Sustainable Aviation Fuel Bill

Committee

Clause 1: Direction to offer revenue certainty contract

Amendment 1

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 5, at end insert “, subject to sections (Further provision about power to liquid fuels) and (Further provision about the direction to offer revenue certainty contract),” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on Lord Ravensdale’s amendments adding new sections “Further provision about power to liquid fuels” and “Further provision about the direction to offer revenue certainty contract”.

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 1, 5 and 6, and Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield. I declare my interests as a chief engineer working for AtkinsRéalis and as co-chair of Legislators for Nuclear.

Turning first to Amendment 5, I listened carefully to what the Minister had to say at Second Reading on this matter and was pleased to hear some clarification on competitive allocation. Of course, to get the market moving, most contracts will initially be likely to be bilateral between the counterparty and the SAF provider, but the legislation must be future-proofed.

We had a lot of discussion in the other place and at Second Reading here on the effect on air fares of this legislation. The way to bring costs down and deliver value for money is, of course, through competition. In the longer term, we need a mechanism similar to offshore wind whereby a strike price and an auction are put in place. That would apply the right competitive pressure to the markets and put downward pressure on costs. All other similar government legislation—for example, the Energy Act 2023 for hydrogen carbon capture and storage, and the Energy Act 2004 for offshore wind—include such provisions, but the Bill does not. Clarity on how this competitive process will be set out is important, so I propose this amendment.

Amendment 5 is based upon Section 76 of the Energy Act 2023, but it has been tweaked so that, rather than spelling out all the things regulation might cover, I give the Secretary of State the power to make rules. This reduces the complexity of the other Acts by avoiding the need to table complex secondary legislation and instead covers this through a rule-making power. Through the framework, the amendment also allows the Secretary of State to make decisions on aspects such as the process of producing SAF, the outputs and, critically, the location of production, which feeds into some of the amendments in the next group.

My Lords, I rise to speak briefly to this group of amendments. I strongly agree on the importance of having a proper framework for these contracts and a competitive process. The lesson from the energy market is that that competitive process is important to make sure that we achieve the policy objective, which is the production of the fuel, but at the lowest possible cost, which in the end will be passed on to consumers, so having some sort of competitive process is very important.

Two amendments in this group are potentially conflicting. I understand the argument in favour of allowing a longer contract period, particularly for nuclear-derived power-to-liquid fuel, as the noble Lord said, but equally, I would not want that to be the automatic default for all these contracts. I was struck by the amendment from my noble friend Lord Moylan about making sure that it is possible for the Government to exit from these contracts. From my point of view, the attraction here is just to make sure that we learn one of the lessons from the energy market. There is a balance to strike here. We want long-term contracts to give the certainty to the investors and those going into first-to-market plants in the UK to produce this, but we do not want to lock in contracts longer than necessary but potentially at a point where the market price is lower and we are effectively holding the price higher than it needs to be. We have learned some lessons from how that works in the energy market. The amendments on the paper may not be the right way of doing that.

The Minister referred in his speech at Second Reading to the contracts for difference models from the energy market. When he winds up this group, I would be interested to hear what the Government have learned. What detailed work has been done about getting these contracts right at the outset but also enabling them to be flexed as the circumstances change, so that we get the right level of price protection which is necessary to get the initial investment and produce investor certainty but do not keep it going past the point at which investors are making returns above what was necessary to get them to invest? Obviously, you cannot change those rules retrospectively, so it is about getting the right level of certainty. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say there.

I thank the noble Lord for his comments on the amendments. I would certainly be open to what he is saying about the wording in that amendment. I will just say that the way we have structured this amendment is to provide 1 million tonnes of oil equivalent figure. We have tried to do it using a floor mechanism, so we looked at the total aviation fuel demand in the UK over the past 20 years or so, took the lowest figure and simply multiplied that by the percentages in the SAF mandate order. I hope that by providing that floor mechanism, there is that flexibility there, but I certainly take his point about the wording.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that clarification. As I said, I certainly agree with the thrust of his amendments; I just would not want there to be a legislative mandate for the Government to do something that proves to be unnecessary. Again, I think we need to understand from the Minister what is the appropriate amount of flexibility for the Government to have in practice, because we want the Government to use the lessons from those contracts and to have the appropriate level of negotiating space to strike the best deal for aviation consumers. However, we also want to make sure that the Government do not give away unnecessary amounts of consumers’ money that is not necessary to produce the results.

Overall, the amendments in this group are helpful in enabling us to have that debate and to just test what lessons we have learned from the way these sorts of contracts work in the energy market, but also the amount of negotiating space that Ministers will need when they are directing the counterparty to strike the best possible commercial deal.

My Lords, this group of amendments is trying to tease out the details around revenue certainty mechanism contracts.

Amendment 2 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, says that the contracts must not exceed 10 years and must have a no-cost break clause at five years. Amendment 3 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, on the other hand, wants the contracts to be increased from 10 to 20 years—we have already heard the reasons around that. So there is a difference in thinking from the two Members. However, what is key here and clear from the debate so far is that flexibility is needed, depending on the type of industry involved here. The Minister briefed Members about the thinking behind the 10-year contracts at a recent meeting, so I hope he can explain from the Dispatch Box to reassure Members that the Government have in mind the right length of contracts for this emerging area.

Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, as he outlined, is trying to put flesh on the bones of the revenue certainty contracts by developing an allocation framework similar to contracts for difference for energy. Although Amendment 6 looks at the role and amount of revenue certainty contracts for power to liquid fuels, both of these are really important points which I hope the Minister can address, as well as whether this is the right stage for such detail or whether some of that should be coming through at secondary legislation stage.

My Lords, I have listened with great interest to this short debate. It is almost certainly my fault, and I will probably need to be mildly humiliated as I am corrected on the topic, but we have discussed the length of contracts by reference to Clause 1(7) and it seems to me that it says nothing at all about the length of contracts. The Minister now has the opportunity to correct one or both sides of this question.

Clause 1(7) states:

“No direction may be given under subsection (1) after the end of the period of 10 years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed”.

Following on from that immediately, subsection (8) gives the power to the Secretary of State by regulation to amend subsection (7) so as to extend the period for a further five years. This is saying when the counterparty can enter into contracts, not when the contracts start. It is not saying when the contracts end. As long as the contract is awarded in the first 10 or 15 years, it could be for 100 years. Nothing that has been tabled by noble Lords in relation to this clause would affect that.

However, in my Amendment 2, I have bitten firmly on the question and said that no contract, whenever it is awarded, may last for more than 10 years and that it must contain a break clause after five years. I am talking in my amendment about the length of the contract, but the other noble Lords who have talked about longer contracts are not talking about longer contracts at all. I may have got that completely wrong—

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way for two reasons. First, despite having asked the clerk for advice, I omitted to declare an interest at the beginning of my speech, which I will now correct. I draw the attention of the Committee to my entry in the register as the non-executive chair of RVL Aviation, as I did at Second Reading. Secondly, on my noble friend’s specific question, I referred in my speech to his amendment. I had the misfortune of supporting his amendment before he had so ably spoken to it, but I agree that it is the contract length that is important and not just the period from when the Bill becomes law.

We are all agreed that we should be talking about contract length, but my amendment is the only one that refers to it. That is the point that I am trying to make.

The noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, in respect of competition, says that there must be at least an opening in the future for these revenue certainty mechanism contracts to be awarded competitively. He seeks to put this in the Bill now and appeared to say that, if this is not done now, through a device such as that which he is proposing, there would not be in future an opportunity for competitive procurement. If I have misrepresented him, I will give way and be corrected—I see that he is about to rise, so I might as well complete the point before he corrects me. My understanding is that there is nothing to prevent competitive procurement taking place from day one under these arrangements. Therefore, it is not necessary to put in place an arrangement to secure it. I am open to being corrected on all hands about this, because I am groping my way in the dark through this thicket.

I agree with what the noble Lord has said. The Minister provided the clarification at Second Reading that there is nothing in the Bill that prevents competition. However, for consistency with the other legislation that I outlined that has such direction on similar competitive processes in the energy Acts, and for clarity on the strategy, it would be beneficial to have that process set out in the Bill.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining that. I am glad we are broadly ad idem, but he helps me to my third point.

The assumption by the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, appears to be that the procurement of all future SAF, including non-HEFA SAF and potentially at some stage power to liquid, will have to depend upon or be supported by a revenue certainty mechanism, or at least some form of subsidy or support from the state. That appears to be the assumption. I wholly deprecate that assumption. It is appalling that we should embark upon this project with a view to a regime of perpetual subsidies. If SAF is not rapidly producible on a commercial basis in this country then, as I shall come to in other amendments, the whole project should be reconsidered at this stage.

However, I am comforted in thinking that the Government do not envisage perpetual subsidy by my reading of Clause 1(7) and (8). These are the subsections that I referred to before, so I will not read them out again, but why would the Government put in place what is, in effect, a sunset clause if they envisaged a need for perpetual subsidy? The Minister may want to confirm this, but subsections (7) and (8) taken together are a sunset clause. At the end of 10 or possibly 15 years, no more contracts can be awarded without further primary legislation. There is a degree of confusion, which I may have participated in, concerning what we are discussing. We are giving the Minister the opportunity to bring a blast of fresh air to clear the fog and explain it all to us, so that we know what we are talking about, because up to now I am not entirely sure that we all do.

My Amendment 2 has been explained very well by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. I do not need to elaborate on what it says, but I have not yet given any rationale for why it should commend itself to the Committee. Amendment 2 seeks to limit the length of contracts. The reason is very simple. This Bill is a large slice of corporate welfare. Having given to the industry, through the SAF mandate which we approved last year, a guarantee of uptake of SAF so that you know that your product is going to have to be bought, this is not enough for them, and we are now going to give them, in addition, a guaranteed price. That is what they are demanding.