Southport Attack

Statement

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Wednesday 5 February.

“With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a Statement updating the House on the Government’s response to the Southport murders.

The attack in Southport in July last year was one of the most appalling and barbaric crimes committed in this country. For young children and adults to be attacked in this way, and three young girls killed, is utterly heartbreaking. The Home Secretary and I would like to thank those people who showed great bravery in attempting to stop the attack. For this foul act of violence to happen while children were enjoying themselves at a dance class at the beginning of the school holidays is beyond comprehension. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the three girls, and with all those injured as they continue to live with the trauma of that dark day. No one should have to go through what they have, and we are steadfast in our commitment to ensuring that they get every possible support.

Responsibility for this abhorrent attack lies with the perpetrator. Axel Rudakubana has been sentenced to life imprisonment. He will serve a minimum of 52 years in prison, and Mr Justice Goose said it is highly likely that he will never be released. When the Home Secretary addressed the House on this case last month, she outlined the multiple interactions that the perpetrator had with state bodies in the years before the attack. Those included police, social services and mental health services. There are serious questions about how various agencies failed to identify and collectively act on the warning signs. All those questions must be answered—we owe that to the families who deserve the truth about what went wrong. That is why the Government are committed to understanding and addressing the failings in this tragic case through a comprehensive public inquiry. It will examine the issues raised in this case, but also wider challenges around rising youth violence. We are moving swiftly to set up the inquiry. We will consult the families to ensure that all critical issues are addressed, while remaining sensitive to the needs of those most affected. We expect to announce further details about the inquiry next month.

Although we do not pre-empt the conclusions of the inquiry, there are areas where action can and must be progressed immediately. Prevent is a vital part of our counterterrorism system. We must endeavour to identify those susceptible to radicalisation early and before they go on to commit terrorist acts. Prevent receives nearly 7,000 referrals every year, and our hard-working front-line staff have supported nearly 5,000 people away from terrorism since 2015. We must get Prevent right. That is why the Home Office and counterterrorism policing commissioned a rapid Prevent learning review immediately after the attack. These are usually internal technical reviews intended to identify swift learning and improvement for Prevent. However, the importance of the families needing answers has meant that today, following close engagement with them, we are taking the unusual step of publishing the Prevent learning review.

I can update the House that the perpetrator was referred to Prevent three times between December 2019, when he was aged 13, and April 2021, when he was 14. Those referrals were made by his schools. The first referral reported concerns about him carrying a knife and searching for school shootings on the internet. The second referral was focused on his online activity relating to Libya and Gaddafi. His third referral was for searching for London bombings, the IRA and the Israel-Palestine conflict.

On each of those occasions, the decision at the time was that the perpetrator should not progress to the Channel multi-agency process, but the Prevent learning review found that there was sufficient risk for the perpetrator to have been managed through Prevent. It found that the referral was closed prematurely and that there was sufficient concern to keep the case active while further information was collected.

The review is clear on the concerning behaviours that the perpetrator demonstrated. It highlights his interest in the Manchester Arena attack and that he talked about stabbing people, and it flags that some of the grievances that could have been a motivation were not fully considered. The review also highlights the perpetrator’s clear vulnerabilities and complex needs, which may have made him more susceptible to being drawn into terrorism.

The review concluded that too much focus was placed on the absence of a distinct ideology, to the detriment of considering the perpetrator’s susceptibility, grievances and complex needs. There was an underexploration of the significance of his repeat referrals and the cumulative risk, including his history of violence. There were potentially incomplete lines of inquiry. At the time, the perpetrator could have fallen into a mixed, unclear or unstable category for Channel, due to his potential interest in mass violence. Indeed, the overall conclusion of the review is that he should have been case-managed through the Channel multi-agency process, rather than closed to Prevent. That would have enabled co-ordinated multi-agency risk management and support.

The Prevent learning review made 14 recommendations for improvements to Prevent. We have accepted those findings and rapid action has been taken to implement the recommendations. Counterterrorism policing has conducted in-depth assurance visits to every region to determine whether the issues identified in this case have been resolved by operational improvements made since 2021. Urgent work is under way to address the findings.

The Prevent assessment framework was launched in September and is now in place across all regions. It was developed by experts and is being used to triage and risk-assess all Prevent referrals. It will improve decision-making at all stages of the Prevent system. Rollout of this tool has been accompanied by rigorous mandatory training. We have begun an end-to-end review of Prevent thresholds to ensure that Prevent can deal with the full range of threats we see today, from Islamist extremism, which is the most significant terrorist threat the UK faces, through to the fascination with mass violence we saw in the Southport case. This internal review will complete in April and further strengthen the approach to repeat referrals and ensure that clear policy, guidance and training are in place.

We have completed the first stage of a policy review into how Prevent supports referrals who have mental ill-health or are neurodivergent. Actions for improving the operational approach have been identified and will be implemented swiftly, with oversight from the new Prevent commissioner. We are also strengthening our approach to the oversight of referrals that do not meet Prevent thresholds to make sure that people receive the right support. Next week, a pilot starts in several local areas to test new approaches to cases that are transferred to other services.

The Government have appointed the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as interim Prevent commissioner. This is the first time in its history that Prevent will have dedicated independent oversight. That will help ensure that Prevent is always held to the highest standards. The first task of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is to review the perpetrator’s Prevent history, drawing on the Prevent learning review. That will identify whether there is further learning, examine improvements made to Prevent since 2021 and identify any remaining gaps that require further improvement. He will complete the review within his term as interim commissioner, which will end with the appointment of a permanent commissioner this summer.

However, it is simply not enough to focus only on this case. We need to take an even more robust approach to identifying learning swiftly and driving that learning through the Prevent system. The Prevent commissioner will be tasked with overseeing a new approach to Prevent learning reviews that enables rapid debriefing and urgent action after incidents, but also that provides a clear framework that binds other agencies into the joint learning process. Transparency and enabling public scrutiny are also fundamental. That is why we will take steps to publish the findings of other independent Prevent learning reviews where there has been an incident of national significance. Next week, we will publish the Prevent learning review into the appalling attack on Sir David Amess, to enable further public scrutiny of this important programme.

The first duty of government is to ensure the security of our country and the safety of our people, because nothing matters more. While we can never undo the hurt and pain caused by this unthinkably wretched attack, we can, we must and we will do everything in our power to prevent further atrocities. As the Prime Minister said, Southport must be

‘a line in the sand’

for our country. If that means asking difficult questions about shortcomings or failures, so be it. If it means holding institutions and processes to account, we will do so without fear or favour. If changes are required to protect the public and combat the threats we face, this Government will not hesitate to act. I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this Statement to your Lordships’ House. I reiterate the shadow Home Secretary’s message in the House of Commons. He said that we must keep in our thoughts and prayers the innocent victims of this despicable act: Bebe King, just six years old; Elsie Dot Stancombe, who was seven; and Alice da Silva Aguiar, who was only nine. Their lives were cruelly and senselessly cut short while attending a Taylor Swift dance class. I know all Members of this House will once again wish to extend their deepest condolences to their families and honour the memory of these young children, whose futures were stolen from them.

This tragedy underscores the necessity of a robust and transparent investigation to ensure that lessons are learned and that no stone is left unturned in holding accountable those responsible for any failures that may have contributed to this heinous act. I welcome the inquiry announced by the Home Secretary a couple of weeks ago and note the Security Minister’s confirmation in the other place that it will begin on a non-statutory footing but transition to a statutory footing. Does the Minister have any information about the timeline for this transition? Can he assure the House that this inquiry will be given the necessary resources and authority to investigate thoroughly? Furthermore, does he agree that it is vital for this House to be kept regularly informed about the inquiry’s progress and findings, transparency being essential to restore public confidence?

I am also pleased to hear that the Prevent thresholds are being reviewed. The lessons learned review highlighted several critical areas for further investigation, particularly the apparent mismatch between the focus of Prevent referrals and the actual threat landscape. Does the Minister share the concern that this imbalance indicates a misalignment in how resources are being allocated within Prevent? What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the review addresses this and that Prevent is laser-focused on tackling the most pressing and dangerous threats? Will the review also examine the training and guidance given to Prevent officers to ensure that they are well equipped to assess and respond to credible threats? Furthermore, could the Minister clarify whether there will be any changes to how information is shared between local authorities and counterterrorism units to improve early identification and intervention in cases of radicalisation?