That the Grand Committee takes note of the Amendment to the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, laid before the House on 26 July.
Relevant document: 2nd Report from the International Agreements Committee
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to debate the International Agreements Committee’s two reports on the related topics of the UK-US mutual defence agreement and the AUKUS agreement. I thank the Government for making the time available for this debate.
I will start with the MDA, which entered into force in August 1958. I am looking forward to this debate, particularly because it includes some new members of the committee; I am very pleased to welcome them to the committee as well. The MDA has been amended several times since it entered into force in August 1958, most recently in 2014. It provides for the exchange of nuclear materials, technology and information relating to nuclear weapons, although it does not provide for the transfer of nuclear weapons themselves. It underpins the UK’s nuclear weapons programme, and as such is a key part of the special relationship.
Despite the MDA being described as the cornerstone of the defence nuclear relationship between the UK and the US, amendments to the agreement in 1994, 2004 and 2014 were not subject to debate in Parliament or a Select Committee report. External stakeholders such as CND and the Nuclear Information Service have raised concerns about the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of previous amendments to the MDA and have called for a debate on the most recent amendments. I am therefore very pleased that we are having this debate today.
The amending agreement should be considered in the context of key developments to the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The UK is currently in the process of modernising its nuclear capabilities and nuclear-powered submarines, aiming to replace its four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines with the new Dreadnought class from the early 2030s. A programme to replace the UK’s nuclear warhead was also confirmed in February 2020. In March 2024, the previous Government published a new Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper, which sets out the long-term approach to investing in and developing the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The United States is also currently modernising its strategic nuclear capabilities.
The amending agreement should also be considered in the context of particular concerns. Some commentators have criticised the MDA as it risks the UK appearing to become overdependent on the US in relation to developing an independent nuclear weapons programme. However, the Ministry of Defence told us that co-operation with the US is based on the understanding that the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent remains independent.
Turning to the committee’s report, we make two main recommendations: two key conclusions, both related to the unsatisfactory arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of the MDA. First, we welcome the expectation that ratification of the amending agreement by the US will be completed within the terms of the current Administration and Congress. But we also observe how the thorough congressional scrutiny processes contrast starkly with the inadequacy of our own arrangements.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for both the meticulousness of these reports and for the unfussy, intelligible and lucid way in which he set out the recommendations. I have nothing to add on that level of detail, so I shall take a step back and ponder why these alliances among the English-speaking democracies are the basis of our security.
I take your Lordships back to 9 August 1941, a date which one or two Members of our Chamber will no doubt remember as if it were yesterday. This was the day on which President Roosevelt made the longest walk of his presidency. In a way that is now almost unimaginable, the US media contrived to hide the fact of the President’s polio from the electorate, so he was always pictured standing unaided or seated. However, on that day, walking from the decks of USS “Augusta” to those of HMS “Prince of Wales”, he decided to walk so, supported by his son on one hand and by a naval officer on the other, he made the slow progress to meet the British Prime Minister, while the band of HMS “Prince of Wales” struck up “The Stars and Stripes Forever”.
What followed was the most extraordinary demonstration of what binds the anglophone democracies together. It happened to be a Sunday, so the crews of the two vessels were mustered for a joint religious service. Churchill had chosen every detail personally and meticulously, down to the hymns and the reading that the chaplain gave from the pulpit. It came from Joshua:
“As I was with Moses, so I will be with thee: I will not fail thee, nor forsake thee. Be strong and of a good courage”.
Afterwards, exultantly, Churchill burst out, “The same language, the same hymns, the same ideals”, and when he said “the same ideals”, he was not making a general point about being the good guys. Think of the world as it stood in August 1941. The entire Eurasian landmass, from Lisbon to Vladivostok, was under one form or another of autocratic rule. Liberty was thrown back to the alliance of English-speaking peoples. We talk of universal values, but actually almost everything we mean when we say that was a precept overwhelmingly developed in the language which I am now speaking. The things that make the modern world rational, comfortable and pleasant—regular elections, uncensored newspapers, equality between men and women, the ability of different parties to contest without people being exiled or shot, habeas corpus and jury trials—were overwhelmingly the heritage of the English-speaking peoples. Imagine that the Second World War or the Cold War had ended differently. There would have been nothing universal about them then. We tend to be polite, so we gloss over the extent to which these values became universal as a series of military actions by this country and its kindred allies.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, even if I feel compelled to correct slightly some of his history. It is not the case that all this is about English-speaking people. The great meetings that took place on various bits of the Atlantic included the Governments of most of what are now continental European countries. They were of course living in exile in London, but subscribed to the same values and qualities that we applaud today. They were, funnily enough, before the establishment of the United Nations organisation in 1945, called the “united nations”.
I will cast that little blemish aside and address the two amended agreements that we are debating today within what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, correctly described as the CRaG process. They are important and deserve to be considered by Parliament; for that reason, I greatly welcome that the Government have enabled time to be made available to do so. They of course relate to Britain’s nuclear co-operation with the US, dating back to the ending of the lamentable US McMahon Act, which cut us off from any process of nuclear co-operation for a period of years after the end of the Second World War; it was very damaging. We are also debating the strategically important AUKUS agreement, which provides Australia with nuclear-propelled submarines.
Your Lordships’ committee, most ably led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, whose introductory remarks I totally subscribe to, has found both agreements to be strategically sound and in the UK’s national interest. We also found them to be consistent with our international obligations, including under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But—and there are a couple of quite important buts—some significant new issues have been raised, which we hope the Minister will reply to positively when he responds to the debate. Neither affects the treaty with the US, which, in a welcome way, is due to be ratified on its side before the expiry of the present Administration and present Congress.
My Lords, I am grateful that the House has provided time for an important debate that I welcome and we need to have. It is of national importance. I also thank my colleagues on the International Agreements Committee and, in particular, our chair, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who at times has the job of herding cats because it is a formidable group to try and get to agree something. For that, we all owe him a lot of thanks.
Over the past few weeks, there has been much debate over the future composition of this House and, without wanting to go off on a tangent and risk starting an entirely different debate, I feel that the Government, when they consider the future of this House, should first consider what role they believe Members should play. I make this suggestion while entirely supporting the concerns raised by the committee that the amendments proposed provide a significant risk that the UK-US MDA would no longer be subject to proper routine scrutiny. I therefore fully back the recommendations and the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, about the need for this agreement to have periodic review.
More widely than that, I put it to the Committee that, in this rather precarious and unstable world in which we live, the CRaG Act 2010 is outdated and the House should be given a greater role in the scrutiny of foreign policy and defence-related matters. I am going to leave the subject of constitutional reform well alone for the time being, but I hope that the Government will today offer the Committee some reassurance on how both the treaty on AUKUS and the amendments to the UK-US mutual defence agreement will be subject to the level of public scrutiny worthy of such matters.
I turn to the AUKUS treaty on naval nuclear propulsion. This trilateral agreement offers the opportunity for the UK to play a leading role in creating a new and much-needed frontier for security in the Indo-Pacific. As I have mentioned in previous debates, the Indo-Pacific region faces increasing tensions, for it is one of the most geographically sensitive areas in the world at this time. It is the duty of the Government to protect our newly forged trade interests in the region, such as the CPTPP and the post-Brexit bilateral free trade agreements that we hold with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the AUKUS treaty will go a considerable way to bolstering the defence capabilities of our allies, while advancing our own security and trade interests.
My Lords, I welcome this debate. I support the ratification of these treaties, which I too consider to be in our national interest, as previous speakers have remarked. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the International Agreements Committee for their informative analysis of these treaties in their second and third reports.
As has been pointed out, the main amendment to the UK-US MDA is to Article III bis, a key provision in the treaty which was added in 1959. It regulates the transfer of non-nuclear components and nuclear materials from the US to the UK and from the UK to the US. This provision historically had a sunset clause, which effectively meant that a new agreement had to be concluded before the expiration of the deadline. Article 5 of the amendment agreement will remove the sunset clause.
In the debate on the strategic defence review, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that he would explain the reasons for making this arrangement indefinite. I very much look forward to his explanation, with which I suspect to find myself in agreement because it seems to me that an indefinite agreement is appropriate in this context given the strategic importance of our alliance with the United States and in light of the commitments under the AUKUS agreement on naval nuclear propulsion. Moreover, making the arrangement indefinite is consistent with the nature of the co-operation that the MDA, in particular Article III bis, provided for.
In some ways, the sunset clause seemed rather out of place in this kind of treaty because, in reality, terminating the envisaged nuclear co-operation would always have required an agreement between the parties and a staged process. This is reflected in the terms of Article XII, which deals with duration. It provides that the treaty
“shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties”.
My Lords, AUKUS is of course an acronym for the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. There are two pillars of defence: first, a conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia, supported by the UK and the USA; secondly, co-operation in advanced capability, including AI.
As a trustee of Policy Exchange, I can say that we coined the term Indo-Pacific as opposed to Asia-Pacific, as it used to be referred to. With the UK’s renewed policy focus on the Indo-Pacific, that is timely. We have joined the CPTPP. We should also join the Quad, with India, the USA, Japan and Australia, making it Quad Plus, circling the world. Does the Minister agree? That would enhance our membership of NATO and Five Eyes, and our security would be greatly enhanced, but—I will come back to this later—we should spend 3% of our GDP on defence. Our Armed Forces—the Army, the Navy and the Air Force—are far too small in numbers of people; I say that as a proud honorary group captain in 601 Squadron of the RAF.
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak assured us in March 2023 that an additional £5 billion would be provided by the MoD for the AUKUS programme and that sustained funding would be provided. Can the Minister confirm that? The Government have also said that this would create thousands of jobs here in the UK and in Australia.
Gideon Rachman wrote an excellent article in the FT this February in which he said:
“China has repeatedly attacked Aukus as dangerous and confrontational. Shortly after it was launched, Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister at the time, gleefully lampooned the ‘raucous squawkus from the anti-Aukus caucus’”.
He concluded:
“The pact is ultimately a statement of resolve and long-term commitment. It is based on a shared perception of the growing strategic threat from China and Russia as they work together to overturn the current international order. That perception seems more pressing and valid than ever”.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on not only the skill with which he introduced this debate but his patience and skill in presiding over the whole business of producing these agreements. I do not know whether it is realised what a cascade of international agreements and treaties pass through the hands of the committee and our excellent staff. It is enormous and seems to be growing. Some of them are gloriously minimalist, such as worrying about driving licences for British citizens in Portugal after Brexit; I know it is important, but it is very small. Some look simple, but are actually enormous and have vast hinterlands of implications behind them. The words in the treaties may be simple, but what lies behind them is enormously significant for the future of this country.
These two agreements that we are looking at—the MDA and the AUKUS agreement—are definitely both in that second category. I am not sure that that is fully appreciated or realised by the machinery which enables us to have a debate here in the Moses Room. These are giant issues that will shape the entire future of our nation and its safety and security. Neither of them has really been given anything like the adequate time needed to go into the thinking behind them and where they are heading.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, eloquently said, the whole Constitutional Reform and Governance Act process—the CRaG process—really will not do any more, I am sorry to say. Some of us pressed the previous Government and are pressing the present Government on this. In this populist age, if we want our Parliament to perform, be trusted and be able to genuinely scrutinise major issues and acts of the Executive, we have to go back to that Act and reform it. I hope that will be a high priority for the new Government.
At first glance, these two treaties look quite separate from each other, but they in fact overlap, not only in not being given enough time to be examined but in that, together, they raise enormous questions about the pattern of our future war weaponry, defence equipment and entire security stance in a totally changed world in which power has changed, threats are coming from different directions from ever before and in unfamiliar forms. Many people do not seem to be geared towards this entirely new situation.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. I agree very much with his introductory remarks about the huge democratic deficit represented by the CRaG process—remarks echoed by most noble Lords taking part in this debate. Democracy? It would be a good idea; I hope most people would agree. I also agree very much with his concluding remarks that we are in a new world and we need new approaches. What we have before us looks very much like something out of the 20th century, rather than being fit for the 21st.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the International Agreements Committee, for their hard and rapid work in preparing the report, securing this debate and introducing it so clearly.
I note that the scrutiny period for the MDA ends on 23 October, which is today, and, for the AUKUS agreement, on 29 October. I might use a hashtag that I use frequently on social media: #NoWayToRunACountry. It would be nice to have more space and time for discussion and thought.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, set out, this debate occurs as the UK prepares to spend, and is spending, an enormous amount of money on new nuclear weapons. I must put on the record the Green Party’s opposition to the huge expense and risks of the Trident replacement programme in a geopolitical environment in which the majority of the world’s countries have backed the UN treaty for a global ban on nuclear weapons. I also note the related context in which the cost of the nuclear clean-up at Sellafield has spiralled to £136 billion, about which the National Audit Office has today expressed great concern. This is on a site where there have been very serious cybersecurity concerns and on which we have yet to find any kind of long-term solution for the storage of nuclear waste.
However, I will focus in particular on the AUKUS agreement, in part because the perspective of the Green Party of England and Wales lines up very much with that of the Australian Greens. We bring a different and widely supported voice to the debate in both our nations. Both our parties are opposed to the agreement, and that gives me the opportunity to draw the Committee’s attention to some important points that should, I respectfully suggest, give the Government and all parties pause.
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The US began its process of ratification earlier than the UK. Under the Atomic Energy Act, Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear co-operation agreement for two periods totalling 90 days of continuous session. That is 30 days of consultation with relevant committees and 60 days during which Congress has the opportunity to adopt a joint resolution of disapproval. The Ministry of Defence has indicated that the period for congressional review has now concluded. By contrast, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, or CRaG, Parliament has only 21 sitting days in which to scrutinise a treaty, take evidence and report on it, and hold a debate.
Considering the MDA’s role in forming the cornerstone of the UK-US defence and security relationship, the committee particularly regretted the lack of sufficient time to take evidence on this important agreement. This is yet another example of the shortcomings of the CRaG regime. Noble Lords may be interested to know that the committee is currently considering and conducting an inquiry into how parliamentary scrutiny of treaties can be improved in future. We have commented on this in previous reports.
In our second conclusion, the committee drew attention to a specific change in the amending agreement, which will potentially reduce the already scarce opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise the MDA. This concerns Article III bis, which provides for the transfer of non-nuclear parts, enriched uranium, special nuclear material and equipment. Article III bis is time-limited and has been renewed on a 10-year cycle since the 1980s. The requirement to approve revisions to Article III bis has also provided the opportunity for both parties to make further amendments to other parts of the MDA. Article 5 of the amending agreement amends Article III bis so that its provisions are “extended indefinitely”, with no requirement for periodic renewal. Given the strategic importance of UK-US co-operation at this critical time in replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent to maintain the country’s security, the committee is concerned at this reduction in scrutiny opportunities and calls on the Government to commit to providing a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years. That is a critical conclusion and recommendation of this committee.
Having dealt with the MDA, I want to turn now to the committee’s report on the AUKUS agreement relating to co-operation on naval nuclear propulsion, which forms part of the broader trilateral defence and security partnership between the UK, the US and Australia. This agreement has been made under pillar 1. The first phase of the partnership focuses on supporting Australia to acquire its first conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Upon its entry into force, it will supersede the current exchange naval nuclear propulsion information agreement, which entered into force in January 2022. That agreement, which I shall call the ENNPI agreement, allowed for the exchange of information to facilitate an 18-month study into the delivery of a conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine capability to Australia. The committee reported on that agreement on 13 January 2022, drawing it to the special attention of the House, and a debate was held in Grand Committee on 17 January.
The new agreement will allow the UK and US to support Australia in acquiring its first conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine fleet from the 2030s. As well as allowing the continued exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information, it will authorise the transfer of material and equipment relating to naval nuclear propulsion, including special nuclear material in complete welded nuclear power units. That will enable UK industry to support Australia in building a trilaterally developed submarine, incorporating technology from the UK, the US and Australia.
The AUKUS nations have released a joint statement detailing the progress made since the announcement of the optimal pathway in March 2023. The specific progress includes: increased education and training of Royal Australian Navy personnel and specialised US and UK schools; increased industry training to build and sustain nuclear-powered submarines; and preparatory activities to build Australia’s capacity ahead of establishing the submarine rotational force-west by 2027—that is, the rotational presence of UK and US nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling.
The committee welcomes the significant progress made in the delivery of pillar 1 of the AUKUS partnership. Nevertheless, we must also be mindful of some risks, as well as opportunities, highlighted by some defence commentators. For example, Dr Sidharth Kaushal, writing for the Royal United Services Institute, warned against the sale of the Virginia class to Australia appearing as a diversion of capacity from the US Navy and of the need to manage design trade-offs as well as human capital. Similarly, Andrew Dowse, the director of RAND Australia, outlined risks such as public perception challenges in relation to cost, nuclear proliferation and implications for the sovereignty of an Australian submarine fleet.
I will briefly summarise the link between the MDA and AUKUS agreements and why we are debating both reports together today. The AUKUS submarine fleet will incorporate designs and technology from both the UK and US, so the MDA could have a key role in enabling the exchange of nuclear propulsion technology and information sharing between the parties. The AUKUS submarine will be based on the UK’s next-generation nuclear-powered submarine design and will include US technology based largely on the Virginia-class SSN, including nuclear propulsion technology and components, and a common vertical launch system and weapons. The Ministry of Defence, from which we took evidence, acknowledged that although they represent two separate agreements, the MDA added value to the AUKUS trilateral agreement and that, without the MDA, we would not have the ENNPIA or AUKUS pillar 1.
Before I conclude and look forward to the debate, I thank the Ministry of Defence for its co-operation in assisting our scrutiny work. I thank my colleagues on the International Agreements Committee, a number of whom are here, for their hard work and support. I also thank the officials of the committee, who have to work on what I have already identified as a very tight timetable to prepare reports, briefs and drafts for us, a feature to which we must have regard when we look, as I hope we will, at a revision of CRaG. Finally, I thank those who offered us a slot for debate in Grand Committee within the CRaG period. I beg to move.
I spent 21 years in the European Parliament and was often teased by continental colleagues about this country’s supposed subordination to the United States. They would mock us: “Do you have any foreign policy of your own? Do you always just have to wait for a phone call from DC? Have you become a sort of aircraft carrier for the US?” As patiently and politely as I could, I would explain that, formed by the same history and institutions, when presented by the same problem, we tended to respond in similar ways. We had a shared indignation with injustice and a shared belief in freedom and the elevation of the individual over the collective.
All of us have lived through a period of anglosphere hegemony, where these values have been treated as universal because they have rested on victory in the Second World War and then the Cold War. But permanence is the illusion of every age. There are rival models out there. Thinking back to the debate we just had in the Chamber, I say that a lot of these rival systems have come together from no motive other than a shared hostility to us. It is very difficult to see what the religious fundamentalists of Tehran, the hermit kingdom of North Korea, the imperial and nationalist autocracy of Russia and the still notionally communist state of China have in common, beyond a hostility to western individual and property rights, free contract and all the things that go with them. History rather disproves the idea that we have an automatic advantage—that other countries will feel their way towards our values as they become richer and more educated.
The Chinese model, in particular, strikes me as a civilisational or categorical alternative to ours. Unlike the others, it is capable of export. Plenty of countries out there do not much like us but, through a combination of high technology—facial recognition and surveillance —and the use of notionally private companies such as Weibo, Tencent and Alibaba to act both as proselytisers and spies for the regime, in a peculiar way Beijing seems to have built a model that it can sell. It could say to, for example, Maduro in Venezuela, “If you don’t want to worry about any more elections, here is a way that we can build you your panopticon state, and then we won’t need to worry about having to deal with any of your successors”.
That, fundamentally, has caused our renewed interest in the Pacific and triggered the AUKUS agreement. It was about maintaining a free world based on the rule of law, rule among nations and open sea lanes, against revanchist states that challenge the established order.
I hope we will be able to build on and strengthen the AUKUS alliance. I look forward, in particular, to its expansion. I am encouraged by conversations that I have had with the Opposition in Canada, who are keen to become involved if there is a change of government. Apart from anything else, that would make it much more euphonic; “CAUKUS” works a lot better than AUKUS, which is quite difficult to say.
I feel that our interest in the Pacific region, quite apart from being in tune with our past, is reflective of the critical economic importance of that region. Just as, at some point in the 18th century, the centre of the world shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, in this century it has shifted to the Pacific. Tied as we are by habit and history, kinship and custom, language and law, many of the nations in that region do not have the option of remaining neutral.
Let us remember what we are defending. Beijing has a tendency to divide and rule. We have not really been on the receiving end of very much direct aggression, but Australia has—a complete trade embargo and immense diplomatic pressure after it called for an inquiry into the origins of Covid. I do not think that we could possibly be indifferent between an allied English-speaking democracy and an autocratic state. As long as we still have a song to sing and more to give, I hope that we remain involved in that region. Nothing lasts for ever. The day will surely come when
“all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!”
But I tell your Lordships what: when that day comes, we are going to miss this era through which we pass more than we currently imagine possible.
The first of the buts relates to the CRaG process itself. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the unsatisfactory time limits within which it operates. These are, to be frank, absurdly short and do not allow your Lordships’ committee to subject treaties and agreements to proper analysis and scrutiny, nor to gather testimony. The UK-US MDA, which we are debating today, exemplifies that problem to perfection. It was triggered during the summer and conference recesses and, even though the recess days were taken into account, there was simply no time to organise evidence sessions before we drafted our report. We therefore had only one session with senior officials, for which I express my gratitude; their testimony was extremely useful. No evidence was taken from a Minister, and we had no time to get outside witnesses to come and give different opinions, perhaps, on the treaties that we were looking at. That is no way to handle the ratification of an important international treaty. I really doubt whether any properly constituted democracy permits such a cursory and inadequate ratification review—although no doubt “people’s democracies”, such as Russia and China, would do so with alacrity.
I hope, therefore, that the Minister in the new Government will consider carefully the operating procedures for CRaG documents and will enable them in future to be scrutinised rather more effectively than they are now. I do not expect a response on that point today because, as the noble and learned Lord said, the committee is proposing to put together its considerations relating to the CRaG process in a report before too long.
My second point also relates to parliamentary scrutiny. As a consequence of the decision to eliminate the 10-year review clause in the UK-US MDA—the committee is not objecting to that and the consequent prolongation of the agreement, sine die—there will now be no occasion at all for further parliamentary scrutiny of the operation of the agreement. That is perhaps inadvertent—I am being generous—but is surely a damaging step backwards. One way in which to resolve it would be if the Minister were to state without equivocation at the end of this debate that the Government of the day would bring before Parliament at 10-year intervals a report on the operation of the UK-US MDA so that it could be considered and debated. Such a report would not—I repeat, not—affect the US side, nor affect the maintenance of the amended treaty itself, sine die. It might be said that 10 years is a long way off, but infinity is a bit longer.
I hope that this debate can end in a meeting of minds between the committee and the new Government. That would surely get matters off on the best possible footing.
Further, AUKUS facilitates the opportunity to deepen trade relationships with Australia and the United States, which are two of the world’s most advanced and trustworthy economies. Through the bedrock of collaborative security arrangements, AUKUS will enable stronger economic ties, and there is the real potential to drive emerging industries such as AI and quantum computing.
We must view the AUKUS treaty as a necessary counterbalance in the Indo-Pacific region. It must remain a government priority that we honour the treaty fully to ensure that our allies have the partnership support needed to maintain freedom of navigation, to protect our trade routes on the high seas and to do what we in this island nation have proudly done for centuries: deferring and, when necessary, neutralising the aggressive actions of rogue players who do not conform within the international rules-based system that we must at all times continue to maintain.
We should be proud that, through AUKUS, we are part of the future. There is a real opportunity here to harness innovation and technological leadership that will not only strengthen immediately our security but potentially allow us, alongside our US and Australian partners, to lead the world in naval defence innovation. I hope that the Government will seek ways to empower and inspire young people in this country to gain the necessary skills and qualifications to drive this much-needed innovation over the years ahead.
Beyond security, AUKUS represents a major economic opportunity for the UK’s defence industries, which stand to benefit significantly from this trilateral agreement involving two G7 nations and a G10 nation. As we transfer technology and our knowledge, there will be demand in highly skilled jobs and manufacturing. It is therefore vital that the Government set out the right industrial framework to allow the UK to feel fully the benefits of this agreement. I hope that the Minister will be able to update the Committee on the Government’s commitment to work in this area.
When considering pillar 2 of AUKUS, I am really excited and pleased to see artificial intelligence listed among the eight advanced military capability areas. It is a fast-moving area and it is therefore vital that we play our part in collaborating fully through AUKUS in developing cutting-edge AI technologies, hand in hand with our partners. That said, it also highlights the pressing need for a wider debate on the use and application of AI when it comes to defence and warfare. Although I am sure that there is wide public support for the application of AI when it comes to the optimisation of military supply chains, improvements to navigation, enhancing training and simulation, while, of course, countering AI threats, Parliament must be given a voice and the opportunity, within the parameters of protecting national security, to consider how this technology is to be deployed in the future.
Over the last few years, the Ministry of Defence has been successful in trialling and perfecting laser-directed energy weapons which, with such low running costs, have huge potential to strengthen the UK’s defence capabilities. DragonFire is a symbol of the MoD’s ability to remain at the cutting edge of innovation, and I therefore wonder whether there is scope to see other areas, such as innovating around laser-directed systems, included under pillar 2 in the not-too-distant future.
The United Kingdom remains a leading military and diplomatic power and with this comes a responsibility to shape the evolution of international rules-based systems through our values, by promoting peace, encouraging stability and strengthening the rule of law. It is with this responsibility that the Government must never lose sight of the fact that AUKUS is much more than a defence pact, for it is the affirmation of this nation’s commitment to an open, free and secure world. I therefore wish the Government well in continuing the work of the previous Government in this important space and taking it further. I hope the Minister will reassure us that the next stage of AUKUS will be a key component of our national security architecture, to be more than a pact and, like Five Eyes, develop, expand and gradually bring in our partners to work together. I hope it will go beyond electoral cycles to be long lasting and there for the future.
I turn briefly to the UK-US MDA. The special relationship between the United Kingdom and US has been underpinned by the mutual defence agreement since it was first signed in 1958 and it has been a key pillar of the world-leading role that the UK and US play in promoting peace and security. The amendment and recent renewal of the MDA will ensure that our co-operation can adapt to a changing strategic, technological and legal environment. Against the challenges we face in the world today, such renewals are most welcome. We must strive to do more on joint research and development, particularly in ensuring that we have the ability to innovate so that our nuclear deterrent does not become obsolete as we face up to a future underpinned by rapid technological advance.
With war raging in Ukraine and the Middle East and tensions rising in the Indo-Pacific, the prospects of avoiding the catastrophe of global conflict continue to be strained. That is why agreements such as these must not simply be words on paper but the actions and resolve of the United Kingdom and her allies.
It does not provide for unilateral termination except in the case of one provision—Article II. I also note that Article 13 of the amendment agreement adds some important changes to Article XII on duration that provide precisely for the kind of staged process that termination would inevitably require. Removal of the sunset clause is the right decision and is also consistent with the legal architecture of this treaty. I commend the Government on securing this change.
That said, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, so clearly explained, a consequence of this change is that the MDA will not come to Parliament every 10 years or so. In light of that, I strongly support the committee’s critical conclusion that the Government should provide a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years or so. I hope the Minister can reassure us in that regard.
I also endorse the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Udny-Lister, on the inadequacy of our ratification process, which these treaties have brought into sharp relief.
The other point that I wish to make that relates to both treaties concerns our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I agree with the Government that neither the MDA nor AUKUS would put us in breach of our obligations under the NPT. This is a very important subject and I am grateful to the Government for the attention they have given to it, including in the evidence that they submitted to the committee.
I was counsel for the UK 10 years ago in the case that the Marshall Islands brought against the UK concerning our obligations to negotiate towards nuclear disarmament. That case was brought before the International Court of Justice against all nuclear weapon states. Most nuclear weapon states had an easy way out of that litigation, but we did not have it, because we accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. We had to defend the UK’s position, which we did successfully.
Since then, it is fair to say that the international landscape of nuclear proliferation has become far more challenging. The risks of nuclear proliferation are greater, as illustrated by North Korea and Iran. Moreover, crucially, the impatience of non-nuclear weapon states towards nuclear weapon states has grown, as reflected in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—the TPNW—which was adopted in 2017 and has already secured 94 signatures and 73 accessions or ratifications. For obvious reasons, the United Kingdom and the United States are not going to become parties to that treaty. The NPT is the only treaty that brings together nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, and offers us the best chance of managing the risk of nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT will not survive unless nuclear weapon states continue to engage with it. That is a position that I am sure still enjoys support across the political divide. I note that a former senior adviser in arms control in the Trump Administration, Dr Tom Grant, has recently made the case for the NPT in a book entitled Nuclear Arms Control in Peril: Why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Matters and How to Save It.
Whether we are progressive realists or realists, we need the NPT and we need to keep it relevant. For that reason, I welcome the engagement of the Government with the case made in relation to these treaties concerning our obligations under the NPT.
He said that in February, and it is truer than ever now.
The noble Lord, Lord Risby, who led a debate on AUKUS in February this year, referred to AUKUS as a “technology accelerator”. I think that is fantastic, because there is huge potential in enhancing our security but also powering ahead with our innovation and research and development capabilities—all things that this country has always been fantastic at.
When I was president of the CBI, one of my priorities was to promote government, business and universities working together, not just in the UK but across borders. As chancellor of the University of Birmingham, I was very proud when we won two Queen’s Anniversary Prizes, one of them for Rolls-Royce and its work in aero engines. We have seen time and again that when you do cross-border collaboration between two universities—in Birmingham’s case, with Panjab University in India or with Harvard University in the United States—the field-weighted impact of collaborative research is three times higher than if the university does it on its own. Could the Government through AUKUS promote this cross-border, collaborative approach, with universities, government and business working together?
Pillar 1 of AUKUS focuses on supporting Australia to acquire its first conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine fleet, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said in his excellent opening speech. It does not involve the transfer of nuclear weapons to Australia. Pillar 2 focuses on co-operation in eight advanced military capability areas: artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, innovation, information-sharing, cyber, undersea, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic, and electronic warfare domains.
The UK-US mutual defence agreement, which many noble Lords spoke about, was established in 1958 for co-operation on nuclear materials, technology and defence and is meant to be renewed every 10 years. This seeks to extend naval nuclear propulsion co-operation to all naval vessels, and the proposal now removes the 10-year renewal requirement for Article III bis—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, mentioned—allowing continuous co-operation. We have been assured of the Government’s commitment to transparency and parliamentary accountability within national security limits. However, there are concerns over reduced parliamentary oversight with the removal of routine reviews of Article III bis. That is worrying. Here is a fact: the MDA amendments would lessen routine parliamentary scrutiny. On the other hand, the United States Congress will conduct far more rigorous scrutiny than us over here in the UK Parliament. Do the Government feel that this is a healthy position to be in?
Pillar 1 focuses on Australia’s acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet, leveraging UK submarine design and technology, with £3 billion allocated over two years. Pillar 2 emphasises developing advanced capabilities—AI, hypersonic and quantum technology, as I said earlier—and enhances interoperability among armed forces. The UK hosted the first AUKUS AI trial in April 2023, demonstrating this military collaboration, which I will come to later.
However, concerns exist about US export regulations impacting co-operation. An open general licence was issued for AUKUS nations as of 1 September 2024, and the Minister, Luke Pollard, outlined ongoing efforts with AUKUS partners to develop undersea capabilities, including launching and recovering uncrewed underwater systems from British and American submarines, integrating this into the SSN-AUKUS design.
The traditional NATO structure was to be a deterrent to Soviet expansion, but with AUKUS members there are huge incentives: for Australia, the concerns over China’s military growth and sovereignty threats; for the UK, to deepen our ties with the United States, enhance military collaboration and expand Pacific exports; for the United States, to maintain military dominance against rising Chinese and Russian assertiveness.
On Australia’s industry capacity constraints, there is scepticism in some quarters in Australia about AUKUS that we continue to need to address. The evolution of AUKUS could yield a new form of plurilateral defence alliance, addressing collaborative military capability needs and the emphasis on flexible investments in inter- operable military capabilities to adapt to geopolitical threats. This also strengthens the UK’s position in global security and military collaboration, and opportunities for technological advancement and military exports, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
For over 65 years, the UK and the US have co-operated on defence nuclear issues. Established as an amendment to the post-World War II US non-proliferation law, the MDA exempts allies from making significant advancements in nuclear weapons from the general ban on exchange leading to proliferation.
I will be absolutely clear about the three amendments. Article 4 makes naval nuclear propulsion co-operation reciprocal, allowing the UK to share technology and information with the US. Article 5 removes the expiry provisions of Article III bis, allowing the MDA to remain in force on an “enduring basis”, which I have spoken about, and eliminating the 10-year renewal requirement. Article 13 ensures that the information, material or equipment shared under the MDA will remain protected if terminated by either party in the future. But no one has mentioned this: a joint nuclear skills plan aims to double apprentices in the sector, enhancing the workforce. We have a Budget coming up. I hope that the Government address the huge flaws in our apprentice system. The apprenticeship levy needs to be reformed wholesale, and with regard to AUKUS. Does the Minister agree?
The review will maintain UK defence ties in the Indo-Pacific, prioritising objectives to create a deliverable defence plan supporting AUKUS. Is this a separate plan? Will it be apart from the strategic defence review or part of it?
As I mentioned earlier, we had a world first as the UK hosted the inaugural AUKUS AI and autonomy trial. This exemplified strong trilateral co-operation in AI capabilities, enhancing operational effectiveness and decision-making speed. Over 70 military and civilian defence personnel and industry contractors participated in the AUKUS AI trial, involving various air and ground vehicles. Milestones included live retraining of AI models inflight and immediate sharing of updated information among AUKUS partners, which is tremendous news.
The reforms will lift export controls, potentially covering £500 million of UK defence exports annually. The UK has issued an open general licence, easing licensing requirements for advanced defence capabilities and technical data among AUKUS partners.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, referred to this: there are discussions about expanding AUKUS to Canada, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand, but I am led to believe that these nations are not yet ready to proceed. Could the Minister confirm whether the Government are encouraging this expansion? US export regulations, particularly ITAR, hinder collaborative defence innovation, posing significant challenges for AUKUS. Could he address that issue?
In 2019, in the debate on NATO’s 70th anniversary, I said that we should spend 3% of GDP on defence. I said that five years ago, and I have been like a stuck record ever since. The MoD is facing funding challenges. Our defence budget today is £54.2 billion. Our spending on defence was higher in real terms in 2010, at £57 billion, than today. That was a golden era for our Chinese relationship and with no threat from Russia and Ukraine. There was not a huge conflict going on in the Middle East, as we have today. We are spending too little on defence.
Our full-time Armed Forces number 192,760 in total—Army, Navy and Air Force combined. I have said this time and again: my father’s army, the central army in India, was 350,000 strong. In the debate on the strategic defence review earlier this month, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said that we have a
“shrinking and hollowing out of our Armed Forces”,—[Official Report, 9/10/24; col. GC 226.]
and the noble Lord, Lord West, said that
“money was the elephant in the room”.—[Official Report, 9/10/24; col. GC 227.]
I concluded my speech by saying that:
“The price of freedom is not free”.—[Official Report, 9/10/24; col. GC 250.]
Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others said, the MDA takes away the 10-year rule and the chance for Parliament to scrutinise an enormously rapidly evolving world of nuclear weaponry and technology—and, of course, civil nuclear technology as well. I am not sure that Congress in the United States or the Parliament of Australia—or, if there are any newcomers to AUKUS, the Parliament of Canada or Diet of Japan—would put up with this sort of thing. They would not tolerate a truncated, short session after which the Executive carry on as before, which is more or less what happens. This is a very unsatisfactory situation, which is very bad for Parliament and will, I hope, be changed.
As for the AUKUS naval treaty, it is all to do with nuclear marine propulsion—not to be confused with nuclear weapons, of course—for a new generation of submarine vehicles for the Australians. It looks quite small; it is mostly about pillar 1 of the two pillars of the AUKUS treaty but, if you start looking at the implications of AUKUS 1—and indeed, AUKUS 2, which will presumably be covered by the same sorts of agreements in due course—you see that it takes us into a new defence world altogether. It is a vast Aladdin’s cave of new technologies, some of which hardly ever come into the media discussion because they are not understood. Some of them are already being used: there was a gentleman here from Ukraine last week who informed some of us that the military plus semi-private enterprise organisations, which organise the battlefield planning for the Ukrainians on all their fronts, are now also in control of the direction, effects and supply of about a million drones. That covers, if you think about it, the control of their production, maybe in remote spots, their deployment, their decision to go into Russian territory and all the rest. That is beyond what any Government or any military organisation can manage alone. It now has to be managed by a whole series of fascinating new enterprises of vast complexity, all relying on the very latest technologies of every kind, including AI, to see that there is a flow and supply chain of drones, and that they go in roughly the right direction. Of course, they are not always co-ordinated at all, which produces some quite sensitive results.
Nevertheless, we are looking at is an entirely different defence world and, as I said, an Aladdin’s cave of new technology. I have just glanced through pillar 2, which is relevant to pillar 1 and the AUKUS treaty. Pillar 2 refers to advanced capabilities, the areas in which we, the British, are now implicating ourselves, not sacrificing sovereignty in a major way but nevertheless weaving our future defence plans into other people’s—America’s and Australia’s. It is welcome and good, but we should be aware of it in a way that I do not think we are.
First, “undersea capabilities” sounds innocent enough. What that is to do with is whether submarines are going to cut our north Atlantic and Atlantic cables and literally slice off the entire British economy. That is a major consideration, fear and danger. The development of proper undersea capabilities and unmanned submarines in due course, which are also on the list for discussion, is a central part of our national survival.
Quantum technology obviously comes at the centre of this, described by the previous Government as a priority of our defence development. Artificial intelligence and autonomy are obvious ones. Advanced cyber is already going ahead, and then there are hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, which are desperately needed, as the affairs in the Middle East demonstrate particularly clearly. There is all the electronic warfare and innovation of every kind, in relation to the traditional visions of defence, including tanks, rockets, soldiers, guns, warfare, battleships and so on—all that sort of thing—with electronic co-ordination, in entirely new ways. There is information-sharing, which of course is intelligence, and advanced radar, in which we were once the world leaders—but now of course the Americans have rather taken over, and the Russians as well. They are particularly well advanced in radar. These are areas that are not usually associated in people’s minds with defence, yet this is the defence of tomorrow, and this is where we are being taken by the two treaties that we are discussing today.
It is a very new area indeed. I cannot help feeling how maddened Mr Putin must be when he was talked into going into Ukraine by generals who probably did not have the slightest idea what they were heading towards—the idea that there could be 1 million drones halting all their attack advances and causing chaos, and the idea that they themselves had to invent new technologies in drones, as the Russians have done with some success. That is something that he must regret bitterly now.
Eric Schmidt, the former head of Google, was remarking in Foreign Affairs a couple of days ago that the US is unprepared for this sort of world and pattern, and he urged certain changes. Obviously, Russia was completely unprepared and has been caught hopping, and Ukraine has had to invent itself as a new force based on these new technologies, totally different from anything that we have ever known before, even though there are a few relics of the old technologies—like the Battle of the Somme and trench warfare. That goes on, but on top of it an entirely new pattern of hostilities and conflict has emerged, with autonomous weapons driven by gigantic algorithms now dominating the scene.
Putin regrets it, and America may be trying to get ready. I hope that we are ready, although you do not hear much about it, and perhaps the Minister will have a word or two to add to the debate today. I think that we are bright and resilient enough not to fall into the same trap. As long as Parliament is given a chance to speak, and the experts in Parliament—and, dare I say it, the experts in your Lordships’ House—at the right times, we shall be able to keep up with affairs. If the MDA will not allow a 10-year review automatically, so what? We can put down a few Motions and have a debate ourselves every 10 years. Actually, I think we will need one every five years, because these things are evolving so fast.
As I said, we must not fall into the old trap of fighting the last war with the last war’s weapons. It is an entirely new world, and these treaties open the gates to understanding it in a more effective way. To finish, I add—rather impertinently and cheekily, because I belong to a rather defeated party at the moment—that I hope all our new Ministers will remember that they are also parliamentarians.
I note by way of background that, in 2022, the Australian Greens had by far their best ever federal election result, labelled a “greenslide” by the leader, Adam Bandt. It saw the election of the first three Green MPs in Brisbane and a significant increase in Senate numbers, and state-elected representation has continued to grow since then. We are in a time of considerable political change in the UK, the US and around the world.
I also note, as I have previously noted to this committee, that two former Australian Prime Ministers and one former Australian Foreign Minister, who are not Greens, have all opposed the AUKUS deal.
I will begin with a longue-durée view and look over more than a century of Australian and UK military co-operation, which has been marked often by strong, even slavish, support for UK and US actions from the top of the Australian Government, although that has not always been backed by, or first checked with, the Australian public.
My speech might be taken as a balance and contrast to that of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, not for the first time. First, I refer to the First World War. ANZAC Day on 25 April now marks the contribution of all those who have served militarily in Australia, but was initially founded very much around trying to get more people to sign up to the war, as historian Martin Crotty said, between 1916 and 1918, after the British-led military disaster of Gallipoli that claimed so many young lives, The Prime Minister of Australia, Billy Hughes, tried twice to extend service for conscripts outside Australian shores to feed more lives into the horrors of the trenches. When the flow of volunteers dried up, twice, the Australian public said no, and I note in passing that the Australian Labor Party subsequently split.
On 3 September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies told the Australian people that they were at war with Nazi Germany. That came just an hour after Britain had declared war. While there is no doubt that the Australian public was, and remained, behind the Government, there was considerable concern and doubt, as there had been in the then dominions of Canada and South Africa, about the Australian Prime Minister’s assumption of automaticity. The slavish abandonment of any idea of Australian sovereignty has echoes which I will come back to.
Without doing a detailed trawl through Australian history, I will just stop briefly at the Vietnam war moratorium protests, the first of which took place on the 8 May 1970. These were then the largest public demonstrations in Australia’s history and represented growing resistance from a significant number of Australians to the Government’s commitment to the Vietnam War in general and conscription in particular. On 16 February 2003, more than half a million people took part in protests across Australia against the US-led invasion of Iraq, the largest anti-war protests in Australia’s history. The Committee can see the pattern that I am drawing out here and should perhaps reflect that Australia is, however imperfectly, a democracy and there is a strong chance that public views may eventually influence political choices.
Australian officials believe, and it has been widely acknowledged, although it is extremely hard to estimate the cost of the AUKUS programme over its life, that the long-term cost of the submarine plan is likely to be about 0.15% of Australia’s entire gross domestic product per year, on average. For context, in 2023, that was put as a comparable cost to boosting the resourcing of schools across the entire nation to what was seen to be an essential minimum standard. But the objections are not just about costs. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the Australian Greens’ dissenting report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade’s report on the Defence Legislation Amendment (Naval Nuclear Propulsion) Bill 2023. The dissenting report is readily available, so I will not discuss it at length but pick out a couple of key points. First, it states:
“There are environmental, health, security and social risks associated with every facet of the nuclear industry. These risks disproportionately impact First Nations peoples and their lands.”
I note that the very much unfinished business of the treatment of First Nations in Australia has recently been strongly highlighted. The report then states,
“that the two major parties have worked together to ensure a short time frame on the reporting of this inquiry and not enabled time for public hearings … the Australian public has not been properly consulted on the AUKUS proposal”.
We can see the clear echo here at the complaints that we have heard across this Committee. The report concludes that the deal undermines Australian sovereignty and violates international nuclear safety principles, and notes that Australia’s Defence Strategic Review rejected advice from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Australian Government’s own nuclear safety advisory council, which recommended that an independent regulator have oversight of the programme.
Finally, the report notes:
“The Australian public has rejected … nuclearisation … for nearly a century”.
It might be of particular interest to the Government that the Electrical Trades Union and the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union, two prominent Australian unions, strongly oppose the development of a nuclear industry in Australia or any end to the moratorium on nuclear power. That is the political context of the AUKUS deal. Noble Lords might think that that presents considerable political risks: they would be right.
I also note that that reflects the conclusion of a report published in the last week by the US Congressional Research Service, which says of the military context that
“the costs … of Pillar 1 could reduce, perhaps significantly, funding … for other Australian military capabilities”.
Crucially, it says that no alternatives were ever considered by any of the AUKUS partners. We come back to democratic scrutiny and consideration. To repeat, this report was from the US Congressional Research Service.
Finally, the timing of this debate all too acutely highlights the geopolitical context, of which our relationship with Australia is a small if significant part. There is the approaching US election, in which there is at least an even-money chance that we will see a second Donald Trump presidency and a risk that, even if that is not the result, we will see that candidate seeking to claim the presidency. I will not get into the details of today’s row, but this is not a politically stable time in US history to be making deals such as either of these. At the CHOGM meeting in Samoa, for which our Prime Minister may just about have landed after 26 hours, he will not be joined by the leaders of India or South Africa, because they are at the BRICS meeting hosted by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, in Kazan, where the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, is also in attendance. Canada too is sending neither its Prime Minister nor Foreign Minister to CHOGM.
As I said in our debate on the defence review, the UK needs to consider far more than defence in isolation. It needs to consider its place and relationships in a world of multiple security threats—not just the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the threats that China presents with its denial of the joint declaration in Hong Kong and the threats to the democratic entity of Taiwan, but the multiple security threats of the climate emergency, the nature crisis and multiple health threats. I draw attention to an extremely disturbing report in Vanity Fair about the H5N1 virus in US dairy herds and that country’s wholly inadequate public health response.
The agreements we are debating today already look like 20th-century relics, and in future will likely look even more so, sitting dangerously, expensively and unstably in the 21st-century world. The security of our country and the world cannot afford such outdated approaches.