Changing positions on the EU and Ukraine in central Europe

Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have cooperated since the early 1990s in the Visegrad Group (also known as the V4), but political cooperation between them has become more difficult in recent years as they have taken differing approaches in the EU and towards Russia and Ukraine.

Since 2023, both Hungary and Slovakia have challenged the EU’s positions on Ukraine and Russia. At the end of 2025, a change of government in the Czech Republic brought it closer to Hungary and Slovakia’s position although Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš has stressed a more flexible approach.

Hungary under Viktor Orbán

Since 2010 Hungary under Viktor Orbán has adopted legislation that has brought it into conflict with the EU, with the European Commission taking legal action against Hungary on matters including judicial reforms, restrictions on civil society and the rights of LGBT+ people. In 2018 the Parliament triggered the EU procedure, set out in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, to determine that Hungary is in breach of core EU values. This was followed, in 2022, by the parliament saying that Hungary can no longer be considered a full democracy and labelling it an elected autocracy. In the same year, the European Commission triggered a new mechanism to make the release of EU funding conditional on adherence by member states to rule of law principles and then blocked the release of EU funding to Hungary.

Hungary has also been at odds with the EU in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since 2022, delaying the adoption of sanctions packages on Russia and aid packages to Ukraine. Orbán has been criticised in the EU for meeting with Russia’s President Putin, and has refused to endorse EU leaders’ statements on Russia and Ukraine.

Orbán has argued with Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy, accusing him in early 2026 of “co-ordinating efforts to bring a pro-Ukraine government to power in Hungary”. After initially agreeing to an EU €90 billion loan to Ukraine at the end of December 2025, provided Hungary was exempted from the financial obligations, Orbán then blocked an EU decision on the loan in early 2026. Orbán said this was because Ukraine had not repaired a pipeline in Ukraine delivering Russian oil to Hungary which was damaged in a Russian attack.

Changing Hungary-Poland relations

From 2015 to 2023, Poland’s government also came into conflict with the EU, with the European Commission taking legal action in relation to judicial reforms adopted under the Law and Justice (PiS) party-led government. In 2017 the European Commission triggered the Article 7 procedure against Poland. The procedure can result in a decision to suspend a member state’s voting rights in the EU. However, it requires unanimity among the other member states in its later stages. Poland and Hungary supported each other in their disputes with the EU, and there was an assumption they would protect each other under the Article 7 procedure.

Poland and Hungary also challenged the introduction of the rule of law conditionality mechanism in the EU budget in 2020, briefly blocking adoption of the EU’s long term budget. The European Commission later also invoked the mechanism to block funding for Poland under the EU’s post covid recovery programme. Following the change of government in Poland in late 2023, Poland’s funds were unblocked by the Commission and the Article 7 procedure dropped.

Relations between Hungary and Poland became strained following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with the PiS-led government firmly backing Ukraine. Since taking office in late 2023, Donald Tusk’s government in Poland has subsequently been highly critical of positions taken by the Orbán government. Hungary has also angered Poland since 2024 by granting political asylum to former ministers of the PiS-led government facing corruption charges.

The two countries, together with Slovakia, have however continued to share concerns about the impact of the EU’s liberalised trade access for Ukrainian agricultural products since 2022, with the three countries imposing restrictions on Ukrainian products.

Slovakia under Fico brings new challenge

A change of government in Slovakia at the end of 2023, with Robert Fico returning as prime minister, brought another V4 government closer to Hungary. The Fico government has criticised EU support for Ukraine and ended Slovakia’s military aid, and joined Hungary in holding up EU sanctions packages. Fico has also been critical of President Zelenskyy and has met with President Putin, attending Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in May 2025.

As with Hungary, Slovakia has secured an exemption from EU sanctions on Russian oil and criticised Ukraine in early 2026 for not repairing a pipeline delivering Russian oil. Fico has said that he may take over from Orbán in blocking the EU loan if Orbán loses office in Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 2026.

In March 2026, Fico joined Orbán in not endorsing an EU leaders’ statement which referred to the loan. This marked a change in approach compared to EU statements in 2025, which Fico had agreed to and Orbán was alone in refusing to endorse.

Fico’s government has also faced criticism from the European Commission over criminal justice reforms seen as stifling corruption investigations, media reforms and regulation of civil society. Changes to the Slovakian constitution at the end of 2025 declaring Slovakia’s sovereignty over so-called “national identity” matters prompted legal proceedings from the Commission. The Commission has also launched legal action over legislation in late 2025 to abolish the Whistleblower’s Protection Office.

Babiš brings changed Czech approach

At end of 2025, Andrej Babiš returned as prime minister of the Czech Republic following parliamentary elections. Babiš was previously prime minister from 2017 to 2021 and is a wealthy business owner who has been criticised by opponents for potential conflict of interest. His ANO 2011 party was launched as a populist anti-corruption party, but has shifted to the right and has opposed EU migration and environmental policies. Since 2022, Babiš has criticised Czech aid for Ukraine.

Babiš’s coalition government includes the Freedom and Direct Democracy party, which has called for Czech referendums on EU and NATO membership and is viewed as “far right” and pro-Russia, together with another right-wing party, Motorists for Themselves, which opposes EU environmental policies.

Babiš has stressed the government’s commitment to EU and NATO membership and its support for Ukraine. His government has, however, ruled out Czech membership of the eurozone and said that it will not give financial aid for military equipment directly to Ukraine. The government has also stated its opposition to EU environmental and migration policies (see below).

Babiš’s return prompted commentaries to suggest that he would form a new political axis in the EU with Orbán and Fico. Following the European elections in June 2024, Babiš and Orbán had launched a new political group in the European Parliament, known as Patriots for Europe, which was joined by other right-wing parties including the French National Rally and Italian League.

An early indication of Babiš, Orbán and Fico working together appeared to be the December 2025 European Council, where the three leaders secured an exemption from financial obligations for their countries under the €90 billion loan instrument for Ukraine. Following the meeting, however, Babiš said that his country had taken a different stance to Hungary and Slovakia. He said that his government supports Ukraine and approved the summit conclusions but he “simply [did] not wish to guarantee the loans”, whereas the other two countries “refused all support”.

In early January 2026, Babiš also attended the meeting of the “coalition of the willing” for Ukraine in Paris and indicated he had reversed his previous opposition to the Czech co-ordinated international ammunition initiative for Ukraine, provided it was financed by other countries and no “Czech taxpayer money” would go into it.

Renewing the Visegrad Group

The Czech government programme refers to the objective of renewing the Visegrad group, and commentaries have suggested this will involve Czech overtures to Poland as well as good relations with Hungary and Slovakia. Areas of common ground between the V4 countries could include opposition to the EU migration pact and the EU green deal.

The governments of all four countries have stated opposition to the solidarity mechanism within the EU migration pact. This involves migrants from member states deemed to be under “migratory pressure” being relocated to other member states. However, states can make a financial contribution rather than take migrants and can be exempted if they themselves are facing high migration.

The four governments have also stated opposition to elements of the EU “green deal”, including its carbon emissions trading scheme and the phasing out of production of cars with combustion engines.