That this House resolves, in accordance with section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and in the light of concerns about the cost of the agreement, the absence of any legal requirement to conclude such an agreement, its impact on international security, and the lack of meaningful consultation of the Chagossian people, and recognising the right of Chagossians to be registered as British Overseas Territory citizens under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, that His Majesty’s Government should not ratify the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, laid before the House on 22 May.
Relevant document: 9th Report from the International Agreements Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)
My Lords, let me start by saying how much I am looking forward to hearing the maiden speech of my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis of Banbury and, more with sadness, the valedictory speech of my noble friend Lord Boswell of Aynho.
Before I speak to the Motion, it is worth reflecting for a moment on the fairly remarkable fact that this debate is the only opportunity that Parliament will have to express its view on this treaty, under the procedure established by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act—or CRaG. While that Act placed Parliament’s role in treaty ratification on the statute book, by convention Parliament has had a role in the ratification of treaties for over century. Under the Ponsonby rule, the House of Commons should be given the opportunity to debate a substantive Motion on a treaty when it is laid before Parliament where there is a formal request in the usual channels. This precedent was confirmed by the right honourable Chris Bryant MP, who was the Minister taking what is now the CRaG Act through the House of Commons in 2010. During Committee, on 19 January, he confirmed that:
“The Government would always make sure that where a debate and vote were requested, they would be made available within the allotted time—or if they were not, we would extend the time in order to allow that provision”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/1/10; col. 218.]
Like so many of our conventions, this is yet another that has been chucked in the dustbin by this Government, who have in fact refused to allow time for a substantive Motion in the other place on this very important treaty. If it is such a good deal, one wonders why the Government are so reluctant to allow MPs to even discuss it? It is therefore only this House which will be able to send a message to the Government on this treaty. I know that noble Lords rightly think long and hard before disagreeing with the other place, but it looks as though we do not need to concern ourselves with such precedents on this occasion.
My Lords, I have a Motion in my name in the debate. I thank the Minister for the open way in which we have had discussions since the agreement was laid before Parliament and put on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, for her willingness to host briefings in the department. I commend the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee of this House for their work and the extremely helpful findings and recommendations they have made. So far they have not been referred to, but we will doubtless hear more about them in the next contribution. I reiterate what I have said on many previous occasions: that the clerks, in particular of the International Agreements Committee, serve Parliament with distinction. They carry out a vital role for this House and for Parliament as a whole.
I look forward to the contributions from my noble friends Lady Ludford and Lord Alderdice, with the experience and perspective they bring, and thank my noble friends on the respective committees for their consideration. I too am looking forward to the maiden speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, and thank the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, for his many years of very distinguished service, in particular as chair of the House’s European Union Committee. I congratulate them both on securing the family handover with such elegant precision today. If the usual channels failed in one thing, they have succeeded in another for this debate.
I want to consider three main areas: first, the circumstances that led us to this debate; secondly, the treaty itself, the issues it raises and why there needs to be further consideration of some of them; and thirdly, what we as a House should do going forward, including why the Motion in my name has been tabled and should, I hope, be supported.
We are here today because of the decision by the previous Conservative Government on 3 November 2022 to
My Lords, the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper invites the House to take note of the recent report of the International Agreements Committee, which I have the honour of chairing. I too look forward to the maiden speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, and to the valedictory address of my good friend, if I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho.
The International Agreements Committee examined this agreement as thoroughly as time allowed. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his opening observations, made the point that there are deficiencies in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. I agree with him on that; there are deficiencies. A review by my committee is in place at the moment to look at those deficiencies and, ultimately, to invite the House to help cure them.
One of those is the time that is allowed for the committee to consider the treaty, which is 21 sitting days. We asked the Foreign Office for an extension to the statutory 21 sitting days that we are allocated to scrutinise this agreement in view of the significant national interest involved. This request was denied without explanation. This raises an issue in relation to the operation of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. We will come back to that. To some extent, the time problem was mitigated by the International Relations and Defence Committee opening its own inquiry. By agreement, we co-operated in the holding of evidence sessions. I thank that committee, its chair, members and clerk for their co-operation. I also very much thank members of the International Agreements Committee, a number of whom are slated to speak today, for their co-operation, insights and wisdom.
I turn to our key takeaways. The House will know that the Chagos Archipelago is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean and consists of more than 1,000 small islands. On the largest of them, Diego Garcia, the UK operates with the United States a joint military base that is a vital strategic UK asset. When Mauritius was a colony of the United Kingdom, the islands were administered by the UK as part of Mauritius. They were separated from Mauritius prior to its independence in the mid-1960s. That separation is the crux of the legal dispute about sovereignty between Mauritius and the UK, which has been running for many years. As a direct result of the Mauritian campaign, the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion in 2019 which found that the UK’s assertion of sovereignty over the Chagos Islands was unlawful.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. This is a timely and important debate, and we have already heard a variety of views. I also look forward to the speeches from my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis and the noble Lord—also, I am sure, a noble father—Lord Boswell. I will look at this deal through the prism of defence and security and address these issues.
You cannot live, as I do, across the Clyde from Faslane, which houses our nuclear deterrent, and not have a sharply honed understanding of the importance of sovereignty. Indeed, one of the most salient arguments for me in the Scottish independence debate, favouring the union, was how independence would create a vulnerable Scotland, stripped of influence on the geopolitical stage and with a skeletal—some would say risible—defence capability. Having sovereign control over that UK defence capability gives strength and authority, and signals to adversaries, “You do not meddle with us, because you cannot meddle with us”. That is what sovereignty means: that unique strength and protection underpin everything that we do in defence.
When I was a Defence Minister, I was clear that, whatever was being discussed about Diego Garcia, and for whatever reasons, our defence and security interests must remain paramount. The admiral, the noble Lord, Lord West, the former First Sea Lord and the Chief of Naval Staff, warned in a Policy Exchange report that
“ceding the Chagos Islands to Mauritius would be an irresponsible act, which would put our strategic interests—and the interests of our closest allies—in danger”.
These are powerful words and since the previous Government commenced exploratory discussions, global tensions have increased and the geopolitical situation has deteriorated. It is now unprecedentedly unpredictable.
My noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, as the then Foreign Secretary, made his concerns clear to the Select Committee in the other place in early 2024. The previous Government did not sign off a deal; the risk was too high.
My Lords, I look forward to the maiden speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, and the valedictory speech of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. As a resident of Fringford, a small village not far away from either Banbury or Aynho, I have a personal interest in the handing on of the baton of parliamentary responsibility. I express my personal appreciation of both noble Lords.
Turning to the Motions before us, as a member of your Lordships’ Select Committee on International Relations and Defence, I have spent some considerable time with my committee colleagues trying to understand the background to the issues, the process of negotiation by the previous Conservative Government and the current Labour Government, and the implementation of the agreement reached with the Government of Mauritius, which the international community has agreed shall be the sovereign Government.
In the short time available to me, I will try to deal with the key issues raised by the International Relations and Defence Committee in its letter to the Foreign Secretary. First, on defence, I ask the Minister whether each time the Diego Garcia base is used, particularly by our US colleagues, as a base for an aggressive military operation, will we as the leaseholder be asked for permission? How will the Government deal with requests for such military attacks on others if we are not happy with those requests, considering that our agreement may well be regarded by those attacked as our participation in such a military adventure? The same applies, in a slightly different way, to the Government of Mauritius. It would be extremely helpful if the Minister could say what he thinks about that.
Other noble Lords have observed the enormous importance of the precious marine environment in which the Chagos Islands sit. I wish to be somewhat further reassured by the Minister that His Majesty’s Government will be intimately involved in the monitoring of the conduct of the marine environment there in collaboration with the Government of Mauritius.
My Lords, today’s debate is odd for two reasons, and that is the one point on which I think I agree with the introductory remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. First, had the outcome of last July’s general election been different, it is highly possible that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, or one of his colleagues would have been standing at the Dispatch Box defending an agreement similar to the one we are debating now. How else can one construe the 11 rounds of negotiations that the Government of which he was a member conducted with the Government of Mauritius before that election following the ruling of the International Court of Justice and the overwhelming vote in the UN General Assembly that the UK should negotiate in this sense?
Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, put down the wrecking Motion he has introduced calling for the agreement not to be ratified even though neither of the two committees examining the agreement—the International Agreements Committee, of which I have the honour to be a member, and the International Relations and Defence Committee—had even begun to take evidence on the text of the agreement, let alone put such evidence in the public domain. The reports of these two committees are now available to the House and they provide no—I repeat, no—justification for the Motion that the noble Lord has put before us. That surely demonstrates a contempt for the two committees, which is deplorable. Some will say, “Well, that’s just politics”, but it should not be so if the work of our committees is to be taken seriously by the House.
Now, that lacuna has been filled and our report and the evidence on which it is based have been published and are available to the House, as is the extremely valuable letter from the International Relations Committee. That it should have become available so late in the day is a matter for profound apology, but given the 21 working days we had to conduct our inquiry of quite a complex agreement, it was inevitable once the Government had already, at an earlier stage, turned down our request for an extension.
My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble Lord. I begin by thanking the staff, officials and, indeed, Members across this House, who have welcomed me so kindly to my place. I thank my sponsors: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who has supported me since I was his pupil 30 years ago, and my noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, my constituency neighbour, whose call during a radio interview in 2014 for more professional women to stand as MPs was heard by me loud and clear while I was washing up in my kitchen at home.
I confess that I have long loved this end of the building. In my first job as a government lawyer, I was frequently sent with heavy bundles of documents, copied 10 times and bound in white ribbon, for the Law Lords. My kinsman, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, enjoyed in many ways the most fulfilling time of his career here as chairman of the European Union Committee through the Brexit years. I spent a great deal of my time as a Minister engaging—sometimes productively but always pleasantly—with noble Lords who, it transpires, take a great interest in agricultural and legal policy.
I am in many ways my father’s daughter. As many noble Lords know, we farm in Aynho near Banbury, and my sisters and I have stayed within a few miles of home and brought up our own daughters there. The Cherwell Valley has formed the backdrop to my life as, kindly, my husband, himself a proud Yorkshireman, was also prepared to make it his home. I was very pleased to serve as Minister for Farming, and I had hoped that the schemes we put in place to support environmentally friendly food production would be the legacy I looked back on. I am concerned by the situation now.
Possibly because my home life is so geographically settled and bound by the rhythms of the rural and Church year, I have always worked away. My work life has been centred on public and international law, almost all in the Government Legal Department. Government lawyers are a committed and able band, and it was an honour to oversee their work as Attorney-General.
My Lords, I am delighted to participate in this debate and thus to play my final set. I would like in particular to congratulate my noble kinswoman on the maiden speech she has just delivered for its perception, skill and elegance. For full disclosure, I ought myself to declare to the House that she is my daughter. Although our careers have not always taken the same path—Oxford against Cambridge, for example—we tend to take similar positions, and our relationship casts an interesting and somewhat varied slant on debates to come shortly on qualification by inheritance in this House. I shall not dilate on that further, not least because I am minded of the wisdom of the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, who once remarked that valedictories should be shorter than inaugurals.
I say at the beginning of the substance of my speech that I have grown increasingly attracted to the traditions attached to this House and Parliament in general. This is not out of antiquarian reverence— although I happen to be a fellow of that learned society—but because they counterbalance short-term political pressures and media activity.
My own first political memory was as a very small child meeting Lord Addison, who served on an agricultural board with my father, had been a Cabinet Minister in the First World War and led this House during the post-1945 Government. Later, as a schoolboy, I went to the Gallery of another place, and I was privileged to spot Churchill, then in his last term, at about my current age, take his seat and listen in. More widely, I am a child of the television age, as my family were very early adopters, and I remember highlights of the London Olympics of 1948. The post-war decade was also identified with the development of nuclear weapons, and I took a rather precocious interest in civil defence and emergency planning. Our wartime generation grew up during the long withdrawal from empire, of which a remaining fragment is the subject of today’s debate. Our record as a nation in this process over the last 80 years, while wholesome, has not been wholly blameless, and it is right to be as rigorous and transparent as we can in analysing it.
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What we are discussing today is, frankly, an astonishing act of national self-harm. Let us be under no illusion: the deal that the Government have agreed to is a strategic capitulation. We are preparing to hand over sovereign British territory which has been under continuous British control for over two centuries and—as if that were not embarrassing enough—the British taxpayer is being asked to pay £30 billion for the privilege.
The British Indian Ocean Territory, and in particular Diego Garcia, is of immense geopolitical importance. It is key to our defence and intelligence interests in a region increasingly contested by authoritarian powers. Astonishingly, the Government are now preparing to cede sovereignty to Mauritius. The island of Mauritius is 2,000 kilometres away from the Chagos Islands and it has never exercised any jurisdiction over the territory. It now stands to gain significant influence in our vital defence and foreign security policies. This is not pragmatic foreign policy; it is a surrender, orchestrated by international lawyers and signed off by a Prime Minister who seems to be incapable of acting in the true interests of Britain abroad.
The Government’s approach to the Chagos Archipelago is not rooted in strategic calculation, nor in genuine concern for the long-term stability of the region. It seems to be driven by a relentless desire to virtue signal on the world stage at the behest of activist lawyers who have no intention of putting Britain’s interests first. The Government’s motivations are ideologically driven, and the Prime Minister, in my view, has been strategically reckless.
Ministers have tried to make a case that this agreement is somehow legally necessary, but it now becomes increasingly clear, not least through some of the evidence given to your Lordships’ International Agreements Committee, that there are in fact a range of views from senior lawyers on this matter. I know that my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar will address more of the legal aspects in his speech later. For now, I will merely say that this Government seem to almost constantly hide behind legal advice, but at some point Ministers must take responsibility for the political choices that they have made. We should stand firm, and we should defend our territory, our interests and, ultimately, our credibility on the international stage.
In trying to justify this treaty, Labour Ministers have consistently tried to claim that they were merely completing a process begun by the last Government. This is simply not the case. After initial discussions between officials, in December 2023, when my noble friend Lord Cameron was Foreign Secretary, talks on this matter were put on hold after it was concluded that this would not be a deal in which British national interests would be served. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Cameron told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee at the time:
“We face a very insecure and dangerous world and there is a need to maintain our security and strengthen our alliances to protect ourselves, and we should think of Diego Garcia in that context”.
That was our approach: pragmatism, realism and responsibility, not the current Government’s programme of virtue signalling and posturing. I know that my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon was very close to this issue as a Minister in the FCDO and I am pleased that he will be contributing to our debate later today.
One of the most astonishing things about this deal is the fact that British taxpayers are paying for it—paying to surrender sovereignty and to embarrass ourselves on the international stage. Given the state of the public finances, I should have thought that this alone would be a red line for this Government, particularly given their recent difficulties convincing their Back-Benchers to cut any sort of spending at all. The Chancellor keeps insisting that we do not have enough money to pay for disability benefits and, until their latest U-turn, not enough money for winter fuel payments to pensioners, but the Government have somehow found the means to shell out £30 billion for the pleasure of giving away British territory. In currency that noble Lords opposite will recognise, this is the equivalent of one and a half black holes and could finance 5,500 more nurses a year, every year.
The Mauritian Finance Minister has helpfully told us what Mauritius is going to do with its fortunate windfall. Mauritius is apparently going to cut taxes and pay off the national debt—and good luck to it. We know that some of the cash is being taken from Ministry of Defence funds, but some of it is coming from the already severely reduced ODA budget—although, so far, the Government have refused to tell us exactly how much. Last week, during Oral Questions, Members from all parts of the House expressed their concerns about the effect of reductions in ODA on things such as infant vaccinations. This indeed is another one of the “tough choices” that the Government keep telling us they are having to make. The Exchequer is making cuts in the UK to fund tax reductions in Mauritius. The long-suffering taxpayer should not suffer the consequences of Labour’s dramatically bad negotiating skills. The fact that this territory is being ceded is, frankly, obscene; the fact that we are paying for it makes it a farce.
I am sure that the Minister will say in his concluding remarks that we are being the Opposition for the sake of being the Opposition. Before he finishes scribbling down his response, I remind him that this agreement is just as unpopular on his own Benches. The greatly respected noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, who is sadly not in his place, has rightly and powerfully criticised the Government for their decision to cede our territory in this way. He said:
“For reasons that are difficult to fathom, the Government risks jeopardising both of these assets as it apparently remains determined to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Islands—the home of our vital Diego Garcia military base—to Mauritius … surrendering sovereignty over the Chagos Islands would be an irresponsible act, which would put our strategic interests—and the interests of our closest allies—in danger”.
I could not have put it better myself. I am surprised that the Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary have not paid greater heed to the words of the former First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, not least because he is a member of their own party. Indeed, this underscores that this is not simply a party-political matter but a national one, and many people agree that it is a national disgrace.
We cannot overlook the fact that, in a deal so roundly criticised, some of the very few words of welcome have come from China. In contrast to what the PM told the House of Commons, this is hardly a surprise. One of the so-called judges who produced the original ICJ advisory opinion is a Chinese communist supporter of the Russian invasion of Ukraine—such is his love of international law. Huang Shifang, China’s ambassador to Mauritius, told guests at the Chinese embassy at the end of May that her Government offered “massive congratulations” on the deal and that China “fully supports” Mauritius’s attempts to “safeguard national sovereignty”. She also confirmed that Mauritius would soon join Beijing’s belt and road initiative—of course it will.
We are bending over backwards to appease a Chinese communist ICJ judge when we know that China itself pays no heed whatever to any judgments on its policy in the South China Sea or over Hong Kong. When China starts welcoming British defence and foreign policy, does this not suggest that, somehow, something in that policy is perhaps not quite in our national interest? We cannot ignore the growing threat the Chinese Communist Party poses to our national security, to global stability and, in many cases, to its own people.
From industrial-scale cyber espionage and economic coercion abroad, to the systematic repression of Uyghurs and the dismantling of freedoms in Hong Kong and at home, China’s actions increasingly defy the norms of a rules-based international order. Its deepening partnerships with autocratic regimes and its hostility to democratic values only compound these risks. It is this regime that has been one of the few to support the British Government’s decision on this matter. In this context, is it not just ill-advised but actively against our national interest to cede control, even indirectly, of sovereign British territory to any arrangement that could open the door to increased Chinese influence? We should not be blind to the geopolitical consequences of our decisions in this matter.
One of the many concerning aspects of this treaty is the second part of Annexe 1, which requires the UK
“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State directly emanating from the Base on Diego Garcia”.
Lawyers are already debating whether this means that we must inform Mauritius in advance of any attack. I wonder how this would have worked last week, if the US had wished to use Diego Garcia for its actions in Iran—perhaps that is why the question was not asked. How would any notification be kept confidential if the Mauritian Government disagreed? At the very least, I suspect that this interpretation of that part of the annexe will provide plenty more lucrative work for their international lawyer cheerleaders.
Under another part of the annexe, we also have to provide notification to Mauritius of any
“access, basing and overflight for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels”.
That provision states that we can give permission only “upon notification to Mauritius”. Again, that can be interpreted as needing to get permission in advance. Have the Government given any thought whatever as to how these provisions will work in a potentially fast-moving international crisis? I suspect that they have not.
There is another group I have not spoken about so far, but their views are one of the most important factors that the Government should take into account: the Chagossian people, who have been treated disgracefully in this long-going saga. I am pleased that a number of them are in our Public Gallery today to view the debate, and they are very welcome in our House.
Although the Government may have closed their ears to the Chagossian people, your Lordships’ House has the opportunity to say today that we, at least, are listening to them. When the Minister responds to our debate, I hope he will be able to tell us what consultation the Government have actually had with them. I understand that the Foreign Secretary had never met any of them until after the treaty was concluded; therefore, will the Government consider holding a referendum of the Chagossian people before ratifying the treaty?
Finally, among many other concerning aspects of the treaty there is the issue of the current marine protected area. This currently includes no catch for fish and is one of the largest and most important in the world, at over 640,000 square kilometres. It a blue jewel in our crown, as it were. We have no idea what will happen to that in the future. We do, however, have the words of the Mauritian Fisheries Minister, who said earlier this year:
“What stops me tomorrow to say that I am going to give fishing licences for any fishing trawler company or any fishing vessel to go to any part of Chagos; to fish and to bring the catch to be landed at our port? We have the authority, the moral authority, legal authority, legitimate authority to fish in our exclusive economic zone”.
There will be a tremendous economic incentive for a relatively poor country such as Mauritius to exploit the fishing opportunities in those areas.
What is before us today is not a strategic rebalancing nor a moral reckoning; it is a self-inflicted blow to Britain’s global standing. This agreement amounts to a retreat: a surrender of sovereign territory that serves as a linchpin of our defence architecture at a time when authoritarian threats are rising and alliances matter more than ever. Handing control to a Government who align themselves ever more closely with Beijing—a regime that actively undermines international norms and our national interests—is not only unwise; it is positively dangerous. To compound the error, the British taxpayer is being made to foot the Bill.
This whole affair has been a gross folly. There is no strategic gain here, no credible guarantee for the future of Diego Garcia and no reassurance for our allies. Instead, we send a message to adversaries and allies alike that British sovereignty is indeed negotiable. It is capitulation and we must reject it.
“begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory … /Chagos Archipelago”.
That Statement by Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, repeated here by the noble Lord, Lord Goldsmith—the other one—specifically referred to
“taking into account relevant legal proceedings”
and the
“intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law to resolve all outstanding issues, including those relating to the former inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 354WS.]
That Statement, which apparently is now “obscene”, “dangerous”, “self-harm” and “a surrender”, was made by the noble Lord Callanan’s Government. This was a major change of policy. If the Benches on my right are in any doubt about that, it was a change of policy because the position was, to quote from a Written Answer from the previous Government made on 20 April 2021:
“There are no current plans for discussions with the Government of Mauritius on the future of the Chagos Islands”.
In March 2022, just weeks before the policy change, the Government said:
“The UK has no doubt about its sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory”,
and on Mauritius, that
“we do not recognise its claim. However, we stand by our commitment, first made in 1965, to cede sovereignty of the territory to Mauritius when it is no longer needed for defence purposes”.
So, since the Government—the Conservative Government—still needed it for defence purposes but made the decision in November that year to open negotiations to cede sovereignty, the change of policy was significant. The treaty is a consequence of now completing the previous Conservative Government’s policy. Some who agreed with it then disagree with it now, but that does not change the fact that the Conservatives made a major policy choice to cede sovereignty and to do it under the context of the International Court of Justice decisions.
This was also a major legal decision, as, up to the change of policy in 2022 to cede sovereignty, the Government relied on their previous argument that the 1965 agreement to separate the archipelago was held to be legally binding by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitral tribunal in 2015. This was therefore reversed, and the relevant legal proceedings referred to was the process of the ICJ, which had responded to the request by the United Nations General Assembly for a determination on the lawfulness of decolonisation and had reported its advisory opinion in 2019. We know that it was found in the opinion that decolonisation was not completed lawfully, and the General Assembly responded to the advisory opinion by adopting resolution 73/295 on 22 May 2019.
In this debate, some noble Lords may well delve deeper into previous history, and may challenge the ICJ opinion—which am sure all noble Lords have read fully. It gives a clear factual history, and some of it, I have to be frank, makes very uncomfortable reading. Others may opine on the ICJ mechanisms and the significance of the opinion and the associated General Assembly resolutions—it is their right to do so. But none of that will change the fact of the November 2022 decision of the Conservative Government.
So, we have established that the previous Government decided to recognise in principle the case for the exercise of sovereignty by Mauritius over the archipelago, and they pursued this over many rounds of discussions on the terms of bilateral relations going forward on how our defence and security interests would be maintained. We may hear in the debate that, after 11 attempts, there was no agreement. But that was not changing the view of the principle of ceding sovereignty; it was no agreement on the actual terms. There is a difference.
As we have settled that, we can now turn to the terms before considering the position we should take on them. The question is: does a deal with deficiencies negate the principle of Mauritian sovereignty? The answer is no, as James Cleverly’s Statement is recognised in principle internationally. The issues are the implications of it, its application and the protection of Chagossian rights under it.
One implication presented is whether this treaty raises questions on other overseas territories. The IAC addressed this in paragraph 26, saying that
“the Agreement would not have any direct read-across”.
Another implication is the question of whether this limits our security or defence. Questions have been raised so far in the debate. The committee concluded that none of the witnesses it heard contested the Government’s view that the treaty will not, for so long as it remains in force, materially change the ability of the UK and US to operate the base at Diego Garcia. We now know that the United States agrees.
Maintaining protection of marine biodiversity has also been raised. In 2010, the UK declared 640,000 square kilometres of marine protected area around the territory. It has some of the most biodiverse waters on the planet and I noted that the committee welcomed the Government’s assurance that they will work closely with the Mauritian Government to establish a well-resourced and patrolled marine protected area. The committee added:
“We consider it vital that an appropriate portion of the annual development grant funding is allocated towards projects to support the new MPA”.
I hope that the Government agree with that. The committee makes the case for more financial scrutiny, and I agree. It is worth, for colleagues on my right, putting on record, because the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, forgot to, that when he was a Minister, his department was the largest disburser of UK overseas aid to Mauritius—we thank him for his work. It is also the case that these financial provisions are of a larger scale, and it is necessary to have further clarity and details on this commitment.
The Government should have been, and should now be, more transparent, including on the basis for establishing the funds in Article 11, but a critical part now is the recognition and restoration of rights to the diverse Chagossian community. I note the 11 June call from the Human Rights Council for the agreement to be renegotiated because it does not respect the rights of the Chagossians. I also note that the committee’s conclusion was that the UK should not be bound by this, but feels that we should all acknowledge the years—in fact, the generations—during which the community has been denied rights, from forced removal in the 1970s to the denial of resettlement in the 2000s. We owe that community both an apology and restoration of rights.
As both communities noted in a round-table event held by the IRDC in December 2024, representatives from members of the community based in the UK and Mauritius expressed unanimous dissatisfaction with the consultation on the part of both the UK and the Mauritian Governments, and were frustrated by their exclusion from the negotiations. Paragraph 46 of the report concluded with a regrettable perception that, it said, had some basis in reality: that, over many years, the interests of the Chagossians had been subordinated to the national security interests of the UK and its allies. It went on to say that it agreed with some witnesses that more could have been done, including in relation to employment at the base, and that the agreement does not provide a clear route to the resettlement of Chagossians in the Chagos Archipelago. It called on the Government to engage with Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement of the islands, including for members of the community currently based in the UK. Paragraph 49 called on the Government to clarify what oversight and accountability mechanisms would be put in place to ensure transparency and the equitable and effective allocation of funds. In particular, it sought clarification of how Chagossians would be consulted in the administration of the trust fund and whether those based in the UK will benefit. I agree with all of those points; indeed, I agree with the committee’s letter to the Foreign Secretary:
“More meaningful engagement would have helped rebuild trust and lend greater legitimacy to the final arrangements”.
My Motion, therefore, would require the Government to fulfil recommendations of the IRC and also the requests in points 4, 5, and 6 in the IRDC letter to the Foreign Secretary to enhance Chagossian engagement by establishing a formal consultation mechanism and meaningful inclusion in decision-making: and how resettlement “will” be provided for, not just “may” be provided for. It would address the request for transparency and accountability. I hope that both the Government and, indeed, the Conservative Opposition will support this Motion. If this is our last opportunity in this House to speak on this treaty, I hope that we can at least agree for further protections of the community to be outlined before the Government ratify.
We have therefore established that the previous Government agreed in principle to cede the exercise of sovereignty in a manner consistent with international law. We have also seen that there are areas where, under this Government, more information and scrutiny are needed on their terms for the conclusion of that ceding. The question now is how we proceed.
We heard plenty of fire and brimstone from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who seemed rather incensed. He sought to give the impression that all routes for the Conservatives to secure a debate in the House of Commons under CRaG had been exhausted, blaming the failure of the usual channels and the Government’s intransigence. That is not entirely true, because the Conservatives had two opportunities during this scrutiny period to secure time in the House of Commons; we know through the Library Note guidance on CRaG that if the Government do not provide time, it can be done in opposition time. Yes, there were coat-tails to hide behind when it came to the Government not providing time, but I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, must have had a meeting with his Commons colleagues when they said that this was not important enough to use their time during the scrutiny period in the House of Commons.
I think that we must all have sympathy with the noble Lord. I can imagine that he was not too happy when they said that it would be for the unelected House to take this up. Students of political history will know that this would have been an impossible course of action. The Conservatives would never use the unelected House to limit the prerogative power to make treaties and to refuse ratification. Do not take my word for it; take theirs. In the debate on the Rwanda treaty, we debated the Motion in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for conditions on ratification. The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, whose contribution we look forward to later on, sought to give me and everybody else very respectful and lengthy legal advice as to why we definitely should not have a Motion to delay ratification of a treaty. I look forward to his altered legal advice later.
Winding that debate, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, called the Motion from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, constitutionally “unnecessary and misguided”. Presumably, this far wider Motion by his colleague is necessary and well informed. Setting aside the amnesia epidemic sweeping the Benches on my right, and in all seriousness, I thank them for the announcement made on 3 June in this House by the noble Earl, Lord Minto, that a fatal Motion had been laid and that they would press it to a vote. I can only commend him and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on being brave. They have reversed generations of Conservative policy never to have fatal Motions in this House. They have reversed generations of policy not to seek to interfere with the prerogative powers, and this major constitutional moment today has not gone unnoticed.
We have an opportunity to restore some of the rights that have been denied a community, which we should all be ashamed of. We have the ability to honour a commitment given by James Cleverly in November 2022 that we would abide by international law and would cede sovereignty. We also have an opportunity to ensure that, at this stage, we do it right. We should therefore honour our commitments, ensure rights and provide clarity, and we hope that the Government can do this before ratification.
The agreement that we are considering intends to resolve the sovereignty dispute once and for all and secure the long-term future of the military base. Our report supports the contention of the Government that the agreement secures UK and US operations at the base at Diego Garcia, but the arrangements by which the UK is authorised to operate the base are time limited. Our committee also concluded that while the agreement is not perfect—I will speak to some of the limitations in a moment—if an agreement were not reached, Mauritius would likely resume its campaign to obtain a legally binding judgment on sovereignty against the United Kingdom.
We heard expert evidence from Sir Christopher Greenwood, one of the UK’s pre-eminent practitioners of international law and a former judge of the International Court of Justice, nominated by the United Kingdom to that court. In his opinion, any international court examining the sovereignty dispute would likely find in favour of Mauritius. Such an outcome would clearly represent a risk to the future of the military base and thus UK national interests and security.
I will briefly discuss the committee’s view on the justification for the agreement, taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 2019. After this discussion, I will outline the report’s findings on the interests of the Chagossian people, rightly referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, and others; the protection of the marine environment; and the financial arrangements under the treaty—all issues that have been raised and are touched on in the committee’s report.
First, on the Government’s justification for the agreement, particularly in view of the national security interests that the UK has in the base at Diego Garcia, Sir Christopher Greenwood told our committee that while the 2019 ICJ opinion was only advisory, it is
“a very authoritative guide to the legal position. In reality, it would be very difficult for any state just to ignore an almost unanimous opinion of the international court”.
The consequences of this ruling have already been seen in the rulings of international tribunals and the actions of international bodies. Members who have read our report will have noted the copy of the UN official world map on page 11, which shows the Chagos Islands as the territory of Mauritius. Similarly, a 2021 ruling of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea decided that, following the ICJ advisory opinion, it had jurisdiction to determine the maritime boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives on the basis that Mauritius was sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago. We heard evidence that there were legal avenues by which Mauritius would be able to bring a sovereignty dispute before an international tribunal. There is therefore a clear risk that Mauritius could succeed in obtaining a legally binding judgment on sovereignty against the United Kingdom.
The issue of whether the base on Diego Garcia is secure against litigation is an important one, given its centrality to the UK’s national security interests. I note the point about the possibility that it might even have been used last week in the US attacks on Iran. The base was described to us in evidence as a “vital” security asset. It sits at a strategic location in the centre of the Indian Ocean, which offers air cover into the Gulf, the Middle East, south Asia and east Africa, and thus protection for crucial shipping lanes in the region, among other security concerns.
Nothing in our inquiry—we looked hard at this point, in so far as we could—contradicted the Government’s view that the agreement would prevent the UK or US retaining full control over operations from Diego Garcia; nothing in the agreement would prevent that. The US Government have also welcomed the agreement, a further sign that it will not constrain activities at the base.
Our inquiry did consider the risk of China’s operations in the region and its relationship with Mauritius. Again, however, we did not hear of any credible threat to the stability of operations at the base that could come about as a result of the agreement. We do, however, note in our report that there is no guarantee that the agreement will be extended at the end of the 99-year term.
I turn to the interests of the Chagossian people, which we looked at. The past treatment of the Chagossian people has left a “deeply regrettable legacy”; that is acknowledged in the preamble to the agreement. However, the agreement makes minimal provisions to support Chagossians. It states simply:
“Mauritius will now be free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago, other than Diego Garcia”.
In fact, that does nothing to secure the right to return of the Chagossian community. At the December round-table event with members of the Chagossian community, our colleagues on the International Relations and Defence Committee heard unanimous concern that Chagossians had been excluded from the consultation process by the British and Mauritian Governments, and that any engagement had felt “tokenistic” and “superficial” and lacking in meaningful engagement or follow-up.
The omission from the agreement of meaningful consultation with and provision for the Chagossian community is regrettable. We note the perception, which we believe has basis in reality, that, over many years, the interests of the Chagossians have been subordinated to the national security interests of the UK. Our committee is of the view that more should have been done to secure the rights of Chagossians in this process; for example, by prioritising Chagossians for employment at the base on Diego Garcia. Our report therefore calls on the Government to engage with Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement on the islands, including for members of the Chagossian community based in the UK.
I turn to another topic, which noble Lords have referred to, which is protection of the marine environment. We heard compelling evidence from Dr Bryan Wilson, the scientific adviser to the Chagos Conservation Trust and a research fellow in biology at the University of Oxford, about the importance and uniqueness of the marine environment around the Chagos Archipelago. He told us it is
“the most important reef wilderness on the planet”.
To date, the UK has been conserving and protecting this area with its own marine protected area. This is the first such marine protected area to change sovereignty. The UK experience has demonstrated that maintaining and enforcing a protected area of this size is challenging. Mauritius has an enormous task ahead of it. As such, our report welcomes the Government’s assurance that they will work closely with Mauritius to establish a well-protected marine environment, including by apportioning an appropriate amount from the annual development fund established under the agreement to support these activities.
That leads me to the financial terms. We have heard that the burden to the taxpayer of the financial payments under this agreement is high. These costs amount to a total of £3.4 billion over the lifespan of the agreement. In addition to the annual cost of leasing the base, the figure includes a one-off payment to capitalise a trust fund for the benefit of the Chagossian community, and an annual development fund to contribute to projects to support the welfare and development of the Mauritian people.
There is little detail in the agreement as to how these latter two funds will be administered or audited, or if there exist criteria for their allocation. Greater clarity on this is needed. Our report calls on the Government to clarify what oversight and accountability mechanisms will be put in place to ensure transparency and the equitable and effective allocation of those funds. In particular, we would like clarification on how Chagossians will be consulted in the administration of the trust fund, and we would further like to know whether Chagossians based in the UK would benefit from this fund.
The summary of our committee’s work is that we agree with the Government that securing the long-term use of the base on Diego Garcia is of the highest importance. I strongly suspect that that is the view of everybody in this House. We heard nothing to undermine the Government’s contention that this agreement achieves that goal, for as long as it remains in force.
Taking account of the agreement’s limitations, to which we draw attention, our report concludes that, if the agreement is not ratified and if a future Government attempted to go on resisting international pressure to transfer sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, there is a risk that Mauritius will obtain a legally binding judgment on sovereignty against the United Kingdom. In these circumstances, despite its imperfections, we considered that the agreement was the safest way to secure the UK’s operation of the base on Diego Garcia.
Two committees of this House—the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee—have published very informative reports on this deal. They certainly deserve our thanks. This agreement still needs to clear Parliament and I hope this debate will help the Government better understand why, in relation to defence and security, red lights are flashing all over the place.
It is regrettable, as has already been mentioned, that the request that the International Agreements Committee made to the Foreign Secretary for more time for parliamentary scrutiny was refused without reasons being given. For an issue of such primary importance as our global defence and security in this turbulent world, that is weak. Why were the Government so afraid of scrutiny?
Perhaps the answer can be found within the two reports to which I referred. Both confirm that there was a difference of legal opinion about whether the UK Government were under any obligation to act. The International Relations and Defence Committee cut to the chase; the chairman’s letter to the Foreign Secretary stated:
“While we heard differing legal interpretations of whether the UK was required to transfer sovereignty, both the preceding and current governments were involved in negotiations with Mauritius, and the decision to proceed was ultimately political”.
So there we have it—it was political, not a legally based decision. This Government are not obliged to transfer sovereignty and were not required to sign a deal. Our essential interests can still be protected by opposing this treaty.
Why does this matter? Let me quote again from the letter, at annexe A, paragraph 4:
“Witnesses were unanimous in their view that Diego Garcia holds a pivotal strategic role for the UK and US and that it is critical for broader Western security strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Dr Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow on US strategy in Asia at the American Enterprise Institute, described Diego Garcia as the ‘pivot point’ between the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, underpinning critical US naval and air operations”.
Which country is dominant in the Indian Ocean? China. Which country appears to be the new best friend of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean? Again, it is China. Are there any countries that explicitly approve of this deal? Yes, Russia and China. This is a dangerous deal and should be ditched, because the most carefully drafted text in the world cannot substitute for sovereignty. Even the wisdom of Solomon cannot achieve that.
I conclude by observing what my noble friend Lord Callanan already referred to. The cost of this will be met largely by an already-stretched defence budget, with the Government scraping around to find every penny they can. Defence is being asked to pay for the gravely weakened defence and security position the Government have created. I support the Motion in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.
However, my main focus is and has to be on the Chagossian people. They have not been well treated over the years by the United Kingdom. It is not at all clear to me that it was necessary to remove them all from the whole of the archipelago in the first place. Can I be assured that His Majesty’s Government will explore the possibility of employing at least some Chagossians to access employment opportunities at the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia? It has been the case in other parts of the world with British bases; why not here? If it is not possible, the Government must surely provide a detailed written justification for their exclusion from resettlement in their own home islands and also contribute to their welfare and well-being as a community.
I say “as a community”, but the Chagossians, as we know, are not all of one view about their future. That is a challenge in terms of assessing what they want, but it is not a reason why there should not be a formal consultative mechanism with the various groups in the Chagossian community, as well as a facility to monitor, collaboratively with them, the implementation of the agreement and to ensure their meaningful inclusion in decision-making about the future of their islands. I ask the Minister to give the most sympathetic consideration to the Motion so ably proposed by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed, which gives His Majesty’s Government a route to fulfilling their moral obligations and responsibilities to the Chagossian people.
Finally, it has been suggested that the Government are paying to cede sovereignty, but surely this is not the situation. The Government have said that they have agreed to cede sovereignty, but once that is done, there will be no further rights. It seems to me that the Government have been trying to negotiate, as the previous Conservative Government tried to negotiate, a leasehold for the continued use of the islets for military purposes. One question about that funding is its amount, but perhaps the most important question is whether there is properly thought-through and objective oversight of the considerable funding that is being made available to provide for the future of the Chagossian people. It should not simply be left to the Government of Mauritius to decide that. We need to try to ensure that the Chagossian people also have a say about that money.
The committees heard the evidence of three distinguished international lawyers. While this evidence was not unanimous, two out of the three—Philippe Sands and Sir Christopher Greenwood—were very clear that the agreement reached was necessary if the UK was to avoid a legally binding finding at some point in the future in addition to the advisory opinion already rendered by the ICJ.
It was also particularly striking that Sir Christopher was so clear that it would be incompatible—I repeat, incompatible—with the policy expressed so frequently at the Dispatch Box by both the outgoing Government and the incoming one that the UK supports the rules-based international order, if the UK should then find it inconvenient to do so on this occasion. For what it is worth, that is my own opinion too. At a time when the rules-based order is under such severe attack, it would be especially damaging if one of its principal supporters were to choose opportunism over principle.
None of the evidence we received supported the view that has been expressed that this agreement is in any way analogous with, or undermines the legal basis for, the UK’s sovereignty over Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and the sovereign base areas of Cyprus.
In conclusion, I would urge Members to vote against the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and to take note of the report from the International Relations Committee, which clears the way for ratification of the agreement reported on. That is the course consistent with our national security interests and with our respect for international law.
Before concluding, I want to say how sorry I am to be speaking before the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, as I would have wished to congratulate her on her maiden speech. I am sorry also to be speaking before the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. He was my boss on the European Union Committee for many years and a completely outstanding chairman of that committee, for whose work we should all express great gratitude today.
As a family, we enjoy learning languages, and our eldest daughter was doing just that in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion. Luckily, we got her home. We also brought over a young woman from Kherson, who came to live with us and is now a much-loved part of our family. After the election last summer, I knew that I wanted to continue the work I had been doing in government to support Ukraine, so I have been training Ukraine’s lawyers in the law relating to war crimes.
The Ukrainians have over 170,000 open files of crimes alleged to have been committed by Russian soldiers. That they are carrying out these prosecutions during an active war is unprecedented, as is the enthusiasm with which they have taken steps to ensure fairness in proceedings. I have in fact spent over half my time training those who are conducting the defence of the Russian soldiers. They are spinning what they describe as a web of accountability with thought and precision, and I will of course continue to help where I can.
They want our help. They see us in the UK for what we are: historical leaders in the field of international law and lucky, far more than we realise, to have judges we can trust. They value our dedication to proper process and individual rights, and so should we. International law should not be seen as a threat to our national interest. In fact, particularly in the environmental space, it regulates the interactions between nations pretty well. Of course we must abide by whatever rules we have agreed to adhere to, but, if we really feel that our national interest is not being served, we are free to walk away. These decisions should be seen as what they are: fundamentally political rather than legal.
Although domestic law changes and evolves over time, treaty law is rather different. Treaties must be precise and clear if they are to be useful. If the Government wish to persuade this House that this treaty represents a good deal for the UK, not to mention value for money, we will need greater transparency. We will need to know how and why the figures were arrived at. We will need assurances that the various legal regimes—including an undefined international law, Mauritian environmental law and the termination clause definition of “serious threat” to Mauritian national interests—can all work together. We will need to know how all this is to be enforced. We will need assurances that the Chagossians are to be consulted about their future. We will need to be sure that the precious marine protection area is cared for in the longer term. Most importantly, we need to be certain, in an ever more dangerous world, that the base can continue to be used for its primary purpose, which is, of course, to keep us safe.
I am very grateful for noble Lords indulgence for the piece of family history playing out before them. I am thrilled to be here.
I want now to thank all those professionals who have guided me on my way, including, initially, the civil servants who were colleagues of mine when I was approached on the farm by my noble friend Lord Jopling and drafted in—as, I hope, a respectable spad—to help invent the system of milk quotas, and then other officials who served me when I went on into ministerial posts. In particular, in relation to parliamentary staff, I single out those involved with the Committee Office here. As has been mentioned, I found myself chairing the European Union Committee for a seven-year stretch, nearly bisected by the Brexit referendum. Here, I was greatly assisted not merely by the staff but, of course, by the expertise and collegiality of my colleagues from all parts of the House.
Now it is fashionable to follow conspiracy theories and to assume that whoever politicians have in their sights at the moment are to blame for our current ills, when the reality is that we are wrestling, as a nation, with the pressures of demography at the expense of growth. More widely, we should reflect on the perils of political “othering” and the wilful selection of enemies, whether it is on a class, regional, ethnic or demographic basis, because I still think that we have to work through disagreements together, as one nation. We should also be aware that constant pressure to regulate more may reflect indirectly the lost agency we have ourselves to some extent wilfully surrendered. Whatever we can do to empower local initiatives, interests and communities behind issues facing us as a nation, and a world, should be actively considered.
I conclude with two final points. The first springs from my term of service to the European committee. I recognise that there is little inclination to rerun Brexit, but I welcome efforts being made to re-establish closer relations. Our committee broke much fresh ground after the vote in drawing attention to outstanding problems, not merely on the trade side but also involving constitutional matters, including the problem of the Irish land border, the status of the Crown dependencies and, of course, the British Overseas Territories. Now, almost five years since the implementation of the withdrawal agreement, I notice that mutual residence issues, to mention one, are about to recur. To judge by the experience of Switzerland, closer association with the EU will involve virtually continuous renegotiation.
I add here that it is important to maintain an emphasis on the teaching of modern foreign languages, not confined to Europe. To be in a negotiating room, of which I have a little experience, or equally or more importantly, in the margins of that negotiating room, and to drop the occasional well-judged phrase into the mix engenders a certain empathy or at least wary respect. To be completely au fait, as our diplomats are, is of course very consequential. I also think that we should sometimes lift our horizon from bare texts and competence to wider issues and passions worldwide. To mention two sports in which I have always taken an interest, Formula 1 and the Premiership have a wide popular domestic and international appeal, and as a nation we are rather good at them.
In conclusion, I will say a word about the rule of law. I defer to my noble kinswoman’s expertise in this area, and that of other noble Lords. We should not allow this debate to become polarised or a proxy for other political debates. We need to get stuck in to achieve negotiated improvements when circumstances change, and we need to make use of the margin of appreciation when we must. We need to put more attention—as a legislature and as government—on the subject. However, there are continuing merits in the rules-based international order, because those who break the rules—or merely threaten to do so—may one day find that they have suddenly excluded themselves from the order which underpins their growth and continuing prosperity.
UK-Mauritius Agreement on the Chagos… · Order Paper · Order Paper