Subsea Telecommunications Cables: Resilience and Crisis Preparedness

Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy

We now come to the Select Committee statement on behalf of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Matt Western will speak for up to 10 minutes, during which time no interventions may be taken. At the conclusion of the statement, I will call Members to ask questions on the subject of the statement. These should be brief questions, not full speeches. I emphasise that questions should be directed to the Select Committee Chair and not to the relevant Minister. Front Benchers may take part in questioning.

It is a pleasure to present the first report of this Parliament of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for this statement on the United Kingdom’s resilience and crisis preparedness in relation to subsea telecommunication cables.

Subsea cables are critical to the UK’s economic prosperity and global influence. They provide crucial, irreplaceable connectivity between the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. Like the trade routes of old, they are the arteries and veins of global commerce and communication. They carry a staggering 99% of the United Kingdom’s international data, and $1.5 trillion-worth in global cross-border trading. That is across 64 cables, including 45 international connections, but capacity is concentrated in newer equipment. For example, two newer cables carry 75% of transatlantic capacity.

For centuries, the United Kingdom has felt secure as an island, but that geostrategic strength is now a vulnerability, as the subsea cables on which the world depends have become a new front in a hybrid war. Revisionist powers and their proxies are targeting liberal democracies’ critical underwater infrastructure. Their aim is to disrupt connectivity, inflict economic damage and cause panic. By attacking us in this way, below the threshold of war, our adversaries are demonstrating their ability to do more at a much bigger scale and a much faster rate, should hostilities escalate. Subsea cables can be cut by something as unsophisticated as a rogue anchor dragged along the seabed by a commercial vessel.

As we have seen over recent months in the Baltic sea, such activity can easily be made to look accidental and readily denied, but Russia and China are also developing more targeted capabilities and operating at greater depths in our oceans, where the cables are harder to access and repair. Governance of subsea cables has been fragmented across at least eight Departments, seven agencies and numerous private sector actors. Contingency planning has been inadequate and largely ignored the possibility of a co-ordinated attack. We rely on legislation from 1885, with the threat of a paltry £100 fine to deter acts of cable damage.

I congratulate the Committee on its report, and I know that it took evidence from authoritative experts, such as the excellent Elisabeth Braw. Can the Chair explain to the House whether his findings were compatible with the alarming headline in today’s Daily Mail about another report from the Council on Geostrategy think-tank, which claims that cutting just 60 cables going in and out of the UK could affect 99% of our data? Is there more resilience in the system than that would seem to suggest?

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his service on the Committee over so many years, which was hugely valued, and his point is absolutely fair. I have not seen the specific report that was published today, but it echoes the points that we have made in this report. We do not want to be alarmist, but we cannot accept any complacency about what the threats are, because there is a genuine risk.

The truth is that there is the potential to reroute cables. There is a significant amount of traffic across the Atlantic—some of it comes into Ireland, some of it into mainland Europe, and some of it into the UK—so it is always possible for data communications to come through to us in different ways and, in an extreme crisis, for us to turn to satellites, although that capacity is significantly lower. I am sure there are some very valid points in that report, and I will look at it more closely.

I congratulate my hon. Friend on his statement, and commend the hard work of other members of our Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in helping to compile the subsea telecommunications cables report. The number of recommendations agreed to by the Government demonstrates that our detailed analysis in the report ensures the very best for our nation’s security. Does the Chair agree that in this fast-evolving security environment, the UK must ensure that our military deterrent is robust to protect subsea cables from the deliberate damage that we have seen in, for example, the Baltic?

I thank my hon. Friend for serving on the Committee and for the work he is doing in chairing the Defence Committee, and he is absolutely right. There are several elements to this. One is, as we have seen in the Baltic and around our shores, the nature of the threats. The attacks on cables are proving provocative, and we have to demonstrate a more muscular approach to how we view them. It is interesting to see that some of our peers in NATO have taken this a bit further, and we should look closely at that, but we are constrained by international law.

I have mentioned the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, which is not fit for purpose. There needs to be some thinking along the lines of what we can do within our territorial waters to address any threat that is presented, such as we saw last year with the Yantar and other ships. Work needs to be done on the legal side, but also on the hardware that we can deploy. As an island nation, this should be something on which we can develop a huge sovereign capability, which would also boost our exports.

May I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on the quality of this report? I have a family interest in undersea cables: it was my great-great-grandfather, Professor Fleeming Jenkin, who laid the first transatlantic telephone cable in 1858. On the question of deterrence, can we realistically deter this kind of behaviour by our adversaries if we continue to allow our hands to be tied by an overstrict interpretation of international law? The vandalism committed on undersea cables has very serious economic consequences, and maybe even national security consequences. It is being committed by ships that are themselves in breach of international law. Should we not just deal with them, particularly if they open fire on our military aircraft, as happened recently with lasers from a Russian ship?

Mr Western, be careful of the time.

I thank the hon. Gentleman, and I will keep my comments brief. I absolutely agree that the legal side of this urgently needs to be addressed, and I understand from the Government that they will look very closely at it in their defence resilience Bill.

I thank the Committee for its work. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the restrictions of international law, but could he explain what evidence the Committee took about the need for international co-operation? It seems evident to me that the nature of subsea cables means that international co-operation is required to protect them sufficiently. Are there any mechanisms with which the UK should be engaging better?

Various organisations that have been established have interests in this area. Of course, much of this is in the private sector. The Committee is concerned about how much of it is in the private domain and how much influence the Government can have. Collectively, there is a need for Governments to work much more closely on this issue, so we need to have closer ties with friendly nations that are facing similar challenges in order to build a greater deterrent. Atlantic Bastion is a good example of the work that can be done.

I commend the Committee’s report and the hon. Member for summarising it so excellently. There are several questions I would like to ask him, but for brevity I will confine myself to one. A few minutes ago, he suggested that the Government should consider including a cable repair ship in its new defence equipment programme, and I think we would have sympathy with that, but for that we need a defence investment plan. The House was faithfully promised such a plan in August and then very faithfully promised it by Christmas, but the rumour is that we will not get it till March. Would he agree with me that we need that equipment plan sooner rather than later, and ideally this month rather than having to wait till March?

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his question. I do not know about the timings—I am not close enough to the Government for that—but the United States did something interesting, which was to have a scheme to lease two ships, costing them $10 million a year. There are ways around this, but having a sovereign capability is going to be important or, to go back to the question asked by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Bobby Dean), we could combine with other nations to develop such a capacity.

I very much welcome the Select Committee’s report. The very nature of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in being a member of NATO, means that it has protection, and therefore the connection from the mainland across the Irish sea to Northern Ireland is protected. However, what is not protected is the Republic of Ireland, which is not a member of NATO, although it is a member of the EU. What consideration did the Committee give to the fact that the Republic of Ireland could be the vulnerable back door when it comes to subsea telecommunication cables, and what has been done to address that?

The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, and it is absolutely true. We did not specifically look at the situation in Ireland. We will be doing further work on this in the coming months, because I think that is required and will be welcomed by Departments, but, yes, we need to meet the EU and Ireland to talk about those threats and how we can collaborate. He is absolutely right to identify Ireland as an important part of this.