A new president and prime minister for Iraq: What challenges face the country in 2026?

In November 2025, Iraq went to the polls to elect a new Parliament. The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes groups linked to the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), remained the largest group of parliamentarians.

In April 2026, five months after the election, Iraq’s Parliament selected a new president, Nizar Amedi. President Amedi has in turn appointed a prime minister-designate, Ali al-Zaid. Zaid and his cabinet must now face a confirmatory vote in Parliament.

This briefing summarises the 2025 election and the background to the selection of the president and the prime minister. It also summarises some of the challenges facing Iraq, which include:

• tensions with the US over continuing Iranian influence in Iraqi politics
• the economic fallout from the 2026 Israel/US–Iran conflict, particularly for Iraqi oil production and government spending, which heavily depends on the oil sector
• divisions among the leaders of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, which has lacked a government since 2024

How does Iraq’s political system work?

Under Iraq’s 2005 constitution, elections to the country’s single-chamber Parliament, the Council of Representatives, are held every four years. The Council contains 329 seats, all of which were up for election in 2025.

Once the Council of Representatives is elected, it must then select a president (presidents are not directly elected). Once they are selected, the president selects a prime minister, who must, together with their cabinet, win the backing of the Council.

By convention, a Kurd holds the post of president, a Shia Muslim holds the post of prime minister, and a Sunni Muslim holds the post of Parliament Speaker.

Iraq has a large number of political parties. Parties often group themselves together on factors including shared ideology and/or ethnic affiliation.

Further information

Section 2 of the Commons Library briefing Iraq: Introductory country profile provides more information on Iraq’s political system and politics after the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

What happened in the 2025 elections?

In Iraq’s 2025 elections:

• turnout rose
• the Reconstruction and Development Coalition of the then Prime Minister won the single largest number of seats
• women won fewer seats than in 2021, though 25% of seats remain reserved for women. Some seats are also reserved for minorities (as has been the case in other elections since 2003)

Turnout rose

Turnout rose across Iraq in the 2025 election compared with the 2021 election. Turnout doubled in areas populated by minority groups like Kurds and Sunni Muslims (though their share of seats remains the same).

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition won the largest number of seats

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition of parties won the largest single number of seats (46). The coalition is aligned with the now caretaker prime minister, Mohammed al-Sudani. Sudani said that the Reconstruction and Development Coalition was an “essential part” of the Shia Coordination Framework, which holds a majority of seats.

The Coordination Framework is a coalition of parties that was first formed in 2021 and which contains many pro-Iran groups.

Women won fewer seats than in 2021 and some seats were reserved for minorities

Women were elected to around 26% of seats in the Council of Representatives in the 2025 election. This was a decrease on the 2021 election, when women won roughly 29% of seats.

A small number of seats in the Council of Representatives are reserved for minorities, such as Christians.

Who is Iraq’s new president?

In April 2026, the Council of Representatives chose Nizar Amedi as Iraq’s President. Reflecting convention, he is a Kurdish politician from one of the two leading Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The other leading Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) boycotted the vote (see below on Kurdish tensions).

The president’s role is largely ceremonial, although it is the president who appoints a prime minister and a cabinet.

The president’s selection was quicker than after the last election in 2021, when the process took over a year.

Who is Iraq’s prime minister-designate?

Following President Nizar Amedi’s selection, he in turn appointed Ali al-Zaidi the prime minister-designate of Iraq. Mr Zaidi has never previously held political office. He has said that Iraq will be a “balanced country regionally and internationally”.

Mr Zaidi was backed by the Shia Coordination Framework, though both Sunni and Kurdish parties are expected to be in the new cabinet.

Chatham House analysis argues that Iraqi parliamentarians have often favoured “consensus figures” as prime ministers because they “pose little threat to any of them”. This analysis was echoed by the International Crisis Group.

US President Donald Trump, who has spoken to Mr Zaidi directly, said that “we support, very strongly”, his candidacy. However, US support will likely be conditional on Iraqi action to curtail militia groups (see below).

Former Prime Minister Malaki was also proposed

Mr Zaidi was not the framework’s first candidate for the post; in January 2026, it proposed former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Mr Malaki was in office from 2006 to 2014, resigning in response to the rise of Islamic State/Daesh from 2014. Iraq legalised the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in the same year.

Mr Malaki’s nomination was withdrawn in response to extensive US criticism. President Trump had warned that the US would “no longer help Iraq” if Mr Malaki was chosen. The US considers Mr Malaki to be too close to Iran.

Mr Maliki had said his candidacy was a matter of Iraqi sovereignty. He had also said he was open to the disarming of the PMF.

What are the US priorities in Iraq?

The US’s priorities in Iraq are disarming Iran-backed groups and reducing US troop numbers.

Disarming Iran-backed groups

At a time when Iran’s regional influence has been greatly weakened, the Trump administration’s primary concern remains eliminating Iranian political and military influence in Iraq, notably through ending the separate PMF.

The US is using several tools to put pressure on Iraq to do this, including further sanctions on the PMF, sanctions on those that allegedly supply oil revenue to the PMF, and a halt on some oil export revenues to Iraq. In April 2026, it also ended a sanctions waiver that allowed Iraq to import Iranian electricity (a waiver for gas, under which Iran provides 40% of Iraqi needs, remains in place).

The US controls Iraqi oil export revenues because the funds are directed through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Other potential ways for the US to apply pressure on Iraq include cutting off Iraqi banks’ access to dollars (as happened for some in 2023) and stopping Iranian gas imports.

Troop drawdown and a new defence agreement

The US military drawdown in Iraq was first announced in 2024 and continues today. In 2024, the Iraqi and US governments had announced that the Global Coalition against Daesh (Islamic State) would end its military mission in Iraq by September 2025, and that the two countries would move towards a new bilateral security relationship. As of 2026, the US retains a presence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, but US troops are expected to transition to a new role at the end of the year.

The US expects its new agreement with Iraq, which is still being negotiated, to retain “long-term security and counterterrorism cooperation” and strengthen Iraqi sovereignty against Iran and non-state armed groups.

Will Iraq disarm the Iran-backed militias?

Iraq is under international pressure to disarm Iran-backed militias. There has been some debate within Iraq on if and when to do this.

International pressure for the PMF to disarm

The Popular Mobilisation Forces were established in 2014 to combat Islamic State/Daesh, and number around 238,000. The PMF are made up of a range of groups including a series of Iran-backed militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. While the Iraqi state legalised the PMF in 2014, they are not part of its armed forces.

The Trump administration has been calling for Iraq to fully disarm these groups, a position reiterated during the 2026 conflict with Iran, in which the PMF and the US have launched attacks on each other. Arab Gulf countries have also called for Iraq to do more to control the militias. Some Iraqi militias launched attacks on other states during the conflict.

Iraqi leaders have acknowledged that state control over some militia groups is limited.

Debate and division within the PMF in 2026

In 2025 and 2026, some support has been expressed in Iraqi political debates for disarming the PMF or absorbing it into the state armed forces.

Following the 2025 elections, some PMF groups had expressed their willingness to disarm, citing their increased parliamentary representation. However, Kata’ib Hezbollah was among the groups that fully rejected disarmament. BBC Monitoring analysis notes that several PMF elements, after the US strikes in 2026, now see the struggle with the US as “existential” and “enduring”.

In 2026, some members of the Shia Coordination Framework have reportedly discussed their conditions for a potential disarmament process. The conditions included:

• protection for militia leaders
• non-interference with militia leaders’ economic interests
• no fixed timetable for disarmament

The outgoing Prime Minister, Mohammed al-Sudani, had previously linked disarmament to the continued drawdown of US forces taking place across 2025 and 2026.

How significant are Kurdish divisions in Iraq?

There are increasing tensions between the main Kurdish groups in Iraq.

Kurdistan region of Iraq

Kurds constitute an estimated 15% to 20% of Iraq’s population and are its second-largest ethnic group.

Kurdish politics in Iraq has been dominated by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). They share control of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (the KRI) and maintain their own security forces, known as the peshmerga. The UK and the US have worked closely with the KRI Government, including to combat Islamic State/Daesh.

As set out in sections 1 to 3 of the Commons Library briefing on the KRI, while the KDP and PUK govern in cooperation, there are increasing tensions between these groups. Recent differences include disagreements over how to achieve KRI independence (the KDP organised an independence referendum in 2017), relations with the federal government (especially over oil), and how to continue power sharing given the relative PUK decline in regional and federal elections.

Electoral performance and tensions over power sharing

In the federal elections of 2025, the KDP won 28 seats and the PUK won 18. In regional elections held in 2024 (which were delayed due to KDP–PUK disagreements over the electoral system), the KDP won 39 out of the 100 available seats and the PUK won 23. At the time of writing, no regional government has been formed.

Given the PUK’s declining performance in elections, the KDP has sought to revisit the power-sharing agreement under which the two share regional cabinet positions equally. Under the same agreement, the KDP holds the regional presidency while the PUK holds the federal government presidency.

In 2026, the KDP boycotted the presidential vote in the federal parliament, saying it was illegal, and suggested that the president’s selection should be tied to negotiations on a KRI government. The KDP has since resumed sitting in the federal parliament. This followed a request by Prime Minister-designate Zaidi.

Analysis for Chatham House argues that the continuing deadlock within the KRI meant it was “at the mercy of other actors” during the Israel/US–Iran conflict in 2026. The region experienced multiple attacks by both sides, following speculation that Kurdish armed groups in Iraq and Iran could mobilise against the Iranian regime.

The analysis also notes that the impasse has allowed Iraq’s federal government to expand its power over the KRI, such as over the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline and arranging the collection of customs duties. These will likely contribute to future KRI–federal tensions.

What challenges does Iraq’s economy face?

Iraq’s economy heavily depends on oil. It has consequently suffered following the Israel/US–Iran conflict, which halted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iraqi state depends on oil revenues

Oil is central to Iraq’s economy, constituting around 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) and almost all of its exports, and providing around 90% of all government revenue.

While the Israel/US–Iran conflict of 2026 has pushed up global oil and gas prices, Iraq has not been able to capitalise on this due to the halt on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which between 80% and 90% of Iraqi oil exports flow. In 2026, Iraqi oil exports have fallen more than any other Gulf state, with oil revenues 75% lower in April than the year before.

Within Iraq, the conflict has also driven a rise in inflation and job losses.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Iraq’s economy will be hit more than Iran in 2026, with a projected GDP decline of 6.8% (versus 6.1% for Iran).

However, if the conflict ends and the Strait of Hormuz reopens, one major Iraqi oil company has said production could quickly resume; in this scenario, the IMF projects over 11% GDP growth for Iraq in 2027.

Options for addressing Iraqi dependence on oil and Hormuz

Iraq’s primary alternative land route for oil exports, via a pipeline through the Kurdistan region of Iraq to Turkey, was re-opened after US mediation in March 2026, but cannot meet nationwide demand. As noted above, the KRI and federal government have also often been in conflict over the sharing and administration of oil revenue, hindering use of the pipeline (see section 3 of the Commons Library briefing on the Iraqi Kurdistan region).

In the short term, Iraq is compensating for the lost oil revenue by drawing down foreign reserves and increasing borrowing, but the conflict increases pressure on the new government to:

• diversify Iraq’s economy
• reform public sector salaries and subsidies
• agree greater use of the oil pipeline via the KRI
• develop new oil pipelines, such as through Syria

However, new oil pipeline routes may draw criticism and opposition from the KRI government by reducing the importance of the KRI pipeline and the leverage it offers over the federal government.