That the Grand Committee takes note of the Report from the International Relations Committee The UK’s relationship with the Pacific Alliance (8th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 386).
My Lords, I begin by thanking all the then members of the International Relations Committee when this report was first published; the excellent clerk and support staff for their work; and, especially, the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who urged us to look at this area and whose expertise greatly benefited the committee, and from whom we will hear shortly.
This is, of course, a delayed debate, in the sense that publication was actually more than 18 months ago. Things inevitably move on, as they certainly have done in relation to the subject matter of this inquiry and report. It is a pity in a way, not least because it means that the initiative in discussion and new insights into important issues tend to slide away from your Lordships’ House into other fora. I know that some colleagues will want to say something about these long delays, which may be inevitable, between the publication and debate of Lords reports. In the meantime, at least this delay gives us the chance to update ourselves on fast-moving events in the region we are looking at today. There is sort of a silver lining to the delay situation.
The Pacific Alliance currently brings together Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. It was founded in 2011 and covers trade and a whole range of wider issues as well. It is one of a number of trade associations and organisations in the Latin America region. In global terms it is relatively small, with a total population of 210 million people, compared with the giant new networks that have sprung up in Asia and are now reshaping the whole of world trade and commerce, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—CPTPP—which I will talk a bit more about in a moment, or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, which, with a market of 2.2 billion people, dwarfs even the European Union.
The Pacific Alliance is certainly thriving, although it has had to survive quite a few political bumps and changes along the way, including several since we wrote this report. As the Financial Times rightly warns, all these will certainly continue. Also, British trade relations with the region have been pretty modest in recent decades, involving in fact only about 0.7% of our total exports and 0.6% of our imports for the four countries in the alliance, and indeed with only 1.5% of our total exports going to the whole of Latin America. Of course, in the distant past things were quite different, and Britain had a far larger and deeper connection with South America. So it may be thought a little strange that your Lordships’ International Relations Committee chose back then to undertake even a short inquiry—as this one is—on these four specific countries, when most of our inquiries tend to be on major and overarching foreign policy issues rather than bilateral single-country relationships.
But there were at least two reasons why we did this. First, the Pacific Alliance is a classic example of the way that world trade is changing. We are not looking at a static picture at all, but at a very fast-evolving one. Saplings grow, sometimes very rapidly, into big trees with wide-spreading branches. The PA is not a customs union; it is something much more modern. I would say it is more of a product of the digital age, when data and services start to form the bulk of international exchange.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, for his characteristically well-informed and expert introduction. I welcome that way that this report has highlighted the potential to the UK of the Pacific Alliance, established in 2011. That importance is underlined, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, said, by the fact that the leaders of China and another 14 countries in the Asia-Pacific region signed in November 2020—just two months ago—one of the biggest free trade deals in history, covering 2.2 billion people and 30% of the world’s economic output. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea signed the deal, alongside members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
Can the Minister comment on the weekend news that the UK is applying to join a free trade area made up of 11 Asia-Pacific nations, under its post-Brexit plans? The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—CPTPP—includes Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand, covering a market of around half a billion people and generating more than 13% of the world’s income. As the Minister will be aware, there are 11 countries in the CPTPP, some overlapping with the Pacific Alliance. Formed in 2018, it comprises Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. Can the Minister say when negotiations will begin and what human rights, employment protection and sustainable growth clauses Britain will seek to place within it?
The committee reports:
“The Government appears to lack a coherent, well thought-through approach to Latin America as a whole, and to its regional and subregional organisations.”
Yet many of the countries in the region, including members of the Pacific Alliance, are ones with which the UK shares considerable common ground on policy issues, such as on the global economy, trade, sustaining the rules-based international order, upholding human rights and addressing climate change. I agree with the committee that the Government should raise and promote the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, particularly in the context of UK companies’ activities in the region, and that they should promote only sustainable, inclusive growth in a continent where nature has been devastated by human commercialism—Brazil’s Amazon rainforest is still being plundered—and which engages with the concerns of indigenous peoples.
My Lords, I welcome this report, with reservations. The UK has neglected relations with Latin American countries since the last war. There have been periodic attempts to increase our commitment, and to reverse the decline in trading and investment links, but we have continued to lag far behind Germany and others in the intensity of our relations with most countries in the region.
I have often acted as a guide in singing tours of Westminster Abbey, where I walk over the tomb of Admiral Lord Cochrane, who at one point commanded the Chilean navy and helped found the Peruvian fleet. Britain has strong historical ties with Latin America that we have let decline. As a policy analyst working on transatlantic relations, I have attended conferences in Chile and Mexico, and have also visited Peru. The members of the Pacific Alliance are significant states. On any definition of global Britain, we should be paying more attention to relations with Latin American states and markets, but we should not fall into the trap of assuming that trade with Latin America can somehow replace trade with the European continent; nor fall into the illusion that economic integration among South American countries is an easier process to commit the UK to than any European one. I recall when I was a young academic, 50 years ago, the optimism of Mexican economists about the prospects for the Latin American Free Trade Association and other regional schemes. These failed or stagnated as regimes changed in different South American states.
The noble Lord, Lord Howell, is correct to argue that the UK needs to pay more attention to the Pacific as a region—with the rapidly growing economies of east and south-east Asia now acting as the dynamo of global growth, and with the rise of China creating new economic and security challenges—but we need to beware of overemphasising the prospect of Britain becoming a major commercial or military player in the Pacific; nor should we see commitment to Pacific co-operation as an alternative to continued engagement with European states and markets and across the wider European neighbourhood to the Mediterranean and Africa. The enthusiasm with which the Secretary of State for International Trade has just announced the UK’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership contrasts sharply with her antagonism towards the European Union. The CPTPP, if it develops into a serious economic grouping, which is not yet clear, will compromise UK sovereignty on issues such as animal welfare, regulation of chemicals, and investor protection. It is not clear to me why such limits on sovereignty should be more acceptable to our Government in the Pacific than across the North Sea.
My Lords, I served on the International Relations Committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Howell. I was the president of the Peru Support Group at the time. Our clerk and her team enabled us to deal with a great deal of evidence, including a valuable session with the ambassadors of the four Pacific Alliance countries.
Since the report’s publication, the UK has withdrawn from the EU, promoted its global Britain strategy and signed continuity agreements with all four Pacific Alliance member states, so it is time now to implement the report’s core recommendation:
“The UK should deepen its engagement with the Pacific Alliance as an active observer state”.
In their response, the Government said that they agreed with that, so I will give a few examples of what being an active observer state should look like and what is in it for the UK.
One of our witnesses, Professor Gardini, pointed out that one of the alliance’s strategic objectives is to build relationships within the Asia-Pacific region, also offering an opportunity for
“UK insertion into regional and global value chains aiming at the Asian market.”
Professor Gardini also said that the alliance could be
“a significant political partner in global forums and issues.”
This could be helpful in reconfiguring our international influence outside the EU and building alliances on global issues such as climate change, on which the UK aspires to be a global leader and which the alliance identifies as a key concern.
The UK has also shown leadership in respect of the UN’s principles on business and human rights. Greater engagement with the Pacific Alliance provides a unique opportunity to put this commitment into practice by influencing sustainable growth within the region without trampling on the rights of indigenous communities.
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Howell on his perseverance, which has finally secured time for a debate on our International Relations and Defence Committee’s report, The UK’s Relationship with the Pacific Alliance. It was a pleasure to serve as a member of the committee under my noble friend’s chairmanship and, indeed, as a colleague on the Front Bench for many years before that. It was therefore an honour to follow him as chair of the committee 18 months ago.
Post Brexit, the UK now has the opportunity to reconsider its strategy in delivering on its global Britain agenda. We await the publication of the long-delayed integrated review of foreign policy, defence, security and development. On 18 January, my noble friend Lord Ahmad confirmed in the House that it will now include a soft power strategy—also long delayed.
Today, the noble Lord, Lord Frost, begins his work in a new post in Downing Street as the Prime Minister’s representative on Brexit and international policy. It is reported that he will liaise with the Foreign Secretary. One has to wonder, however, what impact that will have on the decision-making process in the FCDO. I welcome the noble Lord’s appointment. He is to be congratulated on his work in negotiating our trade agreement with the EU. I also hope that I will have the opportunity this year to welcome him to our committee to give evidence.
It is a pleasure to see my noble friend Lord Godson take his seat today. He is the director of Policy Exchange. I agree with the position expounded in its recent report, A Very British Tilt:
“As it contemplates its global interests post-Brexit, the UK could and should play a significantly larger role in the Indo-Pacific Region. Specifically, it should aim to foster a community of free and independent nations committed to upholding peace, stability, prosperity, and access in the region. By offering a vision of a common strategic future built around shared principles and focused on shared challenges … Britain can add to existing defence, trade, and political relationships and inspire new approaches.”
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to join and engage in this debate, and to have the opportunity to learn from the considerable experience and expertise that your Lordships bring to it.
I have relatively little experience of the region. I have, however, had the opportunity to visit Mexico on a number of occasions, most recently when I was part of an election observation delegation that saw Andrés Manuel López Obrador elected. I was therefore interested in the phrase in the report that said that countries in the region remain
“vulnerable to political swings at future elections”.
I merely observe that either the maintenance in power of a party or a change to a different party in power, as has just happened in the US, is what we tend to think of as democracy, so “vulnerable” seems a slightly odd word to me.
I will make a couple of observations about Colombia, which I have had visited a number of times with British and other parliamentarians and trade unionists. The reason for those visits was to engage with human rights defenders who have come under considerable attack and to meet trade unionists, many of whom have been imprisoned under the catch-all legislation of rebellion. When the report talks of the UK having
“a set of shared values, whether on democracy, or the way we want to see the international system working, based on rules”,
I am pleased that the recommendations and conclusions contain the following:
“The UK should also continue in its bilateral engagement to support and help to strengthen the rule of law in these countries.”
Specifically, I was recently pleased that the Minister was able to engage with some of these issues in response to a Question. I will add to the large number of questions already put to him today. As the penholder for Colombia at the UN, the UK has a particular responsibility to play an active role in ensuring that the Colombian Government uphold their commitment to end violence against human rights defenders and trade unionists. When the Minister spoke of these matters in response to the Question, the answers were very fulsome, but I want to take the opportunity provided by this debate to ask the Minister for an update on the UK’s recent work as the penholder for Colombia and to say what assessment Her Majesty’s Government have made of recent levels of violence there.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, both for the important report that he and his committee have written and for obtaining this substantial debate. It gives us an opportunity to discuss the relationship with the four countries of the Pacific Alliance and advise Her Majesty’s Government on how they should prioritise and promote this set of relationships.
I have a long-standing interest in this area, particularly in Colombia and Peru. I declare my registered interest as the president of the Peru Support Group. I pay particular tribute to my predecessor, the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, pointed out, played an important role in the origins of the report and spoke with such passion and insight this afternoon.
My relationship with those countries and my visits to them began many years ago when Northern Ireland, my own part of the United Kingdom, was emerging from a long and painful experience of terrorism. Both Peru and Colombia were seeking to do the same. Of course, the underlying issues that find tragic expression in terrorist campaigns do not easily or quickly go away—even when, as in Colombia in particular, there has been a substantial effort at peacebuilding. My connection with both countries still includes regular contact with colleagues there who continue to work to build peace, stability and reconciliation, as is also the case in Northern Ireland.
However, like the Select Committee report does, I will focus on some other important elements of our relationships and how they can be developed to our mutual benefit, especially in this post-Brexit period. One of my frustrations over the years has been the way in which our Governments have consciously turned away from long-standing relationships with Latin America. I well recall protesting in your Lordships’ House against the decision of the Blair Administration to withdraw resources from Latin America in favour of a focus on China. The closure of the British Council office in Lima in 2006 is just one example of this serious strategic error of judgment, which was clear to me at the time—and I said so. Abandoning long-standing relationships of that kind in favour of hoped-for economic benefits from countries that do not share our values is almost always foolish and misguided, as those decisions have proved to be.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford for introducing this debate. I must admit that when I signed up to speak, I had mistakenly thought that we would be debating our imminent accession to the CPTPP, which should form an important pillar of the profile of global Britain as we renew and deepen our relationships around the world after leaving the EU. I must also admit that I was not aware of the existence of the Pacific Alliance and briefly contemplated withdrawing from the debate because, although I have spent many years living and working on the eastern shore of the Pacific and have visited California, British Columbia and Hawaii several times, I do not know the Latin American countries of that alliance at all. It is probably true that we hear much more about the Mercosur alliance than the Pacific Alliance, as the former’s total GDP is about 30% greater and, at $2.5 trillion annually, is approaching that of the UK.
However, having read the interesting report of the Select Committee I decided not to withdraw, not least because three of the four member countries of the Pacific Alliance are also members of the CPTPP. It is worth noting that of the other eight members of that organisation, only Japan and Vietnam are not members of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the fourth country of the Pacific Alliance, Colombia, has given notification of its interest in joining the CPTPP. Of the six Commonwealth members that are already members of the CPTPP, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore are already associate members of the Pacific Alliance and therefore committed to enter into free trade agreements with it. Therefore, to maximise our influence in and the benefits we can gain from membership of the CPTPP, it seems logical that we should also seek associate membership of the Pacific Alliance and closer relationships with its members on a bilateral basis.
Two of the early continuity trade agreements to be negotiated were those with Chile, in January 2019, and with the Andean countries, which include Colombia and Peru, in August 2019. As your Lordships are well aware, we concluded a continuity trade agreement with Mexico just in time. However, in general, the Pacific Alliance members are not among those countries with which we have as many historical and trade links as others. Guyana is the only South American country which is a member of the Commonwealth.
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If we look at the new world trade pattern as a complex new jigsaw, which it is, the Pacific Alliance is certainly one of the pieces without which the picture is not complete, and to which the time has come to give renewed and close attention. Linkages between the Pacific Alliance and another major Latin American trading group, Mercosur, could well develop soon. Ecuador could join before long. There are co-operation agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union—not much talked about here in the UK—and with the OECD. Partly this is just what happens in the digital age between networks as they weave together, and partly it is because forward-looking states that want open trade and to be champions of liberalisation, as these four countries do, now seek combined defences against the rather ugly modes of protection which are very much around.
Secondly, when it comes to why we looked at this issue and this region, the word “Pacific” tells the story. The four countries involved face the Pacific and are clearly looking to Pacific trade as a key to their future. Three of the four are already members of the CPTPP I mentioned, and, of course, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand are now associates in return, as it were, with the alliance.
This is an area of acute interest to our own future trade policy as we too seek—and, in fact, officially apply for tomorrow—membership of the CPTPP. We will join its existing 11 members, of which six are members of the Commonwealth—a fact which seems to have escaped the notice of Ministers so far. It is located in the region where almost all the growth in trade, consumer markets, world GDP and innovation over the next 10 years and beyond is most likely, and has been predicted, to occur.
The International Trade Secretary used a good phrase the other day in commenting on the UK’s very interesting new comprehensive partnership agreement with Japan. She said we needed a “Pacific mindset” in developing our global trade policy, to which I would add that we need a Commonwealth mindset, since we have the good fortune to be a member of that vast worldwide network and since all these networks are increasingly interconnected with and reinforcing each other. This is the new emerging pattern in which our intense engagement is essential for our future prosperity, as well as our security.
The government response to our short report was broadly positive and helpful but a little prickly about our urgings that the UK needed to do a lot more and have a clearer overall approach to the region and generally to engage more strongly. But I am sure that the august minds in the now FCDO are fully used to this sort of parliamentary nudging, which may have its critical elements, I concede, but which I hope reinforces the efforts of those in Whitehall who are beavering away at these sometimes unfashionable but potentially—and in due course—crucial areas of trade, investment and broader politics.
These countries are far from being the lowest-income states but some of them undoubtedly have severe problems of poverty and need to develop much faster. Like almost every other region, the pandemic has, of course, set them back very grievously indeed.
The UK provides ODA funds of about £180 million in all for Latin America and £600 million in bilateral programmes. But by far the best way nowadays to build lasting links, which we discussed in our inquiry, is through providing well-focused, technology-based solutions to specific areas and concentrating on the mechanisms—which are different in each country—which unlock faster and fairer growth. Old and facile ideas about development funds, with the measure being simply the amount of cash being handed out, are, in my view, now hopelessly out of date and misleading.
The nations of Latin America are experiencing varying fortunes, with once-rich Venezuela the outstanding problem area, obviously in the grip of a very regrettable pattern of tyrannical government, and bogged down in an outdated economic doctrine that is causing huge suffering and the exile of large numbers of the population. For most other parts of the Latin American continent, despite the political ructions and the comings and goings and changes at the top, there is plenty of promise in the new era ahead. These nations see themselves no longer as America’s backyard or in the so-called American pond. The pond—if one can call it that—to which British attention, commercial thrust and our substantial soft-power influence should be turned, and where major issues affecting our security and prosperity now lie, is the Pacific Ocean. That means having a Pacific mindset and engaging energetically with all groupings heading in the same direction, as the Pacific Alliance is clearly now doing. The hope must be that this short report gives a small further push towards that important goal. I beg to move.
Given that this month the UK will take up the presidency of the UN Security Council, and that Mexico is currently serving as a non-permanent member of the council, what effort are the Government making to co-operate with Mexico as one of the most influential nations in the Pacific Alliance? As part of the COP 26 presidency, what steps will the Government take to tackle the climate crisis, specifically in the Pacific Alliance countries, Peru in particular? What are the Government doing to ensure that the Colombian Government uphold their commitment to end violence against human rights defenders and trade unionists? Because UK citizens can be safe during the Covid-19 pandemic only if everyone in the world is safe, what steps have the Government taken to support vaccine access for central America, when Pacific Alliance countries such as Colombia and Chile are yet to even begin their full vaccination programmes? After the Government’s pernicious cut in aid, what proportion of the multibillion aid cuts will fall on the programmes in the Pacific Alliance?
As the committee argued, together these four Pacific Alliance countries constitute the world’s seventh-largest economy, with “great” potential for increases in the current miserly levels of UK trade. I applaud its recommendations for: around 400 Chevening scholarships to students from Pacific Alliance countries; support for green finance; support for girls’ education, especially in science, engineering, technology and mathematics; and help to strengthen the countries’ competition authorities. I also urge more support for the British Council, which has also suffered big cuts in its vital training, arts and engagement exercises. Like aid cuts, this is a pathetically self-defeating policy for a Government who trumpet “global Britain” yet undermine the British Council, which, as I have seen as a Minister abroad, has been so brilliant at promoting Britain.
The Pacific Alliance is only a small player on the fringes of the Pacific region. One of its four members is not yet a member of the CPTPP. China and the USA are its dominant external partners. The EU as a whole is less important to it. Britain, as the report notes, sends less than 1% of its exports to it. A determined export drive might raise this to 2% or even 3%.
Some of the comments in the report seem questionable. We are told about the
“importance of defence co-operation between the UK and Chile”.
Is that really important compared with our defence co-operation with France and the Netherlands, which our Government attempt to hide from their own people? It is suggested that these countries should be encouraged to have closer relations with the Commonwealth, but we are not told why or how the UK will explain the value of that to the Commonwealth’s African neighbours.
Yes, we should work harder to develop trade and investment with these and other Latin American countries. No, this is not a major element in the new global Britain that the Prime Minister has promised to recreate—to make Britain great again, in his Trumpian phraseology. We await the overdue integrated review of foreign and security strategy to learn about the Government’s vision of Britain’s global role after Brexit, in which closer relations with these four states should have a significant but small part.
Since we reported, there have been significant events in the Pacific Alliance countries as well as in our own—most notably, and in common with the rest of the world, the Covid pandemic, resulting in deep recession in all four countries. Chile has experienced widespread social and political disruption, and Colombia continues to struggle in many ways to implement the peace accord. In all four member states, the fallout from Venezuela is making heavy demands across society.
However, the main proposition of the report holds good. At their summit only last month, the four member states showed confidence and resilience in the role and remit of the alliance, announcing an action plan to address the pandemic’s economic and commercial impact, a digital transformation plan and a declaration on gender equality. Singapore is poised to upgrade from observer status to being an associate member. Australia, New Zealand and Canada are expected to do likewise in 2021. South Korea and Ecuador are also candidates for associate membership. Associate status is based on free trade agreements. When our continuity agreements expire, will the Government look at converting them into an FTA with the alliance as a whole, possibly even seeking associate status alongside other Commonwealth partners?
The report sets out the clear potential for UK export growth in the region. I emphasise the recommendation that the DIT restore “direct language support” to business. Will the Minister take this up with the department?
However, the Pacific Alliance is not just about trade. It is also about the well-being of citizens, addressing inequalities and social inclusion, cultural and educational mobility, and co-operation on scientific research. The role of the British Council is highly valued. Yet we continue to undermine our own interests and those of the Pacific Alliance in these areas, as well as in business, by persisting with an outdated and unjustifiable visa regime that still restricts, delays and deters visitors to the UK from Peru and Colombia for tourism, study or business. Mexico and Chile are not subject to via restrictions; it really is time that the Government accept the case for a level playing field across all four alliance countries. We get the same stonewalling answers every time a question is asked about this, but there can be no clearer case for removing the short-term visa requirements for Peru and Colombia. Will the Minister take this up urgently with Home Office colleagues?
I have not been able to do this report justice in five minutes but I hope that I have at least illustrated, with a few examples, how and why it is very much in the UK’s enlightened self-interest to strengthen our relationship with the Pacific Alliance with serious focus and energy.
Last month, the International Trade Secretary said in another place that our accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership is “a priority”. I join the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in asking my noble friend the Minister to confirm whether the Trade Secretary has now formally confirmed the media reports from this weekend that today is the day when we will make an application to join that agreement. In doing so, of course, we would be the first non-founder member to do so.
As my noble friend has said, three members of that partnership are also members of the Pacific Alliance: Chile, Mexico and Peru. The fourth, Colombia, has given formal notice of its interest in joining the agreement. That should be a reminder that, when we talk about an Asia-Pacific tilt, there are two sides to that great ocean and there are important opportunities to engage with like-minded countries in both regions.
The UK has observer status in the Pacific Alliance. How have we engaged with it since the publication of our committee’s report so long ago, for example in areas such as consumer protection, infrastructure and development, culture, education and trade facilitation? What steps have the FCDO and DIT taken to raise and promote the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, commonly known as the Ruggie principles? I note that DIT launched the UK’s first ever Latin America and Caribbean investor club in April 2019. What assessment have the Government made of its progress so far?
In conclusion, I add my thanks to the ambassadors to the UK from Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, who gave evidence to our Select Committee, and for the enduring friendship that they have shown to this Parliament. Indeed, we have also benefited in recent months from their briefing meetings, hosted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union British group. Continued and deepening engagement with members of the Pacific Alliance can clearly be of benefit to them but also to us.
I hope that the announcement just made by the Government of their intention to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership is a genuine resetting of our orientation. We have a long-standing relationship with these countries. I was reminded—your Lordships may be amused to hear this—of the length of that relationship when I saw that the main highway in Santiago was named after Bernardo O’Higgins: a clear demonstration of the long-standing relationship and one with which the noble Lord, Lord West, would be particularly pleased since O’Higgins was an admiral.
I also hope that the relations with the Pacific Alliance countries that are currently members of the CPTPP will expand—and include all of them, of course—and will be real priorities and not secondary to those with some of the other members that are also long-standing and valued friends.
In our negotiations and in the deepening of the relationship with the Pacific Alliance countries, particularly Peru and Colombia, I have four requests of Her Majesty’s Government. The first is that, to facilitate business, tourist and citizen contacts, the UK needs to change its visa regulations for Peru and Colombia. I have mentioned this before and I am delighted to see that the report is very clear about its importance. I suspect that the unspoken reason for the stonewalling by the Government is to do with security. I am familiar with those issues but I do not think that they should be regarded as a problem. The potential benefits of mutual contact between our countries cannot be overestimated, but even as we all suffer from the profound restrictions on travel very properly in place because of Covid, there is much that can be done online in language, culture and the future opportunities of digital developments.
Secondly, we have long-standing substantial investments in the region, for example in the extractive industries of Peru. I want to see that develop but I also want to see it taking place with due regard to the welfare of the environment, with which the Pacific Alliance is so richly and variously endowed, and—thirdly—the interests of the indigenous peoples of the region, many of whom live in deep poverty and are suffering grievously from the pandemic.
The problems for indigenous peoples go back a long way, as does the concern of Her Majesty’s Government for their welfare. I remind your Lordships of the report on the Anglo-Peruvian Amazon Rubber Co. by Sir Roger Casement in the early 1900s, when he was a diplomat for the United Kingdom. Will Her Majesty’s Government undertake that in all relationships and agreements the interests of the indigenous people, and the people as a whole, will get due attention?
Fourthly and lastly, we want to see economic co-operation. We may well wish to be able to give health co-operation in this time when vaccines are needed. In all these and many other areas, there is much to be gained from our co-operation with the Pacific Alliance countries. I commend the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, and his colleagues, for this excellent report.
The committee’s report noted that China is now the largest trade partner of Chile and Peru and is “extending its cultural diplomacy” throughout the region. It is very much in our interest that the UK, together with other democratic partners which practise rules-based free trade, should seek to balance that trend.
Lastly, the recent research paper by Robin Niblett of Chatham House underestimates global Britain’s capabilities. He does not say very much about Latin America but I do not think he is right to suggest that
“Britain will have to fight its way to the table on many of the most important transatlantic issues”.
His supposition that, even outside the EU, the UK Government
“will be better networked institutionally than almost any other country’s”
implies that the EU has added to our soft power around the world. During the years when I lived in Japan, I often attended meetings at the British embassy and at what was then called the Delegation of the European Communities in Tokyo. I am in no doubt that as the European legation grew in numbers and role, it became a competitor to the member states’ embassies. My experience has informed my view that the expansion of the EEAS has diminished slightly even the UK’s diplomatic influence overseas.
I welcome and support the Select Committee’s report’s conclusions, especially that the strengthening of the UK’s relationships with the Pacific Alliance countries, and with the organisation itself, will be invaluable as we negotiate the terms of our accession to the CPTPP.