To move that the Grand Committee takes note of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of India, laid before the House on 21 January.
Relevant document: Special attention drawn by the 14th Report from the International Agreements Committee.
My Lords, I am delighted to lead this debate on the report from the International Agreements Committee, which I was privileged to chair until late January of this year—a position I then passed to the noble Lord, Lord Johnson of Lainston, who I am delighted will be speaking today also.
The UK’s free trade agreement with India was signed in July 2025. I want to highlight at the outset that concluding any free trade agreement with India is a significant achievement. India sits behind high-tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and is a formidable negotiating partner with a history of protectionism. In view of these challenges, the committee’s view was that the Government are to be congratulated on reaching a deal. That said, the FTA was a compromise and is not without its shortcomings, which I will come to. Under the enhanced procedures for scrutiny of free trade agreements agreed between the committee and—at the time—Her Majesty’s Government, the FTA was published on signature well ahead of being formally laid in Parliament on 21 January 2026. This allowed the International Agreements Committee to scrutinise the FTA in detail, with an inquiry running from September 2025 until January 2026.
I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, the then Minister, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, then chair of the committee, who negotiated these important agreements. If we could extend what came to be called the Grimstone commitment to other treaties, at least some of the concerns that we expressed in our report on treaty scrutiny, which will be debated on 16 March, could have been avoided. I also pay tribute to the members of the committee past and present, whose experience and knowledge brought about an excellent final report. I am delighted that a number of members of the committee will be speaking today. I am going to pick out a few points in my remarks from the paper, but I respectfully draw attention to the whole report. There is a lot there. I therefore also thank our staff: Rhiannon Williams, Dom Walsh, Sophie Andrews-McCarroll, Stephanie James, Cathy Adams and Aneela Mahmood, as well as the committee’s specialist adviser, Professor Sarah Hall. I am also grateful to our witnesses, whose evidence made a vital contribution to the report, and to the Government for their constructive engagement with our inquiry.
As I say, the negotiations on the agreement were over a long period between 2022 and 2025, against what can only be described as a challenging geopolitical backdrop. During that period, we saw a rise in protectionism, growing global instability, mounting uncertainty for international commerce, fragile supply chains, tensions between the US and China and the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Trade is no longer simply an economic exercise but increasingly an instrument of geopolitical strategy, as is evidenced, for example, by the recent United States Supreme Court decision on the legality of President Trump’s general tariffs.
My Lords, as a member of the committee that produced this report, I congratulate our former chairman, who has just spoken, for guiding us through an extremely complex and quite prolonged report on a wide variety of subjects. We think that it is about trade, but the truth is that trade is security, security is confidence, confidence is stability, and stability is investment, expansion and peace. Therefore, this is inevitably just a visible part of a much larger subject area. It is an absolutely excellent report. Of course, I would say that anyway but, having spent 60 years in this Palace—40 of them on committees and the remaining 20 in or out of the Government— I think that this is really one of the best reports that I have ever read. I am not exaggerating that nor just saying it because it is a nice thing to say.
I want to concentrate a little more than the chairman did on, not so much the detail, but the proposition—found in paragraph 223 on page 48—that the whole agreement has to be understood within the wider context of the UK’s evolving relationship with India. This is really the point. We are talking here not just about another country and another FTA, but a relationship with an enormous country, which goes back hundreds of years. It is, in population, the largest of all and is obviously set for great things as it grows increasingly fast and increasingly finds itself at the centre of the world, certainly in its foreign policy as it seeks a balance between the autocracies and the liberal capitalist world, and to do so with some considerable skill—although there are one or two areas of criticism as well.
I think it was Governor Carney, now Mr Carney the Prime Minister of Canada, who was talking the other day about the knowledge and potential power of the middle-power nations. It is not all a game for the big boys, for China, America or even Russia. Mr Trump loves to say, “We’re holding all the cards; you don’t have any cards”, but it is not true. If the middle-ranking powers in influence work together increasingly, as we are trying to work with India, there will be a number of very valuable cards that we can and should play, contrary to dealing with Mr Putin or Xi Jinping. These are things that we should not just give up, saying “They are big; they are going to decide”—they are not. This is not necessarily the age of great powers that the President of the United States thinks it is. For a start, the Commonwealth is 56 nations and 2.6 billion people, of whom more than half are Indians inside the great Indian nation. There are many other areas of technology where they are beginning to take the same kind of lead as we now associate with China.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow and applaud the excellent introductory speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, the former chair of the International Agreements Committee, on which I have the honour to serve. As we see him rotate off the chairmanship, I wish to say—I hope I am not going too far and taking in vain the name of others on the committee—how grateful we are for the skill and sheer hard work that he has devoted to the chairmanship.
The International Agreements Committee is relatively new and unfortunately not matched by a similar committee in the other place. Short though its existence has been, it has been required to handle, under the CRaG procedures, some quite significant agreements, of which this free trade agreement with India is certainly one. In every case, the House has accepted the advice that the committee has given, as it will, I hope, at the end of this debate.
The free trade agreement with India is significant for at least three reasons. First, India is the most populous country in the world. It is rapidly growing, with a huge internal market, and is becoming less fragmented as a result of its Government’s fiscal policies. Secondly, India has a long tradition of trade protectionism but is slowly moving away from that approach towards our preference for freer and fairer trade, with agreements with ourselves, the European Union and the United States—although the details of the last remain something of a mystery. Thirdly, we have been able to negotiate a free trade agreement that we believe to be fully consistent with the provisions of the GATT/WTO, the world’s rules-based trade order, which is taking some hard knocks from President Trump’s regrettable lurch into unilateral tariff impositions.
Is the agreement perfect? Certainly not, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said. It lacks substantial and effective provisions for trade in services, particularly legal and financial services. Services make up 80% of our economy, hence the need to treat this agreement not as an end point but as a living instrument that can be improved to mutual benefit over time. I hope that when he replies to this debate the Minister will confirm that that is how the Government will treat it.
My Lords, it is with great pleasure that I take part in this debate. I welcome this landmark comprehensive trade agreement between the United Kingdom and India, and I thank the International Agreements Committee for its work under the leadership of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on this excellent report.
In a world of shifting strategy and strategic balances, heightened geopolitical uncertainty and fragile supply chains, which are sorely under strain, with rising protectionism and greater polarisation between East and West, this agreement sends out an important signal. It demonstrates not only that this Government are committed to being outward and forward looking but that they are serious about deepening relationships with growing economies and creating partnerships with like-minded democracies.
As we have already heard, India is the fastest-growing major economy globally, but it is not simply a large market. It is a powerhouse in the region and a technology power—one that is likely to be an engine of growth in the decades ahead. Strengthening our relationship is both commercially sensible and strategically wise. The economic rationale alone is compelling. Bilateral trade between the UK and India now exceeds £40 billion annually, spanning goods and services. Therefore, our ongoing dialogue must be dynamic—a living platform, as we have already heard, that evolves as India’s global economic footprint expands.
For Britain’s communities, in particular among the British-Indian diaspora—I speak on behalf of those in Birmingham, in Leicester, in London and elsewhere in the country—real benefits will be felt in everyday life. Expanded trade promises lower prices, greater consumer choice and more resilient supply chains for essential goods. I believe that the benefits will be tangible and wide-ranging for us both. For our small and medium-sized enterprises, which were referred to earlier and are the backbone of the British economy, this will mean tariff reductions and simplified customs procedures. Access to Indian public procurement will open up opportunities in a market of 1.5 billion people.
My Lords, it is a privilege to speak about the CETA signed between the United Kingdom and India. It would be remiss of me not to acknowledge the vital work of the committee and the stewardship and leadership of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. I appeared before it a few times as a Minister and know the thoroughness of his and the committee’s work.
The bringing forward of this agreement demonstrates a real renewed partnership, not merely on commerce but with real conviction about trade flows and shared democratic purpose. The story of the United Kingdom and India is in many respects the story of two great democracies—the oldest and the largest—rediscovering one another in the modern changing world. When the United Kingdom left the European Union, we spoke of forging a truly global Britain, outward looking, confident and anchored in strategic partnerships. Few relationships were more central to that vision than our new partnership with India.
India stands as one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies. By 2030, it is forecast to be the third- largest economy. It is a technology powerhouse and a critical geopolitical actor not just in the Indo-Pacific but globally. Its trajectory is unmistakable. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it has pursued economic reform, infrastructure expansion and digital transformation at immense scale. For the United Kingdom, securing a comprehensive trade agreement with India was not optional, but essential.
During my tenure as the United Kingdom’s Minister of State at the FCO and the FCDO, I was honoured to serve as the Minister responsible for our relationship with India. I had the privilege of working with many Indian counterparts, and I pay tribute to Foreign Minister Dr Jaishankar, many business leaders and stakeholders across our two countries who deepened this relationship. I witnessed first-hand the enormous opportunity and the intricate sensitivities that shape negotiations of this magnitude. The CETA, although ambitious in scope, aimed to reduce tariffs, ease market access, strengthen intellectual property protections, facilitate services trade and create a framework for investment. For the UK, it opened doors for our financial services. More work was needed but, nevertheless, it made progress on legal and professional services, advanced manufacturing, life sciences and education. For India, the agreement offered preferential access to a high-value market, collaboration in technology and a platform to scale its export industries.
My Lords, it is good to follow the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, who was a highly respected and highly successful Minister; I salute him for that. I congratulate my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, the former chairman of the relevant committee. I also thank the secretariat for what was a superlative first draft—in fact, the best that I have personally seen.
The context is clear: India has been highly protectionist from independence in 1947. On the OECD scale of high trade barriers, India is 43rd out of 51. Yet there have been a recent series of trade deals that show a historic shift on the part of India. I will not claim that the dam has burst, but there are very major cracks in that dam. In 2022, India had deals with the UAE and Australia, in 2024 with EFTA, in 2025 with the UK and New Zealand and, in January this year, with the EU. It will also have a deal with Canada by the end of the year. Why? The Indian Government and Premier Modi wish to integrate into the world economy. That change has also been accelerated by the US tariffs and the unpredictability of President Trump’s Administration.
There have been positive advances in areas such as procurement under this deal, but there are still protectionist elements, such as in food grains and other areas. There are also missed opportunities, as my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith has said, in terms of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and particularly in legal services. I recall our meeting with the chair of the Bar Council and the failed opportunity for that “noble profession”, as they call it in India, the legal profession.
Briefly, I will raise two questions. First, are the benefits mutual? Secondly, would the UK have had a better deal if it were not for Brexit and if we had remained within the European Union?
Many of the Indian concessions are phased over a number of years, whereas those for the UK are bunched at the beginning of the process, so it is clear that India will gain most in the short term. However, we have gained access to a dynamic growing market. Indeed, we should have done far better because of the very skilled diaspora in our own country; we start with a major benefit in that sense. In effect, both sides are winners, even if there are differences in the phasing between the two.
My Lords, it is always a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who is a pillar of our committee.
First, I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and his leadership of the International Agreements Committee. In my view—this is widely agreed, and not simply in this Room—he has been an exemplary chairman on and off over the course of several years. I am honoured and, frankly, slightly humbled, which is not my usual state, to step into his place.
I also pay homage and offer my thanks to the existing members of the committee, who have been so supportive of my new role. I recognise, as so many of us do, the incredible level of expertise, as demonstrated by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, just now.
I declare my interests in this debate. This is the fact about me that many noble Lords may find surprising—my noble friend and study mate Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon knows this well because I have told him it many times—but I am the first member of my family not to have been born in India since 1880. I am passionate about trade with India. My family’s businesses have invested in India. We had a cotton milling floor in Madurai with 60,000 spindles—it is still, by the way, the largest in the world—which I then continued.
In that context, the FTA with India is about not merely securing new market access but providing stability for businesses, diversifying supply chains and establishing a platform for sustaining strategic co-operation with an important partner. We also welcomed in the report the fact that the agreement reached is compliant with World Trade Organization rules, especially in light of the current challenges to the rules-based international order.
I turn to the first of the topics covered: the trade in goods. Here, it is clear that the FTA secures improved access for United Kingdom manufacturers. For exporters, it delivers tariff reductions on 90% of Indian tariff lines, while the UK will eliminate tariffs on 99% of Indian imports. UK consumers can also expect to benefit from improved choice and lower prices. That said, there are shortcomings here, chiefly the pace at which benefits for UK goods exporters will be realised. Under the staging and quota arrangements, India will reduce its barriers to UK exports only gradually, over a period of some 15 years. Meanwhile, some Indian exporters will enjoy immediate access to the UK market. This imbalance reflects the relative openness and otherwise of our two economies, but it makes the FTA a long-term strategic investment in the UK, rather than a quick win. I want to come back to that point later in my remarks.
Some UK industries, notably dairy, may face increased competition in responding to new opportunities for access to India’s markets. We therefore ask the Government to set out what measures they will take to support sectors adversely affected. They should monitor carefully the risks of trade displacements, both of Indian goods diverted from the US as a result of President Trump’s tariffs, but also of exports from developing countries, especially Pakistan and Bangladesh, which could be displaced by increased Indian access to the UK. We highlight in the report the potential risk posed by India’s use of non-tariff barriers, particularly the so-called quality control orders. These could undermine the agreement’s objectives and exacerbate market asymmetries. We therefore conclude that the Government must not hesitate to engage with India directly where barriers remain.
I turn next to services and investment, because another shortcoming there is what was omitted from the agreement. In order to conclude the deal—and we understand this—several important UK priorities were ultimately left out. There is no bilateral investment treaty. There are no arrangements on legal services, a long-standing and unresolved issue between the legal professions in both countries—I draw attention to my declaration of interest in the report and elsewhere. There is no new market access in financial services and no finalised framework for mutual recognition of professional qualifications. These represent missed opportunities and highlight that the agreement is heavily weighted towards goods. There is considerable scope for further work with India on services and investment facilitation and we urge the Government to pursue this. They should treat the agreement as a start and not an end.
I turn to the movement of people. We should be clear that the agreement’s provisions relate to facilitating the temporary movement of professionals, not UK-India migration more broadly. We heard that the provisions create stability for Indian business visitors to the UK but are unlikely to impact UK-India migration patterns significantly.
The agreement was accompanied by a side letter stating that the UK would negotiate a so-called double contributions convention—or DCC—an agreement under which temporary workers would make social security contributions in only one country, rather than in both, for a period of up to three years. We called on the Government to conduct an impact assessment on the consequences of exempting certain temporary Indian workers from UK national insurance contributions. Since then, the DCC has been agreed and laid before the House. That was noted by the International Agreements Committee last week. I therefore draw the House’s attention to a letter sent on 25 February by my successor, the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, to the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, the Minister, which reiterates the committee’s recommendations for an impact assessment.
Our inquiry and the preparation for our report took place before the conclusion of the EU-India FTA negotiations, so we were unable to analyse the implications of this in any detail in our report. The two agreements appear similar, in certain respects, taking into account the scale of our respective economies. It appears, for example, that India has committed to a similar level of tariff liberalisation for EU cars as it did for the UK, albeit for a much larger annual quota. Overall, the UK may retain an element of first-mover advantage, as the EU-India FTA will not enter into force for some time, but it is unclear how competitive UK products will remain in India, in the long run, as it opens up its market.
Given the important outstanding areas and the point that I have just made, it is vital that the agreement is treated as a living instrument, not a static one. There is clear and mutual benefit in deepening the UK-India relationship beyond the free trade agreement. The Government should make full use of existing dialogue mechanisms and networks to address concrete issues and to build broader co-operation. Given India’s size and significance, and the potential of our bilateral relationship, we believe this should be a high priority.
Moreover, as one witness reminded us, an FTA is not a panacea. The benefits can be realised only if businesses are able to use the agreement effectively. We therefore recommend that the Government introduce a package of measures to help businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, to take full advantage of the opportunities. This should include clear, accessible, sector-specific guidance and an explanation of the enhanced support that will be available through the department, the high commission and its regional offices in India.
Overall, this agreement is a noteworthy achievement. The task now is to make the most of it by addressing its shortcomings, by helping business to use it and by working with India to remove the remaining barriers to trade. There is real mutual benefit in strengthening this relationship further, and we urge the Government to give that objective the priority that it deserves. We also look forward to the Government’s full response to our report in due course and to what the Minister has to say this afternoon. I beg to move.
If I have any regrets about shortcomings, to add to the points made by our chair, I would have liked to see, first, a little more about the role of the Commonwealth in the future pattern of things, which I think will be much greater than people realise or understand, partly because, in the digital age, you cannot overcentralise to the degree that some organisations are trying to do or have tried to do and failed. Secondly, there are specific issues—dare I even mention the controversial Chagos Islands and the whole north Indian Ocean—where the Commonwealth, and India in particular, might have had a much bigger role to play if they had been consulted and things had been discussed with them in the way that we discussed this FTA with them.
Sadly, as the chairman mentioned, when it comes to services, not much is said. This is a huge omission because services come into every goods package as well. We have been through a curious phase, first, with the statisticians of the world not recognising services at all; then bundling them in with goods; then taking them out again; and now we are through to a fourth phase where everything is riddled with, filled with, loaded with services. You cannot even export a bunch of bananas without a large degree of the service element as well. There should therefore be a little more understanding that not only do services come into absolutely everything—all trade of every kind—but they are mixed with goods, inevitably. Of course, there is also the omission of legal services. To some extent, these things are dealt with in the other agreement that HMG made with India in July 2025, which we now call, rather grandly, a comprehensive strategic partnership. That deals with strictly non-trade issues, particularly cultural issues, which are extremely important.
We should have said a little more about climate and the desire to get emissions down. If one is looking at the source of ever-rising emissions, it is not this country, nor many countries, but India certainly is one of them. What India needs, with about 1,000 coal-fired stations, is the low-cost technology for carbon capture and storage. We are rather good at that, and we could have perhaps spent more money and effort on that, if we really want emissions down, rather than spending it on rather more splendid things that sound good but do not contribute at all to the world’s reduction of emissions.
I would like to have seen a lot more on small and medium-sized businesses, which the chairman mentioned. The other day I think I heard a Minister—I hope I will not be pressed for a name or any detail—respond to the question of what proportion of our businesses are SMEs by saying, “About 70%”. That is completely wrong. According to official statistics, 99.18% of businesses in this nation employ fewer than 50 people. Businesses employing 50 to 249 people make up 0.67%, and large businesses 0.15%. In other words, more than ever, modern economies are overwhelmingly comprised of small enterprises, and it is their interests and concerns that should be at the centre of our evolving relationship with India.
Finally, I remind noble Lords that India is the biggest democracy. It is using AI and other technologies to, among other things, speak simultaneously in 30 languages to its vast electorate. The India of the future is a glittering prospect and one that deserves both respect and friendship. Friendship has to be worked at, night and day, and we have to work a lot harder than we have done in the past. The report is a step on the way and I am very honoured to have been involved in its production.
Does the agreement risk flooding the UK with migrant workers? It does not do that, since the provisions of the agreement are largely limited to intra-company transfers similar to those that we already have with many other countries, to our and their mutual benefit.
Will the gains to the British economy, which are admittedly not enormous and in some cases not immediate, fall into our laps? They will not. They will materialise only if the Government give advice and support, in particular to small and medium-sized enterprises, to penetrate what is a complex and often difficult market. That will require a systematic effort by the Government’s export promotion functions and by the offices of our high commission in India, including its regional branches. Can the Minister say what we are doing to mount that effort?
Straying now a little on to two points that are a bit wide of the precise subject of this debate, I would like to ask whether we should not be using our very welcome membership of the CPTPP to bring both India and the European Union into the ranks of its members. It is often said that CPTPP members do not take positions on other countries’ membership, and I understand very well that the figure of China and Taiwan lurks in the background of that view, but it is slightly absurd. It must be the only membership organisation that I have ever come across where the members do not take a view about future members. I would like to hear what the Government have to say about the prospect of both the EU and India joining. I point out that, if India were to join the CPTPP, that would go quite a long way towards remedying the problem over the lack of provisions on services in this agreement.
Straying a little further again, I would like to point out that the Government’s trade policy and free trade agreements seem not to have reached Latin America. Yet the European Union has just included a very ambitious and important agreement with Mercosur, which is likely to be beneficial to both sides. I believe that a similar agreement could be very beneficial to us. I would like to hear from the Minister whether that is somewhere on the horizon of our future trade policy.
I do not want to close without a wider glance at the inadequacies of the CRaG process, although we will have an opportunity to debate them again on 16 March. The 21 working-days limit for the committee to take evidence and produce a report and for it to be debated is, frankly, absurd. It is absurdly short. In the present case, problems were avoided thanks to the Business Department having co-operated in briefing the committee about the content of the agreement before the CRaG procedure was triggered, but that does not always happen. Sometimes, we get a situation where, I am ashamed to say, as happened on one occasion, we have had to produce a report without taking any evidence at all because there was no time or opportunity to do so. But that is for 16 March. I would like there to be an agreement soon between us and the Government that, as a general rule, the Government will grant one additional 21-day period unless there is an overriding national interest not to do so. I hope that the Minister can reflect on that and discuss it with his colleagues before we meet on 16 March.
Having said that, I agree with your Lordships that we must recognise that SMEs will not be able to utilise these opportunities without extensive support, including clear guidance, understanding procedures and targeted facilitation to transform potential into real trade and innovative outcomes. Many of us have worked over there and have a deep understanding of the different business environment, appreciating the complex relationship between trade bodies and decision-makers there. The onus must be on our trade bodies, especially the regional ones, to step up and support our SME organisations. That will lead to the maximisation of the benefits for businesses and households.
My old friend, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, observed that development requires the expansion of human freedom and capabilities. In this context, trade is not merely a financial exercise. It is about enabling people, ideas and knowledge to circulate freely. The modern economy rewards ideas as much as goods. Artificial intelligence, digital services and advanced manufacturing are reshaping global markets and value chains. This agreement has the potential to strengthen the living bridge between the two much further. Diaspora entrepreneurs, professionals and families who span the UK and India are not merely observers of policies. They need to be active participants in sustaining long-term economic and cultural growth.
I believe that this has to be the beginning of a broader road map—one that deepens co-operation on advanced technologies, green finance, skills recognition and innovations that will lead to SMEs participating fully. If we want to ensure that this agreement is truly forward looking, it must create structured pathways for joint research, co-innovation and regulatory dialogue sooner rather than later.
I say this because of India’s subsequent agreements with the European Union, which I championed for many decades while I was in the European Parliament. They had years to work out that relationship; we had a very short window to work on this agreement. India is demonstrating that it is ready to expand its trade agreement and look at other areas. A couple of days ago, India and Canada struck a range of accords, including a 10-year nuclear energy deal and deals on technology, critical minerals, space, defence and education. We need to follow this.
I encourage the Government to contemplate how this agreement could evolve over the coming decade. For example, there has been considerable debate in this House about AI. Successive offshoots of this agreement could promote a more structured collaboration on emerging technologies, especially AI, in a way that supports ethical standards, fosters SME innovation and deepens people-to-people exchanges across universities and industry. I ask the Minister what concrete mechanism the Government will put in place to ensure that this agreement becomes a platform for not just trade but shared innovation, professional mobility and AI collaboration, turning this vision into tangible benefits for businesses, communities and the next generation of innovators.
To conclude, I once again congratulate everyone involved in bringing about this CETA. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, rightly said, it is no mean feat to get this with India. I commend the Government for the speed with which they have built this strong foundation for a durable strategic partnership with India. Our focus and ambition should be that this comprehensive agreement is of lasting value, measured not merely by trade figures but by how it has strengthened ideas, skills and human connections, ensuring that we have jointly created a resilient, strategic and enduring partnership.
One of the most significant elements of the agreement was tariff reduction. India historically maintains higher average tariffs than many advanced economies. Securing phased reductions in each sector, be it Scotch whisky or medical devices, was a tangible achievement. Equally important was expanding access for UK services, an area where Britain has a clear competitive advantage. Financial services, fintech innovation and regulatory dialogue were central pillars of our approach. Mobility is also key. Facilitating easier movement was a modern character of trade, not simply goods crossing borders but talent and innovation. The UK-India migration and mobility partnership, signed in 2021 by the Conservative Government in which I served, complemented the economic framework for this sustainable trade growth.
Yet any serious reflection, as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, requires honesty. There are areas where the agreement could have been strengthened further in the United Kingdom’s favour. First, deeper liberalisation in legal and financial services would provide greater certainty for British firms operating in India. Secondly, stronger commitments on intellectual property enforcement would have further protected British innovation. Thirdly, public procurement access represented an area where greater mutual benefit would have benefited both India and the UK. Ensuring transparent and open bidding processes for foreign firms also continues to be a vital objective. Fourthly, tariff elimination timelines in certain sectors, notably automotive and spirits, might have been accelerated further. Phased reductions were pragmatic, but swift implementation would have delivered earlier gains for UK exporters. Finally, while mobility provisions were meaningful, achieving broader recognition of professional qualifications could have strengthened the agreement’s long-term impact.
However, I accept that trade agreements are not drafted and crafted in a vacuum. They are forged in the backdrop of political realities, domestic sensitivities and strategic calculations on both sides. India negotiates trade agreements carefully—cautiously at times. It weighs sovereignty and development priorities carefully. Understanding that perspective was essential for the United Kingdom to make progress. Between 2019 and 2024, my role was not simply to advocate for British interests but to build trust, engaging with Indian Ministers, not just in Delhi but across states. With industry leaders I worked to elevate the trade dialogue to a strategic level and was delighted in this venture for several years to be accompanied through sharing a room and on the world stage with my noble friend Lord Johnson, whom I look forward to hearing from shortly. We established structured dialogues, enhanced ministerial-level engagement and deepened parliamentary links. Crucially, we sought to frame the agreement as mutually—and that is crucial—transformative. For Britain, it was about growth, jobs and global reach. For India also, it was about partnership with a trusted friend and democracy, offering world-class services and innovation. By aligning our collective strategic narratives, we created the political space for compromise and agreement.
The CETA must also be viewed in the wider geopolitical context. At a time of immense global uncertainty, supply chain fragility—as we heard from the noble Baroness—and intensifying strategic competition, strengthening ties between two major democracies sends a powerful message. Economic interdependence can reinforce strategic alignment. Trade builds resilience.
Looking ahead, as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Gill, the agreement should be seen not as an end point but as a foundation. Trade deals are living instruments; they require continuous review. There is scope to deepen this co-operation through digital trade co-operation, green technology partnerships and collaboration in critical minerals, advanced manufacturing and, indeed, AI. The CETA between the United Kingdom and India represents a landmark agreement in modern bilateral relations. It reflects ambition, pragmatism and shared democratic confidence. It delivers tangible economic benefits while strengthening strategic ties.
For my part, serving as Minister of State with responsibility for India was a great honour of my service, helping to shape a partnership between two nations—one nation of my parents’ birth with a nation of my own, bound by history yet oriented firmly towards the future. That is the work of lasting consequence. The United Kingdom and India are not simply trading partners; we are democratic allies, innovation collaborators and global stakeholders. This agreement is not merely about commerce but shared confidence: confidence in our open markets, confidence in our shared values and confidence in a future built together.
Would we have done better if we were within the European Union, given the EU’s greater clout in negotiation? Of course, the EU now has its own deal, after relations between the EU and India on an FTA had been becalmed for decades. Could we have done better? It is difficult to compare the two deals—those with the UK and with the EU—and it is possible to argue that the UK has different priorities from members of the EU, and that the priorities that are reflected in the current deal might not have been reflected in quite the same way had we remained members. I hope the Government are now comparing our deal to that with the EU to see to what extent it builds on our own.
I noticed with interest two articles in the Financial Times. The first, by Mr Marshall—a Brexiteer—on 19 December of last year, argued that the real problem is the lack of implementation of Brexit. The second was a reply by Professor El-Agraa on 16 January, who argued that deals such as this offer only a marginal contribution to the UK economy and that we would have obtained a better deal had we remained within the EU. The jury is still out. As Mrs Malaprop said, comparisons are odorous.
Prima facie, there are areas where the EU has a better deal. I think, for example, of spirits. Tariffs on spirits in the deal with the EU will be concluded far more quickly than for Scotch whisky, but the problem here is surely the question of volume. Scotch whisky is the drink of choice for Indians, so it is no surprise that there is a longer timescale for tariffs on Scotch whisky in our deal.
There are other examples, such as lamb and mutton, on which our farmers lost out substantially in the Australia and New Zealand deals—indeed, imports from Australia and New Zealand have soared, to the detriment of our own farmers, as a result of the deals reached with them. So the Government clearly need to undertake to monitor these deals very carefully.
Think also, for example, of the deal on social security payments: monitoring is again very important, because of the effect on His Majesty’s Treasury. I hope the Government undertake to carry out regular monitoring exercises in this respect.
There is a clear prospect of progress on bilateral investment deals for both us and the EU. I hope that, in time, the UK and Indian legal professions will bilaterally negotiate acceptable deals.
I have two final observations. First, there are perhaps only two cheers for the deal generally, but it is a living instrument and, with good will, the joint committees will ensure a dynamic implementation. Secondly, in her speech at the LSE on 11 February, the Chancellor made an interesting comment and put the deal in perspective. She hailed bilateral deals such as this one but stated that the proposed deal with the EU is the big one because it covers 47% of our trade; that is the big one, but these are indeed important bilateral deals.