1: Clause 1, page 2, line 2, after “consumers” insert “and representatives from environmental groups”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, in conjunction with another amendment in the Duke of Wellington’s name to clause 1, seeks to ensure that undertakers take into consideration the views of environmental groups alongside the views of consumers.
My Lords, I am honoured to be the first person to speak at the Report stage of this very good Bill. As I have said, I realise that this is not Second Reading, but I repeat my support for the Bill. I have already indicated to the Minister that I wish only to try to improve it in certain small respects.
In this group I have four amendments—Amendments 1, 5, and 6—and I have added my name to Amendment 7. I have tabled Amendment 1 because the history of the last 35 years shows that the environmental voice in decision-making has been insufficient. One has to admit that considerable damage has been done, at least to the aquatic environment, in the 35 years since the water companies were privatised. Mrs Thatcher, Prime Minister at the time, believed that privatising the water companies would in fact help the environment because there would be more investment from the private sector than if they had remained in public ownership. But I have to say that in that respect, she was wrong.
It was difficult at the time to imagine quite how the water companies would structure themselves financially in order to take out of the industry much in way of high interest payments and dividends. All I seek to do in Amendment 1 is to balance the consumer voice with a stronger environmental voice. I am grateful to the Minister for the several meetings I have had with her on this matter. I think that Ministers are broadly sympathetic to what I am trying to achieve in this amendment, but as is so often the case with Ministers, they prefer their own wording to any amendment that is proposed. I would like, however, to continue this theme because it is important. Amendments 1 and 5 in effect go together. We should ensure that the environmental voice is stronger in all future decision-making.
It is worth reminding the House what the Bill says. It requires relevant undertakers—the water companies—to
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That is basically my point. I almost prefer the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, because in the end what he proposes is that it should be left up to each company to decide whether it has special representation on a board or whether it has a committee or panel. That is a very sensible way to approach it. To leave that direction to officials in Ofwat seems wrong to me. Every company is different; its circumstances and financial condition are different. Each one should decide how it is able to hear clearly the interests of the consumer and of the environment. I would almost prefer to divide the House on his amendment than my own, which takes a different approach but achieves the same result.
That is basically my proposition in this group. I have other amendments in other groups, to which I will return later. I thank the House for hearing my arguments, which I hope will gather support from all sides.
My Lords, I declare an interest as having been a non-executive director of Severn Trent, the largest of the listed water companies, for eight years between 2014 and 2022. I chaired the board’s remuneration committee for that time.
I thank the Minister for taking the time to meet me last week to discuss my concerns about key aspects of this Bill. I am only sorry that her apparent sympathy for at least some of my arguments has not translated into accepting any of my amendments. I have three amendments in this first group. I will be as brief as I can, but each addresses a completely separate issue.
I will take them in order. My first is Amendment 4. New Section 35B(2)(a) addresses performance-related pay. The rules will set standards that companies will have to meet in a financial year in order to be able to make awards of performance-related pay to chief executives and directors for that year. However, the Bill extends the scope of this section, in new subsection (5)(c), to holders of such other description of role with the water company as Ofwat may specify.
My Amendment 4 would remove this extended application to individuals below board level. This extension will be difficult to implement in practice, as different water companies will have individuals described differently by title and role. Nor would such an extension be consistent with general remuneration under the corporate governance rules for listed companies, which do not extend to individuals below board level. If we wish to attract and support the next generation of leaders in this vital industry from middle management, this will not be achieved by extending these restrictive remuneration practices to them.
As the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, has just said, those in this House are better qualified than Ofwat in certain aspects, and this is one of them: to decide on how far down the management chain these rules should apply. My amendment draws the appropriate and proportionate line in balancing the objectives of the Bill with the interests of those most directly impacted by it.
I will speak to Amendment 2 in my name, and I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Roborough and Lord Sikka, for adding their names to it. I will speak also to Amendment 8 in my name, and again I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for adding her name to this amendment. Finally, I am sincerely thankful to the Minister and her officials for discussing with me these amendments and the two other amendments in my name, which will come up later.
Probably the most fundamental failure in our water industry is that the regulator either did not understand or was unwilling to investigate sufficiently the financial structuring of the water companies: how these structures and indebtedness were altered over time beyond all recognition from the original enterprises, and what the risks and impacts would be. If anyone is in any doubt about the results, they need only look at Thames Water, which is now all but drowning in fetid pools of ever more expensive debt, adding to its existing £16 billion of net debt so as to limp along from day to day and racking up huge future interest liabilities in addition to the principal £3 billion it is seeking.
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This amendment is not complex or onerous, but it is vital. It requires simply that water companies report annually on their financial structuring, debt levels and any associated risks. Experience shows that such changes need to be explicitly highlighted in plain language. This will ensure that such alterations or liabilities are surfaced in a timely way and do not slip past, as they have done hitherto, perhaps buried in the financial reporting back pages, or simply not understood by anyone other than a forensic accountant with the time and enthusiasm to unpick the details.
The Minister may say that this is going to be covered by guidance, but the evidence shows that we need more than it being subsumed in general words outside the Bill. It is central to the issue and the mess that the Bill seeks to remedy. Unless we put this specific requirement in the Bill, it will, over time—just as happened in the years post privatisation—enable similar problems to evolve: problems that are now all but overpowering some water companies. Not to do this would be irresponsible, and above all would show that we have learned nothing from the sorry tale of some water companies and the importance of regular and comprehensible reviews of the evolution, or indeed revolution, of their financial structuring. As a minimum, it is an aide-mémoire, a marker that such matters are not possible to quietly put through under the radar of the regulators, investors and consumers.
However, there is another element here. I have been given to understand, to my astonishment, that there is pressure from so-called “upstairs” not to include this because—this is the amazing part—of a fear that it might “put off” investors. The department, regulators, investors and consumers all need to be absolutely clear on what financial structuring and debt commitments are being taken on, and if they are being altered. The water companies themselves would also benefit from being up front with the regulator and other stakeholders about the direction they are taking. To suggest, as it has been to me, that these matters would be better not specifically highlighted on a regular basis is to undermine transparency and obstruct the very due diligence that all stakeholders should be able to expect and that water companies should deliver.
This amendment will ensure that never again can regulators be unaware until it is too late for them to act of what financial strategies water companies are pursuing. If only they had intervened earlier, water companies could have been prevented from siphoning off huge funds to parent companies and being loaded with debt. I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say, but we need to help the water industry to help itself, and for that reason I may need to test the opinion of the House.
I turn now to Amendment 8 in my name, which is in the same group but on a rather different subject. Along with failing to notice the financial jiggery-pokery, the other major failing in the arrangements was the extent to which—so long as water was plentiful, clean and cheap—environmental issues and pollution took a distant back seat in the regulation of the water industry. The lesson here is that civil society, not the regulator, repeatedly raised—sometimes in co-operation with the media—the issue of river and beach pollution. I noticed on Monday’s news that local campaigners—again, not the regulator—have now brought to public attention that developers have apparently been discharging sewage from construction projects directly into the Thames. The regulator’s response? That it is not a matter for them.
A proper mechanism is needed for civil society to engage with the authority, and water companies, in order to raise issues of concern and have them noted and addressed—not via some occasional talking shop that can be ignored but by a regular pattern of meetings that the authority commits to that are minuted, with the minutes made public.
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“have arrangements in place for involving consumers in decisions”.
Fine, although I think it should be consumers “and environmentalists”. On the same page, at line 41, the Bill refers to
“a requirement for persons representing the views of consumers”—
I have added “and environmentalists”—
“to be members of a board, committee or a panel”,
or whatever the body may be. That is basically my point, and I hope that Members will consider it very carefully and agree that it is important to increase that voice.
Amendment 6, which is mine, and Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, to which I have added my name, make a completely different point. I have served on a number of boards where sectional interests have been represented, and in my experience, it almost always leads to difficulties in decision-making and therefore reduces the effectiveness of the board.
I am very much in favour of a sectional interest, such as consumers or environmentalists, being strongly represented in a panel or similar body. In Committee, I tabled an amendment suggesting that it should also be a requirement that the chief executive of the company in question be required to meet regularly with such panels. That would be a very much better way for consumer and environmental interests to be heard strongly, and they would be more likely to have influence over the recommendations of the chief executive to the board.
I appreciate that Ofwat is consulting on the scope of the Bill and its application to individuals. It asserts that it is minded to apply the rule to any executive director who is a member of the regulated company board in receipt of performance-related pay, because that is where ultimate accountability and leadership responsibilities lie. I look forward to the Minister’s response to my concerns in tabling this amendment. In particular, I would be interested to know whether she agrees with Ofwat’s current stance that only executive directors should be brought within the scope of the performance-related pay prohibition, and, if so, whether she will communicate that view to Ofwat.
Amendment 7 is my second amendment and very much relates to what the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, has just been talking about: the duty for water companies to have arrangements in place to involve consumers in decisions. New subsection (6) in Clause 1 allows this in regard for
“persons representing the views of consumers to be members of a board, committee or panel”,
as we have heard. My amendment adds a sentence which ensures that it is for the boards of water companies, not Ofwat—for very much the reasons that the noble Duke raised—to decide on which of those three forums best suits their own requirements. I am grateful to him for adding his name to this amendment, and I agree with all his arguments in support of it and his own amendment. The Minister commented at Second Reading that it always pains her to disagree with him on anything, so I am working on the assumption that she will wish to spare herself further agony by accepting this amendment. I fully support strengthening the voice of consumers. This can be achieved in a number of different ways, as the Bill accepts, but each company in the sector is best placed to judge what is most appropriate for its own circumstances.
I was surprised to read in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, in the overview prepared by Defra, that one of its provisions is to
“ensure consumer representation on water company boards”.
I should be grateful, when the Minister responds, if she could confirm that this is not indeed the position of the Government, irrespective of the choices which this Bill purports to give and the consultation exercise to be conducted by Ofwat.
There should be no highly prescriptive one-size-fits-all approach. Those best equipped to represent consumer interest may not wish to, or be equipped to, sit on corporate boards, with all the responsibilities and liabilities that entails. For Ofwat even to be given the option of this route risks alienating such experts and losing completely their valuable contribution. Nowhere in its consultation document does Ofwat point to the disadvantages of consumers sitting on boards, to which I have drawn your Lordships’ attention. I am therefore concerned that prospective respondents to the consultation may be being given an unbalanced view of the options.
We should not give Ofwat the power to require companies to appoint representatives of the consumer interest to their boards. Maybe some companies would opt for this route, but equally they may feel that stakeholder interest would be better served through the mechanism of panels or committees. My amendment would ensure that it was the boards of water companies which made that decision, not Ofwat. It would be helpful if the Minister, in her reply, could confirm not only that all identified options are, in reality, properly on the table, but that she recognises the disadvantages of board representation in this regard, which would represent a very suboptimal solution.
My final amendment in this group is Amendment 10. Clause 1(4) provides that the rules about performance-related pay can be applied in respect of the financial year beginning 1 April 2024 and for subsequent years. In effect, they can be applied retroactively. My amendment would change that date from 2024 to 2025 so that they would first be applied from the financial year beginning 1 April 2025. If we do something today, we believe that the law applying to it should be the law enforced today, not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it. I would argue that the application of these rules retroactively is even more egregious.
One might at least expect your Lordships to know precisely what it is that they are passing and the resultant retrospective impact, but that is not the case. We are delegating the power to make such rules under this legislation to a third party, Ofwat, and I have already expressed severe reservations about its expertise in doing so, given that this is outside the core competence of an economic regulator. We know not what the rules will be, how they will be applied and what impact they will have. Further, it is not intended that they be subject to further scrutiny by this House before being brought into force, as I say, with retrospective effect.
The retroactive application of rules yet to be drafted will undermine investment and increase the cost of capital, raising prices for consumers. Over the next five years, the sector needs to raise £20 billion of new finance, much of it equity, to deliver the largest investment programme in the sector’s history. Investors are already nervous and can earn better returns in other sectors and in other countries. We need to provide confidence that the UK is open for business. Retrospective action destroys that by creating uncertainty about how their investments will be treated.
It will undermine new talent and the sector clearly needs talented individuals to deliver the amount of improvement we all want. Retroactive changes of this sort will undermine employees’ trust in a career. Why choose water when other sectors do not face this risk? If we cannot attract the best people into the water sector, we will not see best performance.
This Water (Special Measures) Bill is designed to drive better future performance. It is too late to change performance by applying rules to a year when two-thirds of it is already over. The water sector is characterised by assets, with 100-year asset lives and performance challenges that require multiyear investment programmes. That is what we should be concentrating on and incentivising management to achieve, not changing the rules of the game retrospectively as punishment for perceived failings. Many noble Lords, including the Minister herself, have made the point that not all water companies are the same—there are good ones and bad ones. I am concerned that the effect of these rules, when drawn up, will draw no such distinction.
Amendment 10 is about as simple as it gets. It requires the replacement of the number 4 with the number 5 so that the performance-related pay provisions come into effect for the beginning of the next financial year, 1 April 2025, and not the beginning of the current financial year, 1 April 2024. Can the noble Baroness confirm whether these rules are intended to apply to three-year LTIPs, not only those beginning in 2024 but also those beginning as far back as 2022 and 2023, of which 2024 is a part? Her reply on this will be important to me. I urge the Minister to accept this amendment. If she does not, I am minded to test the opinion of the House.