Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Committee (2nd Day)

Clause 5: Public protection procedures

Amendment 20A

Moved by

20A: Clause 5, page 4, line 16, after first “or” insert “giving advice about” Member’s explanatory statement This probing amendment seeks to understand the Government’s expectations of organisations under the new duty to implement procedures “for preventing individuals entering or leaving the premises or event”.

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 21A, 22, 23A and 24A. Amendment 20A seeks to probe the Government’s expectations of organisations that will have the duty to put public protection procedures in place. The public protection procedures listed in Clause 5(3) include measures

“for preventing individuals entering or leaving the premises or event”.

We have no concerns about the prevention of entry to a premises or event, and we can conceive of circumstances where leaving a premises or event would not be the right thing for an individual to do in certain circumstances.

That said, there is a real question for organisations running premises and events. If they are required by the Act to put measures in place to prevent people leaving the premises, what will that look like in reality? Are we empowering people in, for example, a church hall to lock its doors with people inside in the case of a terror incident, or do we expect volunteers to stand in the way of people trying to leave to prevent them leaving? Can we really expect small community organisations to make these decisions for people? Would they not be at risk of prosecution if they got these decisions wrong? This is a specific query but one where clarity from Ministers is necessary.

As background to this amendment, I remind the House that there have been emergencies in the past where the official advice has been wrong, at great cost. After the tragic Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, we learned that the official advice had been wrong and that many of those who survived did so only by ignoring the official advice to stay in their rooms and close their front doors until the fire was over. So we look to the Minister to set out his expectations for how this duty will work in practice. Amendment 21A would add a second test to the Secretary of State’s powers to amend Clause 5. As drafted, the Bill permits the Secretary of State to amend Clause 5(3) if he is satisfied that further procedures will reduce the risk of terrorism.

Amendment 23A is a very specific probing amendment. I will not labour this point. With this amendment, we are seeking an answer to the Government’s expectations of organisations with enhanced duties putting together their plans. It is a simple question which I hope the Minister can answer today. Can he give us a rough sense of what “reasonably practicable” will mean in this context?

Amendment 22, tabled by my noble friend Lord De Mauley, proposes the introduction of a new clause to allow public protection procedures to be waived by the Secretary of State or the Security Industry Authority under specific circumstances. This amendment represents a pragmatic and sensible approach to ensuring that security regulations are proportionate, fair and effective. This is a neat and well-drafted amendment that would give the Government greater flexibility when implementing security measures under the Bill. The Bill rightly seeks to enhance public safety by mandating security measures at qualifying premises and events. However, as with all regulations, there must be room for flexibility to address situations where compliance would be unreasonable or ineffectual. This amendment achieves precisely that balance, by allowing a waiver where the cost of implementation is disproportionate or where the prescribed measures would offer no tangible benefit in reducing the threat of terrorism.

On the issue of cost, we must recognise that many of the venues and events that are captured by the Bill are run by small businesses, community organisations and charitable groups. Imposing blanket security requirements without consideration of financial viability risks driving these important contributors to our social and cultural fabric out of operation. This amendment ensures that, if a venue can demonstrate that the cost of implementing a particular procedure is unreasonable, it can seek relief. This is a common-sense safeguard that acknowledges the real-world financial pressures that many operators face.

The amendment also addresses the fundamental need for security measures to be proportionate and effective. Not all public protection procedures will be relevant to every venue or event. For example, a small rural gathering with minimal public footfall may face no credible terrorist threat. In such cases, mandating extensive security measures would not only be unnecessary but could erode public confidence in the overall security framework, by appearing arbitrary or heavy-handed.

The amendment places a clear and reasonable burden of proof on the applicant, who must demonstrate either that the costs are unreasonable or that the security measures would not reduce the terrorist threat. This would ensure that waivers are granted judiciously and only when justified by evidence. Moreover, by involving the Secretary of State or the Security Industry Authority, the amendment ensures that waiver decisions are made by those with the appropriate expertise and accountability. This provides a safeguard against abuse while maintaining the flexibility needed to adapt to different circumstances.

This amendment is not about weakening security standards but about ensuring that they are applied in a way that is fair, proportionate and effective. It reflects a mature understanding that security is not a “one size fits all” solution. I commend my noble friend Lord De Mauley for tabling this proposal and urge the Government to give it very serious consideration.

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendments 20A, 21A and 23A.

As we have heard, Amendment 20A is a probing amendment to do with advice. Always leaving persons where there is reason to suspect an act of terrorism is occurring or about to occur is not necessarily the right course. You need to have procedures in place which not only prevent leaving but give advice about what to do—it might be to leave or not to leave. If we are going to have specific terms in the Act, it should be clear that the broader picture is encompassed. It could be construed as being simply advice about leaving. At present, on one reading at least, it is too inflexible.

I move on to Amendment 21A. To reduce the risk of reasonable harm is, I suggest, too bold and too bald. Is any risk, however small, to be encompassed by this, to make it even smaller? You will never make any risk negligible. Is any harm, however modest, to be encompassed? What is being guarded against? There is nothing to detract from the purpose here. It is simply to make it workable in real life. We must be sensible about imposing what is, in effect, strict liability for unforeseen circumstances. That is why we suggest that there should be an assessment of the risk, cost and outcome, and proportionality.

Amendment 23A is simply to give a clear time. Currently, I suggest, the words “reasonably practicable” are too vague. They could lead to arguments. It would be better to set an end date. Is it once the document is prepared that it should be provided or is it the time in which to prepare it? To me, reading this, it was not clear. There has to be reasonable time to prepare it and there has to be a time limit after that for providing it. Really, there should be an end date in any event for providing it, which should be clear; in other words, you have a reasonable time to do things but it must be done within three months, six months or whatever is the right time. That is the purpose of this.

My Lords, Amendment 22 is in my name. I am sure we all recognise the threat that the Bill seeks to address and do not underestimate its importance. The attack on the Manchester Arena was, frankly, awful and we must do everything we can to prevent such things happening in future. However, in doing so, we surely must not inadvertently stamp out important local and cultural community-enhancing opportunities for people to enjoy themselves in times when, frankly, there is not much joy to be had.

At Second Reading, the Minister said, I think at column 646, two things which particularly concerned me. First, he referred to “public protection” even in the case of an event attended by as few as 200 people. He referred to “evacuation”, “invacuation”—apparently a word in the Bill drafters’ lexicon, if no one else’s—“lockdown” and “communication”. I will examine “lockdown” in a moment.

Secondly, the Minister expanded on the wording in Clause 6(3)(b), which refers to

“measures relating to … the movement of individuals into, out of and within the premises or event”,

and he added the words,

“such as search and screening processes”.

Let me illustrate my concerns by reference to two different types of event.

First, I help run one of hundreds, probably thousands, of annual parish and village charity fundraising events around the country. Ours, like countless others, is knocking on the door of becoming a qualifying event. We have assessed the risk of attack carefully, and already we have in place sensible precautions. The area is surrounded by walls, so a vehicle could not get near the crowd. A bomb or gun attack, although of course awful, would be highly unlikely, as the target is low value and, furthermore, the event is conducted in the open air, so a bomb would be vastly less effective than in a building with a roof and walls. When I spoke on Amendment 11, I referred to the fact that all 15 attacks listed in the impact assessment took place in urban areas.