My Lords, I shall speak also to the draft Windsor Framework (UK Internal Market and Unfettered Access) Regulations 2024. I offer my gratitude to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, chair of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee; the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments; and members of those committees in this House and the other place for their expeditious consideration of both instruments.
These regulations deliver on key commitments set out in the Safeguarding the Union Command Paper, the contents of which I set out on the Floor of the House on 1 February. The commitments made in that Command Paper will strengthen our union and the UK internal market now and for the long term. I am pleased that the Command Paper has created a situation whereby the Democratic Unionist Party agreed with the recommendation of its leadership to end the boycott of Stormont and has provided the basis on which the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland have returned, with support from across the community; a Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly has been elected with a full complement of Assembly Members now able to serve fully their constituents; a First Minister and deputy First Minister are now in office, and a full complement of Executive Ministers is now forming the Administration in Northern Ireland. It is in that context that I ask noble Lords to consider the two regulations before the House.
I turn to the first of these, the draft Windsor Framework (Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland) Regulations 2024, which seek to strengthen and future-proof Northern Ireland’s place within our union in law. They do so consistent with the vital protections contained in the Acts of Union 1800 and by the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. They seek to address sincere concerns among some in the unionist community that Northern Ireland’s status within the union has somehow been diminished. The Government have been clear in our determination to see our union strengthened, and these regulations have been designed with that in mind. They clarify that Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the sovereign Act of Parliament that gives effect to the Government’s commitments under the withdrawal agreement, operates subject to the democratic safeguards in the Windsor Framework. That, of course, includes the Stormont brake, which gives the Assembly, now that it is up and running once again, powerful and vital democratic oversight over new, amending and replacing EU laws.
These regulations also provide a safeguard against any prospect of regulatory borders between Great Britain and Northern Ireland emerging from future agreements with the European Union. They mean that no Government in the future can agree to another protocol or form of agreement which would undermine the integrity of the United Kingdom internal market. On matters of domestic legislation, the regulations will introduce new safeguards so that government Bills that might affect trade between Northern Ireland and other parts of the UK are properly assessed. Ministers in charge of such a Bill would need to provide a Written Statement to Parliament on whether legislation would have a significant adverse effect on trade between Northern Ireland and other parts of the UK.
My Lords, before I get to the specifics of these two statutory instruments, I ask, in relation to legacy inquests under way in Northern Ireland, is the Minister not extremely perturbed—indeed, embarrassed—by the fact that state bodies appear to be openly running down the clock to 1 May, when the due process that we set such store by in the United Kingdom will no longer apply in Northern Ireland thanks to the shameful legacy Act? In one case, a Ministry of Defence official told an inquest, “We have only a single officer supporting Northern Ireland inquests.” In another, the legal representative of the PSNI admitted that further resources could be deployed and more progress made, but said, in terms, “What’s the point?” Is this not a disgraceful way to treat victims of the Troubles, who have suffered so much already? An abject failure by state officials and agencies to produce the necessary files in anything like a timely fashion also continues, despite the relevant state bodies being directed to do so by a serving coroner acting with the full authority of the Lady Chief Justice.
What on earth makes the Minister think that a body which the legacy Act sets up outside the judicial system headed by a retired former Chief Justice, however distinguished, will fare any better? Or, as many suspect, will those who will be denied proper inquests have to make do with a vastly inferior process on the cheap?
Having said that, I congratulate both the Secretary of State and Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP on the resurrection of Stormont. We hope that the people of Northern Ireland will see the tangible benefits of functioning devolved government without delay. Sir Jeffrey’s detractors would be wise to bear in mind that having functioning devolution is absolutely critical to safeguarding the union. The DUP recognised at St Andrews in 2006—I remember it well—that the future of Northern Ireland is necessarily shared, and its governance will always entail compromise.
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Finally, I ask something for clarification. The Command Paper states in paragraph 17 that this deal will
“end dynamic alignment with EU law”.
Surely this is particularly misleading. Ministers are spinning the Stormont brake—which can be used only in very specific conditions and on amendments to or replacements of EU law under the protocol—as if that ends dynamic alignment. It does not. Northern Ireland remains dynamically aligned to the same portion of European Union law. To claim that the Stormont brake ends that is like saying, because one could occasionally choose to put a finger over one of the tiny nozzles in a shower head, that the shower no longer has a full-flow function. There are dangers in misrepresenting the facts or in overspinning this deal. No matter how welcome the end—the restoration of Stormont power-sharing, and I very much welcome that—this does not justify any means of getting there.
There are serious questions to be asked as to how much of an honest broker this Government really are regarding Northern Ireland. That the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland held a joint press conference with the DUP leader, but with no other party leader, and that the Prime Minister did not hold one with the Taoiseach—as is usual on such important occasions, and as I remember witnessing—is deeply worrying. The Government claim they negotiated solely with the DUP because the other parties did not have a problem with the Windsor Framework or with the resurrection of Stormont. However, that breaches the process established under the Good Friday agreement of negotiating with all parties—for example, the multi-party talks resulting in New Decade, New Approach in 2020, to which the Minister was an important party as an adviser.
The fundamental conundrum is that Brexit meant a stark choice for English Conservatives and unionists. The harder the Brexit—and both the Tories and the DUP chose a very hard Brexit—the harder the trade border in the Irish Sea and the greater the discomfort for unionists and those Conservatives who trumpet their support for the union but—notably like Boris Johnson and the noble Lord, Lord Frost, did with their Brexit deal—in fact often betray it. None of us knows how all this will play out over the next decade or so, but we can be sure that Brexit will continue to poison the shallow well of peace and stability on the island of Ireland, and that is a cause of continuing concern.
My Lords, I endorse the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in relation to the wind-down of the inquests as a consequence of the legacy Act. What is happening in Northern Ireland is outrageous at the moment and causes huge distress to victims.
These instruments derive from the Command Paper Safeguarding the Union,which was stated to be the product of detailed discussions with the Democratic Unionist Party. Paragraph 2 of the paper refers to these discussions being conducted alongside
“engagement with other Northern Ireland political parties and the business community”.
Could the Minister tell the House with whom that engagement took place, since other parties were apparently not sighted of the content of this Command Paper? Can the Minister tell your Lordships’ House why the agreed processes of the Good Friday agreement, which are intended to ensure inclusivity and all-party engagement in order to make change or develop matters, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which was passed to make provision for the Government of Northern Ireland for the purpose of implementing the agreement reached at the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland, did not operate in this case?
It may have been predicated on enabling the DUP to return to government in the Northern Ireland Assembly—and I am glad to see the Assembly back and running. However, exclusion of all but one party at this critical time, and the failure to follow the principles established in the Northern Ireland Act in the creation of government policy affecting Northern Ireland, are unlikely to generate trust among the political parties or in the UK Government.
In the multiparty document recommending the Good Friday agreement to the people of Northern Ireland, the signatories said:
“We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations … we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements … we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement. It is accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional arrangements—an Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to British Acts of Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland—are interlocking and interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South Council are so closely inter-related that the success of each depends on … the other”.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and to take part in the debate. There are two aspects to the package that the Government have brought forward. One is the Command Paper itself, which contains much in the way of the presentation, justification, pledges and promises of new bodies and so on. I hope that there will be an opportunity, at some time in the near future, to debate in full the Command Paper, because what we are also dealing with tonight is the second aspect of the package: the legal instruments and provision. They are what really matter, because it is only legal change—by legislation—that can alter the current arrangements under the protocol/Windsor Framework.
What do these statutory instruments actually do? In essence, the critical question for many unionists in Northern Ireland, from various parties and none, is: do they remove the Irish Sea border and its cause—the subjection of Northern Ireland to foreign jurisdiction regarding the production of goods and agri-food, a large part of our economy?
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Looked at objectively, clearly and forensically, the answer is that, clearly, they do not. Whatever else they represent, they do not remove, at all, the serious constitutional, democratic and, for many, economic damage of the Windsor Framework. However, I accept that they do provide reassurances, clarifications and modifications to certain procedures in how the Irish Sea border and EU jurisdiction operate in practice. Many will see positives in that, and I fully understand it. However, these are all within the context of the continuing application of the framework and the protocol, since not a word of the protocol has changed.
I accept that, in the overall package that has been put forward by the Government in their Command Paper, there are things which are positive, which have been referenced already, such as the east-west council, InterTrade UK and the changes to the budget with the new formula, although I share the concerns about the intervention that appears to be taking place in terms of revenue raising. On the one hand, we are told by many that we need to get devolution back to allow Northern Ireland politicians to make decisions; then, almost immediately, we have senior politicians, including former Secretaries of State, warning that if Stormont does not act in a certain way, Westminster will intervene —so much for respecting the Sewel convention and devolution. I commend the work in other areas too and congratulate those who have been involved in achieving this. There are some significant promises and pledges, although we have heard some of them before; I hope that this time they will be delivered.
Coming back to the legislation, which is the key and operable part of what changes or does not change as far as the current position is concerned, these regulations are being made under Section 8C of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. These enable Ministers to make regulations for the purpose, importantly, of implementing the Northern Ireland protocol and for related purposes. That is the purpose of the section under which these relations have been found—to implement the protocol. That guides us in terms of what is presented in these SIs.
The Windsor Framework (Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland) Regulations 2024 contain five parts. First, we have the new provision, inserted into Section 38 of the 2018 Act, about the union. It is positive in words and declaratory in nature. I take no issue with its contents. However, it does not and cannot change or reduce any obligation under EU law in Northern Ireland. It is not operable or effective, nor has it any efficacy in terms of changing anything that is applied to Northern Ireland under the protocol following the Windsor Framework.
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I should be clear that this provision does not bind Parliament’s hands, but rather ensures that Parliament is properly informed by the Government. The approach we are taking will deliver clarity to businesses that Northern Ireland’s unfettered access to the UK internal market will not be frustrated.
Finally, this legislation provides for how any independent review of the Windsor Framework would operate, requiring the Government to commission such a review one month after the Assembly having passed a consent vote on the Windsor Framework without cross-community consent. In those circumstances, the Government would be obliged to respond to a report from the independent review within six months and raise its contents at the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee.
I now turn to the draft Windsor Framework (UK Internal Market and Unfettered Access) Regulations. The Government are clear that the old protocol created unacceptable barriers to the United Kingdom internal market. In response, the Windsor Framework sought to restore the functioning of the internal market by ensuring the smooth flow of trade within the UK. It disapplied a range of EU law, including ensuring that Northern Ireland benefits from the same VAT and alcohol taxes as the rest of the UK. We saw the framework commence at the start of October, with its benefits now being enjoyed by over 3,000 businesses registered on the internal market scheme.
Following the Windsor Framework, the Government announced the border target operating model. In line with this approach, we have now, for the first time, started to phase in checks and controls for Irish goods and non-qualifying goods moving from the island of Ireland to Great Britain. This is a powerful demonstration of Northern Ireland’s integral place within the UK’s internal market and rebuts claims that it is a member instead of the EU’s single market. The reality is that third-country members of the EU single market will now have full third-country processes applied, while Northern Ireland’s businesses have unfettered access to their most important market by far, in Great Britain.
As a result of these regulations, this now includes guarantees for qualifying Northern Ireland goods moving from Northern Ireland to the rest of the United Kingdom via Dublin. This unfettered access is future-proofed, ensuring that it will persist regardless of how rules evolve in either Northern Ireland or Great Britain. These regulations will more squarely focus the benefits of unfettered access on Northern Ireland traders. The regulations both tackle avoidance of the rules and ensure that agri-food goods are exempt from SPS processes only if they are dispatched from registered Northern Ireland food and feed operators. We will also expressly affirm through these regulations that export procedures will not be applied to Northern Ireland goods moving directly to other parts of the UK internal market. This reflects the legal guarantees secured in the Windsor Framework and achieves the effect of provisions dropped in the then United Kingdom Internal Market Bill by the previous Government in 2020.
The Government are also determined to ensure that public authorities are clear-minded about their existing legal duty to have special regard to Northern Ireland’s place within the UK internal market. We are therefore taking a power to make guidance on Section 46 of the UK Internal Market Act. That guidance will set out how public authorities should have special regard to Northern Ireland’s place in the UK’s internal market and customs territory, and the need to maintain the free flow of goods from Northern Ireland to Great Britain. Public authorities will be bound to have regard to it, ensuring they meet the UK’s international obligations in a manner that is also consistent with ensuring the smooth flow of goods within the internal market.
The Government are now working with vigour to deliver on the commitments set out in the Command Paper, because we want to make Northern Ireland work well for all who live there today and allow it to remain a thriving, prosperous part of the United Kingdom. On that note, I beg to move.
Appropriately, therefore, the package of measures presented in the Safeguarding the Union Command Paper manages to address DUP concerns within the boundaries of the UK’s international legal obligations. Those obligations relate both to the EU and to the Irish Government and remain sensitive and vital relationships for the UK, particularly as they affect Northern Ireland. What happens in Northern Ireland will continue to be crucial to those relationships.
With this in mind, it is worth being exceedingly careful in legislating in this area, and I seek clarification from the Minister on four specific areas. First, relating to the amendment of Section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 regarding the transparency obligation, what is the definition of—or criteria for measuring—what would constitute
“a significant adverse effect on trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom”?
Furthermore, the Command Paper states in paragraph 146 that, if there was to be such a significant adverse effect,
“the Government will set out any measures it proposes to protect the internal market”.
In such an eventuality, how might such measures be made known to Parliament by the Government? I would be grateful for an answer to that question.
Secondly, how is the House to understand the
“prohibition of certain Northern Ireland-related agreements”
that is to be added to Section 38 of the 2018 Act? This regulation specifically prevents only a future UK-EU agreement that
“would create a new regulatory border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland”.
In the Government’s view, does this constitute the complete fulfilment of the Command Paper’s claim to protect against
“future EU agreements which create new EU law alignment for Northern Ireland and adversely affect the UK’s internal market”?
My third question relates to the amendment of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 on the independent review after the democratic consent vote. Why is the independent review to include consideration of any effect of the Windsor Framework on, first, the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and, secondly, the operation of the single market in services between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom? I ask because the Windsor Framework does not cover services and because it is without prejudice to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK. Indeed, the latter point is to be made law with the amendment of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 that we are currently considering.
Fourthly, the Safeguarding the Union Command Paper announces some ambitious new structures and bodies. Given their importance to the realisation of the objectives of this legislation, I would like clarification from the Minister on the following matters. How does the new UK east-west council relate to existing bodies affecting all-UK and east-west governance, including the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council, the Interministerial Standing Committee, and the British-Irish Council? How, too, would it relate to the new ministerial group that, according to paragraph 152 of the Command Paper, is
“to oversee the implementation of the new arrangements”?
How is “political” and “governmental” participation in the east-west council from Northern Ireland to be decided? Is it to be the same as for the North/South Ministerial Council, with two Northern Ireland Ministers designated to attend each meeting, both of whom have to be jointly signed off by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister? How does the function of these new bodies and structures relate to the common frameworks programme?
In that context, there is a regrettable tone to parts of the Command Paper Safeguarding the Union. The agreements made seem to have been totally ignored, as the Government state in paragraph 14 of the executive summary of the Command Paper:
“Overall, this package of measures reflects the outcome of the negotiations with the Democratic Unionist Party; builds upon the progress secured by the Windsor Framework while securing further changes to its operation; looks forward with a broad range of significant further protections for the UK internal market, including in statute; and establishes the structures that will preserve these protections for the long-term”.
The Government say that there needs
“to be ongoing reflection … The Government is fully committed to that ongoing engagement and work, so that all agreed arrangements operate fully consistently with Northern Ireland’s place in the UK and its internal market, now and in the future”.
Much of what is of substance and contained in the Command Paper is not new; it derives from work done more than a year ago with the EU. Notwithstanding that, given the importance of trust to the functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly, can the Minister assure the House that future reflection, negotiation and legislative activity will be the product of discussion with all the parties and that there will be no further situation in which the Government negotiate and then legislate on the basis of a document agreed with one party only?
Regulation 2(3) of the Windsor Framework (Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland) Regulations prohibits the UK ratifying a Northern Ireland-related agreement with the EU that would give rise to a “regulatory border”. Apart from the fact that no Parliament can bind its successor, that provision lacks clarity and could result, given the significant economic consequences involved in future EU-NI agreements, in complex and lengthy litigation between parties seeking to assert that a particular measure does or does not involve a regulatory border.
Much good work has been done between the EU and the UK, and there are now vastly simplified procedures applicable in a range of areas such as medicines, customs, the transportation of goods, agri-food, the movement of pets and the entry of plants, shrubs, trees and seeds to Northern Ireland. All that indicates good and constructive work between the UK and the EU, but it is most important that this constructive working relationship is not damaged by unilateral action on the part of the UK.
Many issues remain to be agreed between the EU and the UK. For example, while UK public health standards will apply to goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain, EU requirements for animal health and plant health remain fully in place to prevent any risk of transmissible diseases on the island of Ireland and such diseases spreading to other parts of the EU single market. There is also a significant outstanding problem with veterinary medicines, which requires urgent action to prevent significant problems for the agri-food industry in Northern Ireland.
Complex new arrangements have been introduced through the Command Paper for internal market assessments, which will require consideration of whether a new regulation may result in increased red tape or barriers for trade between the constituent parts of the UK and within our internal market. The Government have committed themselves in the Command Paper and the SI to
“an enforceable means for the economic rights of Northern Ireland to be upheld in accordance with the Windsor Framework”.
The amendment of Section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, to provide a new transparency obligation, is to be welcomed. But as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, in the absence of a definition of the term “significant adverse effect”, it is not clear how that provision will be interpreted and to what extent it will be effective. Can the Minister provide any more information than that provided to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that this will be a matter for government departments to assess?
The second SI seeks to ensure unfettered access for Northern Ireland goods to the UK internal market—that is to be welcomed. Some very burdensome processes resulted from the Northern Ireland protocol. The evidence received by the Northern Ireland protocol committee—now the Windsor Framework committee, on which I serve—was extensive and indicative of significant additional costs being imposed on businesses seeking to import goods from GB, which might pass through that part of the EU internal market in goods that exists in Northern Ireland to EU states such as the Republic of Ireland. It articulates a number of provisions for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to issue guidance to assist business and authorities operating in what can be a complex environment. However, the Command Paper refers to the fact that two separate regulatory systems will continue to apply in Northern Ireland: that of the UK and that of the EU in so far as goods are affected.
Today’s disclosure that the financial settlement that accompanied the return of the Northern Ireland Assembly is to be accompanied by conditions to be detailed “in due course” does not encourage hope. Northern Ireland is the lowest-earning region of the UK. It has 130,000 long-term sick people and has economic inactivity rates of 26.8%, including those who care for the long-term sick and injured, many of whom suffered and continue to suffer as a result of the Troubles. If the whole of the UK suffered from those levels of long-term sickness, some 4.5 million people would be long-term sick, rather than the current 1.1 million. Can the Minister assure the House that the conditions to be imposed will not make life even harder for the Northern Ireland population, in effect stealth taxing them further and thus reducing the existing very low incomes of so many people in Northern Ireland?
These instruments will be passed by your Lordships today. What is important is that future government legislative activity is the product of consultation and discussion with all the parties in Northern Ireland, so that trust in the Government develops, and that it takes into account the knowledge and experience of those who do business in and with Northern Ireland, so as to ensure maximum future prosperity in the whole United Kingdom.