1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out from “if” to end of line 8 and insert “the Secretary of State had determined that the general level of earnings obtaining in Great Britain had increased by 3.8%.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the provision substituting “prices” for “earnings” and retains the earnings link for the 2022-23 year by stipulating the Government will assume earnings have risen by 3.8% for the purposes of uprating. This reflects analysis from an ONS blog suggesting that the underlying rate of earnings growth was between 3.2% and 4.4%. The figure of 3.8% is chosen as the mid-way point in that range.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 1, 2 and 3. I have to say to my noble friend that I truly believe that the legislation already allows for the provisions that we are trying to enshrine in this Bill. I actually do not believe that the Bill is necessary. It was passed through the other House on the basis of a false premise: that keeping the triple-lock earnings protection would require a pension uprating of more than 8%, at an Exchequer cost of around £5 billion.
However, we are amending Section 150A of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and Section 150A(8) specifically states that
“the Secretary of State shall estimate the general level of earnings in such manner as he thinks fit.”
Given that we are supposed to be uprating benefits that are vital to the living standards of millions of pensioners —I am particularly concerned about the poorest pensioners, who are dealt with by Amendment 3—it is regrettable that the Secretary of State and the Government have chosen not to use the option in the Bill allowing them to estimate a level of earnings that would have allowed for what I think all noble Lords would agree is an exceptional impact from the measures taken in connection with the Covid-19 pandemic. That event is pretty unprecedented but could be allowed for when talking about uprating benefits that so many millions of our citizens rely wholly—or almost wholly—upon to be able to afford to live.
In my attempts to persuade and impress upon the Government that it is not too late to retain the triple-lock earnings link, I have tried to suggest ways in which we can still do this in the Bill, and I am most grateful to my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, who has supported me on Amendment 1. I stress that these are all probing amendments, but this one tries to help the Government by suggesting a level that could be used to reflect an actual level of earnings increase across the economy which is adjusted—in a way that has already been explained by the ONS in a recent publication—for the distortions relating to earnings figures in the normal measure, which has always been average weekly earnings.
My Lords, I have put my name to the first three amendments because I believe that doing away with the earnings link would be a really dangerous step. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Altmann for doing such a lot of work on these amendments and providing the Government with a percentage, 3.8%, which should of course be acceptable. Nobody in this House knows more about pensions than the noble Baroness, and she has introduced this measure so effectively that I can be relatively brief.
Relying on CPI inflation, which would happen if we did away with the earnings link, will act to the detriment of pensioners, as it does not accurately reflect how those pensioners who rely most heavily on their state pensions spend their money. Last month, for instance, the greatest downward pressure on inflation came from hotels and restaurants. It is the basics of life which absorb pensioner incomes, though, not hotels and restaurants. Their money goes on food, fuel and housing, yet we know that the September CPI figure, which would be used to determine the inflation figure for pensions, does not and cannot take account of the increases that are going to dawn on food, fuel and housing prices over the next few months. Earnings are a good guide to where basic costs will go, and we should maintain the link for pensions.
Pensioner poverty is on the rise again. In June this year, Age UK reported that more than 2 million pensioners were living in poverty. We know that very many of those might qualify for extra benefits but do not apply for them, either through too little knowledge or too much pride, so it is crucial that the basic pension—currently, shamefully, the lowest in the OECD in relation to earnings—should rise significantly. There will be some who do not need the extra cash—members of that ever-reducing band with the benefit of a defined benefit pension, or those with an investment income—but the fact that they have more money does not mean that the basic state pension should not rise at a reasonable level: the tax system can claw back the excess. Would it not have been sensible to have made sure that the levy to pay for NHS and social care reform would come from income tax rather than from national insurance, which pensioners do not pay at the moment? I believe that those pensioners who are in work should pay.
My Lords, I will speak to probing Amendments 2 and 3 in this group. The triple lock is not legislated for; it rests on a commitment given by successive Governments since 2011. However, indexing pensions at least in line with earnings is legislated for. Through this Bill, the Government are neither applying the triple lock nor the underpin of earnings indexation. Both have gone as a consequence of this Bill—albeit that the Government say that they will not do it next year.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the removal of both is causing concerns that the Bill is trailing the Government’s consideration of lowering the value of the state pension going forward. While recognising the anomaly in the data behind the 8.3% earnings figure, the pandemic will not account for all of that increase. The decision to raise the state pension by the consumer price index in response to the anomaly comes without any analysis of how that change might impact the value of the state pension in relation to actual earnings.
In fact, the Pension Policy Institute has done such an analysis and, assuming that the CPI increase is of the order of 3%, which it is, the PPI’s recent analysis stated:
“Increasing the State Pension by CPI means that overall, State Pensions will rise by less than the real increase in earnings over the past two years. An alternative approach would have been to consider the rise in earnings over two years to give a more realistic estimation of real wage increases without the artificial impact of the pandemic impact in the year on year earnings statistics. This would need a pension increase of 5.3% in 2022 to match the increase in earnings since the setting of the State Pension level in 2020. Increasing the State Pension by this amount would save £3.1bn in 2022”.
So, increases in pensions will not reflect the real rise in hourly wages over that two-year period—which rows against the clear intention of the underpin of earnings indexation that is in the legislation.
My Lords, I begin by apologising to your Lordships for not taking part in Second Reading due to the volume of Bills currently before your Lordships’ House.
I will be very brief. I rise to offer the Green group’s support for the intention of all these amendments. I express my pleasure in following the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and stress her point that we are not talking about a contest between generations here. There are some very poor people among our older communities, and they deserve not to live in poverty, but that does not mean taking money away from the young. I also stress the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, about how pensioner poverty is rising and that we should have a society where no pensioner is living in poverty.
I particularly want to address Amendment 3, which is the one I would most like to have attached my name to, had there been space. It is crucial: pension credit gets so many people to at least a basically decent, not awful, standard of living, but the fact is that that is useful only if you actually get it. I had a conversation—or a debate—with the Minister about a year ago. At that stage, the rate of pension credit take-up was 60%; that meant about a million pensioners were not receiving pension credit who would have been entitled to it. That was money the Government were not paying out—about £3 billion. It was estimated that it was costing the NHS and social care a spend of £4 billion. So not paying pension credit is actually costing the Government money. Can the Minister now—or later in writing, sharing it with other Peers—update me, a year later, on whether those figures still hold? Have the Government planned, as they did not plan a year ago, a programme to promote pension credit to ensure that those who are entitled to it take it up?
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, says, all these amendments seek to protect pensioners against price increases during a temporary suspension of the triple lock. I very much welcome the proposals made in Amendments 1, 2 and 3, and particularly welcome the proposal to include pension credit in the link with earnings.
I want to speak to Amendment 4 in my name, which seeks to base the uplift on the predicted increase as forecast by the Bank of England for April 2022. My amendment proposes that, as the pension increase will be in April 2022 and the previous pension increase was in April 2021, the best measure would surely be price increases between those two dates.
Circumstances have changed considerably since the Bill completed its passage through the Commons, including rising costs, rising inflation, unreliability of supply chains and the various pressures brought about by those circumstances. While we do not know what inflation will be by next April, there is plenty of reason to think that it will be higher than currently—that is sadly what the Bank of England thinks. For example, the energy cap went up 12% on 1 October, and is expected to go up again next April. I do not think the Government should be happy that these cost rises are not included in the inflation figure that they have used.
We know that pensioners, and older pensioners in particular, tend to spend more time at home and feel the cold more, and so energy bills tend to be a higher share of their household budgets. Given soaring energy costs, pensioner inflation is likely to be higher than average inflation. This is another reason to think that just linking to September’s average figure, when setting the state pension rate, is the answer to the wrong question. I know that some Members will think that using a forecast is not as robust as using an outturn, but this legislation is only for one year, so really we are not setting a precedent. In fact, I am reliably informed that, in the 1980s, the DWP used to use forecast inflation for benefit uprating.
My Lords, there are two issues being discussed in Committee that I particularly want to address. First, what should be the provisions to determine the operation of the triple lock? Secondly—a distinct issue—what is the desirable level of the fixed-rate state pension, and how can we get there? These are clearly linked but distinct issues, which is why I sought to have them grouped apart. In this group, Amendments 1 to 4, we are dealing with the first issue. The question is: how should the triple lock work? We need to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for her work in producing these amendments, as well as the Minister, for the immense amount of time and effort she has put into explaining the Government’s position.
On the clause stand part debate, I will say that I am in favour of the 8% increase; I will explain why at that stage. However, as I said at Second Reading, given the Government’s clear and unambiguous commitment in their election manifesto to sticking by the triple lock, I do not understand why they are not prepared to adopt one of the approaches proposed by the cross-party group of noble Baronesses before us today. Unfortunately, of course, we have a Government who are now in the habit of breaking their promises; in this case in a relatively blatant fashion and, as has been explained, unnecessarily.
The Minister should understand that her Government’s refusal to give any consideration to any of these proposals is why there is so much fear—in this House and more generally—that this is not a one-off, that a precedent will be set that will be attractive to austerity-minded Chancellors in future, and that other excuses for breaking the link will be found. This is clearly not a party-political point. No one could accuse Age UK of being partisan, but it has said that
“it’s asking a lot for older people to believe that any scaling back of the triple lock would only be temporary, rather than permanent.”
My Lords, at Second Reading I accepted the Government’s case for not increasing pensions by 8% or so, and I called for a review of the triple lock, because of the arbitrary nature of the triple element of the lock—that is, the 2.5%—while emphasising the importance of maintaining pensions and related benefits relative to average earnings as a general principle. I therefore support Amendments 1 and 2, which are consistent with that argument.
At Second Reading, as we have heard, the Minister argued that there was no robust methodology for establishing what the underlying increase in earnings had been this last year. But surely the ONS range of estimates, on which these amendments are based, is at least based on some kind of methodology, which is more than one can say about 2.5%, which can be used to increase pensions should it exceed earnings and prices. As it is, the jettisoning of earnings this year has given rise to understandable fears that the earnings link might be abandoned altogether in the longer term, just as it was by the Conservative Government in 1980, leading to a steady deterioration in the position of pensions relative to average earnings during the following two decades.
Moreover, the case for basing pensions on the underlying increase in earnings is the stronger, given what is happening to inflation, which is addressed by Amendment 4. All the indications are that inflation is going to rise above the 3.1% on which the uprating will be based. The Bank of England’s chief economist has warned that it could go as high as 5% in the next few months. For pensioners and others reliant on social security, the effective rate of inflation is likely to be higher still, given the differential impact of inflation when the increase in basics such as fuel and food, which constitute a disproportionate part of low-income budgets, is a key driver of inflation, as already mentioned. I raised this issue at Second Reading and asked the Minister whether she would undertake to look at how the problem might be addressed, but she did not respond then or in her subsequent letter.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Janke, for introducing their amendments, and all noble Lords who have spoken. We had a good discussion at Second Reading about the way the Government have gone about trying to find an alternative to the triple lock that would deal with the impact of the pandemic on earnings data. But I think it is fair to say that the Minister will have worked out from the contributions that this has not entirely satisfied noble Lords around the House as a way forward.
Let me look briefly at the three sets of issues raised by the amendments in this group. Amendments 1 and 2 from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would replace the provisions of this Bill with the provision to uprate using an earnings measure designed to reflect an underlying rate of earnings growth. Amendment 1 sets that at 3.8%, being chosen as the midpoint in the range of this now famous blog by the ONS. I suspect the person who wrote it must be wondering whether they will ever blog again. But that blog suggested a range that—if you were to strip out the base and compositional effects—would give an indication of underlying basic earnings growth.
Amendment 2 takes a similar but less prescriptive approach, leaving it to the Secretary of State to pick a number informed by that same ONS piece of work. Given that a number of noble Lords have expressed scepticism about the Government’s defence—that one of the reasons they do not want to move away from average weekly earnings is fear of legal action—could the Government rehearse again exactly what they are worried about and why? I think that would be helpful, because, clearly, noble Lords are not persuaded by that.
I do not think anyone is very happy with where the Government have landed. My noble friend Lady Drake contributed, I have to say, another piece of astonishing, wonderful analysis. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, that I think it is possible that my noble friend is an even greater expert than the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, based on the strength of her contribution. We have huge expertise in this House, and we are greatly blessed by it. My noble friend summarised the matter when she said that, essentially, in this Bill, the Government have contrived to find a way forward in which they apply neither the triple lock nor the earnings indexation on which the triple lock is meant to build.
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The ONS analysis, which looked at the base effects and the composition effect, suggested that actual earnings growth was not more than 8% but was between 3.2% and 4.4%. I have just picked a number at the middle of the range: 3.8% is a figure that could be inserted into the Bill. The Secretary of State is at liberty to choose an alternative figure that she feels—perhaps with the advice of her officials and all the excellent analysts that the department has—would better reflect the actual number, but that itself would still preserve the earnings link that is so important, as we discussed at Second Reading. So, that is Amendment 1, which specifies that the general level of earnings obtaining would be 3.8% for the purposes of just this one year, which is what we are trying to do.
Amendment 2 is truly cross-party: I am hugely grateful for the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith, Lady Drake and Lady Wheatcroft. Again, this amendment intends to maintain the link between pension uprating and earnings while still explicitly accounting for the problem that, I believe, the Government have been advised to beware of, which is that not using average weekly earnings and not changing primary legislation to permit not using average weekly earnings could open the Government to challenge. I stress that I am also hugely grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who has engaged so constructively with noble Lords across the House, and to her officials, who have been very patient and generous with their time in going through these issues with those of us who feel so concerned about the social-policy and pensioner-poverty implications of potentially setting a dangerous precedent that, actually, increasing by earnings does not necessarily need to happen if the Government do not like the figure one year.
Amendment 2 aims to enshrine in the Bill a provision that says that, for this year only, those benefits—the basic state pension, the new state pension, pension credit, the minimum guarantee and the other smaller pensions, such as category B, category D and so on—need to rise in line with earnings, but that that level of earnings can be adjusted in light of
“the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the level of earnings for the previous year”.
That, again, would open the way for the Government to maintain the earnings link and use an adjusted figure, while addressing the potential concern about being challenged if primary legislation is not changed.
At the moment, the decision seems to have been taken that, if average weekly earnings—the specific statistic produced by the ONS, which has always been used in the past—are not used, the only alternative is to drop the earnings link altogether. These amendments are designed to show that that is not the only alternative. Even though, within the legislation, it is okay to use a figure that the Secretary of State adjusts as she sees fit, this would explicitly state that.
I am puzzled that the officials still seem to think that this could be open to challenge. Very few people would disagree with the idea that average weekly earnings statistics, as reported in the 8%-plus range, were not distorted in some way and that it is not acceptable to adjust them in any way. Indeed, in the figures that have come out for average weekly earnings, the three months that were compared with three months from last year—April, May and June—were all at around 8.8%, but the more recent July and August figures, which have already come out, were significantly below that. They have come down to around 5% or below, so there is an element of MPs having made a decision without recognising that there are alternatives. I propose that we suggest to the other place that there is an alternative that allows retention of the manifesto commitment to maintain the triple lock and, more importantly, of the earnings link.
Finally and briefly, on Amendment 3, I am again grateful for the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake, Lady Smith of Newnham and Lady Wheatcroft. This amendment is specifically aimed at the poorest pensioners—those who rely on pension credit. This credit has never been triple locked, so they have never benefited from that protection directly, although there has been a cash-terms increase to keep the pension credit a little more in line with the new state pension. Since its introduction nearly 20 years ago, it has always had to be linked to the level of average earnings. Suddenly, for one year, because of the pandemic, we are removing that protection even from the poorest pensioners. Typically, they are the oldest pensioners. The majority of them will be women who are not living on very much money; we are talking about £177.50, or thereabouts, a week, as the single pension-credit minimum-income guarantee level.
If nothing else, I am proposing that we do not abandon the earnings link for those poorest pensioners, so I have inserted a provision in page 1, line 8, at the end,
“for the purposes of paragraphs (za) to (c) … only”
of Section 150A(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. That would exclude this Bill from applying to the pension credit minimum income guarantee. It would, I stress, still allow the Secretary of State the discretion to use a different level of earnings than average weekly earnings should she decide to do that for reasons of policy, such as not having too big a differential or too big excess of pension credit over the new state pension. However, the main principle that I am trying to preserve within these amendments is the importance to pensioners, in the context of pensioner poverty and a state pension that is pretty much the lowest in the developed world, that the promised protection is in line with earnings. That is crucial. We must, in my view, not set a dangerous precedent, even for one year. We can take alternative measures to account for the distortions of the pandemic. I beg to move.
However, these amendments make sense. They work as a package and therefore I support them.
The PPI approach of considering earnings over two years would reduce much of the methodology challenge in establishing an adjusted earnings index for one year, which the Minister refers to as the Government’s main defence for the approach they are taking. In fact, we have not heard a proper explanation from the Government as to why they could not consider different approaches. Several could have been taken, such as looking at earnings over the two-year period. So can the Minister give a fuller explanation of why they cannot take a different approach to that contained in this Bill? How do the Government intend to address the fall in the value of pensions against earnings over the last two years?
The triple lock was intended to address the extended fall in the value of the basic state pension. As the Minister states in her letter of 25 October, following Second Reading,
“the triple lock was introduced in order to boost the value of the basic state pension”.
It was to recover from those years of decline against earnings—a sort of accelerator, to get back to a reasonable comparative position.
With the Library’s help, I looked at the hypothetical value of the basic state pension and the pension credit as if they had been uprated in line with earnings, rather than the triple lock, since 2011. Currently, that triple-lock boost delivered a basic state pension of approximately £18 higher a week than it would have been if it had been indexed by earnings alone. When the Bill passes, in 2023 the basic state pension boost will fall to approximately £12 a week higher than if uprated by earnings alone. The pension credit minimum income guarantee, targeted on the poorest pensioners, is approximately £14 a week higher currently than it would have been if uprated by earnings alone. In 2022-23, it will be only £6.79 a week higher.
I am sure that the Government will produce more precise figures than mine, because their ability to do so is greater than mine, but what I am absolutely confident that they will not be able to contradict is that there will be a clawback from the cash value of the current triple-lock boost. The pension credit minimum income guarantee is targeted on the poorest pensioners and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, it is not uprated by the triple lock, although earnings uprating is legislated for. The Government have mitigated that omission by applying the underpin of a cash increase, to give what they feel is a fair increase, rather than conceding the full principle of the triple lock.
However, many older pensioners still face declining incomes, and women are particularly sensitive to changes in the state pension indexation. On average, women are more likely than men to have lower incomes at older ages: 60% of those in relative poverty over the age of 65 are women; and women are more likely to be eligible for pension credit—so there will be a direct gender impact if one starts to tamper with less generous indexation, and there is nothing about future accrual of pensions that suggests that that gender bias would not persist.
Pensioner poverty is rising, and we are now seeing falling life expectancy in areas with the greatest incidence of pensioner poverty. We have accelerated the state pension age; pensioner poverty is rising; and in those areas, life expectancy is falling. That trend was emerging before the pandemic—before anybody says, “Well, it’s the product of the pandemic”, no, that trend was there. I am sure it has been accelerated, but it was there before.
So why are the Government not taking a different approach to the uprating of pension credit targeted on the poorest pensioners and applying a cash increase greater than the value of the uprating by CPI? There need be no complicating legal or methodological issues in doing so. There is a clear precedent for the Government choosing to apply a cash increase.
Some argue that the triple lock unfairly advantages older people and should be scrapped for reasons of intergenerational fairness. But not all older people are experiencing a higher standard of living—older pensioners even less so. In 2020, benefit income was the largest component of income for both pensioner couples and single pensioners, and nearly two-thirds of the total income for single female pensioners.
In fact, younger people arguably have more to gain from the triple lock than older people because, when the state second pension was replaced by the new state pension in 2016, which will apply to future pensioners, its full value then was set at around 24% of average earnings—and that is low in comparison with any other advanced economy. But that is the base on which one is looking to make private savings work. To achieve a replacement income in retirement of 45% for the average earner, privately saving 8% under auto enrolment, the new state pension needs to be nearer 30% of average earnings. The Government argued when they introduced the new state pension that it was set because it was part of a package, together with the triple lock and the accelerated increases in the state pension age, which have been banked.
Again, research by the Pensions Policy Institute indicates that, without the triple lock, it will be harder, at least until the new state pension rises above a certain level, for young workers to achieve an adequate income in retirement, because it is the base on which their private savings will assist in securing them an income in retirement, and the dominance of the role of the state pension in pensioner income will persist long into the future.
Mention was made in the previous debate of the need to implement the new rates as quickly as possible. This really does not take as long, in this day and age; there are processes in place to make it much easier. Surely it would not take long for the preferred body—the Bank of England or the OBR—to come up with an inflation forecast; presumably the Budget will bring new inflation forecasts in any case.
If the Government are committed to protecting pensioners against rising prices when they set the pension in 2022, they should see that this is a more transparent, easily understood method of ensuring that pensioners are protected against the expected rise in prices, costs and pressures in the year ahead.
The organisation goes on to point out that
“some of the prominent voices arguing for a suspension of the triple lock in response to the pandemic, are the same people who have called for its abolition in the past.”
The only way for the Government to mitigate these widespread concerns is to demonstrate commitment, either by sticking to the current legislation or, more likely in practice, through an appropriate amendment to this Bill. Such an amendment is now necessary to demonstrate the Government’s continued commitment —in practice and not just in fine words—to the key earnings element of the triple lock.
We must thank the Minister for her letter—which eventually reached me—and her explanation of why the Government believe that it is so difficult to adopt another definition of the earnings increase that would satisfy Section 150A of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. I am also glad to have had meetings with the Minister, at her instigation, to discuss the issue in detail. I thank her. But the case essentially comes down to “legal risk”. Unfortunately, I still find the argument less than compelling. On the face of it, the choice of the index is a decision for the Secretary of State. Subsection (8) could not be more definitive:
“The Secretary of State shall estimate the general level of earnings in such manner as he thinks fit.”
This puts it in the hands of the Secretary of State, so long as, that is, she does it in a way that is not irrational.
In truth, it is the decision to drop any link to earnings that is irrational—and, anyway, if it were correct that the Secretary of State’s choice is so open to challenge, it would be surprising that it has not been challenged in the past. For example, the prices index is based on a single month, September, whereas earnings are based on the three-month average from May to July. What sense does that make and why has one or other choice not been challenged? Earnings indices, along with those for prices, are inherently a matter of judgment and interpretation. It is not as though there is one true earnings index buried under the data that might ultimately be revealed in the course of legal action. Is any court really going to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of State? I am afraid that the excuses being offered for why the Government are unwilling to accept the approach suggested in these amendments bear all the hallmarks of post hoc-ism, the sort of clutching-at-straws justification that is commonly introduced to justify a decision that has already been made. The Minister has to understand that this is exactly why so many people continue to doubt the Government’s protestations that this is simply a one-off.
For these reasons, I shall support Amendments 2 and 3, in the spirit of helping the Government out of a hole that they have dug for themselves. Unfortunately, although I often agree with the noble Baroness, I am against Amendment 4. Just to give a brief history lesson, the idea of predicting prices figures is fatally flawed. I criticised it back in 1975 when my pensions hero, Barbara Castle, tried it, and I am against it now. Unfortunately, we are not allowed to use visual aids in this Chamber, but those noble Lords who have to hand the House of Commons briefing document can turn to page 22 and see a graph of the real value of the basic pension against earnings. Noble Lords will see that in 1975, when Barbara Castle was Secretary of State, there was a sharp downward dip, which is when they decided to adopt a projected rather than a hard figure. I am against it—I am sorry, because I am sure that the intentions are the best, but it gives too much scope for the Government to adjust the figures.
The other day, the Chancellor said:
“I know that families here at home are feeling the pinch of higher prices and are worried about the months ahead. But I want you to know, we will continue to do whatever it takes, we will continue to have your backs—”
whatever that means—
“just like we did during the pandemic.”
The amendments we are debating here today would be one way of doing whatever it takes. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will take them seriously and, if she does not accept any of them, explain how the Government will do whatever it takes to protect those reliant on social security in the face of rising inflation.
Finally, on pension credit, the subject of Amendment 3, I believe that the uprating should be protected legally. But I would like to return briefly to the issue of take-up raised at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, which also has implications for later amendments on pensioner poverty. I welcome the willingness of Ministers—and our Minister in particular—to discuss with Peers ways of improving the lamentably low take-up rate. I had understood that it had been agreed that one way of doing so was to include a suitably arresting and well-designed leaflet or similar in communications with pensioners. I have received a couple of communications from the DWP since then, neither of which has drawn my attention to pension credit. Just last week, the letter I received about the winter fuel allowance made no mention at all of pension credit. Could the Minister tell us whether the idea of such a leaflet has been abandoned and, if so, why?
The quote from the PPI about what would have happened if the triple lock had been applied over two years was interesting. When we debated the Social Security (Up-rating of Benefits) Bill 2020, I asked whether the Government had considered some sort of smoothing process, such as applying the principles of the triple lock over two years instead of one. I went back and read Hansard again today, and the Minister said—I paraphrase—it was all a bit uncertain. But that would have avoided the methodological complexity and any associated legal risks that Ministers are worried about, since presumably, they are using an established measure—immune, I imagine, to legal test. I ask the Minister again: did the Government consider it? Looking back, does she think that might have been a safer way forward?