Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

If a shop sells faulty electrical equipment whereby a fire is caused in the home for which it has been bought, for example, one does not have to prove negligence. One may have an action under the Sale of Goods Acts or their equivalent, but there is an opportunity to obtain damages for breach of statutory duty. At a construction site, the failure to provide safety barriers gives rise to such an action. If we go to a restaurant and suffer food poisoning because it has failed to reach the statutory hygiene standards, we can make a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty. If one fails as an employer to provide proper training to employees on handling hazardous chemicals, that too gives rise to a potential claim for breach of statutory duty. I have chosen just a few examples—and there are others—where one does not have to prove negligence and the components of negligence.

Such provisions are all designed to secure protection for individuals without the need to prove those other elements of common-law civil wrongs. I do not understand why those rights are removed by Clause 31(1). I invite the Government to reflect on what is, as I have suggested, probably an inadvertent failure.

“Nothing … affects any right of action”.

With respect, I suggest that that would be less clear and less helpful to the courts, because it will leave open a possible argument that breaches of statutory duty are themselves grounds for action, even where no want of care has been established. That would be getting closer, in effect, to strict liability for civil damages, however blameless the body or person concerned. That is why it is a step too far. It is unnecessary and potentially damaging, when we look at the vast range of bodies and people who will be affected.

Another practical consideration is the potential impact on compliance with the Bill’s requirements. Premises operators, many of whom are already facing financial and operational pressures, may view the introduction of this provision as increasing their exposure to litigation. This could have the unintended consequence of discouraging proactive security measures if operators become overly concerned about the risk of legal action. It is essential that the Bill strikes a balance between imposing reasonable obligations and supporting those who are making good-faith efforts to comply.

Furthermore, we must assess whether this amendment could lead to increased litigation that detracts from the primary purpose of the Bill. Legal disputes can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, diverting attention from the urgent task of implementing effective security measures. We should be mindful of the potential for unintended consequences that may hinder the Bill’s objectives. It is also worth considering the impact on the insurance market. If the inclusion of this provision is perceived as creating greater uncertainty or exposure to liability, it could lead to increased insurance premiums for premises operators. This may place an additional financial burden on businesses and organisations that are already navigating a challenging economic environment.

That said, the Government must also be mindful of the importance of maintaining public trust and confidence in counterterrorism measures. Ensuring that individuals have access to justice when they have been wronged is fundamental to our legal system and to public confidence in the rule of law. If stakeholders, legal experts or civil society organisations believe that this amendment is necessary to provide clarity and reassurance, their concerns should be carefully considered. Ultimately, the key question is whether the amendment strengthens the Bill by providing clarity or whether it introduces unnecessary complexity that could hinder its implementation. I look forward to hearing the Government’s view on this matter and the perspectives of other noble Lords.

As we deliberate on this amendment, let us remember the importance of striking the right balance: ensuring robust security measures that protect the public, while safeguarding access to justice and upholding the legal rights that are fundamental to our democracy. We must strive to create a framework that achieves both security and fairness in the face of evolving security threats.

Throughout the Bill, the Government have tried to make the provisions as simple and clear as possible and to not put concerns that would lead to potential costly litigation on the face of the Bill. Clause 31(2) makes it clear that it does not affect any right of action which exists, apart from the provisions of Part 1 of the Bill. I know the noble Lord is aware of this because we have discussed it but, for example, a claim for negligence could still be made under the provisions of Clause 31(2). That provision is precisely in line with existing legislation, such as the health and safety legislation in 2013, which ensured that no civil right of action was available for breach of statutory duty unless provided for specifically under the Bill.

It is right that the Bill makes it clear that existing rights of action, such as negligence claims, are not affected, while providing what I hope—again, this is for noble Lords to assess—is clear reassurance to all that a civil claim for breach of statutory duty may not be brought. Therefore, I hope it helps the true purpose of the Bill: to require reasonable, simple and effective steps to mitigate the harm that could be caused by an act of terrorism, for which the terrorist is solely responsible. It should be achieved appropriately, proportionately and without overcompliance flowing from a fear of costly litigation.

I may not have succeeded, but I hope I am finding the balance point between the concerns expressed by Members of the Opposition, and the genuine concerns put down by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I hope that balance point is achieved by what the Government say. I will listen again if the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, wishes to make any further points based on what I have said. That is —not with my legal training but the legal mind of the Home Office lawyers behind me—the position I put before the Committee in response to the amendments.