- Statement
- 5:59 pm
- My Lords, with the indulgence of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place earlier today relating to espionage. The Statement is as follows:“With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement regarding three arrests that took place this morning as part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation into suspected National Security Act offences. I can confirm that this relates to China. I can also confirm that this relates to foreign interference targeting UK democracy.Mr Speaker, for reasons that you will understand, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on any aspect of what is now a live investigation. It is absolutely critical that we do not hamper the work of the police or prejudice any future legal processes by what we say in this House today. I would, however, point the House to what Counter Terrorism Policing has just said in its own statement: namely, that this morning, officers from Counter Terrorism Policing arrested three men as part of an investigation into suspected National Security Act 2023 offences. All three men were arrested on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to Section 3 of that Act. Of course, any decision as to whether to proceed with a prosecution will be a matter for the CPS.The Government stand resolute in our resolve to counter foreign interference activity targeting the UK from any state actor. The Government have been consistent and unambiguous in our assessment that China presents a series of threats to the United Kingdom. We remain deeply concerned by an increased pattern of covert activity from Chinese state-linked actors targeting UK democracy. This involves attempts to obtain information on UK policy-making and interfere with our sovereign affairs.From the November MI5 espionage alert warning about Chinese intelligence officers targeting individuals with access to sensitive information on Parliament and government to the attempted interference activities of Christine Lee in 2022, this Government will not tolerate it. I can confirm to the House that British officials have formally démarched Chinese counterparts in London and Beijing about these allegations to raise our strong concerns. However, as this is a live investigation, it would not be appropriate to comment further. But let me be clear: if there is proven evidence of attempts by China to interfere with UK sovereign affairs, we will impose severe consequences and hold all actors to account.In the meantime, the Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK’s democratic institutions and processes are a hard target for this activity. The National Security Act provides our intelligence agencies and law enforcement with the modern legal tools they need to deter, detect and disrupt the full range of state threats. The action that Counter Terrorism Policing has been able to take this morning is an example of that legislation working well. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act also provides an essential framework for ensuring that those who seek to undermine our democracy are held to account.I also continue to drive across government the delivery of our counter-political interference and espionage action plan, which I announced to Parliament on 18 November. This is being co-ordinated in strong partnership with the parliamentary security authorities. Our aim is to forge a cross-party and whole-of-society shield to safeguard UK democracy. This includes strengthening our legal defences, cutting off channels for interference, and supporting those on the front line of UK politics to recognise, resist and report the threat.Members should have seen the guidance that the National Protective Security Authority and the National Cyber Security Centre published last year, on what to look out for in terms of malicious foreign targeting and some basic steps that Members can take to protect themselves. I urge all Members to read carefully through the guidance that was issued. If honourable Members experience any suspicious or out-of-the-ordinary interaction, whether in person or online, they should report it to the Parliamentary Security Department. The Government will continue to work in collaboration with the Parliament Security Department to set up a range of more tailored, bespoke briefings for those at greatest risk.In January, I joined the director-general of MI5 and the chief executive of the NCSC to brief the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat culture. I can confirm that officials are now focused on developing a programme of work to engage with the UK’s think tanks and non-profit sector to discuss the threats that they face from foreign interference. Our intent is to work with them to strengthen their resilience, ensuring that their hard-won reputations and networks are not exploited by our adversaries as platforms for covertly influencing UK public discourse and policy-making.In February, we introduced the Representation of the People Bill, which will further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference through political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties.The Government eagerly await the report of Philip Rycroft, following his independent review of regulations and safeguards against foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review was commissioned to rigorously test the financial safeguards we currently have in place and will specifically consider safeguards against illicit funding streams, including the use of crypto assets. The review’s findings will be delivered to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and me by the end of the month, and I can confirm that recommendations, where appropriate, will inform the Representation of the People Bill. We are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-style tool to disrupt proxy organisations undermining our security.It continues to be in our long-term strategic interest to engage with China. We are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically on areas where engagement is in the UK’s national interest, including climate, global health, trade and scientific research, but also illegal migration and serious organised crime, to name just a few. But let me be crystal clear: this is not a question of balancing economic and security considerations. We do not trade off security for economic access. Instead, by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas.We will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere with or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will always prioritise UK national security. That is why the Prime Minister’s visit opened up a direct channel of communication to deliver in the national interest, enabling us to raise frank concerns about activities that impact our national security at the most senior levels of the Chinese system, including domestic security issues.I assure Members of the House and the public at home that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to defend our democracy. The Government are steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and deterring China’s interference activity wherever it takes place. I commend this Statement to the House”.
- 6:07 pm
- My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating this important statement, and I congratulate her very much on her recent and well-deserved promotion. I look forward to continuing our spirited and enthusiastic discourse over many months ahead, and I shall try not to try her patience too far. We are also grateful to Ministers for making a Statement so swiftly and for allowing us to repeat the Statement in your Lordships’ House today.Ministers will recognise the seriousness of this situation. If these charges are proven, it will not be the first time that China has spied on us here in Parliament. Interference with our democracy is unacceptable. I pay tribute to all those who have been involved in this investigation, and especially to those public servants who have put themselves in harm’s way to keep us all safe.This is a fast-developing situation, and I understand that there will be limits to how much the Minister can say to the House on the details of the case. The Guardian has reported that one of those arrested is the spouse of a sitting Labour MP, and that another is the spouse of a former Labour MP.The Security Minister in the other place reassured Parliament of“the Government’s determination to stand with all Members to ensure that they are properly protected”.Can the Minister provide any additional detail on the steps that Members of both Houses should be taking in response to this latest espionage case? Will Members of your Lordships’ House be contacted about any additional measures that should be taken? Given that the individuals arrested for these alleged offences were involved in politics, some apparently over many years, are there steps that we as politicians may take to support the investigations that are ongoing?Although we accept that Ministers, government officials and parliamentary officials will be working very hard to respond to this shocking news, I cannot let this pass without noting the wider background of the Government’s stance towards China. Since the Government took office, we have seen the collapse of a high-profile China trial. Can the Minister reassure the House that the Government have learned the lessons of that case and that every effort will be made to ensure that this case does not collapse in the same way?
- My Lords, we also thank the Minister for repeating this Statement, and appreciate the subtleties of where we are now and the limits as to what we can say about this specific case. I declare an interest: I went to China for the first time in 1982 and have been many times since. I was, professionally, an academic working in a think tank on international relations and teaching international relations at a number of universities, and was actively involved in negotiations at the London School of Economics to build joint degrees with Fudan and Tsinghua universities. I well remember the difficulties we had in years after that with the pressure from the Chinese to double the number of students every year and not to maintain the careful controls that we wanted to have on them.We know that China has become much more of a threat than it was 20 or 30 years ago. That is part of it. We also know that we all live in a bit of a glass house on this and we should not throw stones. This afternoon, I reread the ISC report on China and it is deeply critical of David Cameron—the noble Lord, Lord Cameron —George Osborne and a number of others. We have all walked the very delicate line between maintaining good relations, including good social relations, and not allowing foreign Governments to gain information they should not have or get involved in any sense in undue influence. Foreign influence in British politics is unavoidable. Foreign interference, particularly when it involves money and covert activities, is completely unacceptable.It is not just China or even Russia. We had the statement from an under-secretary in the US Department of State the other week that she intends to use State Department funds for international development to influence British and European politics. That is also foreign interference in British politics. Some of us feel that right-wing foundations in parts of the southern United States now putting money into think tanks and lobby groups in Britain is also unacceptable foreign interference. We hope that will be part of what we will all actively discuss when we come to the Representation of the People Bill. We look forward to the Rycroft review and to the Government taking an active role in accepting the conclusions of that review and putting them in that Bill.
- My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their contributions, the very tone of which demonstrates how serious these matters are. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for her congratulations on my appointment. My introduction to being a Minister has been a really easy 24 hours.I hope I speak for all sides of the House when I say that these matters require us to put the protection of our democracy at the forefront—there is nothing more important. As noble Lords have rightly acknowledged, matters of interference, particularly those relating to Parliament and your Lordships’ House, are of the utmost importance to both Houses and the entire nation. They merit careful consideration by the Government, decisive action by Ministers and appropriate scrutiny by Parliament. It is right that the Opposition have the opportunity to scrutinise, to question Ministers in this House and the other place, and to be appropriately briefed on developments, which is why my colleague in the other place, the Security Minister, was on his feet at the Dispatch Box within an hour of the police statement today, and why I am here this evening.The Government have not hesitated to acknowledge the threats China poses to the UK, from cyber espionage operations to foreign interference. The Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK’s democratic institutions and processes are a hard target for this activity. We will continue to engage with China confidently and pragmatically in areas where engagement is in the UK’s national interests; however, we will never compromise on our national security.Members of your Lordships’ House will appreciate the sensitivity of these issues. Protecting the operational integrity of our police and security services is of the utmost importance. To protect the live police investigation, noble Lords will understand that I am extremely limited in what I can say regarding the specific details of the active case. However, both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness raised a number of questions in their remarks and, while I must be circumspect to avoid any prejudice to legal proceedings, I will seek to address as many of the points that I can now—I will reflect on Hansard if I miss any—within the broader policy points. If I miss anything else, it is because I am unable to address those points, but I will revert to both noble Lords outside.
- 6:27 pm
- My Lords, does this not reflect the flaw in the approach of successive Governments to China? They have all said that we will engage with China where it is appropriate, trade with it where it is appropriate and contest it where it is appropriate. That would be fine if those things came in separate boxes, but that is not how the CCP sees the world. It uses every aspect of Chinese society as a tool to further what it sees as its national interests. It is not at all clear to me that we do the same thing in such a holistic fashion. It is not about not engaging with China. It is about checking your fingers before and after you do and approaching every aspect of engagement with the right degree of caution and suspicion.
- I thank the noble and gallant Lord. I believe I have all my fingers, but he is right—this is about how we engage, what issues are in our national interests, where we can co-operate and where we need to challenge. We appreciate that we have a £100 billion trading relationship with China, which means that there are tens of thousands of jobs in the United Kingdom dependent on our relationship. But, at the same time, we seek to do everything we can to protect ourselves. How we do that is a matter for ongoing discussion, but the Government have made a clear decision that engagement is key and, in areas of global diplomacy, more words are definitely better than fewer.
- My Lords, I declare an interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said that, because our universities are so financially dependent on China, there may be a risk of interference at the behest of the Chinese in academic freedom and free speech. The noble Lord recommended various measures to address that risk and the Minister also referred to various measures. But there is an additional measure, which would be to commence Section 9 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act, which requires universities to disclose to the Office for Students their foreign funding and then the Office for Students to monitor those universities to see if there is any interference in academic freedom or free speech as a consequence of that foreign funding.We know that there are some examples of this. I can think of two off the top of my head, Michelle Shipworth and Laura Murphy, but there are numerous others. It was referred to in the recent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which we discussed in this House last week. Will the Minister take this opportunity to set out a timetable for the commencement of Section 9 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act?
- The noble Lord has campaigned actively on these issues through the Free Speech Union, as I did in my previous iteration at Index on Censorship—slightly different approaches and campaign tactics, but with the same aspiration to ensure academic freedom. Our universities —our cathedrals of challenge, engagement and thinking —are incredibly important. I know that the noble Lord has raised these issues directly with the Minister responsible and I will follow up on those conversations.
- My Lords, I add my congratulations to the newly promoted Minister. My noble friend richly deserves this.If it is genuinely true that the Government make no trade-off between national security and economic access, what other reasons can there be not to place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme now?
- I thank the noble Lord, who is also my friend whom I have known, I hate to say, for two decades—so this is all his fault. He raises a very important point about the foreign influence registration scheme. No decision has yet been made in relation to specifying China on the enhanced tier of FIRS, as I said earlier. Any changes to that position will come before Parliament in the usual way, but I promise noble Lords that their arguments in both your Lordships’ House and the other place have been heard.
- To follow up the point about universities made by the noble Lord, Lord Young, the Xinjiang province of China grows 20% of the world’s cotton. Since it became technically possible to check garments for where the cotton was grown, the laundering of that cotton by the Chinese—because they do not want to put “grown in China” on it—is massive. It was Sheffield Hallam University that produced the report by Dr Murphy on the laundering of cotton, which has been used once or twice in this House. It is a trade issue as well. They are hiding what they are growing because they know there will be reactions against it, and therefore there is every reason to develop these situations, as far as the universities are concerned.
- I thank my noble friend, who had a Question on this specific issue last year. It encouraged me to check where my clothes are made when buying them, which has made shopping on Vinted a challenge. He is right about some of the things that may or may not have been happening in Xinjiang province and what that means for the wider supply chain. I will have to get an update for him on where we currently are, but given that he raised the issue of Sheffield Hallam, I again place on record my thanks to my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, whose name is on the institution that was targeted in the way that we are all aware of.
- My Lords, the Minister spoke about taking tough steps and the seriousness of this. Can I press her further on the location of the Chinese embassy? I know that she attempted to answer the question from my noble friend Lady Finn, but why has the decision been made? Surely this is one occasion on which the decision to allow the location should be rethought.
- I believe the noble Viscount was present when I presented the Statement on the national security element of the Chinese embassy. I and other Minister have repeatedly come before your Lordships’ House to make clear the Government’s line. Given events, I repeat that the Government have been clear throughout that the planning decision was for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government to make, in an independent, quasi-judicial capacity. We are confident that the decision is lawful, and it would be inappropriate to comment any further at this time.