Senior Civil Service (Accountability and Appointment)

It is not just the permanent secretaries we must consider. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trades Union Administration Act 2014 explains that a permanent secretary is a person serving in a range of government posts. That definition needs massively expanding to ensure that it encompasses top officials within state entities such as the NHS—for instance, the CEO of the NHS is often seen as a godlike distant figure and not suitably accountable to this place. Let us be in no doubt: horrific things happen if a culture is enabled where officials feel they are above policy instructions from the elected. At the current time, advancement in the civil service comes from appeasing the established networks, such as the commission, and the Minister for the civil service. These people serve the nation, so their fortunes should lie with this institution, not an elite few within it.

I do not propose that we fix all the issues at once, nor do I propose a baby-out-with -the-bathwater approach, but a modest solution that resets the relationship to a more traditional and, may I say, British footing. By that, I mean a process that is less invested in smoke-filled rooms with those from the Executive, one that empowers this place. I propose that a cross-party Committee of both Houses be formed to fold those appointments into understood due process. Appointments would be fixed-term and renewable by this place, which will end at a stroke the concept of a job for life. This is hardly revolution: it is a mix of established democratic processes in Parliament and professional standards that industry outside this place would recognise. It would only impact a few dozen people at the top; it is hardly onerous. I imagine that 99.9% of the civil service would not be impacted, but the change to the culture at the top would cascade down. If the upper echelons knew they were better overseen by this place—this cross-party institution—they would ensure that those they manage are correctly supported, mentored and held to account.

Some siren voices claim that this work could be discharged by Select Committees holding more hearings, or that better training of Ministers could fix all the issues, but the bottom line is that if a person has vast power over the machinery of government but does not feel a sense of fealty to Parliament, such ideas are mere tinkering. What I have proposed can be done now, in a modest manner, to gently course-correct a few errors and modernise and empower this institution. If we do not do so, eventually we could well need more radical reform. The relief valve is simple and established: professional industry processes via this accountable House. Let us act now, because if a trend of unaccountability continues to make people question who is really running Britain, the gold standard I mentioned will soon be seen as fool’s gold.

That Giles Watling, Michael Fabricant, Andrew Rosindell and Mr Mark Francois present the Bill.

Giles Watling accordingly presented the Bill.