1: Clause 1, page 1, leave out lines 5 to 7 and insert—
“(4A) But sentencing guidelines may not require or prohibit the provision of a pre-sentence report by reference to an offender’s protected characteristics alone.”Member’s explanatory statement
This and other amendments in the name of Baroness Chakrabarti replace the reference in clause 1 to “different personal characteristics of an offender” with the tighter definition of “protected characteristics” in the Equality Act. It further restores some discretion to the Sentencing Council as long as guidelines do not require or prohibit pre-sentence reports on the basis of such characteristics alone.
I apologise to the Committee that I was not able to speak at Second Reading because I was unable to stay for the whole debate, but I attended a significant portion of it and I have read Hansard for the rest. I apologise as well that, subject to how long we are engaged in this Committee, I shall have to shuttle between the Moses Room and the Chamber for Committee on the Employment Rights Bill, where I also have amendments—no discourtesy is intended. Who knows, the Chair might give us a nod with her advice as to how business is going in the Chamber. We may have Divisions on the earlier business in the Chamber.
I take this opportunity to welcome my noble friend the Minister to his first Committee stage of a Bill. I am sad that this is the first Bill that he has had to grapple with. I should have liked a more auspicious Bill for him to begin with—but who knows? With the Gauke review to come, I still have high hopes for cross-party or non-party sensible approaches to sentencing, of a kind that I think we heard a little flavour of perhaps at Questions just now.
I have made no secret of the fact that I am not a fan of this Bill, either of the politics or the constitutionality of it, and I also have practical concerns about it. It is a real shame that this Bill came out of a soundbite war, essentially, about two-tier justice, and so on, which was really an extension of the appalling sights that we witnessed last summer. It is a shame that the Government felt it necessary to respond to less than thoughtful voices on all that, and it is a shame that they were unable to reach a sensible diplomatic resolution with the Sentencing Council.
Also, as a proud member of the governing party, I believe in a certain amount of affirmative action. Again, in this regard, I pay tribute to my noble friend the Minister. One reason why he is such an asset to the Government is that the Timpson brand, not just on the high street but in terms of penal reform, is such a well-respected brand, partly for its extraordinarily progressive experiment in a version of affirmative action, offering employment to people who otherwise would not get a look-in, for whom employment makes all the difference—that is, people who have been in custody. I pay all tribute to my noble friend and to his family.
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As we know, a single mother facing custody for the first time will not just have a very tough time in custody; her children will have a very tough time, too. I have seen, from some of the comments emerging under embargo and otherwise from the Gauke review, that the Government, and certainly David Gauke, are concerned about this, so let us not throw a spanner in the works of the positive Gauke review before it has even been born, if I may put it like that.
The final area for consideration in my Amendment 5 is
“where the sentencer is considering an offender for their first community or custodial sentence”.
Clearly, it is not in the natural scope of the Bill for me to attempt to bind the Government’s or Parliament’s hands to legislate to reverse austerity—more’s the pity—or to have PSRs in every case, but I certainly think that sentencing guidelines dealing with PSRs should be allowed to encourage, and should generally encourage, sentencers to think very seriously about trying to get a PSR before someone is given a community penalty or custodial sentence for the first time.
How can you tailor a community penalty to suit an offender, and have a chance of it working, without a PSR or some kind of expert advice about the disposals and programmes available and about what would suit the offender, including their needs and problems, and, equally, have custody? I really do not think we should be sending people to custody, especially for the first time, without a PSR. I am sorry that I have taken a bit of time, but those are my remarks on the first group.
My Lords, I tabled the next amendment in this group, Amendment 3, but, having had a conversation with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, I hope that we might hear from him, as I think he would be very helpful to the Committee at this point. I say that in case anyone looks at me and wonders why I am not speaking at this point.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for that suggestion. I hope not to detain the Committee for long. I declare some interests at the outset. When I was Lord Chief Justice, I was president of the Sentencing Council and thus responsible for appointing all its judicial members, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor appointed all the lay members with my concurrence. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I was present at the Second Reading debate but did not speak. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, spoke, and we considered that, for the sake of all those there, one former Lord Chief Justice was probably enough.
In one way or another, all the amendments in this group seek to confine or define what is meant by the term “personal characteristics” in the Bill. As all noble Lords will have noted, the term is not defined in the Bill and, in accord with various noble Lords who have tabled amendments, my strong view is that it needs a definition. Although there is no definition in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes try to provide some further explanation. They use the term “demographic cohort” as a synonym for personal characteristics, and they contrast “personal characteristics” with “personal circumstances”, but neither of those terms is in the Bill or defined.
In the Second Reading debate, the Minister said:
“The Bill states that personal characteristics include race, religion or belief, and cultural background, but these are examples and not a comprehensive list. ‘Personal characteristics’ is intended to include a wide range of characteristics, such as sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status”.—[Official Report, 7/5/25; col. 1625.]
The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explores what might be meant by “cultural background”, which is, of course, a term that came from the Sentencing Council’s draft guideline. Like others, I find it an extremely elastic and elusive concept. However, the inclusion of pregnancy status as a personal characteristic illustrates the problem caused by the lack of a statutory definition.
My Lords, I have Amendments 3 and 12 in this group. Like other noble Lords, I am sure, I have found myself very torn. I basically oppose the Bill, but we are having to deal with it today at the level of detail.
I am sorry not to be able to go absolutely all the way with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I am worried about the term “protected characteristics”. Perhaps this is taking too short-term a view, being too aware of the baggage that the term carries at the moment, but I have a nervous reaction against using a term which is in particular legislation for a particular purpose.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, mentioned the report of the Constitution Committee, of which I am also a member, which recommended that
“the Bill should be amended to ensure appropriate legislative certainty and clarity”,
going on to say there should be
“a full definition of the ‘personal characteristics’ on the face of the Bill or … an alternative term which is clearly legally defined”,
and also commented on retrospectivity. If the Bill is intended to apply to guidelines which are already operational, this should be explicit in the Bill.
Over the weekend, I thought about another approach to this. It was too late to table it as an amendment, but as we will come back to this clause—essentially, the whole of the Bill—on Report, I thought I would float it now. I found myself increasingly intrigued by the phrase
“framed by reference to different personal characteristics”.
Does that mean that the guidelines can include some characteristics if they are not the frame for them? Does it mean framed alone or only by reference to personal characteristics? I want to get rid of the Bill entirely, as I have said, but anything that will ameliorate the effects is worth looking at.
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The Bill is about guidelines and not directly about the pre-sentence report, so I will welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the pre-sentence report and sentence can take account of, or possibly even be framed by, personal characteristics. I am not alone in thinking that the terms “personal characteristics” and “personal circumstances” are difficult, when one looks at them together. We have had the ministerial letter, to which the noble and learned Lord referred, distinguishing what is intrinsic from what is external and done to you. Pregnancy and maternity are regarded as both “characteristics” and “circumstances” by some, and indeed at the meeting last week, for which I thank the Minister, we heard from the MoJ that there are some factors—can I call them that?—which can be both characteristics and circumstances. It is a cheap laugh to say that pregnancy is a circumstance, but certainly, as regards maternity, a lot of people would say that it can be a circumstance, but it can be a characteristic. There is a lot of discussion about how maternity affects one as a person.
What about addiction and neurodiversity? Is there a distinction between neurodiversity caused by a trauma, at birth or later, and genetic neurodiversity? I knew a gentleman who sustained a terrible brain injury when some scaffolding fell on him. It certainly changed his character, to the extent that he wanted to be so generous and helpful to everyone that he did not see that it was a problem if he went on an international flight with a hacksaw in his bag so that he could do some DIY work for his son, whom he was visiting. I am not alone in being concerned about the confusion around this.
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The Labour Party has been a pioneer in affirmative action, with all-women shortlists and the idea that sometimes, to deal with entrenched discrimination and injustice, one has to tilt the dial and try to take some affirmative measures. In a nutshell, that is the spirit of the Lammy report. That is where I am coming from, without making the Second Reading speech that I did not make.
We are where we are, as many noble Lords said at Second Reading. So, in the spirit of good faith and attempting to improve the Bill, I have in my name Amendments 1, 5, 11 and 13 in this group, and I support all the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and his colleagues, which I think are in the same spirit, attempting to minimise in particular any constitutional damage. Let us not throw the baby out with the bath water if we are concerned about perceptions of so-called two-tier justice; let us just get this right and make sure, of course, that people are being treated as individuals and not as ciphers for any particular group, but that their circumstances are also appropriately taken into account, which really is the whole point of a pre-sentence report in the first place.
First, in my Amendment 1, I take issue with the broad and quite vague concept of “personal characteristics” offered in the Bill and suggest that, if the Government are so concerned about this sloganistic perception of two-tiered justice, they should probably go to the tighter definitions in the Equality Act of protected characteristics on the one hand, but also not really clip the wings of the Sentencing Council too much: make sure the Sentencing Council does not clip the wings of individual sentencers on the one hand, and let individual sentencers make decisions about when they should and should not require a pre-sentence report. But this concept of personal characteristics is very vague.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his letter of last week, but I think that relying on Strasbourg case law about Article 14 is really not the best approach in the context of domestic law. Not that I am not a great champion of the convention, you understand; there are criteria that are useful at that kind of international law level. But at the domestic level, we should be a bit more granular and precise. In the context of looking at convicted people as individual human beings and at sentencing as an exercise in looking at those individual human beings and at what will help with rehabilitation and preventing reoffending, this very broad, vague concept that has been adopted in the Bill is a mistake and is in grave danger of shutting out the sorts of considerations that actually would be very useful when deciding in the context of rationing.
It is a shame we have to ration pre-sentence reports. Let us be clear—let me put myself on the record. I would like to have a pre-sentence report, ideally, whenever someone is going to be sentenced to a community penalty or to custody, and especially for the first time. If I am going to be told that that is totally unrealistic, so be it, but I certainly do not want their individual circumstances to be shut out of that assessment, and the Bill as currently drafted risks that. That was put incredibly well by a number of noble Lords at Second Reading and I refer colleagues to Hansard on that.
So that is why I suggest in my amendment to Clause 1 that it is one thing to say that a protected characteristic under the Equality Act should never be the reason why you definitely get a PSR or you do not get one, because we are concerned about two-tier justice and all of that—so you should not just get one because you are a woman or because you are black. But if that is part of the matrix of your general experience, knowing what we know about oversentencing and disproportionate outcomes, on the one hand, we need the tighter definition that comes with the Equality Act rather than in the case law from Article 14, and on the other hand, we should not clip the wings of the Sentencing Council too tightly.
Why should we not do that? From a constitutional point of view, the Sentencing Council plays a very important role in bridging the constitutional gap between the Executive and the legislature on the one hand, and sentences and judges on the other hand. What do I mean by that? If Parliament, with or without the initiation of the Government—it usually is on the initiation of the Government, let us be clear—wants to tell judges what to do, Parliament has vehicles for so doing. The primary vehicle is primary legislation and there is also secondary legislation. But the point of sentencing guidelines is not to do that.
The point of the guidelines is so that judges passing sentences of any level rightly and necessarily have discretion, which they must exercise in the interests of individual justice. Sentencing guidelines are about helping them structure that discretion so that we do not have a total postcode lottery and, in a sense, so that brother and sister sentencers can share their thinking about the sorts of factors they might like to have in mind before they sentence or, in this case, before they commission a pre-sentence report. That is what my first amendment is about: do not clip the wings of the Sentencing Council too tightly. Do not use vague terms that come from the jurisprudence of Article 14 rather than the tighter definitions in our established domestic legislation.
Moving on to other amendments in my name in this group, I draw the Committee’s attention to Amendment 5. This flips the dial and looks positively at the sorts of factors we would perhaps want. We have talked about what we do not want the Sentencing Council to be invoking in its guidelines because we are afraid of any suggestion that people are getting special treatment. But what about the sorts of things that ought to encourage the use of pre-sentence reports? I repeat that I would like everyone to get one but, if they have to be rationed, what sorts of factors would we actively want a judge to take into account and therefore the Sentencing Council to take into account and suggest to judges?
These factors are found in my Amendment 5, which includes
“where the sentencer believes that their own life experience is particularly far removed from that of the offender”.
We do not like to talk about this, but that was partly what the Lammy review was about. This is not an affront to people of a particular type; it is just saying that it is very hard. It is one thing to sit in judgment when you are trying to come up with positive, creative community and/or custodial sentences that are going to make things better and not worse. Maybe you should try to understand an offender that you do not understand—so, where the sentencer believes that their own life experience is particularly far removed from that of the offender.
The amendment also includes
“where the sentencer believes that an offender is a member of social group that appears to be over-represented in the prison population”.
I refer once more to the excellent Lammy report, which is how we got here in the first place. I am embarrassed, but also proud, to say that it was commissioned by a Conservative Prime Minister and written by the now Labour Foreign Secretary. It seems to be possible to have a different kind of conversation about sentencing and the criminal justice system, which I hope will continue later this week with the advent of the Gauke review.
The third area for consideration proposed by Amendment 5 is
“where the sentencer believes that an offender or their dependants may be particularly badly”
affected
“by the imposition of a community or custodial sentence”.
A famous Strasbourg judgment, Thlimmenos v Greece, makes a point about equal treatment; it is a very important Strasbourg decision. Non-discrimination is not just about treating people in the same way; it is about understanding the different needs and experiences of different people. If I require everyone coming to my restaurant or hotel to go up a steep staircase, I am shutting out anyone in a wheelchair. Thlimmenos v Greece is the landmark Strasbourg decision that said we also need to think about treating people with different experiences and needs differently in order to enforce the very important human rights principle of equal treatment.
A few minutes later, in the same debate, the Minister said:
“A particular concern was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about how the Bill may impact on women—in particular, pregnant women … To be clear, nothing in the Bill prevents judges requesting pre-sentence reports for pregnant women, nor will it affect Court of Appeal case law, which states that a pre-sentence report is desirable in the case of pregnant or postnatal women”.—[Official Report, 7/5/25; cols. 1626-27.]
With the greatest of respect to the Government, this exposes a degree of incoherence. The Government’s view is that pregnancy is a personal characteristic. It follows that, if this Bill passes in its current form, it would be unlawful for the Sentencing Council to include it in a guideline on pre-sentence reports; and that it would thus be unlawful for the Sentencing Council to give guidance that reflects judgments of the Court of Appeal. Is that really what the Government are trying to achieve? The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who sits directly opposite me, has an amendment to deal with that extraordinary outcome.
Although the Government have shied away from defining “personal characteristic” in the Bill, they have not had such inhibition in correspondence both to the Constitution Committee, on which I serve, and to all Peers. In a letter to all Peers, in a long section headed “Definition of ‘personal circumstances’”, the Minister explains that the European Court of Human Rights uses the term when considering, for the purposes of Article 14 discrimination, whether a person enjoys another status; the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has already referred in passing to some of the jurisprudence on that matter. However, if I may say so—in complete agreement with the Government—that term in the Strasbourg case law has no crisp definition, and it does not do so for very good reasons.
The Minister refers in his letter to jurisprudence in the House of Lords, where, in the context of Article 14, my noble and learned friend Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury—I am glad to see that he is in his place—and my noble and learned friend Lady Hale provided assistance with the meaning of “personal characteristics”. In his letter, the Minister approbates the interpretation of my noble friend Lord Neuberger, who said that
“the concept of ‘personal characteristic’ … generally requires one to concentrate on what somebody is, rather than what he is doing or what is being done to him”.
If it is the Government’s view that those wise words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, provide the kernel of a definition for the term, “personal characteristics”, why on earth is it not in the Bill? It matters because the correspondence goes on to suggest that the observations of both the noble Lord, Lord Neuberger, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and also, historically, Lord Steyn, would be a legitimate aid to construction to assist the Sentencing Council. I emphasise that it would not be a legitimate aid to construction should the matter ever find its way to a court—that is to say, the noble Lord’s letter, rather than the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger.
That comment, if I may respectfully say so, perhaps illustrates a faint misunderstanding in the Government. It is not only the Sentencing Council that needs to understand with clarity what the term “personal circumstances” means. All those who respond to consultation put out by the Sentencing Council must also be able to understand what it means. In these fevered times, it is not impossible that there might be a challenge to what the Sentencing Council has put in a draft guideline, and which might emerge in a final guideline. So, a court will have to—at least perhaps—interpret this phrase.
It is with that in mind that I support all or any amendments that seek to bring some clarity to what “personal circumstances” means in this context. Without a definition, I fear that the Government are storing up trouble for the future.