Frequently asked questions: Cuba’s humanitarian crisis and US tensions in 2026

Cuba is experiencing a significant humanitarian crisis, with major power blackouts now becoming a regular occurrence. This is occurring alongside accelerating emigration and declining tourism.

Cuba is a one-party authoritarian state led by the Communist Party of Cuba which the human rights organisation Human Rights Watch says “continues to repress and punish dissent and public criticism”.

Since US President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025, he has been increasing political and economic pressure on Cuba, reimposing restrictions removed under his predecessor, President Joe Biden, and adding new sanctions on Cuba’s oil imports. Cuba heavily depends on imported oil for energy, and the sanctions have significantly affected Cuba’s power system, with knock-on effects on its economy and healthcare system.

In June 2026, Cuba’s ruling Communist Party announced a significant package of economic reforms, relaxing its strict controls on private enterprise and property ownership.

This page sets out information on the humanitarian situation in Cuba, the position of the US and Cuban governments, and UK Government actions.

What is the economic and humanitarian situation in Cuba in 2026?

Cuba is, according to a March 2026 briefing by the International Crisis Group (ICG), “confronting its most acute humanitarian crisis and the greatest threat to its political status quo in decades”, following the US effectively “sever[ing] the island’s access to imported oil” under President Trump.

Halt on oil imports

According to the US Energy Information Administration, Cuba relies on imports to meet the majority of its energy needs. The ICG reports that around three quarters of Cuba’s oil imports came from Venezuela and Mexico before they suspended shipments in early 2026.

Shipments of oil from Venezuela to Cuba ceased after the January 2026 US raid to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro. Mexico has also paused shipments of oil to Cuba. The ICG notes that one of the reasons for Mexico suspending shipments is President Donald Trump’s executive order from late January 2026 declaring a “national emergency” related to Cuba. This authorised tariffs under the US International Emergency Economic Powers Act on countries supplying fuel to Cuba.

Cuba’s health system

The suspension of oil imports has had a significant effect on Cuba, and particularly its health system. The ICG says that, among other things, the lack of oil imports has led to blackouts, fuel rationing, transport shutdowns, reduced work and school weeks, and disrupted essential medical services:

The cutoff has triggered nationwide blackouts, fuel rationing, transportation shutdowns, suspension of airline refuelling (prompting a number of major international carriers to cancel service to Cuba) and other austerity measures, including shortened work weeks and reduced school hours. Oil is being set aside for hospitals and food production, but the Cuban health system – already weakened by shortages of medicines and equipment – is under mounting pressure, with disruptions of essential services like ambulances and medical flights as well as life-saving medical procedures such as dialysis and cancer treatment.

Other organisations have also described the significant impact of the fuel shortages on Cuba’s health system. In May 2026, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization said that more than 100,000 patients were waiting for surgeries that had been delayed by the fuel shortages:

blackouts lasting up to 20 hours have forced hospitals to suspend non-emergency operations, while fuel shortages continue limiting ambulance services and delaying access to critical care.

[…]

More than 100,000 patients, including 11,000 children, are waiting for surgeries delayed by power outages and supply shortages.

Francisco Pichón, the United Nations resident coordinator in Cuba, wrote an opinion piece in The Guardian newspaper at the end of April 2026 on the humanitarian situation on the island. He emphasised that the energy shock is adding further burdens to an already fragile economy, which in turn affects the health system and quality of life. He said that “humanitarian needs in Cuba remain acute and persistent”, and that they will not be “resolved by limited fuel deliveries from abroad”. He said that “while any additional supply may provide temporary relief, it is insufficient in scale and fails to address the structural constraints affecting essential sectors”. As outlined below, these structural constraints include Cuba’s economic system and the US economic blockade.

Continuing impact of past natural disasters

The more recent effects of fuel shortages come after several years of natural disasters and the deterioration of Cuba’s healthcare system. Hurricane Melissa, which hit Cuba in 2025, damaged or destroyed more than 215,000 homes, according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

In June 2026, the IFRC said that Cuba’s recovery from Hurricane Melissa “has been particularly challenging”. It said this was due to Cuba’s pre-existing structural vulnerabilities, and the cumulative effects of other disasters including Hurricane Oscar and Hurricane Rafael in 2024. It added that Cuba “has faced four consecutive years of significant shocks without a sustained recovery window, contributing to a marked deterioration in socioeconomic conditions”.

The IFRC says that from 2019 to 2025, important health indicators have deteriorated: “infant mortality increased from 5.0 to 9.9 per 1,000 live births; maternal mortality from 37.4 to 44.1 per 100,000 live births; and the low-birth-weight rate from 5.4% to 7.8%”. Communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and hepatitis A have also increased.

Food production in Cuba declined by more than 50% from 2021 to 2025.

What role does the United States play in Cuba’s economy and political affairs?

The US–Cuba relationship has been one of confrontation and distrust since 1959 when the Cuban communist-revolutionary Fidel Castro overthrew a US-backed regime on the island and allied itself with the Soviet Union.

1962 blockade and designating Cuba a State Sponsor of Terrorism

In 1962, in response to the communist Cuban Revolution, the United States imposed a “comprehensive economic embargo” on Cuba, which remains in place. The embargo was codified into US law in the 1990s. US policy since the revolution has, according to the Congressional Researach Service “generally sought to isolate the Cuban government to promote change on the island and limit Cuba’s ability to engage in malign activities abroad”.

In 1982, under the administration of President Ronald Reagan, Cuba was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (PDF). This further tightened economic sanctions on Cuba. The human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO) the Washington Office on Latin America says these sanctions have reduced Cubans’ ability to open bank accounts abroad and made it difficult for companies and NGOs, including those delivering aid, to operate in Cuba.

Steps to normalise US–Cuba relations under President Obama

In 2014, in a significant reversal of previous US policy, President Barack Obama announced several steps to normalise relations, including:

• removing Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (May 2015)
• restoring diplomatic relations and reopening the US embassy in Havana (July 2015)
• easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and financial services (2015 to 2016)

Reversal under President Trump

During his first term from 2016, President Trump reversed several of these measures, including Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and introduced new sanctions in 2017. These included restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military.

President Biden in his last few days in office in January 2025 implemented several measures to improve relations with Cuba, including removing Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and revoking President Trump’s restrictions on transactions with state-military companies. However, these were not implemented or were reversed by President Trump on taking office (see below).

Cuban emigration and diaspora population in the US

Successive waves of emigration from Cuba have created a large diaspora in the United States, and emigration has accelerated in the last several years. In 2024, the Pew Research Center estimated that there were around 2.9 million people of Cuban origin in the US: 23% more than in 2019. The Cuban diaspora is important economically and sends significant remittances back to Cuba (just under $2.5 billion US dollars in 2023), according to the Inter-American Dialogue (IAD) thinktank. The administration of President George W Bush and both administrations of President Trump have imposed stricter limits on these transfers. For example, in 2020 President Trump limited remittances to $1,000 per person per year, reducing the total sent by around two thirds compared with the 2019 limit, according to the IAD’s data.

The Cuban diaspora also has significant political influence, particularly in the US state of Florida, where many reside. A 2024 poll of Cuban Americans in South Florida reported that 55% of those polled supported continuing the embargo (PDF) and 38% opposed it (including “don’t know” responses). Of those polled, support for the embargo was strongest among older respondents, those born in Cuba, and registered Republican Party voters. Opposition to the embargo was strongest among younger respondents, those born in the United States, and registered Democratic Party voters.

How has President Trump changed US policy towards Cuba since returning to office?

Days after re-entering office in January 2025, President Trump reversed President Biden’s relaxation of sanctions and Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation.

New sanctions and tourism ban

Since January 2025, President Trump has further increased economic and political pressure on Cuba and its leadership. In June 2025, he signed a presidential memorandum which reimposed a ban on US tourism in Cuba, and restricted financial transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military. Throughout 2026, the US has issued sanctions on the senior leadership of Cuba, and state-owned and military-controlled enterprises.

As outlined above, in January 2026, President Trump issued decision an executive order declaring a “national emergency” related to Cuba and authorising tariffs on countries supplying fuel to the island.

Restrictions on Cuban immigration

The US has also increased restrictions on Cuban immigration. In March 2025, it removed a temporary legal status given to around 110,000 Cuban immigrants under a scheme enacted by the Biden administration. In January 2026, the US Government announced that Cuba was 1 of 19 new countries to which it was adding travel restrictions, that it was stopping visa processing for Cubans outside of the US and that it was restricting the entry of many Cubans. Exceptions were for categories including lawful permanent residents and dual nationals travelling on passports of non-designated countries.

Reasserting the ‘Monroe Doctrine’

The Trump administration has signalled it will take on a stronger role in the Latin America region. In its November 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS; PDF), the administration said it would “reassert and enforce the Monroe doctrine to restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere”.

The Monroe doctrine, first developed in 1823 under the then President James Monroe, “designated the western hemisphere as an area of US influence in which the European powers of the time were explicitly warned not to interfere”. It was later updated to assert America’s right to intervene in the region. The 2025 NSS added a “Trump corollary” to the doctrine, in which it said it would limit the ability of competitors from outside the region “to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere”. The January 2026 US military operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro has been linked to this change in policy.

US statements on the future of the Cuban Government

Since the January 2026 operation in Venezuela, the US Government has suggested that the Cuban Government is at risk of collapse. In an interview with the New York Post in January 2026, President Trump said he was not considering military action against Cuba, responding “No, Cuba is going to fall of its own volition. Cuba is doing very poorly”. In the same month, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, told reporters that Nicolás Maduro’s guards and Venezuela’s “whole spy agency” were “full of Cubans”. He said, “if I lived in Havana and I was in the government, I’d be concerned at least a little bit”.

US accusation of Cuban subversion in the US

In mid-2026, the US Government accused the Cuban Government of subversion and said it was trying to infiltrate the US Government and influence its population. In June 2026, it imposed sanctions on five entities and five individuals it alleged were carrying out “subversive anti-American activities” as part of what the US State Department called “the Trump Administration’s comprehensive push to end the Cuban regime’s decades-long campaign of political, ideological, and institutional warfare against the United States”.

On 20 July 2026, the US State Department released a report accusing Cuba of a nearly seven-decade “sustained campaign of subversion against the United States”. It said the Cuban Government had “backed an unprecedented wave of left-wing terrorism on American soil, and carried out one of the most durable and damaging foreign intelligence penetrations in American history”. The Associated Foreign Press reported that the document “contain[ed] little new information” and made “sweeping -- if unsubstantiated – allegations”. Cuba’s Foreign Minister called the report “the latest fallacy from the US State Department”.

What are the causes of Cuba’s economic problems?

The Cuban Government and the US Government disagree about the causes of Cuba’s economic problems. However, analysts generally agree that they are caused by a mixture of Cuban economic policies and US sanctions.

Cuban Government criticism of US action

The Cuban Government has emphasised the role of US policies in the country’s humanitarian crisis. In July 2026, Cuba's Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodríguez, said the US had waged a “multi-dimensional, non-conventional warfare” against Cuba, which had “become ever more cruel” over the last seven months. Earlier that month, the Cuban President, Miguel Díaz-Canel, accused the US on X (formerly known as Twitter) of trying to “incite social unrest by strangling Cuba’s fuel supply” (translated from the original Spanish). He described the sanctions as a “genocidal energy blockade”.

US blames nature of Cuban Government

In June 2026, in remarks made at a UN member states’ briefing on the situation in Cuba, US Ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, said “the actual reason Cubans don’t have electricity, fuel, or food [is] not because of the embargo, or because of an ‘oil blockade’ which is untrue and fake”. “The truth”, he said, is “Cuba is suffering because the regime chose failed communist economics, is incompetent, and the massive corruption that it has enacted on its people over their basic needs”.

Mr Walz said that the US was offering a “$100 million package of humanitarian assistance […] to be distributed directly to the Cuban people through the Catholic Church […] and other reliable institutions […]”. He also said the US had “allowed fuel deliveries from the United States to private entities not affiliated with the regime”, as well as one fuel shipment from Russia.

Analysis and commentary by thinktanks

A July 2026 analysis by the Atlantic Council thinktank says that much of the recent media attention and commentary about Cuba’s humanitarian crisis “has focused on recent economic factors. But this risks echoing Havana’s preferred explanation that outside pressure, and not decades of communism, is to blame”.

It argues that “the collapse of the island’s tourism sector, the closure of dozens of hotels, the reduction of flights to and from the island, and other negative outcomes are a result of the disastrously run state-led economy”. The thinktank said recent US policy measures “have an effect”, but “treating this situation as a sudden, unexpected, and external shock misses the broader, more alarming reality”. It said this is that Cuba has “long been collapsing” under its communist dictatorship:

The island has long been collapsing under the weight of a communist dictatorship that has spent decades decapitalizing its economy and undermining the engines of the country’s prosperity.

An article for the Just Security website states that “the Cuban regime is a primary driver of the suffering of the Cuban people”. It argues that “the government’s corruption, its mismanagement of the economy, its repression of dissent, and its insistence on a failed economic model are responsible for the dire conditions on the island”. However, it adds that “the United States bears responsibility too” and that “nearly six and a half decades of comprehensive sanctions have not produced regime change. They have hardened the regime’s grip and deepened ordinary Cubans’ suffering”.

Human Rights Watch, in a 2025 report on human rights in Cuba, says that “authorities in Cuba continue to use the US embargo as a pretext for abuses and a way to garner sympathy from governments that might otherwise condemn Cuba’s repressive practices”.

Analysis for the Cuba Capacity Building Project at Columbia Law School states that while “it seems fair to assume” that President Trump’s reimposition of sanctions and terrorism designation in January 2025 meant Cuba’s tourism industry “has suffered significantly” because of harsher U.S. sanctions, “the situation is far more complex”.

Cuba’s tourism industry has underperformed over the last decade. Visitor numbers peaked in 2018 at 4.7 million, buoyed in particular by President Obama’s loosening of travel restrictions on US citizens. The covid-19 pandemic dramatically reduced tourist numbers, which fell from 4.3 million in 2019 to 360,000 in 2021. The numbers have not recovered to their pre-pandemic peak, standing at 2.4 million in 2023.

Other factors that the Cuba Capacity Building Project identified as being behind the reduced tourism include emigration reducing the number of people available to work in the tourism sector, concerns from potential tourists about a rise in street crime, and issues with food supplies and power outages which predated the 2026 US restrictions on oil imports.

How has Cuba’s government responded to the economic situation?

As well as denouncing the policies of the United States (as outlined above), the Cuban Government has announced a significant package of economic reforms.

Measures on diaspora returning

In March 2026, the Cuban Government said it would relax restrictions on the Cuban diaspora returning to the island and investing in businesses there. According to an analysis for the Conversation website, the “regime in Havana has traditionally maintained a disdainful attitude towards the Cuban diaspora”, but its economic challenges are forcing it to rethink.

In an interview with NBC News in March 2026, Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, said: “Cuba is open to having a fluid commercial relationship with US companies and also with Cubans residing in the United States and their descendants”.

Potential economic reforms

In June 2026, the Cuban legislature approved what were described as “sweeping reforms” by the Reuters news agency, which it said “would represent the single largest change to Cuba's socialist model since former leader Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and a major shift towards a market economy”. The reforms include:

• allowing private real estate development
• turning state-owned businesses into private commercial ventures with shares and equity stakes
• letting private banks enter the financial sector
• allowing ​the sale of state-owned properties to national and foreign legal entities and individuals
• permitting businesses in Cuba to hire more than 100 employees
• authorising entrepreneurs to hold stakes in multiple private businesses
• introducing a ⁠real-time digital ​foreign exchange market with authorised agents

The Cuban President, Miguel Diaz-Canel, told the Cuban parliament that, despite the proposals, “we are not renouncing socialism”. At the time of writing, there is no timetable or published plan as to when these reforms will be implemented.

How have the Cuban people reacted to the crisis?

There have been limited protests in 2026 in Cuba in response to the blackouts and other economic challenges.

The monitoring group Amnesty International has reported the challenges of protesting in Cuba, with “Dissent […] met with unrelenting harassment, criminalisation and violence”. BBC News reported in early July 2026 that Cubans in “several locations on the island banged pots […] to express their anger about the latest nationwide power cut” and that locals shouted “turn on the lights!” in areas where power still had not been restored.

In March 2024, there had been rare street protests in Cuba’s second-largest city, Santiago, in response to power cuts and food shortages.

2021 protests and Cuban Government response

None of the recent protests approached the scale of the protests in July 2021, when thousands of Cubans took to the streets in response to the government’s handling of the covid-19 pandemic and a scarcity of resources. These were reported by Human Rights Watch to be “the largest nationwide demonstrations against the government since the 1959 Cuban revolution”. The monitoring group accused the Cuban Government of systematic human rights violations in response to the protests, “including harassment, arbitrary detention, abuse-ridden prosecutions, beatings, and other cases of ill-treatment that in some cases constitute torture”.

An American academic writing for the Conversation website in 2026 said that during a recent visit to Cuba he observed much less faith among the people he met that the Cuban Government cared about their suffering than during previous visits, and that they directed less blame towards the US blockade. Indeed, some of those he met were “placing their hopes in the United States generally and the Trump administration specifically”.

Emigration patterns are changing

As outlined above, a significant number of Cubans have chosen to leave the island for the US, with more than 300,000 Cuban immigrants settling in the US from 2019 to 2024.

However, the Trump administration’s tightening of immigration policies seems to have had a significant effect on Cuban emigration. According to the US Customs and Border Patrol agency, encounters between immigration officials and Cuban nationals dropped significantly, to 33,000 in the US financial year October 2024 to September 2025, compared with 218,000 in 2023/24. Analysis by the International Organization for Migration in March 2026 suggests that Cubans are now increasingly travelling to South America and are choosing to stay in the region.

What is the UK’s policy towards Cuba and what humanitarian support does it provide?

In recent decades, governments led by both Labour and the Conservatives have opposed the US’s embargo on Cuba.

UK opposition to US embargo

Responding in June 2026 to an urgent question in the House of Commons on the humanitarian situation in Cuba, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Minister Chris Elmore reiterated the government's opposition to the US embargo and expressed concern about the humanitarian situation:

The United Kingdom is concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cuba, particularly shortages of food, fuel and essential medicines, which are having a real impact on ordinary citizens. The United States’ long-standing embargo continues to place significant constraints on Cuba’s economy and its access to international finance. The United Kingdom has consistently opposed the embargo, for instance at the United Nations, for nearly 30 years [most recently in a statement with the EU in July 2026]. At the same time, domestic economic challenges within Cuba also play a role, and sustainable improvement will require economic reform and greater resilience.

Mr Elmore said it had been confirmed that the US and Cuban governments were holding talks “to permit an urgent improvement in the current circumstances” and that “we urge all parties to move swiftly to an agreement that can alleviate the suffering of the Cuban people”.

UK aid has been low in value

UK bilateral aid to Cuba has been low, averaging around £1.7 million a year from 2009 to 2024 (the latest year for financial aid data). From 2020 to 2024, the annual average was lower, at £0.9 million. Total UK bilateral aid was £0.4 million in 2024 (see the FCDO’s Final aid statistics 2024, table A4c). These statistics relate to bilateral aid only (aid for specific countries and programmes), and do not include aid delivered via multilateral channels like the UN.

In 2024, UK bilateral aid was solely focused on the British Council (whose role is to support English language training and cultural engagement with the UK). Most other UK aid since 2020 has been spent on similar programmes, such as Chevening scholarships, facilitating aid from other donors or supporting civil society (data from the FCDO, Final aid statistics 2024: data underlying the SIDS).

In response to other written parliamentary questions, in 2025, the UK Government said that in 2024 the UK provided aid for Cuba through the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The UK provided aid to CERF following the October and November 2024 hurricanes. In response to these natural disasters, CERF provided funding for sectors including food security, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, and health. In his response to the June 2026 urgent question, Chris Elmore said the government was also providing aid to Cuba through funding to the World Food Programme and the UN Children’s Fund, Unicef.

No bilateral aid is planned from 2026/27

The government is in the process of reducing the UK aid budget to 0.3% of gross national income. The FCDO’s Annual report and accounts 2025-26, published in July 2026, and which sets out the FCDO’s three-year spending plans from 2026/27, says that no FCDO bilateral aid is planned for “other American countries” (a collection of countries, including Cuba) to 2028/29 (see annex A of the report).