My Lords, I will speak also to the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
Noble Lords will be familiar with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which passed through this House last year. It provides the UK with the legislative framework to continue to meet our international obligations, to implement autonomous sanctions regimes and to update our anti-money laundering framework after we leave the European Union—although the last of these is not under consideration today.
Noble Lords will be aware of the importance of sanctions. They are a key element of our approach to our most important international priorities. They help defend our national interests, support our foreign policy and protect national security. They also demonstrate our support for the rules-based international order. The United Kingdom has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years. We have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach and that is why, when we transition the EU sanctions regimes into UK law, we intend to carry over their policy effect. I shall say more about that in a moment.
The principal interests and threats facing the UK and the other EU member states will not fundamentally change when the UK leaves the EU. The Government recognise sanctions as a multilateral foreign policy tool and intend to continue to work in close partnership with the EU and other international partners after EU exit to address those threats, including through sanctions. The SAMLA 2018 was the first major legislative step in creating an independent UK sanctions framework. However, while the Act set out the framework needed to impose our own independent sanctions, we still require statutory instruments to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within that framework.
Such statutory instruments set out the purposes of our regimes, the criteria under which the Secretary of State may designate individuals and entities, and the types of restrictive measures imposed. They do not specify which individuals or entities will be sanctioned. The Government will publish the list of those we are sanctioning under UK legislation when those prohibitions come into force. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but these decisions will be subject to the legal tests in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests would not be implemented.
One important feature of the sanctions Act, which I am sure noble Lords recall, was passed in your Lordships’ House and discussed in detail during its passage: the right given to individuals to challenge their designation. Anyone designated under these instruments will be able to request that the Minister carry out an administrative review of their designation. The procedure applicable to such requests for reviews is set out in the Sanctions Review Procedure (EU Exit) Regulations, which were made in November last year and which are now in force. If, following the review, the Minister’s decision is to uphold the designation, the designated person then has the right to apply to the High Court, or, in Scotland, the Court of Session, to challenge that designation decision. The court will apply judicial review principles to determine whether the designation decision should be set aside. It will also apply the procedure set out in the amended Civil Procedure Rules for England and Wales, the Rules of the Court of Judicature for Northern Ireland, and the Rules of the Court of Session for Scotland, which allow in particular for closed material proceedings to take place in relation to such challenges.
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The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations aim to deter the use and proliferation of chemical weapons and encourage the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention by imposing immigration and financial sanctions on those involved in their use and proliferation.
The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations seek to deliver a cost to Russia for its actions in Ukraine to pressure Russia into changing its Ukraine policy. The continuation of sanctions since 2014 sends a strong unified international message that Russia’s actions in Ukraine will not be tolerated. The three corresponding EU sanctions regimes—including asset freezes, travel bans on individuals and entities, sectoral measures restricting parts of the Russian finance, energy and defence industry sectors, and trade and investment restrictions on Crimea—were introduced in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and continued destabilisation of Ukraine. These regulations combine all three existing EU Russia sanctions regimes on Russian actions in Ukraine into a single sanctions regime, which will replace existing EU Russia sanctions legislation on EU exit day. They are designed to deliver the same effect as existing EU regulations.
The Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations aim to address human rights abuses and threats to the rule of law, and to encourage the proper investigation and institution of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearance of four individuals. Measures include an arms embargo, financial and immigration sanctions, and restrictions on goods or technology that may be used for internal repression.
The Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations aim to encourage the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights, and to deter the repression of civil society. The regulations impose an arms embargo and other financial, immigration and trade restrictions, including on the trade in goods and technology that may be used for internal repression.
To conclude, these statutory instruments transfer into UK law well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. They will encourage respect for human rights, the rule of law, and security and stability in difficult environments. Approving these SIs will allow the UK to continue to implement sanctions from the moment we leave the EU. It will send a strong signal of our intention to continue to play a leading role in the development of sanctions in the future. I welcome this opportunity to debate the SIs in front of us. I beg to move.
I thank the Minister for introducing these SIs in somewhat more detail than he introduced the last set. I think he was in a considerable hurry last time, which we all appreciated. If we leave the EU, we need to incorporate into UK law the sanctions regimes we have as an EU member. These reflect our support for the rules-based international order to which he has referred.
There has to be a concern that we may lose influence in this field in the future. When we acted as part of the EU we had greater effect and are credited with playing a leading role. If we end up outside the EU, we lessen our effect. I am sure the noble Lord knows that, even if he is not willing to admit it. In addition, there will be new pressures on the UK from allies such as the US, which may wish us to align more with them, and maybe from the City of London, which may not wish us to take certain actions. Maybe our own economic short-term interest will mean that we are less keen to sanction those who may bring their funds to the UK. That is a completely predictable situation.
We considered a series of sanctions regimes last week and we now come to another set. I am grateful once more that my noble friend Lord Chidgey will deal with Zimbabwe.
On chemical weapons, I note that, in answer to a recent Written Question, Sir Alan Duncan stated:
“The UK played a key role in EU efforts to establish a new Chemical Weapons sanctions regime, which was adopted on 15 October 2018”.
This is a case in point. Will the EU be as proactive as it was without the United Kingdom there?
On 21 January this year, the EU added nine individuals and one entity to the regime, which included those involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria and members of Russia’s main intelligence directorate deemed responsible for the Salisbury attack in March 2018. Sir Alan referred to, “This strong collective action”. Does the Minister agree that “collective” is key?
My Lords, the sanctions regime is aimed at encouraging the Government of Zimbabwe and anyone else involved in human rights abuses to respect, as the Minister said, democratic principles and institutions and the rule of law; to refrain from actions, policies and activities which repress civil society in Zimbabwe; and to comply with international human rights law and respect for human rights. There has not been much sign of that in recent months. I note from the Minister’s remarks that there will be scope for the UK to update the sanctions in time, so I will just put down a few markers in advance.
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The EU has been imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe for the last 17 years in reaction to serious human rights violations, usually occurring in the run-up to presidential elections. Over that period we have seen the removal of President Mugabe, yet the repressive legislation of that era is still in place. The EU has adjusted the restrictive measures over time in response to constitutional changes or to intimidation, restriction or violence from the political and security establishments. The current sanctions were updated in February 2019 and consist of an arms embargo, asset freezes and travel bans on, I believe, two individuals. This followed appalling violence against civilians, with security forces using live ammunition against rioting crowds. There clearly remains a serious human rights situation in Zimbabwe, with no improvement in respect for democratic principles or the rule of law in sight. The Government say they are working with international partners to encourage Zimbabwe to improve. What examples can the Minister give us of improvements made since last year or planned, sending a strong political message that human rights violations will not be tolerated?
In February 2019, during an Oral Question on asylum seekers from Zimbabwe, I reported to noble Lords that the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission had found that the police and the military were breaking into the opposition MDC offices. From there they were downloading membership files from computers and subsequently visiting members’ homes to make arrests and carry out beatings under the cover of darkness late at night. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Matthew Harrington, has said that President Emmerson Mnangagwa can forget any lifting of US sanctions until he moves to jail soldiers accused of killing at least six civilians last August and goes ahead with repealing repressive laws governing the media. Harrington also cited the protests in January that left another 17 people dead, when the army launched a sustained crackdown on citizens in response to their protests over fuel price increases. He said:
“We welcome a better relationship with Zimbabwe, but the ball is very much in the Zimbabwean government’s court. If there’s real, concrete progress in the areas laid out in the ZDERA legislation, Zimbabwe will find a committed partner in the United States”.
Does the UK share this view?
The United States passed the ZDERA in 2001, imposing travel restrictions and asset freezes on more than 200 individuals and entities accused of abetting human rights violations. This compares with travel bans on just two individuals under the current EU regime. Can the Minister explain this apparent contrast in approach? Has time meant that many of these bans were lifted? I do not know, but it will be interesting to find out.
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The sanctions Act requires a review of all UK sanctions listings at least every three years. In addition to this triannual review, the UK will review all sanctions regimes, such as those being debated today, on an annual basis and present the results in a written report to Parliament. These governance arrangements provide protection for designated persons, especially when coupled with the wider safeguards in the sanctions Act. We have published reports on the purposes of each of the sanctions regimes under consideration today and the penalties contained within them alongside the statutory instrument. These reports, plus an Explanatory Memorandum for each SI, are available in the Vote Office should noble Lords wish to see them. As I have done on previous occasions, I once again thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments for their close and helpful scrutiny of these SIs.
Before closing my opening remarks, I draw it to your Lordships’ attention that while the majority of the substantive provisions in the regulations come into force only on exit day, the provisions enabling sanctions designation decisions to be taken were commenced so that decisions could be taken in good order in advance of exit day. Due to the extension of Article 50, the provisions that have been commenced have not had any practical effect as no designations have been made under these powers. In the case of the Russia sanctions regulations, the provisions in Regulation 1(3) to allow designation decisions to be taken were commenced on 11 April, the day after the regulations were made. The regulations were laid before Parliament at midday on 11 April. As no time was specified for when the regulations came into force on 11 April, there was a period during that day in which the regulations were in force but had not been laid.
I regret that due to an administrative oversight, we failed to follow the correct procedure to inform the Lord Speaker and the Speaker of the other place of this pre-laying commencement. This matter was addressed as soon as the error was found but I regret that the Easter break led to the Lord Speaker not being notified until eight working days after the instrument was laid. We take seriously the procedural and legal requirement to notify the Speakers, in accordance with Section 4(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Europe and the Americas, Sir Alan Duncan, has already written to the Speakers of both Houses, and to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. A copy of his letter has been placed in the Library. Although this is an unusual situation, we have also reviewed our processes and taken steps to ensure that it does not happen again.
I will say a brief word, if I may, on the SIs in front of us. As I said earlier, these instruments seek to substantively mirror the policy effects and mutually reinforce the measures in the corresponding EU sanctions regime. Noble Lords will note that human rights are a significant focus of the sanctions regimes being debated. I know that many are keen for the UK to develop our own, stand-alone human rights sanctions regime and may therefore query why we are simply transferring existing EU sanctions regimes. I assure noble Lords, as I have done previously, that the sanctions Act does give us the necessary powers in UK law to develop our own such regime. However, the SIs we are debating were laid on the contingent basis to provide for the continuation of some existing sanctions regimes should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures by laying SIs such as these. We will give consideration to new regimes as circumstances suggest and parliamentary time allows.
I turn briefly to each of the SIs in front of us. The Syria sanctions regulations aim to deter the Syrian regime from actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population, and to encourage a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict. They include: asset freezes and travel bans on designated persons, together with financial, sectoral and aircraft sanctions; and wide-ranging trade restrictions, including on goods and technology which may be used for internal repression and in intercepting and monitoring telecommunications, but also in respect of other goods and technology such as crude oil, jet fuel, luxury goods and items that could contribute to chemical and biological weapons.
Noble Lords will have noted that the JCSI has reported on the drafting of these regulations. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 6 to the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations permits the Secretary of State to issue licences for financial transactions involving the Central Bank of Syria or the Commercial Bank of Syria. The JCSI’s concern is that this paragraph could be seen to prejudge the question of whether those banks are to be designated under the regulations. We take these concerns seriously and recognise that the drafting could have been clearer. However, from the outset, I reassure your Lordships’ House that the Secretary of State’s discretion has not been fettered, and any decision to designate will be taken in the proper way.
Sir Alan also stated on 7 February, in response to a Question from my honourable friend Jo Swinson:
“The UK has actively supported proposals for three new EU thematic sanctions regimes in order to strengthen our international resilience to hybrid threats. These regimes are in different stages of development in the EU”.
These included the chemical weapons regime. The second was a mandate for work on EU cyber sanctions, and the third followed a Dutch initiative to establish a regime on global human rights. All are important developments but, having supported them, the UK is of course in danger of no longer being able to play such a leading role. Can the Minister update us on how these three strands will be taken forward and what part we might play in them?
On Belarus, the measures include an arms embargo, financial and immigration sanctions, and restrictions on goods or technology that may be used for internal repression, as the Minister has laid out. The Explanatory Memorandum states:
“This sanctions regime is aimed at encouraging the Government of Belarus to respect democratic principles and institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law in Belarus, refrain from actions, policies or activities which repress civil society in Belarus”.
The EU is calling for the proper investigation and institution of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearances of four named people, and for Belarus to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. What effect does the Minister think the sanctions are having in bringing any change in Belarus? Are there any plans to extend or limit sanctions against Belarus? I note that some were removed in 2016.
The stated aim of the Syria sanctions regulations is to deter the Syrian regime from,
“actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population”,
and to encourage a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict. The sanctions against Syria have been in place since December 2011. They are reviewed annually and the next review will be on 1 June—just coming up.
The sanctions comprised an oil embargo imposed in September 2011, restrictions on trade, a freeze of Syrian central bank assets, export restrictions on arms, weapons and equipment that might be used for internal repression, and a ban on export of equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications.
In April 2013, the EU eased the oil embargo to allow oil exports and oil equipment exports to areas under opposition control to help the civilian population. As of March 2019, 277 Syrians are targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze. Seventy-two entities are targeted by an asset freeze. Will the UK abide by the results of any EU sanctions review? Is there any plan to share intelligence on such matters? How is the review into oil sanctions to be conducted? What kind of impact assessment was made of sanctions on the civilian population? What actions must the Syrian regime take to get sanctions lifted? Has consideration been given to the difficulties of international development NGOs working in Syria, an issue discussed in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill? However, I note that the much-respected former FCO Minister, the right honourable Alistair Burt, emphasised in the Commons,
“the importance of the roll-over of these sanctions, in particular in relation to Syria”.
He expressed his concern that there was,
“a risk of Syria becoming almost a forgotten conflict because it is no longer on the front pages and it needs to be”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/4/19; cols. 78-79.]
He is surely right.
I hear what the Minister said about the sanctions in relation to Russia. I note that the Commons has not debated these and he has given some explanation of why they were separated and not put forward with the others. As he said, the EU sanctions against Russia broadly relate to the aim of bringing about Russian policy change on Ukraine. They followed restrictive measures after Russia’s actions in Crimea. These regimes are reviewed regularly, two on a six-monthly basis and one annually. How will we play a part in that, and will we follow what the EU decides?
The sanctions regime was most recently strengthened in March 2019, when eight Russian officials were added to the sanctions list after escalation in which Russian forces took Ukrainian sailors into custody. The EU has called for the release of the sailors and their ships, as well as free passage for all ships through the straits in the future. The US and Canada have also adopted similar sanctions in response to the incident. There are currently 170 persons and 44 entities from Russia on the EU’s sanctions list. This will next be reviewed in September 2019. The assets of individuals responsible for misappropriating Ukrainian state funds have also been extended until March 2020. All these review dates will be important for the United Kingdom. Where will we fall in our reaction to those? Do the Government anticipate remaining in line with the EU? Since March 2015, EU leaders have aligned—or sought to align—the economic sanctions with the implementation of the 2015 Minsk agreements but these have not been implemented and many political commentators think it unlikely that they will have an effect. What are the implications for the sanctions regime? The US has generally imposed a harsher sanction regime on Russia and dealt with other issues, such as interference in the 2016 US presidential election. We have not become involved in those. Does the Minister think that we might align ourselves on them too?
The general effectiveness of sanctions against Russia has been contested. Some have argued that Russian actions demonstrate the failure of EU sanctions to influence Putin and Russian policy. The Minister referred to the separate Magnitsky provisions put into the sanctions Bill by the Commons but there is no sign of them there. The Minister made brief reference to that and said that they might be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. Given that parliamentary time clearly does allow, might they be brought forward sooner rather than later?
In conclusion, we support these SIs, but are concerned about exactly how we will liaise with the EU down the track, how we align ourselves, and how we will have most effect in the future.