With your permission, Mr Speaker, I want to update the House on the facts surrounding the collapse of the trial of Christopher Berry and Christopher Cash. However, following the Home Secretary’s statement, I also want to take the opportunity to express my deepest sympathies for the victims and families of those affected by the abhorrent terror attack that occurred at Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur. Tragically, two members of the UK’s Jewish community lost their lives. They remain in the thoughts of the whole House at this very difficult time.
I also express my gratitude for the rapid reactions of emergency responders, the security services and members of that local community. Two days later, a mosque in Peacehaven, East Sussex, was targeted in an arson attack. Fortunately, no one was injured. My thoughts, and I am sure the thoughts of the whole House, will be with members of that local community as well. We remain united in standing against hate in all its forms.
As I told the House in September, the Government remain extremely disappointed by the outcome of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry case. I understand the strength of feeling across the House and share the deep frustration at the fact that these individuals will not face trial. While the decision not to proceed was an independent one made by the Crown Prosecution Service, the Government remain gravely concerned about the security of our democratic institutions and are crystal clear that our Parliament must and will be protected from espionage. That is why I am today announcing that MI5’s National Protective Security Authority will be taking further steps to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I will set out more details on that in a moment.
Since I addressed the House on 15 September, there has been correspondence between hon. Members, the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service. There has also been widespread—and, at times, wholly inaccurate—reporting in the media. I will address the details set out by the Crown Prosecution Service and the basis on which the Government provided evidence to support the case, but first let me underline a fundamental point that has too often been overlooked in recent days, including by the Conservative party. The CPS brought these charges under the previous Government, and under the legislation that was in place at the time: the Official Secrets Act 1911—an antiquated law that is clearly no longer fit for purpose in addressing the complex and sophisticated nature of the state threats that we face today.
It has been clear for many years that the legislation has not kept pace with the modern state threats that we face today. It was evident that the Official Secrets Act was no longer fit for purpose as early as 2015, when Conservative Ministers tasked the Law Commission with reviewing this antiquated legislation—10 years ago. In 2020, the Law Commission and the Intelligence and Security Committee of this House were both clear that the legislation, drafted before the first world war, needed to be updated as a matter of urgency. It referred to espionage as
“any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information…which…might be…useful to an enemy”.
Those terms are archaic in the modern threat landscape that we now face. That is why the Labour party supported the passing of the National Security Act 2023 on a cross-party basis, closing the loopholes that have been exposed by this case.
The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), and the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), about this case, and it is welcome that these facts have been set out. The DPP has made it clear that charges were brought in April 2024 based on the law as it stood at the time of the offences. The deputy National Security Adviser—a senior official with very extensive experience in matters relating to national security—provided a witness statement in December 2023, under the previous Government. Further witness statements were requested and provided in February and July of this year.
All the evidence provided by the deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offence and the policy position of the Conservative Government at the time of the offence. Every effort was made to provide evidence to support this case within those constraints. The decision on whether to proceed with the prosecution was ultimately taken by the Crown Prosecution Service, which was hamstrung by antiquated legislation that had not been updated by the previous Conservative Government—[Interruption.]
Despite the evolving nature of the state threats that we face, the DPP has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government, or any senior civil servant or special adviser working within it. I want to be clear again today, as the Government have been before, that suggestions that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or restricted the ability of witnesses to draw on particular bits of evidence are all untrue. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so.
What has changed is the CPS’s assessment of the case law. The DPP has explained that in a separate case—the Crown v. Roussev—the High Court ruled on the threshold for evidence needed to prosecute under the antiquated 1911 legislation. In the light of this new judgment, the CPS independently decided to seek further evidence. But the fact remains that it was not the policy of the Conservative Government to classify China as a threat to national security. As the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) said as Foreign Secretary, summing up China in one word as a threat was
I have listened with interest in recent days to advice from former Conservative Ministers on how the UK should now define our approach to China, but I must remind them and the House that what matters is what their policy was in government. The previous Government set out their position on China in the 2021 integrated review, in which they described China as a “systemic challenge” to UK security. In the integrated review refresh of 2023, they described China as an “epoch-defining challenge”. As the Prime Minister has explained, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to the assessment made by the CPS. Ministers cannot retrospectively change policy that existed under the Conservative Government and, as stated before, the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official.
May I associate myself with the Minister’s remarks about Heaton Park synagogue? I thank Mr Speaker for all his work on Members’ security. No one has worked harder to protect the integrity of our Parliament.
The Security Minister is very well regarded, so I am sorry to see that he has been sent here again to make these arguments, which will not wash. This is about the ineptitude of the Government, and I cannot accept much of what he says. He has brought some updates to the House, which we acknowledge, but in essence, China spied on this Parliament and the Government are issuing us with leaflets. That is not good enough. There are Members here who have been spied on and sanctioned by China. Even Madam Deputy Speaker has been sanctioned. All MPs speaking today should be acting in the national interest—nothing else.
Let us remind ourselves of what has happened. Two men have been accused of spying on MPs in this very building. The CPS has what it felt was a clear and compelling case to prosecute, but the trial has collapsed because, for months and months, the Government have refused to give the CPS vital information. That was not a mistake; it was not a misunderstanding; it looks like a deliberate decision to collapse the case and curry favour with the regime in China. Instead of admitting that, the Security Minister has come here blaming the Official Secrets Act, when we know that the Act was enough to prosecute the case. Its deficiencies had nothing to do with the Government’s failures.
May I remind the House how serious this is? If the Government do not prosecute those who spy on us, it sends a message to the public that the Government do not care about their safety; it sends a message to our allies, who share intelligence with us, that Britain cannot be trusted; and it sends a message to those who spy on us that they can get away with it.
Let us look at the facts. First, the Government blamed the CPS. The Minister came to the House on 15 September and claimed that he had become aware of the situation only that day, and that the CPS decision had been an entirely independent one—an assertion that he has repeated today. He said:
I find it genuinely astonishing that at no point did the Leader of the Opposition acknowledge that all the acts that we have been talking about this afternoon happened when she was in government, on her watch.
I believe that it is important to discuss these matters in a fair and reasonable way, so I particularly made sure that the right hon. Lady had early sight of the statement, to give her ample opportunity. She has clearly not read the statement—she either did not read the statement or did not listen to what I have said, because she has asked me a number—[Interruption.]
I took every opportunity to give the right hon. Lady as long as I possibly could so that she could look at the points that we were seeking to raise today. But she has asked me questions that I answered in my earlier responses. I say that to her because it is important that we seek to discuss these things in a reasonable way. Matters relating—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston (Neil O'Brien) guffaws from a sedentary position, but I think it is important that we should seek to discuss matters relating to national security in a reasonable and consensual way. That is the approach of this Government.
I am genuinely really sorry that the right hon. Lady has taken the opportunity to make a whole series of baseless smears this afternoon. Perhaps we should not be too surprised: the statement that we have heard from the Leader of the Opposition is sadly typical of what we have heard from some of her colleagues in recent days. For days, the Conservative party has been making baseless claims that the Government deliberately collapsed an independent legal process through political interference. There is not a shred of evidence to back up any of the accusations that she has made. I do not think that is a responsible way to discuss matters of national security.
I remind the Leader of the Opposition that, whatever Members might say this afternoon, we are here today because of legislation and policy that existed under the previous Government. The Leader of the Opposition referenced the letter that she had written to the Prime Minister. We want to respond to her in a timely fashion, so I will now respond to the points that she made to the Prime Minister. In case she has forgotten, it was she herself who said in September last year:
“I have shied away from calling China a threat”.
She articulated the previous Government’s policy as Business Secretary, saying in September 2023:
May I begin by expressing solidarity with the two previous Conservative Chairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who would seem to have suffered from having Chinese spies in their offices? That must have been very distressing, upsetting and threatening.
The DPP’s claim of needing further evidence from the Government and decision not to publish the China audit has, I think, become conflated and resulted in a great deal of muddle and confusion, and allegations that the Government are soft-pedalling on China. Before we disappear down that rabbit hole, may I take us back to basics? As I understand it, these men were charged with an offence under section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act: to pass on information that
“might be…directly or indirectly useful to an enemy”.
When the Crown Prosecution Service was building its case, presumably it had a witness and presumably that witness was the deputy National Security Adviser, who was there to answer this question: is China an enemy? Without that evidence, there was no point in charging the men in 2024. What has changed since 2024? We are told that what has changed is that the enemy is now—[Interruption.]
It seems that there is now case law saying that an enemy is a threat to national security. Frankly, that seems to be a lower test not a higher test. But if, in 2024, there was evidence that China was an enemy and the Crown Prosecution Service had made a decision to prosecute on that basis, I cannot understand why there has been a change now. The only other answer is that the Crown Prosecution Service did not properly assess the evidence before making those charges. Moving away from all the light, heat and fury, it seems to me that those are the central points.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. She talked about muddle and confusion: she is right that there has been a lot of ill-informed commentary in previous days. That is precisely why the Government have proactively brought a statement to the House to set out the facts of the trial, and I am very happy to be able to do that.
Let me do that again for my right hon. Friend. The DPP has set out the reasons at the heart of his decision not to take this case to trial. He believed that the evidential test was not met. The DPP took an independent decision on the evidence, as was set out in his letter of 7 October. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so. As the Prime Minister, her constituency neighbour, has explained very clearly, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to this assessment. It is only the Government’s policy at the time that the alleged offences were committed that is relevant.
My right hon. Friend will understand that the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official. I have been crystal clear about that today. The Director of Public Prosecutions has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party. As the Government have already stated, the suggestions that the Government concealed evidence or withdrew or leant on witnesses are all untrue.
I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. Over the weekend, Sir John Sawers became the latest former intelligence chief to express disbelief at the collapse of this espionage case, and our intelligence allies are now also questioning whether the UK can be trusted to counter China’s growing threat. It is vital that we have a clear answer about who in Government is responsible for the failure to bring this case to trial. Sadly, instead of clear answers, over the weekend we have heard Ministers delivering vague and cryptic lines to take.
The nation has a right to understand which figures within Government were involved in the process not to proceed with a prosecution. Given the Minister’s statement that the Government have not concealed the evidence or suppressed anything, will the Minister commit to publishing a timeline showing who knew what and when, and who said what and when? Will he publish correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS? If he will do that, we can gain the clarity that we and the British public need.
Will the Minister confirm again, with full confidence, that the Prime Minister, or any individuals who act on his behalf, played no role in any decision to prevent the supply of relevant evidence to the CPS, which might or might not include words of gentle encouragement either way? We must learn the lessons from this appalling episode so that we can have confidence in the ability of our national security laws to protect our interests and protect our democracy. That is our job in this House. This is the only way to provide the British public with the answers that they deserve and demand, and to rebuild the UK’s credibility with Five Eyes allies.
Will the Government commit today to holding a statutory independent inquiry into the China spying case? We know that China poses a clear threat to this country’s interests and values, a view that is shared by Liberal Democrat Members, as well as by our intelligence chiefs. Yet the Government’s approach to this case is only the latest example of their unwillingness to challenge Beijing’s efforts to expand its espionage capabilities in the UK and export transnational repression to our shores.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman to his new role. As he may know, I am a regular visitor to his constituency and I pay tribute to the important national security work that takes place there. He asked me a number of questions and, with great respect to him, I hope that he will concede that I have responded to a number of them already.
On his point about releasing information, which is an entirely reasonable question, it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in any further ongoing legal processes, so I hope he understands the reason that I am unable to commit to doing that at the moment.
I take issue with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis of the Government’s relationship with China, particularly on transnational repression. I hope that he will accept that the Government take that very seriously. We have done a lot of work through the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that we have the right resources in the right place to protect all those who live here in the UK from the impact of transnational repression, but I am happy to discuss that with him further.
The hon. Gentleman specifically raised the importance of our Five Eyes alliance, about which I agree with him. That is precisely why the UK recently hosted the ministerial gathering of the five countries in London, where we cemented our excellent relationship with our Five Eyes partners. As he will know, we share intelligence with them on a very regular basis. That relationship is in good health and has in no way been undermined by recent events.
The Government have made it clear that they regret the fact that this case is not going ahead. The Minister rightly says that the CPS acts independently when making charging decisions, but will he go further than regret and say that, as a matter of law and evidence, this prosecution should have gone ahead and that the issue of innocence or guilt should have been determined by a judge and jury?
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At this moment of profound global change and insecurity, these matters have led to discussion about this Government’s approach to China, so let me set that out for the House. We must tackle the threats that China poses, which range from cyber-security attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hongkongers in the UK. This Government are unequivocal that the first duty of Government is to keep people safe. We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, yet we must also be alive to the fact that China presents us with opportunities. It is the world’s second largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, the UK’s third largest trading partner. The only way to act in the UK’s best interest is to take a long-term and strategic approach. That means working in close co-ordination with Five Eyes and wider allies to build collective resilience to the threats that China poses, investing in our intelligence services and being unequivocal about our position on human rights. It also means developing a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising on our national security. Let me set out the recent actions that the Government have taken to strengthen UK security against state threats, including those posed by China.
MI5’s national protective security authority has today launched new guidance to protect the UK’s democratic institutions from foreign interference. The guidance will help Members in this House and the other place, Members of the devolved legislatures, local councillors, mayors and elected representatives’ staff to better understand the nature of the threat. It also provides simple, effective steps for at-risk individuals to take to protect themselves, their teams and the integrity of our democratic processes. The guidance will kick-start a wider cross-Government action plan that is being driven through the defending democracy taskforce to reduce foreign interference and espionage threats to UK democratic institutions. It will be delivered in close co-ordination with the parliamentary security authorities. I urge all Members of this House to be alert and follow the guidance, and to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses.
The Government also remain steadfast in our commitment to holding Chinese state-linked actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage. In September, the NCSC co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I can reassure the House that we continue to keep all tools under review, and will act as necessary to reduce their threat.
The Government are also committed to legislating to further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference. That specifically includes a new elections Bill to strengthen safeguards against covert foreign political funding, and involves taking forward the recommendations from the independent reviewer for legislation on state threats.
Let me finish by reiterating this Government’s unwavering commitment to national security and to keeping our country safe. We will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm, and to ensure that the UK is best placed to tackle state threats, including those emanating from China. I commend the statement to the House.
“I am not able to talk about why the CPS has decided to make this decision.”—[Official Report, 15 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1186.]
He said that it was not for him to “speculate on the reason”. He told my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) to “seek a meeting” if she wanted to find out the reasons. However, we now know, despite all he has just said, that the trial collapsed because the Government refused to give the CPS what it needed, and the Minister knew full well why it had collapsed. The Director of Public Prosecutions has said that he spent months trying to get the Government to provide the evidence that the CPS needed.
Secondly, the Government tried blaming the previous Government. Just like the Prime Minister, the Minister claims that the CPS could not prosecute because the previous Government did not describe China as a threat. I cannot believe that he would actually say that. He knows what we said, but let me remind him. For starters, the 2021 integrated review described China as—listen carefully—the “biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security.” The 2023 integrated review refresh said several times that China posed—listen carefully—a threat. In 2024, the then Minister for Security said from the Dispatch Box that China poses a serious threat. But even if the previous Government had not said China was a threat, which they did, this Government needed only to convince a jury that it was a threat, and the Minister knows that. I am astonished that he has repeated that nonsense today.
The Minister’s and Prime Minister’s argument has been refuted by no less than a former DPP, two former Cabinet Secretaries—one a former National Security Adviser—two former heads of MI6, and a professor of public law at the University of Cambridge, who said today that Ministers’ statements so far are “misleading” about the legal position. They are all clear that those people could have been prosecuted under the old legislation. Is the Government’s position that they are all wrong and the Government are right? The Minister referred to R v.Roussev. That case last year made it easier to prosecute, not harder. As the former Director of Public Prosecutions said of recruiting people to spy on MPs,
“That of itself clearly constitutes a threat to national security.”
Only this Government could mess that up.
We know that the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, has a very close relationship with China. Are we supposed to believe that he was not involved in the “substance of the case and discussions around it”, as they say? What does that even mean? He was in those meetings, acting in the name of the Prime Minister. Do the Government really expect us to believe that he never mentioned any of this to the Prime Minister at any point?
We know from the CPS that it spent months and months asking the Government for the evidence that it needed. The Government say that the NSA did not take the decision not to give it the evidence, so who did? Who made that decision—can the Minister answer that question today? Is the Government’s argument seriously that no Minister knew anything about this until the trial collapsed? If that is the case, it is astonishing. My suspicion is that that is not the case, and that Ministers did know. They had the Chinese super-embassy in their in-tray, and they are allegedly being asked to pay £1 billion in compensation for the nationalisation of British Steel. I suspect that they have decided that closer economic ties with China were more important than due process and our national security. If that is the case, and that was the Government’s decision, they should tell us and have the backbone to admit it. They should explain it to the public, the CPS and our international allies, and let them all be the judge.
This issue is not going away—there is nowhere to hide. I wrote to the Prime Minister today and would like to know when I will get a response to my questions. We have also written to the Crown Prosecution Service to ask whether the trial can be reopened if the Government finally provide the evidence that they have been holding back. We know that the evidence that the CPS needs exists. If the Government decide not to provide it, then we will know that that is because this weak Prime Minister does not have the backbone to stand up to Beijing.
“We certainly should not be describing China as a foe”.
Those are the right hon. Lady’s own words.
Opposition Front Benchers have raised a number of questions, including in the letter published by the right hon. Lady earlier today. I am very happy to set out the Government’s response to her questions. First, on the question of what Ministers knew about the Government’s interactions with the CPS, Ministers were aware that evidence was being provided by the deputy National Security Adviser to the CPS as it built a case for prosecution, as was first agreed under the previous Government. Ministers and special advisers did not take decisions about that evidence and they were not cited in the contents. The deputy National Security Adviser was given full freedom to provide evidence without interference, as was the case before the general election.
Secondly, the right hon. Lady asked in her letter whether the Prime Minister was briefed by Ministers or the National Security Adviser about the case. The Prime Minister has already confirmed that he was briefed on the case by officials, not least because the case began under the previous Conservative Government.
Thirdly, there have been various reports alleging that in a meeting in September, the National Security Adviser ruled that China could not be defined as a threat and took decisions relating to witnesses or evidence. That is simply untrue. Of course, the NSA takes part in discussions about national security and diplomatic relations—that is literally his job. But any discussions were on the basis that the case would be going ahead and about how to handle the implications. The National Security Adviser was not involved in any decisions about the substance of the evidence. That means, to answer the fourth question raised by the Leader of the Opposition, that he made no decisions about the content of any evidence—[Interruption.] Hon. Members have asked for a thorough explanation and I am giving it to them; they might pay the House the courtesy of listening to the responses.
The National Security Adviser made no decisions about the content of any evidence relating to the case itself. This was a matter for the deputy National Security Adviser—a hugely experienced, highly capable senior official who provided evidence under the previous Administration.
On questions about when I and other Ministers were aware that the case would not be proceeding, I should say that Ministers were informed after the DPP had made his decision and shortly before reporting restrictions were lifted. Hon. Members will note that I came to the House straight away to make a statement.
Finally, on whether it might still have been possible to argue successfully in court that China was a threat regardless of the previous Government’s position not to do so, that was a judgment for the Crown Prosecution Service. However, the deputy National Security Adviser provided evidence reflecting the threats posed by China as the CPS built its case. On the comments, referenced by the right hon. Lady, made by two former Cabinet Secretaries, I note that they have both remarked that the Official Secrets Act was not fit for purpose. Of course, if the Conservatives had been swift in replacing it, we would not be here today.
Safeguarding our national security is the most fundamental responsibility of this Government. In 14 years of rule, the Conservative party was slow both to update our national security laws and to adapt to the national security realities that we face today. If we followed the Conservatives’ approach—to ignore and refuse to engage with China—that would undermine our national security. On this side of the House, we will always defend our national interest.
It is time for the Government to take the steps necessary to protect our interests and those of our citizens. Working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to prosecute the two individuals involved? Those options are still available. Will the Government block the application for the Chinese mega-embassy? And will the Minister add China to the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?