Trade (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) Bill [Lords]

New Clause 1

Report: accession of states to the CPTPP

“(1) Before any decision is made by the Government of the United Kingdom on the accession of economies designated a ‘threat’ or ‘systemic challenge’ in the Integrated Review to the CPTPP under Chapter 30 of the CPTPP, the Secretary of State must publish a report assessing the impact of the accession of that economy on the United Kingdom.

(2) Both Houses of Parliament must be presented with a motion for resolution on the report under subsection (1).”—(Sir Iain Duncan Smith.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Assessment of impact of CPTPP on deforestation and import of certain products—

“(1) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report containing an assessment of the impact of the implementation of the CPTPP on—

(a) the volume of UK imports of palm oil;

(b) the volume of UK imports of tropical wood;

(c) the rate of deforestation in Asia;

(d) the UK’s ability to fulfil its obligations under—

(i) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and

(ii) the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.

(2) A report under subsection (1) must be published no earlier than a year and no later than 18 months after the passing of this Act.”

New clause 3—Report on the impact and use of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement procedure—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report on the impact of the implementation of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement aspect of the Investment Chapter of the CPTPP on the UK.

(2) A report prepared under subsection (1) must include—

(a) analysis of the likely use of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement procedure in relation to the UK, and the likely impact of such on the UK;

(b) details of discussions held with other signatories to the CPTPP regarding the use of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement procedure in relation to the UK; and

It is a pleasure to speak to new clause 1, which is signed by a cross-party group of MPs who all believe that Parliament should have the right to scrutinise trade deals. It seeks to ensure appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the UK’s position toward the accession of economies that are designated—that word is very specific—as “threats” or “systemic challenges”. It would achieve two things. First, the Government would be required to produce a report assessing the impact of the economy’s accession on the UK, and both Houses of Parliament would have a non-binding vote on the UK’s position regarding the accession of the economy in question. In other words, we would take the temperature of Parliament’s view, even if it disagreed with the Government. That is important, because the public need to know about it, so we should not be frightened of this.

I thank my right hon. Friend for introducing the new clause. Some of us have been arguing for parliamentary scrutiny of trade deals for the last four years. There is a mechanism in the form of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Is that not the better vehicle, because it has already passed? It also offers a vote, theoretically, for us to be able to scrutinise our trade deals.

I will come to that in a minute, because it does not, and that is the whole point of the new clause. In the 2023 integrated review refresh, the countries defined as threats were Russia, Iran and North Korea, while China was designated a systemic challenge. The new clause does not directly mention China, but of the eligible countries under the current integrated review, China is the only economy that has applied to join. In fact it is theoretically next on the list to go into the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-pacific partnership.

I completely understand the point my right hon. Friend is trying to make, but one of the interesting things about being a member of CPTPP is that countries then have a power of veto. That gives us quite a lot of strength to potentially prevent China from joining.

I enjoy the idea that my hon. Friend puts such trust in Government never to take other arrangements into consideration. We know how that works. It will be fine today with my right hon. Friend the Minister here, but there may be others in charge in future, and I am not sure I would always want to rest my defence in Ministers.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way and for this new clause. Was he as surprised as I was that when we asked the Secretary of State whether she would block China’s accession to CPTPP she was unable to give us an unequivocal answer?

I think the right hon. Gentleman makes my point. I sat in Government and all I can say to him is that one cannot always say that Ministers will necessarily do the right thing; rather, they will do the right thing by the Government, which is sometimes not the same. I do not mean to cast aspersions on my party’s Government by any means, but that has happened in the past. I simply want to make the point that China’s potential accession has huge implications for all sorts of things, including because of its immense economic and political influence in the region and the pressures on the UK if we were almost isolated in our observations.

China is not a likeminded party—there may be other countries that are rather similar. It openly seeks to revise the liberal, open and rules-based order and establish itself as a regional hegemon. If admitted, it would be the largest economy and dominant economic and trading partner in the CPTPP, with unrivalled political influence. It could block a future US entry. As we join it is important for us to make way for the US and bring it in, which will help in a whole range of areas. China’s accession would help to cement Beijing’s desired leadership in global trade. I will remind the House that China is next up for the CPTPP, so this is not something conjured up.

China’s entry also risks further increasing economic dependence on it, which is already too high, and building resilience into the Chinese economy to weather sanctioning should tensions over Taiwan escalate, which they almost certainly will. That would run counter to the UK’s strategic efforts to de-risk and maintain the status quo in the region. Serious human rights abuses are and continue to be embedded within Chinese supply chains. China is the most egregious offender in this regard, with its actions on religion in Xinjiang and in Tibet, where slave labour is also practised. Slave labour undercuts the World Trade Organisation and normal trade. Those are good commercial reasons why the membership of any country with the views China happens to have would have a real impact.