That this House takes note of the Report from the International Relations and Defence Committee Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic (1st Report, Session 2023–24, HL Paper 8).
My Lords, I am very pleased to be able to introduce this debate on the report of the International Relations and Defence Committee, Our Friends in the North: UK Strategy towards the Arctic. I had the very enjoyable privilege of chairing the committee for this inquiry, and I start by thanking the members of the committee for their tolerance, the current chair, my noble friend Lord De Mauley, for allowing me to introduce this debate, and the staff of the committee for their excellent work, especially the clerk, Jennifer Martin-Kohlmorgen, together with Alex Nice and Rob Jones. We also received great help from FCDO officials for our visit to Norway and Finland, for which we are very grateful.
Way back in 2023—and it seems a long time ago—the committee set out to hold an inquiry into the Arctic, given the unprecedented geopolitical and environmental changes impacting the region. Some people might ask why it matters to us. The answer is that the Arctic may be remote, but what happens there has a direct impact on us in the UK. We heard time and again that what happens in the Arctic does not stay in Arctic. As the Arctic’s closest neighbour—and let us not forget that parts of Scotland are closer to the Arctic than they are to London—developments in the region have a significant impact on our national, environmental and energy security, and implications for our foreign and defence policy. Our report is just over a year old, but its conclusions are still—if not more—relevant today, and it is a good thing that we are able to highlight them. I am grateful to the Government Chief Whip to allowing us time to debate the report today.
As we all know, the Arctic is undergoing a profound transformation. Climate change is accelerating at an unprecedented rate, with parts of the region warming four times faster than the global average. That has far-reaching consequences, from the melting of the sea ice and permafrost to the impacts on indigenous communities and global climate patterns. Despite their importance, we did not investigate the science of Arctic climate change or ecological pressures on the flora and fauna, including endangered species—although I must say, as an endangered species myself in your Lordships’ House, I feel even more sympathy for them now than I did during the inquiry. Our inquiry revealed that the Arctic is not only a region of ecological importance but an area of growing economic and geopolitical significance—and that is what we concentrated on.
Melting sea ice is opening up new shipping routes, and the region’s vast natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals, rare earth metals and fish stocks, are going to become only more accessible. This has sparked a new era of competition that includes both Arctic and non-Arctic states, with Russia and the US leading the charge but China and others vying for influence and control.
As we might expect, China is taking a long-term approach to the region. Its strategy for the Arctic is to make it international, in which it, as a leading world power, can influence the rules on how the resources I just mentioned should be distributed. While its footprint is currently limited, this is likely to change. For example, China is easily the largest consumer of fish in the world and has the largest distance water fishing fleet. If the central Arctic Ocean, which is part of the high seas and therefore accessible to all, becomes ice-free for considerable periods, this could lead to overfishing and the depletion of local fish stocks. The UK has a direct interest in the sustainable management of fish stocks, not least because around 10% of the fish that make it to our fish and chip shops comes from the Arctic.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to participate in today’s proceedings and to have the opportunity to contribute to the debate on this report. Given the distinguished membership of the committee that produced it—not least the chair the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, whom I thank for his excellent introductory speech—the report’s thoroughness and forensic analysis are perhaps unsurprising, but valuable none the less.
Even the most cursory glance at the report’s structure demonstrates the breadth of its scope. It asks us to consider the UK’s role—historic and future—in respect of the Arctic. It points up the future of the Arctic as a sphere of potential great power contestation and analyses the implications of growing economic activity, consequent in part on the effects of climate change.
Mindful of the limited time I have available, and of the priority that should be accorded to the members of the committee which produced this report, my contribution will focus on a relatively small number of points, the first of which, and its effect, have to a degree already been diluted by some of the introductory remarks by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde.
The Arctic Circle is only 380 miles north of British waters, which is only 64 miles less than the distance by road between my home in the west of Scotland and London. As the report reminds us, although the Arctic is a byword for remoteness, it is in fact extraordinarily close to our country, in terms of both geography and, much more importantly, our strategic interests.
I saw no inherent flaw in the previous Government’s expressed desire to give our foreign policy an Indo-Pacific tilt. Noble Lords will need no reminder from me that the sinews of diplomacy in that area are very often subject to strain, nor will they need to be reminded of the importance of that region in economic, political and military terms. But the report we are debating today, as well as the evidence session of 11 July 2023 in which the committee took evidence from the then Minister for the Armed Forces, James Heappey, makes it clear that there are real challenges of capacity if the UK is to maintain and increase its relationships operability in the High North.
My Lords, almost a year ago I had the privilege of visiting Camp Viking, where our commandos and marines are absolutely superb in their Arctic training and their work. That was part of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, which I would recommend anybody to join, and I know that a number of Members here have done that. It was a great experience. As all Members would, I utterly compliment our forces there, although I was less impressed by some of the artillery pieces, which reminded me more of World War II than of the current cybertechnology we have today.
I also congratulate the Government Whips’ Office on choosing this week for this subject. One of the great fears of this committee was that one of our NATO allies in the Arctic region would be threatened with military invasion, and that has happened this week. Of course, it was not from the beast of the east but from what we always aspire to be the best of the west—the future Trump Administration and Greenland.
I mention this not to be jocular but to note that French Foreign Minister Barrot, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who was the President of the European Council, all made very positive comments to say that Denmark’s sovereignty had to be noted and respected. Yet, as I understand it, we in this country—this Government—have not done so. When he was challenged on this on the “Today” programme this morning, David Lammy did not say that Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland must be respected. I challenge the Government and the Front Bench to make that comment. Like many of us, I believe that our relationship with the United States is absolutely paramount in terms of defence, but we have not to be meek. We have to show some backbone in pushing back and respecting the international order and law that we have promoted since World War II. I challenge the Government on that not least because we have a very close military relationship with Denmark. Whether in the Balkans, in Iraq or particularly in Afghanistan, we have trained, operated and fought with Danish forces. We owe it to that country—one of our closest NATO allies—to show it the respect of recognising its sovereignty over Greenland.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to participate in this debate, which was so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, the excellent chair of the International Relations and Defence Committee during the period of the inquiry. It is also a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who was the inspiration for the inquiry.
In the considerable time since the report was published, the two underlying issues that have driven so many of the conclusions have not changed. Polar ice is continuing to melt and, partly as a consequence of that and partly because of wider international stresses, the Arctic has moved from being an area of co-operation to one of contest and, potentially, conflict. This has to be of fundamental concern to the UK. Our geographical location means that instability in the Arctic threatens the security and prosperity of these islands, and we should therefore devote the necessary care, time and resource to protecting ourselves in this regard.
As the report makes clear, the Arctic is likely to see a dramatic increase in destination shipping over the coming years. There are two main reasons for that. The first is the increasingly accessible resources, particularly subsurface resources, in the area. The second is the geostrategic importance of the region, particularly to the nations that wish to reshape and then dominate the international order over the coming years.
Both issues have attracted the attention of the Chinese Communist Party, which has declared China a “near-Arctic state”. Although in 2013 Russia was reluctant to grant China observer status in the Arctic Council, events have moved on considerably since then. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has left it increasingly beholden to the Chinese for their support. There seems little doubt that over the coming years China will increasingly leverage that alliance into greater involvement in the Arctic. That involvement may be, at least initially, in pursuit of scientific and economic benefits, but it would bring China into NATO’s backyard, with all the scope for misunderstanding, accident or even direct competition that this would involve.
My Lords, I rise as the current chairman of the International Relations and Defence Committee. I very much thank my predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, and the committee’s members for their work on this important report. Although I did not join the committee until it had completed this report, I hope noble Lords will bear with me if I take this opportunity to focus on the pressing matter of the security of our critical national infrastructure in the face of emerging threats, particularly those being manifested in and coming from the Arctic.
The European Arctic has increasingly become an area of strategic importance. The rising tensions between NATO and Russia have created unprecedented security dynamics in the region. The Arctic and the Baltic regions are viewed as integral to Russia’s strategic interests. The Arctic’s difficult environment and related challenges for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance make that region particularly conducive to tactics which are difficult to detect. Russia has developed a range of capabilities to sabotage and disrupt critical infrastructure, including undersea data cables in the Arctic and further afield.
These specialist capabilities for deep-sea maritime sabotage are based on the Kola peninsula, which borders the European Arctic. Recent hybrid attacks, including deliberate disruption of undersea cables—one as recent as Christmas Day, as the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said—and heightened surveillance activities highlight the vulnerability. Our critical national infrastructure, particularly subsea telecommunications cables, energy infrastructure and maritime communication networks, is facing a growing number of risks.
We are witnessing a troubling shift towards more aggressive tactics. NATO and western intelligence services have warned that Russia is behind a growing number of hostile activities across the Euro-Atlantic area. The interconnectedness of our modern world means that a single incident away from our shores can have far-reaching consequences. In January 2022, one of two subsea data cables connecting Norway’s Svalbard archipelago and the Norwegian mainland was damaged. Although it did not result in prolonged disruption, it clearly demonstrated the capabilities of a hostile actor and should serve as a wake-up call to the United Kingdom and our allies.
My Lords, as a member of the committee, I had the privilege of visiting the Arctic as part of our inquiry. I will confine my contribution to the issues we identified and received evidence on in relation to the indigenous communities of the Arctic.
More than 40 indigenous communities are spread across all eight Arctic states, speaking many different languages, and their status varies considerably. For example, the Samis in the Nordic countries enjoy a similar health and economic status to the general population, whereas the Inuits in Canada, Greenland and Alaska experience limited access to healthcare, high unemployment and poor housing.
The committee heard very troubling evidence about how Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has severely compromised the rights of the Sami and other indigenous groups to cross-border co-operation and contacts. The Russian Samis are closely controlled by the Russian Government and are reported to have been effectively coerced into declaring their support for the invasion of Ukraine. One witness told us that they were terrified that if there were a conflict between Russia and NATO, the Sami would have to fight each other.
From indigenous groups outside Russia, we heard of concerns that their interests are being overlooked when it comes to defence and security, economic development, and climate change. The good news is that the strongest guarantee that their voices will be heard is the structure of the Arctic Council, which includes the permanent representation of six participants from indigenous groups. This is an innovative, inclusive model, which has found a pragmatic way of continuing its work and dialogue, despite the formal suspension of Russia at ministerial level since the invasion of Ukraine. Every effort should be made, including by the UK as an observer state, to make sure it does continue.
Nevertheless, one of our recommendations was that the UK should prepare for the possibility that the Arctic Council may cease to function or diminish in importance, and that if a new governance structure were to emerge, we should advocate for indigenous representation that is at least equivalent to the status currently held. HMG’s official response to that recommendation was only partially to agree, though I am not sure it was clear which part was not agreed, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification on this point, including whether the current Government are still committed to funding UK-based research to strengthen engagement with the Arctic Council’s working groups. Specifically, can the Minister update the House on the support we are providing for a UK and indigenous initiative on scientific research, modelled on the Canada-Inuit programme, for the study and protection of Arctic indigenous languages, and for social science research to improve our understanding of the impact that climate, development and geopolitical changes are having on indigenous people?
My Lords, I welcome this excellent and timely report. It confirms an urgent reality: the Arctic is no longer a frozen wilderness; it is the new frontier where climate change meets great power competition. Melting ice is reshaping trade routes, exposing vast reserves of oil, gas and rare earth metals essential to modern industry.
According to scientists, in 1987, planet earth experienced a global climate shift of unprecedented scale—a major step change or regime shift in earth’s biophysical systems, from the upper atmosphere to the depths of the ocean and from the Arctic to Antarctica. That very year, and with this unbeknown to him, Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in Murmansk, envisioned the Arctic as a
“zone of peace and co-operation”.
Yet, under Vladimir Putin, the Arctic has become central to Russia’s quest to reclaim superpower status.
Today, Russia dominates the region, with its fleet of icebreakers, military bases and infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route. This route is not only economically vital to Moscow but geopolitically significant, enabling the rapid movement of its naval fleets and offering a platform for cyberattacks, disinformation and sabotage. We were recently made aware and reminded of Russian efforts and continuous attempts to sow discord across Europe, which is a stark warning of the risks posed by Russia’s Arctic pre-eminence.
Equally concerning is China’s growing interest in the Arctic. Although over 800 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle, Beijing now calls itself a “near-Arctic state”. By this logic, half of Europe, including the United Kingdom, could claim the same title, but China is far more than a passive observer. Between January 2022 and June 2023, 234 Chinese-owned firms registered in the Russian-controlled Arctic. China has built docks, railway lines and infrastructure in key Arctic ports, working hand in hand with Russia to consolidate control over energy supplies and resources. This partnership underscores the deepening Sino-Russian alignment in the Arctic—a development that we cannot ignore.
My Lords, this is the second time in recent years that this House has reported on and debated Britain’s overall Arctic policy, this second debate having been excellently introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde. That is to this House’s credit, because that dimension of our external policies, often overlooked, presents plenty of challenges, and even threats. The comparison between the reports produced demonstrates how quickly those challenges are changing, while some, such as those from the climate, have become more intense. Britain may not be an Arctic state itself but it is a close neighbour to the Arctic, and a friend and ally in NATO of several states which are, and an adversary to one, Russia, which is waging an illegal war of aggression in Europe against Ukraine. The scale of these changes is not altogether surprising. However, it requires policy responses from us, not just words.
What has not changed is the rapid melting of the Greenland ice cap and the other Arctic ice caps in Russia, Finland, Norway, Canada and the US, and the consequent rise worldwide of sea levels. This demonstrates beyond peradventure that global climate change policies are not yet sufficient, all the more so as the Arctic ice melt is occurring more rapidly than elsewhere for a number of technical and scientifically demonstrated reasons.
It is all the more shocking, therefore, that in 10 days’ time the incoming President of the US may decide to withdraw again from global efforts to brake and reverse climate change. What will our response be to that? Is the incoming President aware of our regret at any such move if it were to be made? Surely we will not be tempted to throw in the towel and simply accept that the sea rise, which will damage not only us but many developing countries around the world, should continue unchecked.
A second development, which has not changed, is the enlargement of the high seas areas in the Arctic potentially now available to fishing and the depletion of already threatened fish stocks, on which most countries, including ourselves, are for good and justified reasons supporting a moratorium, although we are no longer a legal part of it. If there is to be fishing in the future in these waters, it must surely be effectively regulated internationally and enforced. What is our policy in that respect?
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For now, China has subscribed to a fishing moratorium via the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, but we heard that it could allow that to lapse in 2037 when the moratorium is up for renewal and as the protective ice caps start to recede. To enable us to continue to advocate effectively for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean, we need to rejoin the agreement on the prevention of unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean that we had to leave because of Brexit. What steps are the new Government taking to rejoin the agreement? Until then, will we announce that we will voluntarily abide by its provisions?
As Russia, weakened by the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions, turns eastward, this could provide China with an opportunity to increase its influence. Since we published our report, China’s coastguard entered the waters of the Arctic Ocean for the first time, in a joint patrol with Russia, and last summer, the Chinese air force conducted a joint air patrol with Russia off the coast of Alaska. In themselves, these are not hugely significant developments, but they point to a deepening co-operation with Russia. The Government will therefore need to pay very close attention to Chinese ambitions in the Arctic and the developing Sino-Russian relationship. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has been a major catalyst for change in the region. Not only is it drawing China and Russia closer together but it led to the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. These two nations bring a wealth of expertise and experience to the alliance, including their ability to operate in cold weather conditions and a long experience in managing Russian pressure.
NATO enlargement provides an opportunity for the UK to deepen its already extensive defensive co-operation with the Nordic countries. Finland’s accession also doubled NATO’s border with Russia, and the UK has an important role to play in supporting deterrence in the High North. I am pleased to note that our Armed Forces have increased the scale and frequency of cold weather training and exercises in the region. The establishment of a new Arctic operations base in Camp Viking in northern Norway is a welcome development, and the Royal Marines are experienced and well placed to operate in the region. We are one of the few non-Arctic states that has the military capability to operate in the High North and we are valued, in particular, for our role in antisubmarine and air policing. However, our report also raised concerns about the limits of our capacity to operate in the Arctic. Our fleet of P-8A maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft is small and our single dedicated ice patrol ship, HMS “Protector”, is stretched impossibly thin, covering both polar regions.
The Arctic is a priority for the UK, where it can add real value, but as a mid-sized power with global ambitions, the UK’s Armed Forces face a perennial risk of overstretch. The UK needs to do more to articulate clearly its priorities and the hard choices that are required in the face of competing pressures on resources. The strategic defence review, led by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who was a member of the committee throughout our inquiry, provides an opportunity to do so, and we trust that the Minister will take the lessons of our and his report into consideration.
Fears that NATO enlargement could result in an increase in Russian hybrid activity appear to be materialising. The commander of the Finnish armed forces raised the alarm about GPS jamming and other disruptive activities last May. Here, we heard from the director-general of MI5 that agents of Russia’s military intelligence agency are conducting arson attacks, sabotage and other dangerous actions with increasing recklessness. As recently as Christmas Day—just over two weeks ago—the Estlink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia was cut and four telecoms cables were damaged. We must therefore work to bolster our national preparedness and resilience to such attacks through a whole-of-society approach. Our report sets out that we can learn from the Nordic concept of total defence, which integrates civilians into national security efforts.
The Arctic Council is the region’s premier governance body. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have put it under significant strain and led to a steep drop in co-operation between Russia, on the one hand, and all the other seven Arctic states on the other. Cautious re-engagement with Russia at official level is taking place to attempt to ensure that vital scientific co-operation can resume. This kind of low-level co-operation is not universally welcomed. But we considered it desirable, not only for scientific purposes, but also as a bridge to foster mutual understanding and, crucially, to reduce the risk of escalation in the event of a crisis. The probability of an incident or mishap swiftly turning into a major crisis is greatly increased by the growth in maritime activity in the Arctic and Russia’s remilitarisation of the area. While the Arctic Council does not formally deal with security matters, we think it is important that the channels that could be used for deconfliction purposes are retained.
The UK’s existing Arctic strategy addresses many of the points raised, but the committee was concerned that the Arctic is not receiving in the ministerial attention it deserves outside the security sphere. Recent UK Ministers have rarely attended multilateral fora on Arctic affairs. This sends the wrong message about the importance of the Arctic to the UK. We also recommended the appointment of an Arctic ambassador, in line with many other non-Arctic states. This recommendation was rebuffed by the previous Government. Could the Minister confirm whether this is something that the new Government will consider and whether ministerial involvement will increase? Are there any areas where their strategy towards the Arctic may differ from that of the previous Government?
The Arctic is not a distant concern but a region of immediate and profound strategic importance to the UK. Although we are not an Arctic country, we can exert influence, not just through military means but through soft power. During our visit to Norway and Finland, everyone we spoke to was full of praise for the UK’s contributions to polar research. Our world-class scientific research provides a strong platform for legitimising our involvement and exerting soft power in the region. Our overall strategy towards the Arctic must be at once nuanced and comprehensive, balancing diplomatic engagement with strategic preparedness. I hope the Government will take our report’s findings into consideration and ensure that the UK stands ready to support our friends in the north in the years to come. I beg to move.
In short, there are choices to be made. In that evidence session, Mr Heappey summed up this environment of choice very effectively, saying that:
“It is important not to specify ships”—
I say this with some trepidation in the current environment—
“to be extraordinarily capable in one environment to the exclusion of their capability in another. If we specify them to be extraordinarily capable in both environments, we will only be able to afford one, not six. There is always a balance to strike”.
That is as succinct a summary of the constraints and contextual challenges of defence spending as I have seen. Pierre Mendès-France, during his time as Prime Minister of France, repeated in speech after speech the mantra
“to govern is to choose”.
As part of the strategic defence review, currently in progress under the aegis of my noble friend Lord Robertson, we will be faced with just such choices: the allocation of finite resources to meet a multiplicity of threats across different spheres.
Given the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO membership, we have new obligations in the Arctic and the High North. As paragraph 105 of the report makes clear, we are now in the position of applying our NATO security guarantees under Article 5 to a new landmass of significant size. While I think interoperability between the Finnish, Swedish and NATO forces should be pretty straightforward, a capacity issue remains. Here, we have a challenge significantly greater, in some senses, than any other NATO allies because of our near unique capabilities and the demands of our geographical position.
As the report identifies, only the UK and US have the capability to conduct nuclear submarine patrols under the ice cap. Russia has made substantial investments into its northern fleet and we know, for instance, that, in 2019, 10 Russian submarines ran a drill of a size unprecedented since the Cold War, testing their ability to breach the GIUK gap without detection.
We know too that Russia’s latest maritime doctrine places the Arctic above both the Pacific and Atlantic as the highest priority region. It is unfortunately clear that, in the medium term at least, it seems unlikely that we will be able to return to our classic post-Cold War aspiration of the Arctic as an area of “high co-operation and low tension”. Indeed, the best way to abate the tension—or at least to mitigate its possible consequences—is to ensure maximal co-operation between the UK and its allies in the region. It seems clear that this will only be possible if we assign this theatre an importance that corresponds with the new risks present within it.
I have only been able to touch on the breadth of those risks, but among the other factors I do not have time to enumerate in any depth, I would mention President Xi’s openly expressed ambition to make China a “polar great power” and the see-sawing asymmetrical relationship between China and Russia that may allow the former to use the latter as a proxy for its own ambitions.
Complicating all these strategic calculations is the insidious threat of climate change, the effects of which are manifesting themselves in the Arctic at several times the average global rate. The Arctic states and the UK will need to consider their response to an Arctic that presents new commercial opportunities, as well as a different range of security threats.
Most topically, we have seen the President-elect insist that he should be allowed to buy Greenland for national security purposes. Though, as ever, there is a shadow of farce hanging over this pronouncement, it is clear that the incoming US Administration will be placing greater emphasis on strategy in the High North.
Although I concur with the report in thinking it unlikely that the Arctic will become a theatre of military conflict, it describes in compelling terms the opportunities that the changing character of the Arctic affords to our strategic adversaries who wish to operate in the grey zone of hostility.
On fisheries, the chair of the committee, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, has said this so well, but it is so important from an ecological point of view that we protect the high seas beyond EEZs in the Arctic Ocean. It is great news that the moratorium was signed in 2021 and lasts for 16 years, but following Brexit we are no longer a member of that agreement. I notice that in the Government’s response to our report they say they are working to become signatories of that agreement again as soon as possible. Like the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, I ask the Government when we will become part of that agreement again. Have we made a public declaration on supporting it? What are we doing with the scientific work that is also required as part of that treaty? It is important to note—exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said—that the long-term threat there is the Chinese fishing fleet, which rapes and pillages many of our oceans with very little control at present.
I see the UK ambassador recommendation as absolutely fundamental. As other Members of the House have said, Out Stack, the most northerly part of the Shetlands, is only 300-odd nautical miles from the Arctic Circle. We are the nearest non-Arctic state. That area is vital to us. It is a changing environment in terms of security, climate change and critical minerals.
I am absolutely clear that we need to raise our game with our diplomatic activity. Why is it that Singapore, Poland, France and other nations have Arctic ambassadors, yet this country does not? We have not participated sufficiently in the Arctic Council. I am delighted to note that its chairmanship has now moved to Norway from Russia, which means that the body, which caused so much stability for so long, can now become rather more active, if not perfect, without Russia’s participation as chair. I am clear that we need an Arctic ambassador and to raise our game, and I hope that this Government will change that decision.
Meanwhile, Russia, which owns some 50% of the Arctic littoral, retains a significant military presence in the region. The war in Ukraine has impacted its ground forces in the Arctic, but its maritime and aviation forces remain formidable. Of course, the accession to NATO of Finland and Sweden has added a new dimension to alliance challenges, as well as opportunities, in the Arctic. Competition for resources, tensions over environmental issues and the search by some for military advantage all create the conditions for instability and insecurity.
While most witnesses to the inquiry asserted that neither Russia nor China was likely to initiate a conflict in the Arctic, unlikely is not the same as impossible, especially given the risk of miscalculation. That risk is exacerbated by the much higher likelihood of grey zone operations in the region. For example, greater access to Arctic waters is likely to mean a considerable growth in undersea infrastructure there. We have seen from the recent incident involving the “Eagle S” tanker how aggressively Russia is seeking to disrupt such infrastructure. The report highlights several other grey zone activities that are possible or even likely in the Arctic. These in themselves are a threat to our security, but they could easily escalate into something even more serious. A conflict involving NATO which started elsewhere could, and almost certainly would, spread to the Arctic.
We have long had a close military relationship with our Norwegian partners. In my younger days I flew in many NATO exercises in the Arctic, guarding against a potential Soviet attack through the Finnmark gap. We also have newer but equally strong connections to Sweden and Finland. The Arctic is therefore not just an area of strategic importance to the UK but one where we have experience and expertise. This is reflected in our leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, our partners in that organisation are becoming concerned about the weight of effort and the priority that we are according to this crucial role. They look to us to set a strong example and they are not seeing it.
The inquiry report also highlights the inadequacy of our air and maritime contributions to the High North, which is scarcely surprising given the small number of platforms available to the Navy and the Air Force and the many demands placed on them. These are all particularly serious consequences of our already inadequate military capabilities being spread too thinly. The security of the Arctic is crucial to the safety of the UK, so we have a vested interest in deterring conflict in the High North. To do so, we and our partners in the Joint Expeditionary Force need to demonstrate the capabilities and the will to counter Russian aggression effectively. We are failing seriously and falling short in that regard.
We also need the capabilities and will to deal with grey zone operations in a way that protects our interests and guards against escalation. The recent announcement that the UK will lead Operation Nordic Warden in response to the threat to undersea infrastructure is welcome, but where are the necessary resources to be found? The forthcoming defence review needs to set out the unanswerable case for an increase in the defence budget to at least 3% of GDP, but it also needs to take a much more ruthless and realistic approach to priorities than its recent predecessors did. It must make clear that the security of the Arctic is of fundamental importance to the UK and should therefore be resourced accordingly.
Russian naval intelligence, under the guise of oceanographic research, operates vessels such as the “Admiral Vladimirsky”, which is designed, among other things, for maritime sabotage. Moreover, civilian ships, including fishing trawlers, are being used to survey and potentially attack infrastructure in shallower waters, such as those in the North Sea. In spring 2023, four Nordic broadcasting companies mapped suspicious trajectories of Russian fishing trawlers, research vessels and merchant ships travelling in the region and detected 50 ships that appeared to be collecting data along the seabed and monitoring military and other sensitive activities. In November 2022, the “Admiral Vladimirsky” was spotted loitering near the RAF’s maritime patrol base at Lossiemouth in the United Kingdom. It also passed suspiciously close to several UK offshore windfarms.
Returning to the experience of our Arctic partners, Norway, now Europe’s primary gas supplier, has been the subject of increased Russian surveillance of its energy infrastructure. Any disruption to its energy production would pose a significant risk for Europe’s overall energy security. Since Sweden’s NATO accession, several Swedish organisations have fallen victim to cyberattacks carried out by groups of hackers suspected of having ties to Russia. In this context, international collaboration is essential. Also important is collaboration between Governments and industry, as private companies often possess extensive monitoring and surveillance capabilities. The Norwegian oil and gas sector alone, for example, has 600 remotely operated underwater surveillance vehicles. The committee heard during its inquiry that military-civilian partnerships could considerably enhance deterrence. When infrastructure is designated for both civilian and military use, adversaries could perceive that the risk of sabotage leading to escalation would increase.
State collaboration with major tech companies will also be crucial for ensuring cyber resilience. As we confront the growing challenges to our critical national infrastructure, the role of our Reserve Forces becomes vital. Noble Lords may recall my interest in reservist service, as set out in the register. Our reservists, drawn from all parts of society, possess unique skill sets, linguistic capabilities, technical expertise and adaptable professional backgrounds that are invaluable. They can significantly enhance our capabilities and societal resilience in a way that is cost effective. However, in order fully to realise the potential of our Reserve Forces, we must ensure they are adequately funded, equipped and supported. This involves investing in their training and resources and recognising the invaluable contributions they make to our national security. The dismantling of mechanisms for mobilisation and civil defence after the Cold War has left us vulnerable. There is an urgent need for a whole-of-government effort to build resilience and improve protection of the UK’s critical national infrastructure. New Reserve Forces are needed to provide this protection.
The UK is far from immune to the hybrid threats experienced by Russia’s neighbours in the European Arctic. The protection of our critical national infrastructure is a pressing concern that requires our immediate attention. Reserve Forces, with their unique skills and expertise, are essential in addressing this challenge. I call on the Government, through the SDR, to prioritise the development and support of our Reserve Forces and recognise the vital role they play in defending our nation’s interests.
I want briefly to mention two other issues. First, there is a fear that further militarisation of the region, as a result of geopolitical tensions and the enlargement of NATO, could have an adverse impact on indigenous ways of life and security—for example, through forced displacement to make way for new military bases, or from the damaging effects of leaked radioactive material. Can the Minister say whether, and if so how, these concerns are being taken into account by HMG and NATO? Given that security and military issues are excluded from the remit of the Arctic Council, the UK’s influence could be significant in this regard.
Secondly, there is widespread concern that while global warming is damaging traditional lifestyles by reducing the amount of grazing land for reindeer herds, economic investment in Sami lands—including so-called “green investment” to support the transition to a low-carbon economy—is being conducted without sufficient consultation with indigenous groups. Indeed, the green transition has been called the “green colonisation”.
We heard of plans to develop a large onshore windfarm near traditional reindeer lands, which the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled would violate the human rights of the Sami people but on which the Norwegian Government have not yet taken any remedial action. Another conflict of interest is over the development of deep sea mining by Norway of rare and battery minerals, which some indigenous groups believe will harm or diminish their access to fish, depriving them of both economic activity and a food source. Could the Minister update the House on the agreement between the UK and Norway on the development of a green industrial partnership, which was referred to in the then Government’s response to this report, and say how it will reconcile these apparently conflicting interests and what its priorities will be?
We recommended that HMG should promote a sustainable approach to UK investment in the Arctic, including by directing potential investors to the Ruggie principles and the Arctic investment protocol. Could the Minister also confirm that the current Government stand by the response to this recommendation on the importance of justice and remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses, and of businesses conducting due diligence with respect to human rights?
I end by quoting one of the Greenlandic Inuit parliamentarians we met, who said quite simply that there should be
“nothing about us without us”.
I will not comment on the US President-elect’s aspirations when it comes to Canada or Greenland, but we can be grateful that what Mr Trump is saying is not being uttered by Mr Putin, as I imagine there would be much chatter about Article 5 today. The strategic significance of the Arctic is clear; our collective response ought to be too. Although the UK is geographically distant, it is strategically intertwined with the High North. Securing NATO’s northern flank, ensuring freedom of navigation and maintaining vital energy imports from Norway all depend on our active engagement in this region.
I therefore welcome the report’s recommendations, in particular on partnering with businesses managing critical infrastructure, such as subsea cables and pipelines, to protect against emerging threats; on preventing unregulated fishing and supporting the creation of marine protected areas; and on its call to appoint an Arctic envoy or ambassador, and strengthen co-operation with other observer states on the Arctic Council while respecting the leadership of Arctic nations. The rules-based international order must shape the future of the Arctic, and I also welcome calls for a new international polar code to establish clear guidelines.
I also note the recommendation to engage with China on scientific research and climate change. Although it is important to engage with China on these issues, we must approach this cautiously, with a clear-eyed understanding of the challenges posed by the evolving partnership between Russia and China.
Part of this is a matter of our military capability. While our Armed Forces are not short of tasks, they are short of capability. They rely on a single polar-capable vessel, HMS “Protector”, which is regularly deployed between the Arctic and the Antarctic and has faced technical challenges. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, will be aware of this, and I hope the Minister agrees that we must make sure that his recommendations, made in the SDR, are not constrained by defence spending commitments or the lack of them. Defence spending is not a luxury; it is a necessity. Without investment, in this case in polar assets, we cannot safeguard our interests or support our allies.
As we rightly focus on the Arctic, we must do everything to strengthen existing transit routes, ensuring their stability and security, as the best way of improving the stability and security of global shipping. It is astonishing that a non-state terrorist group can disrupt global shipping in the Red Sea, and the same can be said about piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, closer to home, shifting global shipping from the Suez Canal to the Northern Sea Route would carry serious geopolitical risks. Increased reliance on this route could deepen Europe’s dependence on Russia, in the same way that gas dependence has, limiting our collective ability to counter Moscow’s choices.
The Arctic is not someone else’s problem; it is ours too. Climate change, great power competition and emerging threats in this region will define global security in the years to come. The United Kingdom must remain not only present but relevant, to safeguard NATO’s northern flank and to protect our own national security. This demands proactive engagement, investment in polar capabilities and support for our allies.
When we first debated the Arctic, the opening up of the northern trade route from the Far East to Europe and elsewhere was more a matter of speculation than reality. We were inclined to treat that, and the competitive threats to routes using the Suez Canal, with what has turned out to be an excessive degree of complacency. The illegal actions of the Houthis in Yemen and the consequent damage to the Suez Canal route mean that such complacency can no longer be sustained or defended—the northern route, one should add, being vulnerable to Russian interference, perhaps supported by China. What is the Government’s medium and long-term response beyond the so far relatively unavailing action against Houthi attacks? This is a major threat to freedom of navigation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which affects all nations.
The biggest change since the report by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, arises in the field of security and defence, which the scope of the Arctic Council does not cover—a council that in any case is in suspension since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. What is the UK and the NATO response to that sharply increased threat? Will this aspect be fully covered in the strategic defence review of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, due to be presented in a few months’ time?
In the report by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, the case was made for the appointment of a UK special representative for the Arctic. That proposal has received considerable further support during this debate. The case was summarily rejected by the then Government, but, as has been seen, much has changed since then, in particular the threat in the Arctic from defence and security issues and the multipolar nature of the challenges facing us in the Arctic—quite different from the essential and valuable work being done in the Antarctic by the FCDO’s polar regions unit. I welcome the present report’s reiteration of the need for strengthened UK diplomatic input in the Arctic. Is it not now time to look again at the case for a UK special representative for the Arctic, perhaps in the light of the increased prominence there of security issues? Such a post could be based jointly in the Ministry of Defence and the FCDO. Can the Minister respond to that suggestion when he replies to this debate?
Finally, a word about the sovereignty of Greenland. It is surely the height of irresponsibility to have raised that issue again, one which belongs more to the 19th century than the 21st century. In this way it has complicated and distorted the work that needs to be done to face the global challenges that are posed for us and others in the Arctic and which we need to face up to. I hope we will have nothing to do with the raising of that issue in recent days.