In December, following a collective Government decision and a procurement process involving my Department and the Treasury, we contracted with three shipping companies to provide additional ferry capacity as part of contingency planning for a potential no-deal EU exit.
Let me make it absolutely clear that in the event of a no-deal Brexit, the Government’s priority will be to ensure the smooth operation of both the port of Dover and the channel tunnel, and we are introducing measures at the UK end to contribute to that. However, any sensible Government plan for all eventualities. That is why we agreed contracts worth around £100 million, with the bulk of the award—£89 million—going to DFDS and Brittany Ferries to provide services across seven separate routes. Built into those agreements are options to add capacity on two other routes from those companies, should they be required. That capacity could be needed to guarantee the smooth flow of some key goods into the UK, particularly for the NHS. It is worth my reminding the House that, in the event of no deal and constriction on the short strait, the capacity would be sold on to hauliers carrying priority goods.
In addition to the £89 million-worth of contracts with DFDS and Brittany Ferries, the Department entered into a £13.8 million contract with Seaborne Freight to provide ferry services from the port of Ramsgate to Ostend. At the time of the award, we were fully aware of Seaborne’s status as a start-up business and the need for it to secure vessels and port user agreements to deliver a service. However, the shorter distance between the two ports meant that the route could provide us with shorter journey times and lower cost, making it a potentially attractive part of the package.
Seaborne’s proposition to the Department was backed by Arklow Shipping, Ireland’s biggest and one of Europe’s largest shipping companies. For commercial reasons, I have not been able to name Arklow Shipping or mention its involvement to date, but its support for the proposition from the outset and the assurances received by the Department provided confidence in the viability of the deal. Arklow confirmed to me that it intended to finance the purchase of ships and would be a major shareholder in Seaborne. It also confirmed to me its view that the Seaborne plans were “both viable and deliverable”. Those assurances included clear evidence about the availability of suitable vessels from the continent and about the formal steps that Seaborne, via Arklow, had taken to secure the vessels. However, releasing that information into the public domain could have driven up the cost of the vessels significantly and might even have resulted in their being removed from the market, where supply is extremely scarce. I have therefore had to refrain from saying anything publicly about this to date.
My Department monitored closely Seaborne’s progress towards meeting its contractual commitments. By last week, the company had secured firm options on ships to operate on the route, had reached provisional agreement with Ostend and was close to doing so with Ramsgate. However, late last week, despite previous assurances, Arklow Shipping suddenly and unexpectedly withdrew its backing from Seaborne. In the light of this, and after very careful assessment, I took the decision to terminate this contract. My Department concluded that there were now too many major commercial issues to be resolved to enable Seaborne to establish alternative arrangements and finance in the time needed to bring ferries and ports into operation.