Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2019

The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 recently updated these powers, adding the publication of images offence and extending extraterritorial jurisdiction, so that UK nationals and residents can be prosecuted in the UK courts for certain proscription offences committed overseas. This will ensure that we can take action where, for example, a foreign fighter located with a terrorist group in another country reaches back to individuals in the UK via the internet, seeking to build support for that organisation.

Proscription sends a strong message to deter fundraising and recruitment for proscribed organisations. The assets of a proscribed organisation can also become subject to seizure as terrorist assets. Proscription can also support other disruptions of terrorist activity—for example, the use of immigration powers such as exclusion from the UK, in a case where the excluded individual is linked to a proscribed organisation and their presence in the UK would not be in the public interest.

Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise the power to proscribe only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence. This includes information taken from both open sources and sensitive intelligence, as well as advice that reflects consultation across Government, with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as relevant Whitehall departments. The cross-government proscription review group supports the Home Secretary in this decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of each case but, given the impact that the power can have, it is appropriate that proscriptions must be approved by both Houses before they can come into force.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that Hezbollah in its entirety, JNIM and Ansaroul Islam are currently concerned in terrorism. Noble Lords will appreciate that I cannot comment on specific intelligence. However, I can provide a summary of each group’s activities in turn. First, this order extends the proscription of Hezbollah’s military wing to cover the group in its entirety.

I am sure noble Lords are aware that Hezbollah was established during the Lebanese civil war, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is committed to armed resistance to the State of Israel, and aims to seize all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from Israel. It supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, and has a lengthy history of involvement in terrorism elsewhere in the world including in Europe. Currently it is most active in Syria where, since 2012, it has helped to prolong the brutal conflict and the suffering of the Syrian people. In 2016, Hezbollah helped besiege Aleppo, stopping humanitarian aid reaching parts of the city for six months and putting thousands at risk of mass starvation. Its actions continue to destabilise the fragile Middle East.

Hezbollah, as a political entity in Lebanon, has won votes in legitimate elections and forms part of the Lebanese Government. It also has the largest non-state military force in the country. Successive UK Governments have long held the view that elements of Hezbollah have been involved in conducting and supporting terrorism, and, as a result, proscribed Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation in 2001. In 2008, the proscription was extended to include the whole of Hezbollah’s military apparatus—namely, the Jihad Council and all the units reporting to it. Hezbollah’s military wing is also designated in the UK under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 and by our EU partners under the EU asset freezing regime. The US, Canada, the Netherlands and many partners in the region already designate Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organisation.

There have long been calls in this country to proscribe the whole of the group, and it has been argued that the distinction between the political and military wings is an artificial one. Indeed, the group itself has laughed off the suggestion that there is such a distinction. The Government have continued to call on Hezbollah to end its status as an armed group, in line with our commitment to strengthening Lebanon’s stability, security and prosperity. However, it has not listened, and indeed its behaviour has escalated.

In the light of Hezbollah’s increasingly destabilising behaviour in the region over recent years and the links between its political and military wings, we have concluded that the distinction between the two is now untenable. We assess that the group in its entirety is concerned in terrorism, and we now believe that it is right to proscribe the entire organisation.

The second group that this order proscribes is Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, also known as Nusrat al-Islam and Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen. This includes its media arm, az-Zallaqa. JNIM, as it is called, was established in March 2017 as a federation of al-Qaeda-aligned groups in Mali, including the AQ-Maghreb Sahel branch, Ansar al-Dine, the Macina Liberation Front and al-Murabitun. JNIM’s area of operations includes northern and central Mali, northern Burkina Faso and western Niger. JNIM aims to eradicate state and western presence from these areas and to institute governance in accordance with a strict Salafist interpretation of sharia law.

The group has been responsible for attacks on western interests in the region and across wider west Africa, as well as the kidnap of western nationals for ransom. It is also designated by the US and the UN. JNIM attacks are typically claimed via az-Zallaqa, the group’s media foundation. Examples of attacks include, on 18 June 2017, a firearms and improvised explosive device, otherwise known as an IED, attack on Le Campement resort in Bamako, in which three civilians and two military personnel were killed; on 2 March 2018, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, otherwise known as a VBIED, and firearms attacks on the French embassy and the Burkinabe Chief of Defence HQ in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso; on 14 April 2018, a VBIED and firearms attack on the Timbuktu camp of the French-led counter-insurgency operation in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. On 22 April 2018, there was a further indirect fire attack on the Timbuktu campi; on 28 June 2018, a VBIED attack on the G5 Sahel force HQ at Sévaré, in the Mopti region of the Sahel; and on 29 July 2018, a VBIED attack on a Malian army and Operation Barkhane convoy in the Gao region in Mali.

The final group to be proscribed, Ansaroul Islam, is also known as Ansaroul Islam Lil Irchad Wal Jihad. Its overarching aim is to establish dominance over the historic Fulani kingdom of Djelgoodji, situated in northern Burkina Faso and central Mali, and to implement its own strict interpretation of sharia. The group announced its existence on 16 December 2016 and claimed responsibility for an attack on an army outpost in Nassoumbou in Burkina Faso, which killed at least 12 soldiers. The group seeks to eradicate Burkinabe state presence from the country’s northern regions. It does so through attacks on government institutions and civilians linked to them, including police stations, schools and civic officials. Typical methodologies include small arms fire and IEDs. Further, the predominantly ethnic Fulani organisation will frequently target other ethnic groups, leading to substantial internal displacement of persons. Ansaroul Islam is highly likely supported by the federation of al-Qaeda groups in Mali, JNIM.

He went on, just 13 months ago, to say that,

“it is difficult to separate Hezbollah from the state of Lebanon. Hezbollah is in the Parliament and the Government, and that represents a different challenge from that which we find with many other terrorist groups”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/2/18; cols. 507-8.]

Do the Government still subscribe to the comments I have just quoted, made by the Security Minister just 13 months ago? What has changed over the last 13 months to lead the Government to adopt the approach they now propose in relation to the political wing of Hezbollah, which we will not be opposing, but which the Government were arguing against in January of last year?

In the debate in the Commons on Tuesday, the Home Secretary said:

“I can say that Hezbollah has been reported in many open sources as being linked to or claiming responsibility for many atrocities. These include a suicide bomb attack on a Buenos Aires Jewish community centre in 1994 that left 85 people dead and hundreds injured. The bloodshed came just two years after an attack on the Israeli embassy in that same city, which killed 29 people. Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war since 2012 continues to prolong the conflict and the brutal repression of the Syrian people. In 2016, it helped besiege Aleppo, stopping humanitarian aid reaching parts of the city for six months, putting thousands at risk of mass starvation. Its actions continue to destabilise the fragile middle east”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 283.]

I am sure nobody would wish to do anything other than condemn the specific acts referred to by the Home Secretary last Tuesday, but the point is that all those acts he referred to were known about when the Security Minister was arguing, 13 months ago, against proscribing the political wing as well as the military wing of Hezbollah. Again, what has happened over the last 13 months to lead to the Government changing their stance?

In her letter to me of 25 February the Minister wrote:

“Hezbollah itself has publicly denied a distinction between its military and political wings”.

I think, though, that I am right in saying that that was known at the time of the debate in the Commons in January of last year, when the Security Minister was arguing against proscribing the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah.

At the end of the debate in the Commons last Tuesday, in response to questions about why the Government had changed their stance, the Home Secretary said:

“I will give four reasons”.

It would be helpful if the Minister could repeat those four reasons, since it seemed to me that he gave only two. He said:

“First, there is secret intelligence. I think the House will understand why we cannot share it … there has been a step change in the activity of Hezbollah, particularly in Syria”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 304.]

The second, I think, was that the proscription review group had expressed the view that Hezbollah in its entirety met the definition of a terrorist organisation in the 2000 Act. Does that mean the proscription review group was not of that view at the time of the debate in January 2018, when the Security Minister argued against the course of action the Government are now proposing—namely, that the political as well as the military wing of Hezbollah should be proscribed? If so, what is it, at least in general terms, that has led the proscription review group to change its view of 13 months ago?

The Home Secretary also said that both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development have looked again at the work they do in Lebanon. They are clear that they can continue that work and support the legitimate Government of Lebanon and its people. What exactly does that mean in practice? One of the Conservative contributors to the debate on this order in the Commons on Tuesday said that he thought Hezbollah provided,

“13 out of the 68 Members of Parliament in the governing coalition”.

That Conservative contributor went on to say that there were,

“important development objectives, particularly in the south of Lebanon where Hezbollah has the core of its support from the poorer Shi’a communities in the Lebanon”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/19; col. 294.]

If the FCO and DfID think that they can continue their work in Lebanon—and the Minister for Security laid some stress in the debate 13 months ago on how the stronger the state of Lebanon is, the weaker Hezbollah will be—does it mean that they will be having, or continuing to have, contact with members of the political wing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, even though this order proscribes Hezbollah in its entirety, including its political wing?

One change since the debate in January 2018 is not a new Minister of Security, but a new Home Secretary. Maybe that is an important, though not decisive, reason behind the change in the Government’s stance. This order will be passed by your Lordships’ House, and I stress again that we are not opposing it, but I would like some answers on the record from the Government to the questions I have asked and the points I have made, because I do not think the questions addressed in the letter of 25 February sent to me by the Minister on behalf of the Government were in relation to Hezbollah.

“at least 14 of the 74 organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 … are not concerned in terrorism and therefore do not meet the minimum statutory condition for proscription”.—[Official Report, 17/12/18; cols. 1642.]

The Minister will recall the debate, when concern was expressed that organisations were being proscribed for political reasons rather than because they fulfilled the statutory requirements for being proscribed.

Of course, one can speculate about what has changed. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, talked about a change of Home Secretary. He may not welcome my commenting that political capital has been made from the leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, having previously been a supporter of Hezbollah. Of course, the Labour Party is facing considerable issues regarding anti-Semitism, and the concerns of the Jewish community about Hezbollah are well known. But I am sure that these have nothing to do with the timing of the whole of Hezbollah being proscribed on this occasion.

We have serious concerns about the whole process, which we expressed in debates on the then Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill. However, like the formal Opposition, we will not oppose this order; we simply wish to place on the record our concerns about the process.

Hezbollah has said:

“Until Israel ceases to exist and the last Jew in the world has been eliminated,”

it will continue to fight. It has said:

“If Jews all gather in Israel it will save us the trouble of going after them worldwide”.

We cannot possibly go along with allowing such an organisation to march through London.

Hezbollah is a partner to Iran, for which cause it engages in money laundering, arms sales and drugs smuggling. It is implicated in the Yemen disaster. It has prolonged the Syrian conflict. It has carried out attacks all over Europe. Classifying Hezbollah as “terrorist” would stop it using our banks to transfer money around the world. What it does fits precisely Section 3(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000. It has been involved in Iranian-directed bombings that have killed more than 1,000 UK and US servicemen in Iraq and Afghanistan. What has changed in the last year is increasing revelation of this and increasing fear. It is by no means a partisan move. I hope that this House will wholeheartedly support the Motion.

As an aside, my response to Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon is very clear and was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg. It does indeed play a significant role in Lebanon: it has 150,000 rockets and missiles embedded in south Lebanon, facing Israel.

There is a simple and clear answer to the question, “What has changed?” In my view, the change is as refreshing as it is important. The change is in the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary. We have Ministers of integrity, with the courage to ask questions and seek explanations on advice they receive.

Sometimes, policy can drift and we can find ourselves in a time warp where policy remains unchanged as if we are in a fantasy land, rather than facing up to reality. Our policy on proscribing Hezbollah was in such a time warp, until the change was made by Sajid Javid, Jeremy Hunt and Gavin Williamson. They should be praised for making this important change. This legislation is important as it shows the rest of the world that the UK is a safe country to do business with and supports the global economy by mitigating terrorist risks. In our constant fight against terror, they have ensured that our Government are in the right place. This gives me great hope for Britain’s future post Brexit as a world leader in a turbulent and dangerous world.

To me, it would be a viable argument to say that it is because of the rising incidence of anti-Semitic hate crime against people and property, such as the destruction of headstones in cemeteries. Appalling things are going on both against the person and against property. In that context, it is totally unacceptable that the Metropolitan Police is unable to take action against demonstrators proclaiming their support for Hezbollah, waving the flag and putting stickers on it saying, “We are the political wing so you cannot touch us”. I would be interested to hear the argument from the Government: “It is unacceptable that on the streets of London fear should be put into the Jewish community and all of us who want to see decency and an absence of prejudice and discrimination”. But we have not heard that argument from the Government and they are being coy by not telling us what has changed. So, if I have to fall back on the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Polak, that it is because of a change of personnel, that raises interesting questions about the attitude of the holders of those offices over the past nine years.

Lastly, I want to ask how Brexit is going to affect European co-operation in counterterrorism and things such as asset freezing. Every form of Brexit will damage that co-operation, but a no-deal Brexit will damage it even more. We are to have a mega-SI from the Home Office shortly. I attended the briefing meeting kindly held by the Minister on Tuesday. However, although we have been hearing discussions about whether or not no deal is being ruled out, I have just seen a clip of the Leader of the House of Commons, Andrea Leadsom, who this morning is still protesting that she has total support for a no-deal Brexit. That would have a catastrophic effect on our co-operation across the European Union in exchanging vital data, working with Europol, extradition and the exchange of evidence to bring people to trial, and a whole range of counterterrorism co-operation, as well as the freezing of assets. How is the Government’s attitude to Brexit—any kind of Brexit, let alone a no-deal Brexit, which the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House of Commons are refusing to rule out absolutely—consistent with an apparent stance of wanting to do everything in our power to counter terrorist organisations? That really does not quite add up.

Palmerston said that our interests are eternal and our allies are temporary. I subscribe to that view of foreign policy. In Iraq, as well as in Lebanon, the Arab Shia have tried to underwrite some form of democratic Government. They are to be distinguished very much from Iran, which is Persian. Our Foreign Office used to have an understanding of that but has somehow lost it; it should retain some historical understanding. We should develop some form of independent foreign policy that does not just follow the United States, which is extremely pro-Saudi and pro-Sunni, and therefore hostile to Hezbollah.

We need to recognise that Hezbollah has made this journey towards democracy and towards preserving the territorial integrity of the Lebanese state. As the Minister mentioned, Hezbollah represents the Shia community—but not just the Shia community; it also has votes from the Sunni community and from the Christians. I am not suggesting to the House that Hezbollah is like the Lib Dems; it is obviously more successful and slightly more significant than that. I do not doubt that there are very bad people in its midst, but it is a political party that represents the largest plurality in Lebanese politics and has committed itself to democracy and pluralism in its deeds. We should always look at the deeds rather than focus exclusively on incendiary words. I ask the House to reflect that maybe it would be foolish to block conversation and possible negotiation with Hezbollah.