UK-France Nuclear Partnership

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the UK-France nuclear partnership.

The UK and France have a proud history of co-operation on defence nuclear matters. Alongside our conventional warfighting capability, the independent strategic nuclear forces of the UK and France contribute significantly to the overall security of the NATO alliance and the Euro-Atlantic. Since 1995, we have stated that we do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of one could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened. In 2010, both nations agreed to share research facilities and co-operate on nuclear technology under the Lancaster House treaties. In 2022, at Chatham House, the Defence Secretary set out the importance of rebooting Lancaster House and our defence relationship with France. That was reaffirmed in our 2024 manifesto.

Today, the Prime Minister and President Emmanuel Macron will agree to deepen their nuclear co-operation and work more closely than ever before on nuclear deterrence. That is an important step forward for the UK-France nuclear partnership, and reflects the significant improvement in the relationship between our two countries that this Government have driven. A soon-to-be-signed declaration will state for the first time that the respective deterrents of both countries are independent but can be co-ordinated. The declaration will also affirm that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by both nations. As such, any adversary threatening the vital interests of Britain or France could be confronted by the strength of the nuclear forces of both nations. Co-operation between our countries on nuclear research will also deepen, while we work together to uphold the international non-proliferation architecture. Further details will follow today’s agreement.

In an increasingly volatile and complex global security environment, exemplified by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine—a war on the European continent—the UK and France, as Europe’s two nuclear powers, are united in our determination to work closer than ever before on nuclear deterrence. That is a manifesto commitment, a promise made and a promise kept, and yet another example of how the Government are delivering for defence.

Thank you for granting this urgent question, Mr Speaker. I do think it is incredible that we have had to find out about such substantive matters overnight from the press and without a statement from the Government.

We Conservatives back our nuclear deterrent 100% and have never wavered on that. We support steps that boost the resilience of our nuclear enterprise, diversify delivery and, above all, help our core continuous at-sea deterrence to remain the cornerstone of our homeland defence against the most extreme threats. We also welcome steps to genuinely strengthen UK-French co-operation on defence, building on Lancaster House. In particular, having been the Government who first authorised provision of long-range Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine, we recognise the urgent need to replenish our own Storm Shadow stocks, which is in the press release. Can the Minister confirm whether we are placing orders for new Storm Shadow missiles from MBDA or simply reconditioning existing stocks?

The nuclear aspect of this is by far the most significant. Can the Minister confirm where this will leave the operationally independent and sovereign nature of our existing Trident nuclear deterrent? The Telegraph quotes the declaration—which, of course, we have not seen—as saying that both nuclear arsenals

“remain independent but can be co-ordinated and that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by both nations”.

Does this mean that our respective national deterrence will now be jointly operationally delivered, and how will that co-ordination take place in practice? Crucially, how does this new nuclear doctrine affect NATO and our very close co-operation on nuclear deterrence with the United States? Will France now be offering its nuclear deterrent to NATO, as we do? Perhaps most importantly, will France be joining the NATO Nuclear Planning Group?

There has not been a statement yet because the agreement has not been signed yet. In fact—

You’re briefing it to the press.

If the right hon. Gentleman would like to listen to the reply, the agreement has not been signed yet. I am sure that as soon as it is signed—

But it has been briefed to the press.

I am sure that as soon as it is signed—[Interruption.] The shadow Minister has asked his questions. I would like to try to answer them without him heckling me too much, although it is up to him how he behaves.

No, it will be up to me.

Indeed.

The shadow Minister asked whether the idea that we should work more closely with France has any implications for the independence of Trident, and he referred to the phrase

“independent but can be co-ordinated”.

The answer is no. Our CASD operations are entirely unaffected. This is not a new nuclear doctrine on behalf of the UK. Our nuclear doctrine is the same as it ever has been. The use of our nuclear deterrent in any circumstances can only be authorised by the Prime Minister, and that remains the case. The French have their own arrangements for how they authorise theirs; it is a matter for them. This agreement implies no co-ordination in that respect.

The agreement says that there is an opportunity, when vital interests are affected, for co-ordination between both nations in the way in which they respond. That just strengthens the power of the deterrent across Europe. When two nations that are nuclear powers can co-ordinate their responses, it strengthens the deterrent against our potential enemies by making it clear that the two nations will act in co-ordination rather than entirely separately.

The shadow Minister asked whether the agreement has any implications for our deterrent still being dedicated to NATO. It does not; our deterrent is, of course, still dedicated to the defence of NATO. He referred again to tactical nuclear delivery options. I do not know whether he meant tactical nuclear weapons development. This Government do not see any use of any kind of nuclear weapon as tactical, and we are not proposing in this agreement to develop any new kinds of nuclear weapons. It is about co-ordinating the options that we have together to make Europe and the north Atlantic stronger.

I welcome today’s agreement that is in train, as a powerful signal that Britain is once again stepping up to be a reliable European ally, with deeper UK-France co-ordination on nuclear deterrence marking a step change in how we engage with our closest partners. This is not just a diplomatic milestone; it has real potential to reset relations, strengthening European security and driving long-term investment into our industrial base. As the keenest champion of our sovereign capability and resilient supply chains, particularly in my constituency, may I ask the Minister how this partnership will be used to maximise opportunities for UK industry, ensuring that we can build the skills, infrastructure and capacity that is needed to keep our deterrent credible for decades to come?

The effort on co-ordinating our nuclear deterrence, between the UK and France, is in the context of a refresh of the Lancaster House treaties, which also include provisions about co-ordinating our conventional forces and co-ordinating efforts through our industries to ensure that we can manufacture new and future-proofed complex weapons that will assist in deterring potential adversaries who would threaten Europe. This is in the context of an entire, refreshed agreement that should strengthen our conventional forces as well as our capacity for co-ordination between our militaries and of our nuclear deterrence.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

The Liberal Democrats have consistently said that the UK’s security depends on deeper defence co-operation with our European allies, so we welcome progress but urge the Government to go further. Nuclear co-ordination between the UK and France can help to deter Putin and support Europe’s collective security. That is particularly critical as Donald Trump has shown that our security is no longer his concern. France cherishes the independence of its nuclear system, as the Minister confirmed, so will she provide further details on exactly how the new system of co-ordinating nuclear deterrence will work? The Government must now go further, so will the Minister update the House on whether the Government have secured full access for UK defence firms to the EU Security Action for Europe fund? As Putin escalates his attacks against civilian targets in Kyiv and other cities, we must work with our allies to support Ukraine. Will the Government use today’s coalition of the willing talks to agree on how the UK and France can seize Russia’s frozen assets that are held in our two countries?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support for deeper defence co-operation. On the co-ordination of our nuclear deterrence—there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations, but France and the UK remain two sovereign nuclear weapon states, and their respective nuclear forces and decision-making processes are independent. There will be increased co-ordination of research and development, and of the co-operation that we have been engaging in since the Chequers announcement of 1995. That will be deepened, and a co-ordinating committee between the Élysée and the Cabinet Office will be the joint arrangement for deciding precisely how and what extra research or training we might do. There will be increasing co-ordination of that effort, but I stress that our decision-making arrangements remain completely independent. Both nations recognise that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations—our vital interests are the same in that respect.

On Security Action for Europe and access to EU funds, negotiations are ongoing but not complete. One would hope that progress can be made. I cannot recall the hon. Gentleman’s third point—

The coalition of the willing.

I have nothing further to say on that today, as the hon. Gentleman would probably expect in a response to an urgent question on nuclear co-ordination.