UK Air Defence

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Mark Tami.)

I am grateful for this opportunity and declare my interests as a reservist, the father of two servicewomen and the brother of a serving admiral.

Among the many issues that should be keeping Ministers awake at night are two tech-based conundrums that particularly worry me. One is future access to critical minerals and their products, which I have spoken about in the past. The other related issue is the patchy nature of the protection of these islands against missiles and drones. That is what I want to raise this evening.

Everything costs, and it is easy when one is not in government to wish the ends without the means. At the moment, defence is spread too thinly and what I am suggesting would spread it even more thinly. Whether the UK should be globally deployable or focus on the defence of the homeland and its Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood is moot. The likelihood is that we will soldier on, make do and mend—we always have. But the scene is set for the biggest retrenchment since Suez. I wish it were otherwise, but it falls to this Government to make the call. Their attempted unforced surrender of the Chagos islands is perhaps an indication of where their thinking lies.

In 1963, the 35th US President told his National Security Council that European NATO members were not paying their fair share. John F. Kennedy said,

“We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves”.

On Monday, the 45th and 47th President will likely be saying the same thing. Clearly, American frustration with Europe enjoying the insurance policy without paying the premium is nothing new. What is new is the American willingness to strong-arm Europe into changing its ways. Forget 2% or 2.5%—Trump says he wants 5% of GDP spent on defence by all NATO members, and here is the kicker: he wants a 20% tariff on all goods imported to the US. Combine the two and it is not a stretch to imagine him slapping tariffs on European goods unless Europeans step up to the plate.

Ultimately, the single most important reason Trump can do what we fear he is about to do is that America is no longer principally competing with Europe’s proximate threat—Russia. A vast but thinly populated nation of 144 million, a busted economy and a military whose weaknesses have been generously displayed for all to see since February 2022 is not perceived by Washington as a main threat. An America emerging from the 9/11 Bush counter-terrorism era is back to facing off with great powers once again, but the great power is not Russia; it is China.

As the US pivots, European states of all sizes must step up to defend their homeland and safeguard the north Atlantic. There are no free passes. Israel is a small state, but its military capabilities are unmatched in the middle east. Its layered missile defence systems—the famous Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow—and its formidable fleet of aircraft demonstrate how small states, with a little help from their friends, can punch way above their weight. Several of those small states will provide the first line of defence against Putin’s Russia. The bulk of the cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles that Putin would fire at Britain as a proxy for the US will be intercepted by existing defence systems and fighter aircraft stationed in the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland.

While our geography, as so often in our history, gives strategic depth and protection from long-range attack, we can have less confidence in dealing with proximate threats from sea and subsea platforms and with threats to deployed and overseas assets, such as Cyprus, that fall well within the scope of short-range missiles and drones from Russia, Iran and their proxies. In any event, some missiles directed at the homeland would get through in the event of a full-on attack right now by the Russian Federation. That has been our blind spot.

The public would expect that missiles evading the first line of integrated missile defence would be destroyed closer to their target. The Type 45-mounted Sea Viper and the ground-based Sky Sabre are exquisite examples of air and missile defence systems, but there are simply not enough of them—not enough missiles ready to go and not enough industrial capacity to enable resilience in anything more than the very short term. Russia’s war on Ukraine has helpfully made us alive to our vulnerability. Russia, as we have seen in Ukraine and throughout its history, is capable of taking long-term pain in a way that it seems unlikely we would. As things stand, the capital is particularly vulnerable to Russian missile attack, unless we park all our Type 45s—those that are operational—on the Thames.

Happily, unlike Israel and Ukraine, we are surrounded by friends. It makes sense to be a full part of, and a contributor to, NATO integrated air and missile defence, but European IAMD, and its suppression and destruction of enemy air defence systems, are currently completely reliant on the US. In any event, the suspicion is that a full-on attack by Russia right now would find too many holes in the patchy architecture that has evolved to protect against missiles.

Germany has recognised that threat; it has owned the consequences of doing nothing. It has established the European Sky Shield initiative, and has begun procuring trusted systems such as Patriot and Arrow 3. The UK has been considering joining ESSI. Where are we with that? What about off-the-shelf systems such as Arrow 3?

I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend for that point. It is interesting that the Arrow 3 project he mentions is a joint project between Boeing in America and the Israeli defence machinery. Is there something in the innovation offered by Patria, a Finnish company, which is offering to help us build armoured vehicles here in Britain but based on its design? Do we need less of a reliance on domestic systems and to consider, as he says, off-the-shelf systems from elsewhere?

There is a great deal in what my hon. Friend says. Historically, buying off the shelf has proved to be somewhat more cost-effective than designing exquisite systems of our own. I hope very much that, as we go further into this process, we can partner with others to ensure that what we buy is both integrated and cost-effective. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on ESSI.

Ukraine has shown the limitations of the “just in time, not just in case” policy that has driven our failure to stockpile the materiel of war in recent decades. In the 1930s, the shadow factories initiative fitted commercial premises that typically produced cars for reconfiguration as armament factories, in case the need should arise, which it did. Car workers would switch to become the basis of the skilled workforce necessary to create materiel for prosecuting the war effort. That then happened, to the point that in 1940, this country was outstripping Germany in the production of fighter aircraft. With every respect due to the Few, the Battle of Britain was won in Britain’s factories and on its production lines as much as in the skies. Victory hinges just as much on logistics now, except the timelines are far shorter. The defence ecosystem in the US 2022 national defence strategy had more than a whiff of the 1930s in advancing an intertwined commercial-military co-operative.

In a good light, we can see shadow factories in the thematic approach to missile defence taken by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory missile defence centre. Crucially, it is industry partner-based, with a heavy focus on growing suitably qualified and experienced people, of whom we are desperately short. The MDC is now 20 years old. What assessment has the Minister made of it, and what changes does he propose to its structure and remit to help plug holes in our missile defence architecture? In the light of prevailing circumstances, will he consider upgrading the MDC so that it has the salience and clout approaching that of the pre-war directorate of aeronautical production? Then, it was Spitfires and Hurricanes; today it is missile defence, SDEAD—suppression and destruction of enemy air defences—and drones. Then, it was preparation for the total war to come; now—God willing—it is deterrence.

I thank the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) for calling this debate and for the seriousness with which he has approached it. I share his general analysis of the context that we live in more difficult, unsettled and challenging times. That is the reason why, on coming into office, the Prime Minister commissioned Lord Robertson to begin the strategic defence review to look at our capabilities and to set those against the threats we are facing as a country. I will return to some of those areas, and indeed to the questions the right hon. Gentleman asked.

There is a real challenge when it comes to integrated air missile defence, the threats from drones and the threats from one-way effectors and long-range strike, as we have seen every single day in Ukraine, with the brave people of Ukraine being on the receiving end of onslaughts from Putin’s illegal invasion. Those are the lessons we are seeking to learn in the strategic defence review to make sure not only that we can support our friends in Ukraine with the equipment they need, but that we can adapt our own ways of war fighting and defending to deter aggression if at all possible, and to defeat it if necessary.

The right hon. Gentleman has raised a number of issues, and I will come on to those in my remarks if I can, but I am sure he will keep me honest if I have missed any by the time I reach the end of my response to him. His analysis of the context of the political challenges in this debate is certainly true. When he was a Defence Minister and I was on the Opposition Benches, the current Defence Secretary and I made that argument. Having heard from the Government Dispatch Box that defence had been hollowed out and underfunded, we argued that we needed a different approach.

I do not like the approach the right hon. Gentleman mentioned of having to “make do and mend—we always have”. I recognise it, but I do not think we should accept it, especially in more difficult times. Precisely because of that, the SDR needs to be bold, and that is in effect the remit given to Lord Robertson, Fiona Hill and Richard Barrons by the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary.

I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) for bringing this important debate to the Chamber. From the discussions the Minister had at the E5 conference, does he think our allies are confident that we are playing our part in air defence?

I thank my fellow Devon MP for that question. He will be able to read the joint statement by the UK, Italy, France, Germany and Poland when it is published on the Ministry of Defence website on the conference’s conclusion. I made the point clearly in the press conference afterwards that the UK is calling on all NATO partners to increase their defence spending. We have a plan to increase our defence spending from 2.3% to 2.5%. Where any increased defence spending goes matters, because it needs not only to deter aggression, but to defeat it and—perhaps most importantly and relevant to this debate—to be interoperable with our allies. We need to ensure that any investment in defence has an increase in our deployability and our lethality as we fight together. It is the assumption of this Government, with a declared NATO-first policy, that we will be supporting our NATO allies in any defensive measures. That is the reason we have the British Army in Estonia with Operation Cabrit. It is the reason we have NATO air policing in a variety of states along NATO’s eastern flank.

Integrated air and missile defence is an area that all NATO members need to develop. There is not one answer that everyone has reached for yet. It is a difficult, wicked problem that requires investment and a change in strategy. That is part of the reason why that is being addressed by the SDR. That is a long answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, but I hope it provides him with the clarity he needs.

The Minister represents a city and a football club that are close to my heart. I also thank the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) for bringing forward this important debate. I am heartened to hear that the Minister views the interoperability of our workforce and our assets alongside our NATO allies. Do the Government view the defence of UK airspace not singularly but, as I do, as the western front of European air defence?

I would certainly be happy afterwards to take up any discussion about Plymouth Argyle and a post Wayne Rooney world.

It is certainly true that the United Kingdom’s commitment to NATO is not just in securing a northern and western flank and dealing with the north Atlantic and the high north; we also have responsibilities to our NATO allies on the eastern and southern flanks. Part of the challenge we have with integrated air and missile defence and the threats that the UK and our allies face is that the definitions of what are the close and the deep have fundamentally changed, because of the experience of the Ukraine war. I recognise that there are Members in this House and this debate who served in our armed forces, and they will be familiar with the broad definitions of close and deep.

It is certainly true that what we previously regarded as close and deep have fundamentally changed. The distances have increased enormously. We are seeing that in Ukraine, and that means we have to re-imagine and re-define the strategies and capabilities we need to be able to operate in those environments. Having the ability to project power and fire at distance is one reason that we have supported Ukraine with so many weapons systems. It is also the reason why the SDR is looking in particular at this area and how any forces and capabilities can meet the threat we are facing. In that respect, I hope that the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) understands that the SDR will address many of the answers to his broad question. Our responsibilities are more than just securing the UK homeland; they are about supporting our allies, and indeed it is our allies’ role to support not only their own country, but their NATO partners, including the UK.

The threats posed to our security continue to proliferate and converge. With technologies rapidly developing, protecting Britain and our allies from attacks becomes ever more complex and challenging. Let me be absolutely clear: adversaries must be in no doubt that the UK possesses formidable capabilities contributing to our integrated air and missile defence, along with the will and the intent to protect the UK and our allies. We have Typhoon aircraft on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. I am sure that the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire has seen the quick reaction aircraft, as I have, operating out of RAF Lossiemouth and seen the incredible speed, dedication and professionalism of our teams there responding to threats approaching the United Kingdom. Our radar at Fylingdales provides continuous early warning against ballistic missiles, and the Royal Navy proved the effectiveness of the Type 45 destroyer against different air threats in the recent operations in the Red sea in particular. That included shooting down drones similar to those used by Russia against Ukraine.