in the US, is one figure among the Iranian opposition groups. In 2026, as in earlier protests, Reza Pahlavi called for Iranians to remove the Islamic Republic. On a potential return to the monarchy, he has said that “my role is not to run for office” and that decisions on Iran’s future will be settled through a democratic transition. Analysts have noted his popularity in Iran is uncertain and contested among opposition groups.

Assessing the extent of the 2026 protests

Analysts note that while the intensity of the protests ebbed and flowed in early 2026, groups typically considered loyal to the regime also participated. Protests also occurred in areas populated by minority ethnic groups, such as Kurds. For background on the treatment of minorities in Iran, see the Commons Library briefing on the 2022 Iran protests.

International monitors such as the US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that the number of protests in Iran peaked around 7 to 8 January 2026. At this point, Iranian authorities shut down internet access.

This made it hard for international observers to assess the continued strength of the protests. Foreign news agencies, including the BBC, are banned from working in Iran and journalists in Iran have reported targeted threats and violence. Elon Musk’s Starlink has been attempting to restore internet access.

The below map from the ISW shows the distribution of protests on 7 to 8 January 2026. On 14 January 2026, Iran’s Foreign Minister said that “calm” had been re-established in the country. On 15 January 2026, the ISW said that the protests had largely come to an end.

Map of protests in Iran, 7 to 8 January 2026

Recorded protests are divided between three confidence levels: low (1/brown), medium (2/orange) and high (3/green).

Source: Institute for Study of War, Interactive time-lapse: Protests in Iran, updated 14 January 2026. © Institute for the Study of War and [American Enterprise Institute] Critical Threats Project. See maps for other days on the Institute’s website.

How did the Iranian authorities respond? Announcements of reform

Iranian authorities initially differentiated between “protesters” and “rioters” in their public statements. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said “we will speak with the protesters but […] rioters should be put in their place”. As in past protests, the regime blamed outside actors for the protests.

Reflecting the economic spark to the protests, the government announced changes to the subsidy system to help manage rising inflation and prices. The Iranian Central Bank chief also resigned. Measures have not been announced to address other drivers of discontent, including energy and water shortages (which in 2025 were sufficiently severe that the Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian, suggested moving the capital from Tehran).

Increased violence and arrests

Increased state violence and measures were employed in response to the 2026 protests. These included blocking access to the internet from 8 January 2026. This tactic had been deployed in past protests in 2019 and 2022; on both previous occasions, blocking access to the internet was followed by extensive state violence. In January, authorities also began to describe protests as “terrorism”.

As of late January 2026, internet access in Iran remains limited, despite a request on 18 January by the Iranian President to state security to restore access. Analysts note that Iran may be aiming to reduce the access of citizens to the global internet over the longer-term.

Restricted internet access has contributed to Iran’s worsening economy. In January 2026 the Iranian currency, the rial, reached another record low against the US Dollar.

The number of casualties (both protesters and security forces) is uncertain and cannot be independently verified.

The Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has acknowledged that “several thousand” people have been killed, blaming the US and Israel for inciting the protests. The state-funded Martyrs Foundation and Veterans says that around 3,117 people were killed.

However, rights organisations give higher figures. The Norway-based Iran Human Rights organisation says that at least 3,428 protesters were killed since the start of the protests (to 22 January) and that around 40,000 have been arrested (as of 29 January). The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency says that 6,800 civilians were killed, with a further 11,744 under investigation and around 53,777 people detained (as of 23 February 2026). Arrests are continuing.

These estimates compare with around 537 killed and 19,200 people arrested in the 2022–23 protests, according to the Human Rights Activists News Agency.

As set out in the BBC Monitoring article, “Why casualty estimates from Iran's protests vary so widely”, a range of other estimates on the number of people killed have been published. The Iranian government has not published a figure.

In 2026, Iran’s judiciary has said trials will be organised quickly, and that charges carrying the death penalty will be applied among those arrested. The Iranian Foreign Minister has since said there are no plans for hangings.

Some pro-regime rallies were also held.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have called on other states, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, to initiate criminal investigations against those in Iran responsible for violence and human rights violations.

How far were the protests a threat to the Iranian regime?

Foreign policy analysts assessed the threat posed to the regime during the protests and they largely judged that the regime was likely to survive. However, the regime’s regional and domestic position is now judged to be much weaker than in the past.

At a minimum, if the regime is to survive, analysts judge that the economic grievances that sparked the protests must be addressed. However, Chatham House analysis argues that Iran has a “political order that has lost its capacity to adapt” and that the protests will be far from an “aberration”.

One article in the Atlantic magazine argued that the key five conditions for a revolution were “nearly” met. These conditions were: a fiscal crisis, divided elites, a diverse oppositional coalition, a convincing narrative of resistance and a favourable international environment. Analysis for the same magazine argues that opposition groups must first unite to allow them to better capitalise on the discontent. Analysis for the ISW, however, notes many of the indicators of reduced regime stability were only partially present.

Analysis for the Royal United Services Institute thinktank notes that fear of state collapse (like the state collapse in Libya after Colonel Gaddafi was removed in 2011) or a long civil war (like the civil war in Syria between 2011 and 2024) has informed some of the hesitancy among opposition groups.

Iranian security forces also remained loyal to the regime during the 2025–26 protests, with no reports of defections. No public dissent within the leadership towards Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been reported (even as the battle for Khamenei’s successor continues).

Analysis for Foreign Policy magazine also cites a lack of coordination among opposition groups, and that the regime can still potentially address its economic challenges through measures such as subsidy and anti-corruption reforms.

An article in Foreign Affairs magazine said that the effects of a potential US military strike (see below) were likely to rally support around the regime. However, an article for the Washington Institute thinktank argued that the extent of state violence represents a “watershed” for Iran, and that greater US pressure through cyber-threats and a demonstration of air superiority could compel the regime to reform.

Analysis for BBC News and the Arab Gulf States Institute notes that the regime may ultimately be heading for a “slow collapse”.

The International Crisis Group has warned that “some of Iran’s possible futures could well be worse”. It cites the potential for sectarian violence (Iran has many minority religious and ethnic groups) and the need to secure Iran’s enriched uranium.

Neither would the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps necessarily disappear in any post-Khamenei Iran, given the group’s extensive military and economic presence.

How has the UK responded? The UK has condemned the violence

Addressing the Commons on 13 January 2026, Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, said the UK “condemns in the strongest terms” Iranian state violence against protesters. She said that the Iranian regime’s response was “no outlier” but “in keeping with the fundamental nature and track record of the regime”.

The Foreign Secretary has raised the government’s concerns directly with her Iranian counterpart.

The UK Government has also issued a joint statement with Germany and France urging Iran to protect the right to protest, as well as with the G7 group of states condemning the violence.

The UK also participated in a special session of the UN Human Rights Council on Iran in January, in which the mandates of the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran and Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran were renewed. Iran rejected their renewal. The Council’s resolution also “deplore[d] the violent crackdown of peaceful protests”.

The government has also said that decisions on Iran’s future are “for the Iranian people”.

Foreign Secretary has announced more sanctions

A range of existing UK measures target the Iranian leadership, Iranians accused of human rights violations, Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programmes, Iran’s support for armed and terrorist groups abroad, and Iranian state activity in the UK (see the next section).

In response to the protests, in January 2026, the Foreign Secretary said that the government will be bringing forward legislation to implement further sanctions.

She said these would target “finance, energy, transport, software and other significant industries that are advancing Iranian nuclear escalation”. These will be implemented alongside other partners, including the European Union, which has announced further sanctions (it will also proscribe the IRGC—see below).

On 2 February the government designated ten individuals and one organisation, Iran's Law Enforcement Forces, under the sanctions regime. Among the individuals sanctioned are the Minister of the Interior and police chiefs.

The Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Callum Miller, has called for Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei to be sanctioned directly (the US has applied direct sanctions against Khamenei and his office since 2019).

Existing UK measures against Iran

UK sanctions and other measures against Iran include those outlined in the bullet points below. The Commons Library briefings on Iran’s influence in the Middle East, the UK’s response to the 2022-23 protests, Iran’s nuclear programme, and the UK response to Iranian state threats provide more detail.

• As of 14 January 2026, there are 286 individuals and 260 organisations sanctioned under the UK’s Iran and Iran (nuclear) regimes. Sanctioned organisations include the morality police and the Basij paramilitary force, which has been deployed to supress protests.
• In October 2025, the UK, together with France and Germany, triggered the UN’s “snapback sanctions” against Iran under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. As UN sanctions, all UN member states are expected to comply. Measures target Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
• Under the existing Iran (nuclear) sanctions regimes, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been sanctioned in its entirety. Despite calls within Parliament for the IRGC to be proscribed as a terrorist group, this has not happened. Proscribing creates offences such as being a member of, or encouraging support for, the organisation in question, and allows financial sanctions to be imposed upon it. The government says proscription of the IRGC remains under review, though it notes that there are challenges to proscribing a state body such as the IRGC, and that the effects may be limited as it is already sanctioned.
• In 2025, the government said it would introduce a new power targeting state-backed organisations, following a recommendation from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism and State Threats Legislation (PDF). In January 2026, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, called for the legislation on state-backed organisations to be sped up. The government has said the legislation will be progressed “in due course”. On 30 January 2026 the Times newspaper reported that the UK would bring forward legislation against state agencies like the IRGC later this year.
• In 2025, the UK placed Iran on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme (only Russia is similarly designated). Restrictions apply to the IRGC and other parts of the Iranian state.

UK soft power in Iran

The UK Government and UK TV licence-fee payers also fund the BBC World Service, which includes BBC Persian.

While BBC Persian is blocked in Iran, the BBC estimates 13 million Iranians (in a country of 91 million) have accessed the service.

EU proscribes the IRGC as a terrorist group

While the US has designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist group since 2019, both the UK and EU have not designated it as such, rather applying sanctions against the organisation and individual measures.

However, in response to the protests on 29 January 2026 the EU announced that it would proscribe the IRGC. France has previously expressed concern that proscribing would lead to Iran cutting diplomatic ties (echoing reported UK concerns). Iran’s foreign minister described the EU approach as “deeply damaging to its own interests”.

How has the US responded?

The US has long had the most extensive sanctions regime in place against Iran, targeting it not only militarily but also economically. This means its capacity to apply new sanctions is limited.

President Trump’s statements on intervention

Since the beginning of the protests in late December 2025, President Trump has threatened on several occasions that the US would intervene in Iran, and warned the regime against violently suppressing protests.

Speaking on 13 January 2026, President Trump said that if protestors were executed by Iranian authorities “we will take very strong action”, and that “help is on its way”. He cited economic action as one part of this action (see the below subsection on tariffs).

On 26 January 2026, a US carrier strike group arrived in the region.

President Trump also announced that he had cancelled any US meetings with Iranian officials. Iran says it remains open for talks.

Media reports suggest that the US administration had been briefed on several potential steps. These included cyberattacks, air strikes and economic action.Analysis for Chatham House argues the US is seeking the “strategic submission” of Iran:

Compelling Iran’s leadership to accept permanent constraints on its nuclear ambitions, a narrowed regional role, and the reality that the US is prepared to escalate abruptly if its red lines are crossed

On 14 January 2026, the President said that the US assessment was that both protests and violence had declined and that he would now “watch what the process is” in Iran. He has also said that “it’s time to look for new leadership in Iran”. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, however, has said “no one knows who would take over” if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was to fall.

Addressing the UN Security Council on 15 January, the US representative, Mike Waltz, said that “all options are on the table to stop the slaughter”.

Iranian response to potential military action

Iran has blamed Israel and the United States for the protests, and said any foreign military intervention will be met with force.

In response to the June 2025 Israel/US strikes on its nuclear facilities, Iran attacked a US base in Qatar. Iran may also take action in The Strait of Hormuz, a major trade and oil route.

Iran was also in contact with regional states including Turkey, Oman, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Turkey cautioned against military action and Oman and Qatar called for de-escalation.

Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi militias have also threatened to intervene in defence of Iran.

The US has a wide military presence in the Middle East, including the forward headquarters of its Central Command at Al Udeid in Qatar (the base that Iran attacked in June 2025) and the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Some US and UK personnel were withdrawn from Al Udeid on 14 and 15 January 2026.

Russia and China response to potential action

While in 2025 Russia signed a new strategic treaty with Iran, as was the case with the June 2025 strikes by Israel and the United States, it is not expected to militarily defend Iran.

Russia has condemned the threat of foreign intervention. On 13 January 2026, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry criticised “subversive external interference in Iran’s internal political processes” and said “the threats emanating from Washington regarding further military strikes against [Iran] are categorically unacceptable”.

China has also opposed outside intervention in Iran.

UK response to potential US military action

In response to parliamentary questions on potential US military strikes on Iran, the UK Foreign Secretary said “the US response will be a matter for the US Government”.

Responding to a question about whether it “would be right for America and its allies to help with the removal of that regime”, the Leader of the Opposition, Kemi Badenoch, said “I think that given the threat that we’re seeing to the people, I think that would be right”, as part of a coalition of countries. She said that any “calculation always has to be about our [the UK’s] national interest” and that it “all depends on exactly what the situation is”.

New US sanctions

On 15 and 23 January 2026, the US announced new sanctions against several Iranian security officials who it says were responsible for the state response to the protests. The US also announced new sanctions against members of Iran’s “shadow banking” network, which is used to help fund the regime and avoid sanctions, and its “shadow fleet”, that trades in sanctioned oil.

Proposed tariffs on countries trading with Iran

On 12 January 2026, President Trump announced that the US would apply 25% tariffs on countries that continue to trade with Iran. No further announcements have been made, including on how this tariff would interact with existing tariff rates.

According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, China is Iran’s largest trading partner. The majority of the trade is sanctioned oil.

China is followed by Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. European Union data suggests that in 2024 the bloc as a whole was Iran’s fourth-largest goods-trading partner (PDF).

Germany is assessed to be Europe’s largest trading partner with Iran. In 2025, German–Iranian trade totalled around US$1 billion.

The UK continues to trade with Iran: in the year to June 2025, total UK–Iran trade totalled £420 million (PDF). Government guidance for companies trading with Iran says it “supports sanctions-compliant trade with Iran”, which includes adhering to US and other restrictions on trading with certain individuals or goods.