My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to introduce the second day of Committee on the Sentencing Bill. Amendment 51, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, proposes a targeted and necessary change to Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act, dealing with the Sentencing Code. Its purpose is straightforward: to ensure that, where a police or prison officer is murdered because of or in retaliation for their current or former duties, that murder automatically falls within the highest sentencing category—that is, one where a whole-life order is available and, ordinarily, appropriate.
At present, Schedule 21 refers to murders committed “in the course of” the victim’s duty. Those words are too narrow. We suggest that the provision was intended to capture the most egregious attacks on those who serve the public in roles that inherently expose them to danger. However, the phrase
“in the course of … duty”
in the statute has, in practice, been interpreted by the courts in a restrictive manner, excluding cases where an officer is murdered because of, in retaliation for or in consequence of their earlier performance of their official duties—for example, when a murder takes place a while later, after service has ended.
This amendment would correct that anomaly by inserting the essential clarification that, where the motivation for the murder is connected to the officer’s current or former duties, the case will fall within the highest sentencing category. That is legally coherent and morally necessary. Motive is already a well-recognised component of sentencing. It is taken into account in terrorism offences, hate crimes, witness intimidation and organised crime retaliation. It is therefore entirely consistent with the existing principle that the deliberate targeting of an officer because he or she carried out their duty should be regarded as an aggravating feature of the utmost severity.