United Front Work Department

Order. Before I call the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), I will make a short statement.

The House of Commons respects the jurisdiction of the courts—for example, in our sub judice rule. The sub judice rule applies to all criminal cases, including cases involving espionage, which are currently before courts. It is important that nothing we say should prejudice a fair trial before a jury. The sub judice rule also applies to the majority of civil cases, but it does not apply when a ministerial decision is in question, such as the decision in this case by the Home Secretary to exclude the person known as H6 from the UK on the basis that his exclusion is conducive to the public good on grounds of national security.

I understand that this afternoon the administrative court decided to lift the anonymity order. The Government are responsible to this House, which holds Ministers accountable for what is done on their authority. Although it is important that Members should be able to question Ministers, I remind them of the rule set out in paragraphs 21.20 and 21.23 of “Erskine May” that it is only in order to criticise the conduct of a member of the royal family when debating a substantive motion drawn up in proper terms, which is not the case in this urgent question. I hope that the House now has a feel for the way in which we will debate this subject.

(Urgent Question): To ask the Government if they will make a statement on the extent of the operations of the United Front Work Department within the UK.

The first duty of any Government is national security, and we therefore welcome the court’s decision to uphold the Home Office’s position with regard to the exclusion of H6, who can now be named as Yang Tengbo. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission concluded that there was a “basis for the conclusion” that H6

“had been in a position to generate relationships with prominent UK figures which could be leveraged for political interference purposes by the CCP (including the UFWD) or the Chinese State.”

Where there are individuals who pose a threat to our national security, we are absolutely committed to using the full range of powers available to disrupt them. When we encounter foreign interference or espionage, whether it stems from the United Front Work Department or from any other state-linked actor, we will be swift in using all available tools, including prosecutions, exclusions, sanctions and diplomacy, to keep our country safe.

Given the potential for further litigation, it would be inappropriate for me to say any more, but it is important to recognise that this case does not exist in a vacuum. As the director general of MI5 made clear in October, we are in the most complex threat environment that he has ever seen. Alongside the threat from terrorism, we face ongoing efforts by a number of states, including China, Russia and Iran, to harm the UK’s security. Our response is among the most robust and sophisticated anywhere in the world.

The National Security Act 2023, which was supported by Members on both sides of the House and which strengthened our powers to protect the UK, is central to our protection against states that seek to conduct hostile acts. To date, six individuals have been charged under the new Act, and the Government have been working hard on the roll-out of a crucial part of it: the foreign influence registration scheme, or FIRS. We will say more about that soon, but we intend to lay regulations in the new year and commence the scheme in the summer.

I want to put two things on the record. First, it would have been easier for the Government to come to the House with a statement; obviously, there was more to say than we have allocated time for.

Secondly, I say to Sir Iain: please do not tell the media what you are going to do and how you are going to do it, and do not try to bounce the Chair into making a decision. If anybody else had put in for an urgent question, I would have given it to them—on the basis that I am not dancing to the tune of the media.

It would be helpful if the Government came forward with statements, rather than being dragged to the Dispatch Box. Hopefully, we can all learn from this, and here is a good example of how that will be done: I call Sir Iain Duncan Smith.

Mr Speaker, I apologise if that was the case.

Yang Tengbo—H6—was, in fact, not a lone wolf. He was one of some 40,000 members of the United Front Work Department, which, as the Government know, the Intelligence and Security Committee report last year said had penetrated “every sector” of the UK economy, including by spying, stealing intellectual property, influencing, and shaping our institutions. Our agents say they are now frustrated by the lack of action, but they do not seem to have the tools they need to deal with the issue. One of those tools is staring us in the face. Will the Government commit to putting China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and will they do it now? There is no need for delay.

The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, or IPAC, found that H6—Yang Tengbo—is already well known as a United Front member, and that he is known to others who are already deep in the political establishment. Parliamentarians are exposed to the United Front on a regular basis. Will the Minister remedy this today, and accept that China is our most prominent security threat and that all action must take priority?

My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), who was the previous Security Minister, has said publicly that the Home Office was ready to name China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, which would have forced United Front members like H6 to register or face serious consequences. Given that doing so is an available option, why have we not done it yet? Is it true, as is being reported by papers, including The Times, that behind the scenes the Government are now under pressure from banks, the wider business community and Government Departments not to do it?

When it comes to a member of the royal family, I simply say this: how was it that somebody who was known to the security forces was allowed to get so close to a member of the royal family without proper scrutiny exposing them?

Let me first come to the point the right hon. Gentleman made about FIRS. Upon our arrival in government, we found that FIRS was not ready to be implemented, as has been claimed. Since coming into office, we have ensured that more people than ever are now working on FIRS implementation, and the case management team have been recruited and are now in place. As I said in my opening remarks, we plan to lay the regulations that underpin the scheme in the new year, ahead of the scheme going live in the summer. As we have previously committed, we will provide three months’ notice of the scheme’s go-live date to give all those who will be affected by it adequate time to prepare.

The scheme will be underpinned by an IT solution consisting of a registration platform, a case management system and an online public register. The IT programme developed under the previous Government was not ready for the scheme to go live, and plans were not sufficiently robust. This Government have progressed at pace with the work to ensure that we are in a position to launch FIRS, with the laying of the regulations in the new year with a view to the scheme going live in the summer. Work is also under way to identify which foreign powers will be placed on the enhanced tier. That will be based on robust security and intelligence analysis. The Home Secretary and I plan to begin setting out the Government’s approach for the use of the enhanced tier in due course.

The first duty of Government is national security, and the threat that the country faces is the most complex and evolving we have ever seen. Given the range of threats we face from hostile state actors, it is important that the Government take action to protect our critical national infrastructure from cyber-attacks and ransomware attacks. Can the Minister update us on the plans announced in the King’s Speech for a new Bill on cyber-resilience and other actions to improve protections in this area?

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are working at pace with colleagues across Government, including in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, to progress these matters. There is a lot of work going on across Government to ensure that we are as resilient as we can possibly be to the threats we face from a range of actors. He can be assured, as can the House, that this Government will use all necessary measures to protect our security and ensure that our critical national infrastructure is as resilient as it possibly can be.

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

Can I start by thanking the Security Minister and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster for the security briefing they arranged earlier today for the shadow Foreign Secretary and myself? We are grateful for the assistance. Chinese infiltration of public organisations is of grave concern, but this is not just about public organisations such as the Government; businesses and universities are also being systemically infiltrated, and intellectual property theft is often at the heart of what the Chinese Government are trying to achieve. When I was Technology Minister, I saw this in areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and I would like to hear the Security Minister say more about intellectual property theft of cutting-edge technology in a moment.

Last year the head of MI5, Ken McCallum, said that Chinese activity seeking to infiltrate our institutions was taking place on an “epic scale”. Last year there were multiple attempts by Chinese companies to get hold of sensitive technology, and MI5 estimates that 20,000 individuals have been approached by Chinese agents who are trying to influence them, or forge contacts in some way. It is likely that at some point, either in the past or in the future, an attempt to contact every Member of this House will be made in one form or another.

The Opposition will fully support the Government in working to secure our nation’s safety, and I will ask the Minister one or two questions in that spirit. First, would he consider expediting the implementation of the foreign influence registration scheme that he referred to? I echo the suggestion from my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) that China should be placed in the enhanced tier of that scheme.

Secondly, will the Security Minister review the wisdom of the Government’s approach to China? Given what we have learned and what we now know, the very close relations that the Prime Minister is apparently attempting, and the rather sycophantic tone he took with President Xi at the G20 a few weeks ago, may not be very wise.

First, we were pleased to offer that briefing because these are important matters that should not divide us. It will always be this Government’s approach that, where we can work co-operatively with all Members of this House on matters relating to national security, we will seek to do so.

The right hon. Gentleman made some important points about matters relating to business, higher education and universities. He is a former Technology Minister, so I know he speaks with authority and expertise on matters relating to intellectual property theft, and this is an important point for him to make. I share his concerns. It is completely unacceptable that any entity, whether they are a hostile state or otherwise, should seek to draw intellectual property out of our country, and this Government take the matter very seriously.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the comments of the director general of MI5, Ken McCallum, and I would say to him that the National Security and Investment Act 2021 provides a framework for this Government, as it did for the previous Government, when dealing with some of these matters.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about FIRS, and I hope I have been able to provide some reassurance on the Government’s intention to table the regulations as soon as practically possible in the new year, with a view to having the scheme up and running by the summer.

On the approach to China, I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s characterisation of the Prime Minister’s recent meeting. I would just say very gently to him that at least the Prime Minister did not take President Xi to the pub for a pint.

Will the broader China audit include an assessment of the number of Chinese Communist party operatives working in the UK, including through bodies such as the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office? And will the Minister ensure that everyone targeted, whether they are Members of this place, members of the royal family or members of the public with British national overseas status who are originally from Hong Kong, has access to tailored security support?

We are working with other Departments to carry out an audit of the UK’s relationship with China. This is being done to improve our ability to understand and respond to both the challenges and the opportunities that China poses. It is vital that we have a thorough understanding of the bilateral relationship with China, including where we need to challenge to protect the UK’s national security. The audit is ongoing, and its outcomes will guide a consistent and coherent approach to China.

British national overseas status is a matter that I know my hon. Friend has rightly pursued for a significant amount of time. This reflects the UK’s historical and moral commitment to those people of Hong Kong who chose to retain their ties to the UK by taking up BNO status at the point of Hong Kong’s handover to China in 1997. BNO status holders and their families are making significant contributions to our economy and local communities. From the route’s introduction on 31 January 2021 to the end of September 2024, more than 215,000 visas were granted.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this urgent question on a crucial issue for all of us in this place, because we are looking for robust action from this Government to keep our politics and democracy safe from the influence of foreign Governments.

We should not pretend for a moment that the case of H6 is in any way unique or unusual because, as we have heard, the director general of MI5, Ken McCallum, has warned that bodies like the UFWD are

“mounting patient, well-funded, deceptive campaigns to buy and exert influence.”

We see it in our business world, and we see it in our universities.

We have the Chinese consulate in my Edinburgh West constituency, and I have, on more than one occasion, been personally chastised by the consul for expressing my views about Uyghur Muslims or for speaking up for Hong Kong residents in this country, so it is a serious problem. In fact, I was once filmed by a mysterious drone while speaking at a Hong Kong protest. We need robust action to clamp down on things like the police stations that we have heard exist in this country. The Government say they are seeking closer relationships with China, so how can the Minister reassure us that they will not weaken their stance or robustness against Chinese influence in this country, or on human rights and democracy in Taiwan and Hong Kong? How will they protect us all from China’s insidious approach?

I can assure the hon. Lady that this Government are, and will be, taking the robust action required to combat the nature of the threat that she rightly characterised. She is right to say that the particular circumstances of the case we are discussing today are not unique. The Government are working with the intelligence agencies and partners to combat a much wider threat On matters relating to China, she will understand that the Government have to weigh a number of considerations. While national security will always be our primary responsibility and the thing we take most seriously, there is, as there would have been for the previous Government, a requirement to look for areas where we can co-operate. In truth, we have to balance that relationship, but I can give her an assurance that we will take the robust action required, including through the defending democracy taskforce, which is a useful mechanism that we use across Government to look more closely at these matters.