My Lords, hybrid proceedings will now resume. If the capacity of the Chamber is exceeded, I will immediately adjourn the House.
Proceedings on consideration of Commons reasons and amendments on the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill will follow guidance issued by the Procedure and Privileges Committee. When there are counterpropositions, any Member in the Chamber may speak, subject to the usual seating arrangements and the capacity of the Chamber. Any intending to do so should email the clerk or indicate when asked. Members not intending to speak on a group should make room for Members who are. All speakers will be called by the chair. Short questions of elucidation after the Minister’s response are permitted but discouraged. A Member wishing to ask such a question, including Members in the Chamber, must email the clerk.
The groupings are binding. Leave should be given to withdraw. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Chamber only. Where there is no counterproposition, the Minister’s Motion may not be opposed. If a Member speaking remotely intends to trigger a Division, they should make this clear when speaking on the group. Noble Lords following proceedings remotely, but not speaking, may submit their voice, content or not content, to the collection of the voices, by emailing the clerk during the debate. Members cannot vote by email. The way to vote will be via the remote voting system. We will now begin.
The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, says, “Keep it up,” which I know is a sentiment widely shared.
Noble Lords have been clear throughout this debate on the UKIM Bill about their support for the common frameworks programme. I and the Government concur with those sentiments, and I reiterate the Government’s continued commitment to this programme. I am pleased to update your Lordships’ House that common frameworks are developing well, with three common frameworks currently undergoing scrutiny, including in this House’s committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews—and I pay tribute to the work of that committee.
Out of 33 active frameworks that we have assessed are needed, we expect 30 to be agreed by the end of 2020, mostly on a provisional basis, pending scrutiny by Parliament and the devolved legislatures. The common frameworks programme embodies the value of strong intergovernmental relations. The UK Government and the devolved Administrations are working together, on a voluntary basis, in support of cohesive policy-making and the maintenance of high standards in respect of the specific needs of each part of the United Kingdom. While recognising this positive collaboration, we also need to acknowledge that the common frameworks were always intended to cover only a specific set of issues where powers are returning from the EU. Common frameworks support the functioning of the internal market but cannot by themselves ensure regulatory coherence across the whole UK internal market—the key objective of this Bill.
As the Government have noted previously, we regret that the Scottish Government walked away from the joint internal market workstream in spring 2019. Detailed engagement has been ongoing with the Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive on this Bill, and the door remains open to the Scottish Government to join similar discussions. The strength of common frameworks lies in the fact that they provide a forum for discussion and collaboration, with a clear process in defined, but limited, areas of economic activity.
At end insert “and do propose Amendments 1B, 1C and 1D in lieu—
1B: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Common frameworks process
(1) The United Kingdom market access principles shall not apply to any statutory provision or requirement that gives effect to a decision to diverge from harmonised rules that has been agreed through the common frameworks process and states that its purpose is to give effect to that agreement.
(2) No regulations may be made by a Minister of the Crown with regard to a matter that is under consideration under the common frameworks process while that process in relation to that matter is still in progress.
(3) The common frameworks process is a means, established by the Joint Committee on European Negotiations, by which a measure of regulatory consistency to enable a functioning internal market within the United Kingdom may be mutually agreed between the United Kingdom and the devolved governments.”
1C: After Clause 18, insert the following new Clause—
“Common frameworks process
(1) The mutual recognition of authorisation requirements shall not apply to any regulatory requirement that gives effect to a decision to diverge from harmonised rules that has been agreed through the common frameworks process and states that its purpose is to give effect to that agreement.
(2) No regulations may be made by a Minister of the Crown with regard to a matter that is under consideration under the common frameworks process while that process in relation to that matter is still in progress.”
1D: Clause 25, page 19, line 13, at end insert—
“( ) Section 22(2) does not apply if the provision has been agreed through the common frameworks process and it states that its purpose is to give effect to that agreement.””
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 1B, 1C and 1D in lieu, which are in my name. The fact that the Commons have disagreed with your Lordships’ amendments about the common frameworks process is a matter for regret, but they were good enough to give us a clear and simple reason. They told us that these amendments
“will create legal uncertainty, which would be disruptive to business.”
I took this to be a reference to what the noble Lord, Lord True, said when we were considering these amendments on Report:
“No one could know for sure, until the question was determined in court, whether a regulation or requirement, or a combination of regulations or requirements, was giving effect to an agreement reached within a common framework. There would be uncertainty as to whether or not the market access principles applied”.—[Official Report, 18/11/20; col. 1466.]
I can well understand the point that he and the other House are making, but I do not believe that it is incapable of being met, so I have added some words of my own to each of my proposed amendments to suggest how this could be done.
To be given the benefit of exemption from the market access principles, the regulation or exemption would need to state that it was their purpose to give effect to an agreement that had been reached through the common frameworks process. It seems to me that, if this were to be stated in the relevant instrument, the problem that the noble Lord referred to on Report would be overcome: everyone would know what it was and why it was there. No doubt there are other and better ways of achieving this, but my point is that, if there really is a will on the Government’s part to make this system work, a solution can be found. There is surely room for further discussion on this issue; the door must be kept open—and I am encouraged by some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord True, made in opening this debate. I ask your Lordships to invite the Commons to think again, and I will be seeking the opinion of the House as to whether we should do so.
1:45 pm
The problem with the interaction between the common frameworks process and the market access principles is that, in the case of the principles, as the noble Lord has just been telling us, there is no room for any such assessment at all. Take a divergence about food standards, for example. Suppose that a devolved Administration secures agreement for a higher standard for their own purposes, because it has been judged that, overall, it was not a barrier to trade across the UK. This would be an agreement to which the UK Government were party, because that is what the process requires. It would, nevertheless, be incapable of effective enforcement because of the automatic application of the UK Government’s own market access principles—that is the conundrum. Traders from other parts of the UK who had no regard for the higher standard could simply ignore it, irrespective of how simple and easy it was to comply with. That is not where we should be going.
A balance needs to be struck here, if devolution is to be respected. We want this to be a United Kingdom internal market, after all. That means that it needs to suit the needs and aspirations of all parts of the UK, which may differ greatly from one part to another. This is particularly the case for the smaller nations, which are part of our United Kingdom family. That is why the common frameworks process is so important and why it deserves support. Ministers still say they support it, but they have to do what they say. The two approaches to the creation of the internal market need to be reconciled if that process is to remain alive. That should not be beyond the Government’s reach, if they are willing to put their minds to it. I very much hope that they are, and that discussions on these important issues can continue before it is too late. I beg to move.
The following Members in the Chamber have indicated that they wish to speak: the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Naseby. I call the noble Lord, Lord Moylan.
My Lords, I recognise that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and many other noble Lords who have spoken on this subject burn with a passion for their interpretation of the rule of law, but I ask them to reflect that statute needs to have more than principle; it needs to have practicality in its application as well. The effect of these clauses resubmitted in lieu would be to tie the Government’s hands completely in response to any emergency that might arise in Northern Ireland which might need to be addressed. I look in vain in these clauses for any exception that says, for example, “in an emergency”, “if the food in the supermarkets runs out” or “if there is a shortage in supply of medicines”. In such cases, those matters, as I understand these clauses, would need to be addressed through the joint committee, and if the European Union was not willing to accept them, it would need to go through a lengthy process of arbitration. I do not believe that that is acceptable.
My second point relates to devolution and democracy in Northern Ireland. The effect of these clauses is to privilege a particular interpretation of a particular international treaty, the withdrawal agreement.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his thoughtful participation in these debates and his considered amendments to the Bill, which he has now partly revised. I welcome also the willingness of the noble and learned Lord to continue engaging in discussions on his amendment with my officials, and those discussions may continue. I also thank noble Lords opposite for their own positive and practical engagement on these matters. Discussions are not exhausted on this topic.
On the amendment before us, I have cautioned your Lordships’ House before, regarding the previous amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that this would lead to the automatic disapplication of the market access principles, creating a very broad exclusions regime, with the attendant risk of legal uncertainty for businesses and consumers over whether or not market access principles apply. It is the Government’s view that these revised amendments carry similar risks, both in terms of the breadth of the exclusions regime created and in terms of uncertainty. As to the latter, there is no safeguard against different Administrations attempting to implement different interpretations of an agreement into law, potentially leaving the courts in the unenviable position of adjudicating on these different interpretations. That would potentially invite the courts into the common frameworks process, which is inherently undesirable. Any such litigation would create great uncertainty for businesses. This is clearly not in keeping with the need to provide certainty and a stable trading environment for citizens across our United Kingdom.
Moreover, Amendments 1B and 1C prevent the introduction by a UK Government Minister of any new regulations in any area where discussions under the common frameworks process are ongoing. This could mean Ministers would be unable to act, even if there were an urgent need to do so.
Furthermore, the common frameworks programme was established in 2017 to manage the powers returning from the EU in devolved policy areas. In line with its voluntary nature, the programme has not been put into legislation, although I recognise that it is alluded to, in very high-level terms, in Schedule 3 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act.
While it is a key objective of common frameworks to agree consistent regulatory standards, in practice there may be cases where divergent approaches could be agreed through a common framework. If this were to occur, and if any such divergence were to fall within the scope of the market access principles, we should be in no doubt that the market access principles set out in the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill would apply. That means that even if divergence is agreed in a particular case, it would not prevent businesses from other parts of the United Kingdom being able to sell their products into the relevant place. This would ensure that barriers to trade are not erected through the introduction of divergent policy.
We must also bear in mind that common frameworks are jointly owned by the devolved Administrations. Any proposal to legislate them into this Bill would need to take into account their involvement in the programme. While we have carefully reflected on the arguments made in both Houses, I respectfully suggest that the approach put forward in these amendments brings significant drawbacks to the Government’s ability to provide businesses with the certainty they need to operate across the United Kingdom.
I and colleagues across government look forward to discussing further with our partners in the devolved Administrations and devolved legislatures to consider how we can capitalise on the ways of working agreed through common frameworks. We are also working towards concluding a joint review of intergovernmental relations with the devolved Administrations. These future intergovernmental structures will create a system that secures strategic co-operation and proactive discussions on shared areas of interest, including on common frameworks. The aim of any reform will be to establish an adaptable and effective system of governance that facilitates building long-term trust between the Governments.
We are, of course, open to considering how to put these areas of co-operation on a sustainable footing for the longer term, complementing the IGR review and the market access principles to the benefit of citizens and businesses. I beg to move.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
Of course, I appreciate that it is not as simple as that; there are important issues of principle too. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Paul Scully, said in the other place that to legislate the common frameworks into the Bill would,
“not sit well with the flexible and voluntary nature of the common frameworks programme.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/20; col. 601.]
I appreciate, as has been stressed many times in your Lordships’ House, that the whole purpose of the market access principles is to enable traders to do business without internal barriers to trade across the UK. It is about
“a job, someone’s pay packet at the end of the week”,
as the Minister, Chloe Smith, said in evidence to the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee last week. But it all depends on how this is done.
It has to be said, too, that the issues about market access and the problems it may create are not all one way. Spare a thought for the trader in one of the devolved nations who has to have regard to the relevant requirements of all the other parts of the UK when considering whether a good which does not meet his own area’s requirements is something that he can properly market in his own area. It is not sunshine and roses for everyone.
Simply to say that the market access principles do not apply to an agreed decision, which is all that my amendments seek to do, does not seem to me to justify the concern that this would deprive the common frameworks process of its flexible and voluntary nature. Whether a given policy divergence really does create what amounts to a barrier, given its purpose, nature and effect, should be a matter for examination and assessment: that is what the common frameworks process is designed for. It is not about creating barriers, but about allowing for policy divergence in ways that are found, by agreement, to be consistent with the internal market.