UK Air and Missile Defences

I beg to move,

That this House has considered UK air and missile defences.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I am pleased to have secured this debate to highlight a critical weakness in our national defences. I am sure it will come as no surprise to hon. Members that I say this, but I sincerely believe that outside this place, and even among many of our colleagues, it is not appreciated that the diversity of the threat we now face from air attack, and the lack of our defences against it, is at its most serious in decades.

This debate is about defences against conventional air and missile threats, not nuclear threats—for that we maintain our continuous at-sea strategic nuclear deterrent. The world is more unstable today than at any point since the cold war, but sadly, despite a changing threat environment, I fear our defences have not been adapted quickly enough to deter or protect against it. The House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee’s report published in September, which analysed the lessons we can learn from Ukraine, laid out in stark terms the significant weaknesses in European defences. Key among them is the fact that our air and missile defences are, frankly, inadequate. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine not only brought conventional warfare back to mainland Europe, but has shown in stark terms the importance of credible and robust air and missile defences.

Nearly 12,000 missiles have been launched against Ukraine by Russia since February 2022. About 80% of them have been intercepted, thanks to different air defence systems protecting military and civilian infrastructure, but that still means that thousands of missiles have impacted, often to devastating effect. Earlier this month, over the course of just one week, Russia used more than 800 guided aerial bombs, about 460 attack drones and more than 20 missiles of various types against Ukraine.

During the cold war NATO’s air defences were a largely static system arrayed in belts around a unidirectional and well-defined threat of manned aircraft from the Soviet Union, but today’s environment is less predictable. The range of air and missile threats is larger and the threat can come from any direction. Indeed, according to reports from earlier this year, NATO states can provide less than 5% of the air defence capacity deemed necessary to protect allies in central and eastern Europe against a full-scale attack.

Unlike Ukraine, the UK has some obvious geographical protection from attacks by ground-based short-range missiles and drones, but two significant and concerning reports over recent days show once again that there is no cause for complacency. First, Russia is now prepared to use intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missiles against targets in Ukraine. This is the first successful use of that type of missile with conventional warheads in combat. They are harder to intercept and represent a significant escalation. The second concerning report in recent days relates to the presence of unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles around three RAF bases—Lakenheath, Mildenhall and Feltwell—between 20 and 22 November and overnight on 25 November. I do not expect the Minister to go into too much detail about that recent incident or about what counter-measures are in place at our bases, but both reports show that short-range and long-range threats to the UK are very real, very diverse, and we need to be able to defend ourselves against them.

If we look at events in the middle east, we can also see the diversity of short to long-range aerial threats. Israel has faced rocket, drone and ballistic missile attacks from Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria. In October, Iran launched almost 200 ballistic missiles against Israel following its previous attack involving 300 missiles and drones in April, but, unlike the UK, Israel has a sophisticated and multi-layered air and missile defence system to counter wide-ranging aerial threats. The Iron Dome intercepts short-range rockets of the type fired by Hamas and Hezbollah. David’s Sling can intercept medium to long-range rockets, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, and Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 can intercept long-range ballistic missiles. Recently, we saw the deployment of US THAAD—terminal high altitude area defence—batteries to bolster defences against ballistic missile threats.

The UK’s current air defence capabilities against such threats are primarily made up of Sea Viper on Type 45 destroyers, utilising Aster missiles, Sky Sabre ground-based air defence, and quick reaction alert Typhoon fighter jets. Typhoons on quick reaction alert at Coningsby and Lossiemouth can intercept potential hostile airborne threats, including aircraft and UAVs. The Sky Sabre ground-based air defence system can intercept multiple cruise missiles, aircraft and UAVs up to 25 km away. However, there are only about six Sky Sabre systems in service with the British Army, and at least two are deployed overseas, to the Falkland Islands and Poland. Clearly, many more such systems would be needed to provide sufficient cover to a larger number of critical military and civilian national infrastructure sites across the UK.

I know the business case for more Sky Sabre launchers has been approved, but orders have not yet been made. Bizarrely, no business case has been made for ordering more missiles for Sky Sabre, despite such orders taking longer to fulfil. Crucially, Sky Sabre cannot defend against ballistic or hypersonic missile threats—it was not designed to do so. The only defence the UK currently has against ballistic missiles is Sea Viper, which utilises Aster 30 missiles on our six Type 45 destroyers. Sea Viper can currently track potential threats at ranges of up to 250 miles, and eliminate them within about 70 miles.

I know that Sea Viper is being upgraded over the next decade, with initial operation capability in 2028. That is very welcome, but given that we have only a few Type 45s in service at any one time, the coverage that they can provide in defence of homeland targets against ballistic missile threats is limited. To defend London against ballistic missile threats, a Type 45 destroyer would have to be permanently moored in the Thames estuary, which would mean that it could not do anything else. In particular, it would be unavailable for its primary role of protecting one of our aircraft carriers from air and missile threats. That alone makes the case that some form of new or upgraded ground-based air defence system that provides protection against threats, including ballistic and hypersonic missiles, is needed.

To consider only the military critical national infrastructure that would be vulnerable to air attack and would need adequate protection, we have the three main Royal Navy operating bases at Portsmouth, Devonport and Clyde; seven RAF bases, including Lossiemouth, Marham and Coningsby; and the major Army garrisons. We have radar sites, ammunition depots, and overseas sites, including the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which are in range of Iranian ballistic missiles, unlike sites in the UK. Major defence industrial sites would also presumably be at risk. Then there is a plethora of significant civilian infrastructure that could be targeted, including nuclear power stations, large transport hubs, industrial sites and Government buildings. We know tragically from the war in Ukraine that Russia has no compunction about hitting civilian targets such as hospitals, shopping centres or concentrations of housing, purely to terrorise the civilian population and degrade national morale.

The previous Government’s integrated and defence reviews slowly started to acknowledge the threat from air attack. The 2023 Defence Command Paper described the threat as being

“at its most acute for over thirty years”.

Clearly, the resources have not yet been put into upscaling equipment and filling the gaps in capability that we need to counter that.

Other European countries have been taking the issue seriously and placing orders. In the past decade, France and Italy have jointly developed the medium-range SAMP/T air defence system, which can intercept ballistic missiles, drones, fighter jets and other targets. In September, France ordered eight new SAMP/T NG systems, capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles. The first ones will enter service in 2026. Italy also ordered 10 of these new systems, which will utilise upgraded Aster 30 missiles.

Many European countries already utilise the American Patriot air defence system. To bolster that, existing operators Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and Sweden are procuring 1,000 additional Patriot missiles between them. Poland has signed contracts worth £4 billion with UK industry to deliver the NAREW next-generation air defence system. Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France and Hungary are jointly buying around 1,500 Mistral short-range air defence—SHORAD—missiles. Latvia and Estonia are jointly procuring IRIS-T for medium-range interception, and Finland has ordered the David’s Sling system.

To fill capability gaps and ensure interoperability, we should be working with our European NATO partners on joint procurement. The Government have said that the UK is engaging with the European Sky Shield initiative, which seeks to establish a ground-based integrated European air defence system with anti-ballistic missile capability. There are clearly different views across Europe about which systems it should comprise to ensure not only interoperability but to develop and maintain Europe’s defence industrial base.

I am aware that the UK signed a letter of intent to launch the integrated air and missile DIAMOND initiative in October, alongside six allies: France, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Sweden. That is clearly welcome, as it shows the seriousness with which the threat is recognised, but there is no clear timetable of key milestones associated with the DIAMOND initiative. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide an update.

It is not just our ability to take down hostile airborne threats that we must consider; there is also our ability to detect them in the first place. It is no secret that we have only a limited number of fixed and mobile land-based radars on UK soil, which would probably be among the first targets vulnerable to air attack. The previous Government’s early retirement of E-3 Sentry left a capability gap in airborne early warning and control, which has only been compounded by delays in the E-7 Wedgetail programme.

Airborne early warning and control will be crucial in monitoring the western and south-western coasts of the UK, where ground-based radar is limited, to detect potential submarine-launched threats. We also need to take seriously the potential for radar evasion along the east coast, particularly by UAVs or projectiles passing through wind farms. The Government are actively working on deconflicting windfarms and existing air defence surveillance systems. I would be grateful if the Minister could speak briefly about that.

Ministers will be acutely aware of everything I have said but, as I said at the start of the debate, I do not think many of our colleagues, including across Government outside the Ministry of Defence, appreciate the scale or seriousness of the issue. The defence analyst Francis Tusa has compared the current situation with that found by General Frederick Pile in 1937 when he was appointed commander of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division. General Pile highlighted the severe lack of anti-aircraft batteries to defend civilian and military locations. His analysis led to an increase in personnel in anti-aircraft roles and the mass production of anti-aircraft artillery.

Our armed forces are among the best and most capable in the world but, unfortunately, the defence they can provide today against significant airborne threats to the homeland, such as missile attack, is very limited. We have highly capable equipment but not enough of it to protect the significant amount of critical infrastructure across the length and breadth of the country, and to defend troops deployed on operations overseas. Principally, that is because we spent most of the previous few decades focused on expeditionary overseas missions rather than active homeland defence. We have been too slow to adapt to the changing threat picture.

The lack of active homeland defence is fundamentally a strategic failure. I hope the ongoing strategic defence review will deem it such and outline how it can be urgently addressed. The first responsibility of our Government is to protect our people and defend our freedom. I fear that further delay in outlining the action we are going to take and, crucially, the budget to deliver it, brings only greater risk of catastrophic failure in fulfilling that fundamental responsibility.

Addressing that capability gap needs to be an urgent political, funding and industrial priority for Government. I hope the Minister feels that this debate helps her demonstrate the political support in Parliament for tackling it.

Order. I remind Members to bob if they wish to be called in the debate.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. It seems only a few minutes ago that you and I were last in Westminster Hall—you brought the 4.30 pm debate to an end yesterday afternoon, and we moved on, but here we are again, within minutes it seems. I congratulate the hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst) on bringing forward the debate. I spoke to him last week when I became aware that he had this upcoming debate, and he is right to bring it to Westminster Hall for consideration. We must recognise the importance of UK air and missile defences and of us in Parliament collectively making a clear pledge.

The Ukraine conflict, in tandem with the sustained attacks on Israel, has illustrated—in a way that none of us wants to see, but that has unfortunately become a reality—the need for strong and robust air defence. On Israel, I will just say that it is good news that a 60-day ceasefire with Hezbollah has hopefully been agreed. We hope that the peace agreement will stand firm and can last 60 days, and possibly longer.

As hon. Members may be aware, the leading air defence company Thales in the UK and perhaps the world is based in the constituency neighbouring mine, that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), although he tells me that the majority of the workers are my constituents. I am thankful to this good local employer for not simply providing skilful, gainful employment at a very decent wage, but offering incredibly helpful apprenticeships. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East and I met Thales back in August, we pushed for apprenticeships, and we were pleased that the company was approaching the issue constructively. Those who gain an apprenticeship have their student fees paid, because Thales wants to retain those apprentices for the long term. One worker, who happens to be my constituent, has won the Northern Ireland apprentice of the year award, which is an indication of how much Thales does for apprentices. The use of local suppliers also means that more people than just those on site owe their employment to Thales’s innovation and excellence. The company’s design and production of air defence capabilities in Northern Ireland directly employs more than 800 people, and contributes £81 million to Northern Ireland’s GDP.

My hon. Friend refers to the stock that we require. Hopefully it never needs to be used, but we definitely require it. Does he agree that it would help if the Government were to outline in clear detail how quickly defence spending will get to 2.5%?

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. The Minister, who is assiduous in her work, will no doubt take note of that, or her officials will and will pass forward up-to-date information on where we are. I will comment on that later on, because it is really important that we look forward.

It is my hope—I know it is a shared hope in this room—that we can shortly find a way forward to peace for Israel, Ukraine and Africa—peace in so many theatres of war. Two weeks ago in the Baptist church I attend, the pastor said in his prayers that there are 47 wars in the world; that is how many there are. The ones that feature highly are Ukraine and Israel, of course, but across the world there are wars and rumours of wars. Those 47 wars give an indication of why peace is so important.

While we hope, aim and strive for peace, we must also be prepared for war. We must ensure that our armed forces are equipped and trained on land and sea and in the air, as well as in the new cyber-space, and missiles are part of that preparedness. The UK has to prepare for Russian aggression. It was in the paper this morning—the hon. Member for North Durham referred to this—that Russian drones were looking at the east of England, and I understand that the MOD was responding to them. I know that that is a hot story—if that is the way to put it—having been in the paper for the first time this morning, but maybe the Minister can give us some indication of how we are preparing ourselves for any such incursion by Russian forces, wherever it may be in the east of England—or indeed coming through the Republic of Ireland, into Northern Ireland and ultimately towards the rest of the United Kingdom. I would love there to be a special NATO relationship with the Republic of Ireland, but we must be aware that it is a back door to Britain, so we need to be prepared and ready. What is most important is that we are doing what we can.

I welcome the news that we are again to increase our GDP spend, and my hon. Friend the Member for East Londonderry (Mr Campbell) referred to that. I know that the 2.5% is something we all want the Minister and the Government to achieve, and nobody differs in that view. What discussions have taken place with our fellow NATO countries and compatriots in battle about their preparedness to spend 2.5% for a similar reason?

It is pleasure, Mr Dowd, to serve under your chairmanship. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst) for obtaining the chance to debate this vital matter, and I commend him on his comprehensive diagnosis of the threats we face.

My hon. Friend is right to say that we have entered a period of global instability not seen since the cold war. First, there is Putin’s brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine, where the threat continues to escalate and the damage continues to spread. We must answer Russia with a European, transatlantic and UK-based response that adapts to the evolving threat of warfare—be that through technology, on land, in the sea, in the air or in space. I am proud that my constituency of Stevenage plays an integral part in the UK’s response to Putin, as the place where Storm Shadow missiles are refitted for use by Ukraine.

Secondly, there is the ongoing instability in the middle east—with the risk of escalation to an all-out regional conflict that will implicate allies around the world. We must also assess our preparation for the vastly different challenges that ongoing chaos in the region will cause.

Regardless of the conflict, and the differing threats posed, it is clear that NATO, Europe and the UK are not where we need to be to confidently say we can protect our interests at home and abroad. On air defence alone, NATO states can provide less than 5% of the air defence capacity needed to protect Europe from a larger attack.

This matter is of deep importance to me and my constituents in Stevenage. As a former local armed forces champion, I am proud to represent a constituency where MBDA is based. The company produces Sea Ceptor and Sea Viper, which bolster our naval-based air and missile defence capabilities and are integral to the UK’s missile defence strategy—both in protecting our ground-based assets at home, and for our blue water naval capabilities wherever they may be deployed across the world.

It is clear that war in Europe—war on our continent—has fundamentally shifted defence priorities and key areas for our focus. Does my hon. Friend agree with the Chief of the Defence Staff’s recent comment that a key area for future investment should be integrated air and missile defence, so that we better address growing global challenges and threats?

I thank my hon. Friend, the Chair of the Select Committee on Defence, and I absolutely agree. We must have interoperability across all our services—not just on land, at sea and in the air, but in space, which is not just the next frontier but brings it all together. We must not forget that.

Currently, the UK, alongside 22 other NATO allies, is meeting the NATO contribution requirement of 2% of GDP. I am pleased that this Labour Government have a commitment to increase that to 2.5% following the strategic defence review. In undertaking that review, the Department will be looking at the many ways in which we can develop strength where we are weak and efficiency where we are slow—and develop strength we must. It is integral to that that the UK bolsters its air and missile defence capability, especially as we saw only last week Putin’s first use of intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missiles in Ukraine. We must ensure that our constituents and the infrastructure on which we rely are protected from missile attack, and the threat of such attacks will continue rising for the foreseeable future.

I believe that the only way we can upscale our capability effectively is by working with both our strategic partners in NATO and our geographically-closest partners in Europe. I urge the Minister to explore the viability of a defence and security pact with the EU and across Europe. As a third partner currently, we run the risk of not just the UK Government but our industry being locked out of discussions with our counterparts across Europe. We must work to supercharge our UK-based defence industry and give it the correct tools to work hand in hand with our European partners to keep us all safe. If that does not happen, we will not be effectively maximising either our own capability for our defence or our wider response to the war in Ukraine and to increasing uncertainty internationally.

I make this case to the Minister: keep spending, bolster our armed forces and do everything in our power to retain sovereign capability over every area of the defence sector, from manufacturing to procurement. We must speed up production and explore every avenue to develop the new technologies and systems that we need to face down modern threats and tackle global challenges. At the very heart of this all, we must prioritise the UK’s missile defence capabilities so that companies, such as MBDA and Airbus in my constituency, can contribute in an ever bigger and better way than they already are.

I apologise for my late arrival, Mr Dowd. Two airbases in my constituency of West Suffolk, Lakenheath and Mildenhall, were recently targeted by drones; residents were concerned to hear aircraft being scrambled in the middle of the night to intercept them at the weekend. When the Minister responds, I would be grateful if she could give us a clear account of what happened and what the response is likely to be if that continues.

I particularly want to raise a related security concern. Concerning Russia, the director general of MI5 recently said:

“We now face…state-backed sabotage”

and

“we should expect to see continued acts of aggression here at home. The GRU in particular is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets: we’ve seen arson, sabotage and more.”

That is obviously a serious threat to our country. I do not expect the Minister or other hon. Members present to know the details of the proposed Sunnica solar and battery farm, but it is very close to both Lakenheath and Mildenhall, and many of the service personnel who work at the bases live even nearer to the proposed site. At that site, the proposal includes battery energy storage systems, which are especially vulnerable to acts of sabotage. BESS fires on similar sites have been caused by lithium battery failure leading to thermal runaway. That can cause explosions and the resulting fires cannot be extinguished using conventional methods.

Four years ago, a fire at a BESS site in Liverpool took 59 hours to put out, and similar stories apply elsewhere around the world where those facilities have been constructed. The fires emit toxic fumes, which means that people in the vicinity must remain indoors throughout. The risk to the bases, given the location of the Sunnica solar farm, is quite obvious. I do not expect a full answer from the Minister, but in her concluding remarks can she commit to having a meeting with me and some of her officials so we can talk privately about the issue? I would be very grateful.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. I declare an interest as the Member of Parliament for Bolton West, which is the home of MBDA’s Logistics North production site. I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst) on securing this important debate; I particularly welcome his comments on both the lessons to be learned from Ukraine and the need to ensure that our armed forces can protect us from a diverse range of threats.

All of us will have constituents who are concerned about last week’s developments between Russia and Ukraine, including Putin’s use of an advanced hypersonic missile. This is a personal issue for me. My own father was stationed in Germany throughout the 1970s as the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union loomed. The shadow cast by that period of constant existential fear is, unfortunately, a long one. The terrifying reality is that now war is not just something we read about in newspapers; it is on our doorstep. However we are not fighting on the beaches, landing grounds, fields and streets any more. The long distance missile capabilities of hostile states mean, regrettably, that war can now reach us in our own homes.

All that is to say that sovereign capability for missile defences here in the UK has seldom been so important. As others have already noted, we are vulnerable to advanced missiles such as the one fired by Russia last week and the one fired by Iran on Israel earlier in the year. As our armed forces and defence infrastructure were left to crumble during the last 14 years, a serious capability gap has emerged, particularly around defence against air threats and our ability to engage targets at extended range. Only in September, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee warned that the Government must

“pay greater attention to homeland defence”,

particularly to

I thank my hon. Friend, who is making an excellent speech. It is increasingly clear that enhanced co-operation with NATO and other allies will be essential in achieving air and missile defence aims in the UK. Does my hon. Friend agree that, as we have seen in the recent Estonia pact, these continued alliances will not only enhance our ability to meet procurement challenges but ensure that we are able to defend against these long-range missile threats?

I agree with my hon. Friend; I will come on to that issue in the context of the recent Germany-UK defence agreement, which was signed in Trinity House only last month.

Over the weekend, there was also an intervention from former Defence Minister and former Chair of the Defence Committee Tobias Ellwood, who said that we are “woefully unprotected” and described London as “almost a sitting duck”. This issue can garner support from all sides of the House; I know that other Members will recognise the scale of the challenges ahead, which necessitate ever closer international relationships and collective defence within NATO and the European Union. With that in mind, I should say that I had the immense pleasure of talking to German counterparts as part of a delegation to Berlin in September. As the secretary of the all-party parliamentary group on Germany, I enthusiastically welcomed last month’s UK-Germany Trinity House agreement on defence.

The Government’s shared objective with Germany to sustain effective deterrence against would-be aggressors by building credible, resilient defence forces and defence industries is vital if we are to work towards the vision of a peaceful and stable Europe and north Atlantic. Sovereign capability, as an enduring necessity, is something that I expect the Government’s forthcoming strategic defence review will attest to. To ensure adequate manufacturing capacity, industry must remain at the very heart of our missile defence system.

MBDA employs 1,200 people in my constituency and almost 6,000 across the UK. I am sure that colleagues will agree with me and my hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage (Kevin Bonavia) that MBDA represents the very best in ingenuity, working as a trusted partner throughout Europe and providing the air defence capability that we and our allies need to stand up to Russia’s unwarranted aggression. I therefore welcome the Secretary of State’s comments at the Farnborough International Airshow earlier this year, when he committed to

I thank the hon. Member for giving way; he has done so already.

Scotland is a tremendous asset in defence. Companies right across the country provide enormous pieces of equipment, such as the aircraft carriers built in Scotland. Scotland also has many small and medium-sized enterprises—we have Raytheon, which provides parts for Tomahawk, and Thales on the banks of the Clyde. However, does the Minister know that there is something of a hostile environment from the Scottish Government towards companies that need to ramp up and access finance to deliver the large orders coming from the Ministry of Defence? Senior Scottish Government figures have boasted about the fact that, under their watch, money would not be given to large companies for warfighting capabilities; it would be for civilian use only. That is alarming. We will need to ally with defence companies as well as NATO.

The hon. Member makes an important point about the importance of the defence sector across all four nations of the United Kingdom.

The Secretary of State also spoke at the Farnborough International Airshow about the importance of driving prosperity and creating skilled jobs across the country. But defence cannot be done on the cheap—we will have to put our hands in our pockets. It is an investment, not a cost, and I must urge the Government to reach the 2.5% of GDP defence spending target at the earliest opportunity so that the rogue states causing ongoing geopolitical instability know that their continued unlawful aggression will not and cannot win.

To conclude, the threats we face are very real, as are the resourcing, production capacity and resilience needs. I look forward to further measures from the new Government to show their resolve to stand up to Putin, invest in our defence capability and increase domestic manufacturing capacity.