Strategic Defence Review 2025

Secondly, I put on record my thanks to the many experts who assisted us in this historic endeavour. Working with the three reviewers was the defence review team, six non-partisan experts with us the whole way: Robin Marshall, Ed Dinsmore, Grace Cassy, Jean-Christophe Gray, Angus Lapsley and finally, and importantly, Sir Jeremy Quin, who was one of the best Defence Procurement Ministers in the last Conservative Government. In addition to them, over 150 experts were involved in the review and challenge process, which was a crucial way of capturing and interrogating external views. We are grateful to all of them. I pay fulsome credit to the talented team who worked with us on this review, led by Ayaaz Nawab, Group Captain Matthew Radnall and our chief drafter, Ashlee Godwin. We had a staff of truly remarkable and dedicated people assisting us in this mission. They made a pivotal contribution to a review which, I am confident, will intimidate our enemies, inspire our friends, invigorate our defence industry and make our country safer. They can be proud of what they have done, and we are proud of them.

This is a truly transformational review. It does not tinker with the issues, gloss over deficiencies, or just marginally improve on business as usual. Our adversaries have given up business as usual, and we must do so as well. Over the years, we have allowed our forces and defences to become hollowed out. When we say in the report that we are unprepared, it is an understatement. We do not have the ammunition, the training, the people, the spare parts or the logistics, and we do not have the medical capacity to deal with the mass casualties that we would face if we were involved in high-intensity warfare.

Over the years—I suppose I must plead guilty to this as well—we took a substantial peace dividend, because we all believed that the world had changed for the better; that the values of liberal democracy had been cemented into our societies; that war between nations was outmoded; and that our military forces would be needed only for short-term, distant interventions. Sadly, we were not alone in that.

It may have been overoptimism, or at worst wishful thinking, but the brutal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Putin’s Russia three years ago was a savage wake-up call for all of us. This world we now live in has changed out of all recognition, and we have got to change as well. This review, comprehensive and detailed as it is, is therefore designed to bolster deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, by rebuilding war-fighting readiness. With a combination of homeland resilience, a new integrated force and new command structure, and by putting NATO first, we will, we believe, be safer at home and more influential abroad.

We ruthlessly examined every aspect of defence, and the review challenges preconceived notions and habits for the very different world that we now live in. We have concluded that we need a strong digital foundation and an effective digital targeting web, which underpins the lethality and agility of our forces across all five domains.

We propose a new, reinvigorated partnership with the defence industry, capturing innovation at wartime pace. With a powerful new national armaments director shaking up our procurement process we will ensure, therefore, that our fighting forces have the modern equipment that they need, on time and on budget.

The review proposes a major boost to the reserves and the cadets. It reinvigorates and modernises training, it tackles the chronic troop accommodation problems that we have, and it deals with the recruitment shortfalls with innovative new ideas. It confronts—this is important—peacetime cultures of risk aversion, lack of trust and bureaucracy. Importantly, it will capture the innovations that we all see emerging from the experience of Ukraine.

Indeed, the lessons of Ukraine do not just lie in the impressive ingenuity and tenacity of the Ukrainian people and their leaders. Britain has been in the forefront of helping Ukraine defend itself against the Russian invaders. We should make no mistake at all that if Putin prevails in subjugating his neighbour, we will all pay a heavy price. I dealt with Vladimir Putin on a number of occasions when I was in NATO. He once stood beside me and said: “Ukraine is a sovereign independent nation which will make its own decisions about peace and security”. He is now a threat not just to Ukraine but to the whole of western Europe. We have already supported Ukraine substantially, and it remains at the very heart of this review.

One of the most important recommendations that we make in the review is that defence has to be a whole-of-society matter. In a world where the homeland is already under attack, with our critical national infrastructure on a knife-edge, where over 95% of our international data comes from threatened undersea cables and 77% of our gas supplies come in one single pipeline, we cannot simply contract out our defences to the people in uniform. We need to learn the lessons of Finland, Sweden and Norway in obliging all of us to know our individual and collective roles in protecting our nation.

Let me address the question which I am pretty confident is going to be at the core of the speeches that come later in the debate. Is there the money for what we propose? I believe that there is and that there has to be, and the Prime Minister knows that as well. In the national security strategy, which was published only a few days ago, the Prime Minister says under his own name:

“That is why, as part of this strategy, we make a historic commitment to spend 5% of our GDP on national security by 2035”.

There are no qualifications or caveats involved in that statement. In the Commons, on 2 June, the Defence Secretary, John Healey, said,

“take it from the Prime Minister when he said that we will spend what is needed to deliver this review”.

He added:

“The vision of this strategic defence review now becomes the mission of this Government to deliver”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/6/25; col. 62.]

There is no messing in what either of them said, and there will be no messing in what the reviewers hold them to account on.

Finally, I say to Members of this House, who will all travel home after this debate in peace and safety, that three and a half years ago the European citizens of Bucha, Mariupol and Zaporizhzhia in eastern Ukraine also walked their European streets in peace and safety. Then came the sudden, unprovoked invasion by Putin’s Russia and with it the depraved violence of the Russian occupiers. In an instant they were not safe, at peace or free. Ordinary European people in ordinary European streets were doing ordinary things, until they were not. That is a warning for us all.

The British people need, more than ever in my lifetime, the renewed defence insurance that this review promises. Those of us, including in this House, who know the dangers and the answer must make the case with the people and decisively win that argument. I beg to move.

I welcome the logical conclusions that follow that analysis: commitment to our independent nuclear deterrent, explicitly identifying NATO as the bedrock of our defence, reinforced homeland resilience, a new model integrated force, boosting our reserves, innovating at a wartime pace, a new partnership with industry and the appointment of a new national armaments director. I certainly hope all that enables us to address the new character of threat.

My one note of dissonance is that, amid the language of readiness, immediacy and pace repeated this morning by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, there is a mismatch with reference to, for example, “when circumstances allow” or to essential equipment with no specific date. In that I detect the meddling fingers of the Treasury after the noble Lord had done his valuable work.

In this exciting and brave new world for defence, the elephant in the room is money. None of the excellent aspiration proposed by the review means anything without attaching pound signs to the proposals. Ambition must translate into specific financial commitment, so I make no apology for pausing in my plaudits to deal with funding, resource and spend projections. I direct these concerns and questions to the Minister. The Minister probably regards me as an unrelenting, irritating nag constantly pushing him on funding. I do so not as a political attack but as a constructive challenge to ensure that the Government are doing what they say they are, as repeated earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson.

Noble Lords will all know that the Government have committed to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP—or 2.6% if one includes intelligence spending. We now come down to simple arithmetic. If one takes the projected GDP figures for 2027 of £3.134 trillion, and then takes the spending on the single intelligence account for 2027—set at £5.1 billion in the spending review—it indicates that spending on the single intelligence account will be 0.16% of GDP in 2027.

This throws up several questions. If the Government are claiming that they will spend 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027, or 2.6% including intelligence, how does this square with 0.16% being spent on intelligence? The Einsteins among your Lordships will have already worked out that 2.6% minus 0.16% equals 2.44%. If the Government shift all intelligence spending into definitions of defence spending, it appears they will not hit their 2.5% target. Can the Minister clear this up for me? Are the Government reclassifying all intelligence expenditure as defence expenditure or only a particular portion of it? If the latter, can the Minister tell the House what proportion of intelligence spending, in numerical terms, they are shifting into the definition of defence expenditure?

My second question on the money is on the new NATO defence targets. The 2025 NATO summit in The Hague led to the new target of spending 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements, defence and security-related spending by 2035. Of that, 3.5% would be allocated to core defence expenditure; this is obviously higher than the Government’s currently stated ambition of reaching 3% when economic and fiscal conditions allow. Can the Minister give an unequivocal commitment that the Government will meet that 3.5% NATO target by 2035?

The remaining 1.5% contribution is, in NATO’s words, to

“protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defence industrial base”.

We need to understand what the Government will include in this. Italy has recently passed a resolution to reclassify a bridge over the Strait of Messina as a strategic project vital for NATO’s interests, so that it can be included in its 1.5% obligation. What will His Majesty’s Government be bundling into this definition? If the Minister could give some concrete—I use the word deliberately—examples, it would be very welcome.

My concern with this expanded NATO definition is that it will not actually lead to any new money being injected into defence but will represent little more than creative accounting. I hope the Minister will implore his ministerial colleagues at the Treasury and the MoD to ensure that the Armed Forces are not fobbed off with balance sheet wizardry but see tangible benefit.

In returning to the review, just as I welcome the reviewers’ blunt analysis of threat, I found refreshing the frank assessment found on page 12 at paragraph 3:

“In modern warfare, simple metrics such as the number of people and platforms deployed are outdated and inadequate. It is through dynamic networks of crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous assets and data flows that lethality and military effect are now created, with military systems making decisions at machine-speed and acting flexibly across domains”.

When, as a Defence Minister, I stood at the Dispatch Box warding off accusations that the Army was at its smallest size since Napoleon’s time, I responded as courteously as I could to the sheer inanity of that comparison. It implied that military strategy, equipment and technology had remained static for over 200 years—but in vain I made my argument. To some, numbers were all that mattered. So I say to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, that it took courage for the reviewers to be bold, but what they said had to be said.

I could talk about a miscellany of matters—transformation, defence roles, war-fighting, integrated force model, reservists, industry and all the other excellent matters that are covered in the review. Each merits its own debate, and each gives rise to a separate range of questions. I anticipate that many of these will be reflected in contributions from your Lordships today. I also anticipate that we shall regularly return to all these issues within the House. Some of your Lordships may want to talk about what they see as omissions from the strategic defence review. We look forward with interest to the debate.

I will focus—and this is made possible by the thoroughness of the review—on the highlighted significance of two domains: space, and cyber and electromagnetism, or cyberEM. On page 20, at paragraph 31, the review says:

“With the Integrated Force fighting as one across all five domains, greater attention must be given to the space and cyber and electromagnetic (CyberEM) domains”.

It goes on to say:

“A reinvigorated Cabinet sub-Committee should set the UK’s strategic approach to space, maximising synergies between the UK civil space sector and clear military needs”.

I am delighted by that recommendation. When I was a Defence Minister, such a committee existed and, interestingly, was chaired by the then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, because, astutely, he understood the need for strategic leadership and governance embracing government departments with primary interests in space. Quite simply, it meant that space—a domain with unlimited opportunity but which, if malregulated or non-regulated, could deliver catastrophic consequence—was at the top of government thinking and awareness. Sadly, my party and Government subsequently downgraded that committee. I urge the Government, in accepting this recommendation from the review, to give serious thought to restoring that top level of political leadership.

I had hoped for comparable recognition for the domain of cyberEM. Given the primary importance of this domain, I had thought that parity of status with space would be appropriate. In fact, the review has chosen to restrict its proposals to defence only; the creation of a new cyberEM command within Strategic Command, which is very worthy, but cyberEM is at the heart of government activity. With the best will in the world, sharing, thinking and awareness across government will not happen without strategic leadership and governance, as is proposed for space. The alternative is silos of varying knowledge. I urge the Government to consider replicating the new structure for space as applicable to cyberEM.

I have focused on these domains because of the rightful prominence the review has attached to them. They are the new defence territory in a fast-changing environment. But they have an umbilical connection with myriad other areas of government activity, and that must be matched by an appropriate structure at the top of government.

I look forward to this debate. I conclude with my overriding concern: the money. Unless the Government can be specific about amount and timing, this well-received, and justly so, strategic defence review will become an interesting but passive library exhibit. Our defence industry will wither in that vacuum. Our safety and security will be deeply compromised. None of us wants to see that. I ask the Minister to reassure us.

Just yesterday in Grand Committee, we debated the tensions in May between India and Pakistan. That could have been an enormous conflagration, which would have had direct impacts here in the United Kingdom with the enormous diaspora community that we have. The Sudan conflict is being played out within our community here at home. Although geographically we are an island, we are not a security island.

There should of course be a high level of cross-party support. On defence, our Benches have a long and proud tradition of supporting our Armed Forces and veterans, as well as adhering to the view that the principal job of government is the maintenance of our national security. In that regard, I hope the Government will continue to engage and also bring regular updates on the many action plans proposed in the defence review and the national security strategy and the many workstreams that feed into its strategy. As the noble Lord said, this is not the work of one Parliament or one party. We all need to be engaged in that process, to ensure that the decisions made are sustainable and that we here in Parliament can appraise progress.

Parliamentary scrutiny is a part of our freedom that we seek to protect, and that is why many of us have been shaken by the lengths gone to by the MoD and the previous Government to avoid proper parliamentary scrutiny. I feel that this will have deep repercussions. With regard to yesterday’s revelations about the data breach and the extent to which parliamentarians themselves were not able to consider it, I hope that this Government will never follow that terrible example.

In many ways, the UK has a unique security need, but in most others we can act as a global, open and interconnected country—but only if we secure the support and partnership of others. In response to the publication of the national security review, I mentioned that, as an island nation, our shipping and data cables keep our economy alive. The noble Lord referred to that in his contribution. We were the first country to lay subsea communication cables, 175 years ago. Today, we are almost exclusively reliant on them for communications. Shipping contributed to our growth in the Industrial Revolution, and today our consumers are reliant on shipped imports and key sectors on shipped exports. Conflict between China and Taiwan would have an immediate repercussion here at home.

In order to defend this, we require our naval and maritime capabilities to be enhanced, our reach broadened, our intelligence services bolstered and our cyber resource reinforced. We agree that the way forward comes with the need for increased defence and lethal capability. We support the Government on increased defence expenditure, but it would be helpful if the Minister could indicate the breakdown of the sources of the overall 5% that was announced on national defence and security. What is the assumed level of growth of the size of the economy to meet the level of expenditure we expect to be necessary? Will the Minister provide more clarity on the timeframe and the certainty of the level of resources that will be available, rather than on aspirations? We need cross-party talks on this, too, if this is to be a generational approach, and a degree of consensus on planning and investment.

It is interesting to note Germany’s Zeitenwende—“sea-change”—in which Berlin has allocated €86 billion to defence, equal to 2.4% of GDP in this year. By 2029, annual defence expenditure is expected to reach €153 billion, or 3.5% of GDP—the most ambitious rearmament since reunification. Chancellor Merz has signalled a willingness to spend up to 1.5% on defence-adjacent infrastructure, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, referenced, with potentially a French bridge and the French Government doing so, too. There may be vitally important infrastructure upgrades that are necessary for our whole national defence, including transport corridors and strategic mobility projects, coinciding with NATO’s wider agreement to split the 5% target into 3.5% for hard defence spending and 1.5% for expenditures related to defence.

Bundling may be justified, but we need a plan. It needs to be transparent, and we need to see it because an aspirational approach now needs to come with specificity, planning and transparency on procurement. This is not necessarily something where the United Kingdom has been a world leader in recent years, and how we link our procurement with that in the European continent and the United States will be vital.

We do not, therefore, depart from the level of funding, although we want to see more detail. We say, with respect to the Government, that it should not have been transferred from the official development assistance budget. That is a strategic mistake. We are seeing considerable reductions in programmes that have been part of the UK national security platform—successfully so—for many years. It is no surprise to me that in recent weeks we have seen public statements from former defence chiefs, military leaders, diplomats and heads of the intelligence community in the United Kingdom appealing to the Prime Minister not to cut the very programmes that have been national security-focused in conflict prevention and conflict resolution and in supporting allies to build resilient civil societies and institutions against malign interference.

The western Balkans was raised in the defence and national security strategies. Three times in the Chamber I have asked for clarity on the continuation of the western Balkans freedom and resilience programme funded by ODA, and I hope that that is not under threat. The UK and USAID cuts to the World Service and Voice of America frequencies and spectrums were immediately filled by Russia and are doing damage. We know that in the very sphere that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, referred to, within eastern Europe and in other countries within malign influence, when we cut support for resilient institutions, freedom of speech, freedom of the media and the rule of law, Russia and China will fill that vacuum.

The FCDO network and our excellent diplomats were mentioned in the security review and also by the noble Lord. We agree with that. That is why we regret that year-on-year funding for that very network is now being reduced.

On other threats, such as biosecurity, I believe that we are less of an island than many might hope. I looked back at the UK’s first biological security strategy in 2018 under the previous Government, and I thought it was a good strategy. DfID and ODA were mentioned on almost every page—a recognition that biosecurity in the UK is weakened if it is also weak in the countries where we have a large diaspora community or a travel relationship. There was a reason why 10 years ago Ebola did not become Covid. It was because of the UK, DfID and our official development assistance. Now we have only passing references from the Government. I hope the Minister will be able to say that development assistance is a critical part of our partnerships around the world.

The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, said, and I agree with him, that we are underinsured, unprepared and unsafe. To correct that, we need investment, partnership and for our allies to be safe also. We may well hear about the Commonwealth. The noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, speaks eloquently about our Commonwealth network, but the previous Conservative Government cut partnership support for developing Commonwealth nations by one-third and the incoming Labour Government have cut it further by 40%.

The Center for Global Development has already shown that those very countries are now moving to China, and in east Africa to Russia, for finance and more debt. It is not wise insurance only to spend on the eventuality of an emboldened adversary when we, by our very actions, are bolstering them. Official development assistance, according to the report on Tuesday by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, will be 0.24% at the end of this financial year, the lowest in the 50 years of development statistics. Why is this significant for this debate? It is because we know that conflicts now are never fought on one front, with one technology, one tactic and one means, and that that will always be the case in the future. We need an approach for our defence and security that is also for diplomacy and development. All should be complementary. It is not too late for the Government to ensure that they are not set against each other.

The second reason is the need to build up the scale of defence orders over a number of years, matching them to the necessary growth in industrial capacity. If this is not done, if industry is faced with a sudden cascade of orders in the 2030s, the consequence will be a dramatic increase in defence inflation, seriously undermining the value of any budget increases. We have already seen this damaging phenomenon as a consequence of the demands of the war in Ukraine.

Finally, there is the wider fiscal position. There are only three ways of paying for an increase in the defence budget: taxation, borrowing or a reallocation of public expenditure. Increases in taxation, which look inevitable, are likely to be consumed almost entirely in sustaining the viability of the economy overall. This is already challenging given the high and volatile cost of servicing the national debt, so the scope for further borrowing looks very limited.

That leaves a reappraisal of public expenditure. We were spending 4% of GDP on defence in the early 1990s. By 2024, that had reduced to 2.3%, although accounting changes over the interim period mean that it would be more like 2.1% in 1990s terms. By 2023, health and social security accounted for about 41% of total managed public expenditure, while defence took just 4.8%. That latter share would need to increase to about 7.2% to bring the defence budget up to 3.5% of GDP. This would equate to a 5% reduction in total health and social security spending. Considering the scale of the challenge and the difficulty of the various options, it is clear that the kind of restructuring I believe is necessary could not be carried out quickly, so the process needs to start soon if we are to be anywhere near 3.5% of GDP for defence by 2035. As yet, however, there is no sign of any urgency on any side of the political divide on addressing this crucial matter. This is surely the key issue for public policy and debate over the coming months because unless it is resolved, and resolved quickly, the excellent work that has gone into this review will be wasted and the country will be left ill prepared for the risks it will face in this complex and dangerous world.

Here is one small example: the Church, through its lead on the Global Investor Commission on Mining—working with the Anglican partnership for peacebuilding, based in Cape Town—is enabling local communities to be trained in dialogue work at the nexus of friction around extraction and armed groups, where conflict is fuelled by the demand for critical materials. This is an active development opportunity. Further north, the UN is working with Anglican leaders trained in dialogue skills to be peacemakers and social and civic builders in places where civil society has completely broken down.

So, while I welcome the strategic defence review, not least in its honesty and courage—though I too am concerned about the financial plans alongside it—I also yearn for a companion strategic peacebuilding review, and the Church, being the Church, stands ready to be a partner in that task.

I think of myself as a generalist with common sense, more interested in practical solutions than in ideological beliefs. I started as a social worker and spent many years working with young offenders and children who had experienced early-life trauma. We need to improve the interactions of our justice, social welfare and education structures. There is too much process and not enough problem solving.

When it comes to defence, we also need more joined-up thinking. As a former shadow Defence Minister, I welcome the SDR and congratulate my noble friend Lord Robertson on a fine piece of work. It is time to face reality about the risk of war. Only by preparing can we hope to maintain the peace. I agree that we need to up our contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.

I welcome stronger relationships with investors and defence innovators as the way forward, and I am convinced that increased defence spending can be a motor for growth. But as we have heard, it will not be easy to find the resources needed under current financial rules. Perhaps greater flexibility and innovation is required there—maybe defence bonds, or something designed to free defence expenditure from the constraints inherent in current Treasury planning.

As a former chair of Labour Friends of Israel, I take an active interest in the security of that country and the search for a just Middle East peace, which I believe includes the people of Iran. They deserve our support in their struggle to free themselves from the corrupt, barbarous regime oppressing them and exporting war, conflict and terrorism.

I am also a supporter of life sciences, a huge fan of the hospice movement, and keen on medical technology. Through my association with Heart Valve Voice, I support improved diagnoses and treatment for those with heart valve problems. I look forward to working with others across this House who share my interests.

Finally, may I say that it is a long way from Port Glasgow to this place, but if I can do it, anyone can. British values are something to be proud of, and opportunity really matters if we are to modernise and renew our country to face the challenges of the future.

The public have, to some extent, been shielded from the escalating risk, so the willingness of the Government to start the national conversation that my noble friend called for about national security, resilience and preparedness, is welcome and indeed essential.

Grey zone aggression is already threatening our daily lives. Cyberattacks against public and private organisations are detected daily. Russian submarines are encroaching into British waters. Geopolitical unrest is threatening continuity of supply chains, and disinformation campaigns threaten national cohesion. We have to improve our preparedness for all of these. The nature of these attacks will change and intensify. They will demand a nationwide response, a nationwide endurance, and, in the same way, we need to be prepared for all the other risks that we face.

Just think of what has happened in the last few months. We have had the cyberattacks on M&S and the Co-op, and four substation fires in five weeks—one of them shutting down Heathrow. They are probably not malicious but demonstrate the consequences of clapped-out, aged infrastructure and certainly highlight that vulnerability to future malign actors. West Nile virus has been detected in mosquitoes here in Britain. A wildfire shut the M25, following on from the driest UK March on record. Most recently, three ne’er-do-wells were found guilty of an arson attack on a warehouse that they carried out on behalf of the Wagner Group. I could go on. That is why the National Preparedness Commission has advocated the need for a threat-agnostic preparedness. As a nation, we must be ready for whatever may happen.

The SDR proposes a defence readiness Bill that would give the Government new powers to improve preparedness of key industries, support the mobilisation of resources when needed, and mandate annual reporting on our war-fighting readiness. Can my noble friend the Minister tell us when this will be introduced? The National Preparedness Commission has separately proposed a national resilience Bill, following the model of the Climate Change Act, that would place a legal obligation on government departments and public bodies to take account of and prioritise the need for preparedness and resilience in all their actions. Such an Act could establish an independent national resilience committee, akin to the Climate Change Committee, to advise the UK Government on their assessment of the progress being made and what additional measures should be taken.

So why not bring these proposals together? Let us have a national resilience and defence readiness Bill in the next Session of Parliament. This should spell out the respective roles of the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, mayors and local authorities. It would place explicit expectations on the critical national infrastructure and businesses more generally. It would strengthen and rationalise the network of local resilience forums and require them to engage with local businesses and the local voluntary, community and faith sectors.

We need the national conversation proposed in the strategic defence review. We must raise public awareness of the threats we face, the escalating risk of conflict, as well as the consequences of climate change, the associated extreme weather events and other hazards. The SDR has kick-started that process. The Government have acknowledged what needs to be done in the national security strategy, but now that must be turned into action. We have not got long.

“more substantive body of work”

needed to the UK’s critical national infrastructure will be undertaken promptly?

Regarding the billion-pound commitment to homeland air and missile defence and the creation of a new cyber and electromagnetic command, how can the Minister be confident that this funding will be sufficient for the SDR’s objectives?

The SDR’s focus on innovation and digital skills is essential. The war in Ukraine has shown the importance of rapid procurement cycles and scalable technologies. We welcome the £400 million identified for defence innovation and the doubled investment in autonomous systems, yet SMEs still face major challenges in engaging with the Ministry of Defence. Radical procurement reform is essential, and concrete timelines for this are still lacking.

To return to the essential theme of resilience, defence in the 21st century is no longer confined to the battlefield; it requires the full mobilisation of society—an integrated approach that connects the population, industry, infrastructure and education. While there is much in the SDR that reflects a broader understanding of defence as a collective national effort, which the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, referred to, the MoD continues to show its complete misunderstanding of Reserve Forces, such an important part of connecting to wider society, and the pressures on those who seek to train while holding down civilian jobs. Can the Minister guarantee that the Reserve Forces will not be singled out, as they so often have been in the recent past, for cuts and so-called in-year savings?

The MoD is persisting in its efforts to neuter the Reserve Forces and cadets associations, whose council I chair, which could and would, if encouraged, rather than deliberately constrained as is proposed by converting them into a more costly NDPB, do so much to promote the resilience that the country so desperately needs. I know that Ministers simply do not understand the damage that they will be doing, especially to the SDR’s aspirations for the reserves and national resilience, if they follow what their officials are pushing them into, and I ask the Minister to look again at that.

To conclude, notwithstanding what I have just said, the shift in the strategic approach set out by the SDR is welcome. To turn its ambitions into reality will require strong and continuing commitment, especially on funding but also on improved relations with industry and sustained engagement with the public. I emphasise, though, the need for a fully costed road map and ask the Minister what plans he has to keep Parliament updated on the implementation of the SDR’s recommendations.