Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2020

The cyber sanctions regulations are aimed at preventing certain types of cyberactivity that undermine the integrity, prosperity or security of the UK or any other country. They are also intended to prevent certain types of cyberactivity that cause the economic loss or prejudice of commercial interests, undermine the independence or effective functioning of an international organisation, or otherwise affect a significant number of people in an indiscriminate manner. The regulations permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. We have imposed sanctions on the same 12 individuals and entities as were sanctioned in 2020 by the EU. These include actors from Russia, China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The Guinea sanctions regulations aim to encourage the Government of Guinea to properly investigate the violent repression that took place on 28 September 2009 and its aftermath, as well as to hold those responsible to account. The regulations permit the imposition of targeted financial and immigration sanctions.

The misappropriation sanctions regulations are aimed at deterring and providing accountability for the misappropriation of state funds from a country outside the UK. They permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions. Rather than establish geographical regimes, as existed under EU legislation, this instrument creates a single thematic regime under which designations can be made in respect of misappropriation of state funds taking place anywhere outside the UK, allowing for greater agility and flexibility.

The Nicaragua sanctions regulations are aimed at encouraging the Government of Nicaragua to respect democratic principles and institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law, to refrain from the repression of civil society and to respect human rights. The regulations permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions.

The Unauthorised Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 aim to discourage any unauthorised hydrocarbon exploration or production activities in the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus or on its continental shelf. They permit the imposition of financial and immigration sanctions.

In conclusion, sanctions are a key part of many of the UK’s political and diplomatic strategies. They also contribute to our efforts to uphold and defend the rules-based international order. The United Kingdom has long been a global leader in this field and this will not change now that we have left the European Union. Our independent sanctions policy allows us to use sanctions to achieve maximum impact by working in a way that is agile, expertise-driven and in support of our values, and enables collaboration with both new and established partners. International co-operation is at the heart of our policy. As I have said a number of times, sanctions are most effective when implemented and enforced collectively. We will continue to co-ordinate closely with our European and other international partners on sanctions, using the excellent relationships and networks we have already established.

These regulations are a crucial part of the legal basis that underpins our sanctions policy and of which the sanctions Act is the keystone. With them in place, we can promote and protect security, stability and prosperity at home and overseas, call for accountability and justice, and deter human rights violations and abuses. In short, they will help us to project the United Kingdom as a force for good in the world. I beg to move.

I recall speaking at a conference on aid effectiveness in Maputo, Mozambique, and being heckled from the audience. It turned out to be two Burundian MPs. They were complaining loudly that the UK had withdrawn all financial aid from Burundi, which was then about $20 million a year, and replaced it with technical assistance in its Treasury. In fact, a Burundian Vice-President told me later that it was the best thing we ever did. He said the taxes collected through the revenue officials the UK trained were four times greater than the cancelled aid. In his reply, can the Minister say what, if any, changes have been made to the sanctions regime in recognition of the change of leadership in Burundi? What is the current situation regarding aid for Burundi?

Similarly, in Guinea, what impact have the changes in the leadership had on the sanctions regime? With the collapse of France’s Fourth Republic, Guinea was the only colony in France’s African empire to take the harsh option of immediate independence without transitional support, rather than joining the French community of nations created by de Gaulle. In 1958, France abruptly left Guinea, taking with it everything it could move. The incoming President, Ahmed Sékou Touré, swept to power and introduced a centralised Marxist socialist regime. A third of the population fled the country. Those who remained suffered the privations of a failing state—hyperinflation, food shortages, starvation and riots. Sékou Touré called for help, first from the Russians and then the Chinese.

Guinea is potentially an incredibly wealthy country in terms of natural and mineral resources. It has up to one half of the world’s bauxite reserves and a large deposit of high-grade iron ore. In parallel with failed economic policies and state-sponsored drug smuggling, a series of brutal dictatorships have enforced control through murder, human rights abuses and imprisonment. My client at the time, the Minister of Public Works, was imprisoned by the President and starved, eventually to death. The 2009 violent outbreak was just one of many such incidents. In January this year, the French-Israeli mining tycoon, Beny Steinmetz, was sentenced in a Swiss court to five years in jail, guilty of corruption by bribing the late President Conté’s fourth wife, Mamadie, with $10 million to persuade the President to transfer the Simandou iron ore concession to Steinmetz for $170 million. Steinmetz later sold on a 51% share for $250 billion. Is the Minister confident that the sanctions delivered under these SIs are sufficient to tackle this level of extreme corruption?

The failure of these peace talks at Crans-Montana in 2017, despite a major effort by former TRNC President Akıncı, was a great disappointment, especially as the TRNC went out of its way to make concessions, some of which alarmed mainland Turkey to such an extent that it did not want him to have another term. As these bi-zonal, bi-federal talks have failed, the new TRNC President Tatar—rightly, in my view—believes that a two-state solution is the only answer. According to the island-neutral Cyprus Mail, it is reported that, in private, President Anastasiades of the Republic of Cyprus is keen on the idea. The Cyprus Mail’s recent article stated that a section of the population of the Republic of Cyprus believed that he

“had calculatingly spurned the opportunity of a reasonable settlement at Crans-Montana”

because he really believes in a two-state solution.

With regard to the UK’s relationship with the TRNC, I welcome the recent meeting between our Foreign Secretary and President Tatar. Can the Minister say what came out of these talks? After Brexit there are good trade opportunities. As an interim measure, could the UK copy our Taiwan policy, whereby we have a trade office in Taipei, which is very successful, even though we do not have diplomatic relations?

A recent press release from the TRNC President sums up the opportunities well. He said the Turkish Cypriot side desires a win-win situation on Cyprus and believes that solving the decades-long Cyprus problem would help reinstate stability in the eastern Mediterranean. He also said that we should see what ideas and proposals the British diplomats bring to the table. He pointed out that he had also raised the issue of strengthening bilateral relations and commercial ties with the UK now that it had left the EU. Tatar also expressed concerns regarding the opening of certain parts of the British bases for non-military development. Can the Minister write to me on this?

I also ask the Minister, who is so well regarded in this House and has such expertise on FCO issues, when the UN Secretary-General’s 5+1 informal talks convene, will the FCO look at reality and the long-standing deadlock to realise that a two-state solution is the only answer and that the gas situation should be part of these talks, rather than just reinstating this unhelpful statutory instrument?

I would like to concentrate on two areas. I noticed in doing some research for this debate that there were regulations on Burma—or Myanmar—but they are not mentioned. The other area missing from this list which I believe needs to be covered is that of the Uighurs and China.

In relation to Burma, in particular, the coup d’état that took place last week and the—shall we say—unlawful imprisonment of the leadership there, could the Minister outline what consideration the Government have given to introducing sanctions on members of the Burmese military linked to human rights abuses and the recent coup d’état in Myanmar? What assessment have they made of the coup d’état which took place on 2 February and its potential impact on the rights of the country’s religious and ethnic minorities and the process of democratisation in Myanmar?

In relation to China, what further sanctions will the Government take against the human rights abuses and acts of genocide against the Uighur community? Will there be separate legislation on this matter? I believe that what has happened there is also a violation of human rights, and sanctions should be in place.

Therefore, what actions will the UK Government take at the UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council against human rights violations in those countries and to ensure adherence to democratic standards? What representations will they make to the International Court of Justice regarding such violations of human rights?

I hope that the Government will work with the EU, NATO and the UN, along with the new political dispensation in the USA, against human rights abuses and to ensure that democratic standards are upheld. While supporting the sanctions that will be in place as per the statutory instruments—as long as they comply with human rights legislation—I ask that further consideration is given to Burma, and to China and the Uighurs.

Many years ago, when I was an opposition spokesman on foreign affairs in the Commons, I agreed with the then Minister that we should suspend the constitution of the Turks and Caicos Islands because of financial irregularities there. Incidentally, this was done again some years later. We also know that the TCI, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Channel Islands are used regularly by people, including some from the countries listed, to set up bogus companies and to carry out and cover up illicit activities. The Governments in some of these territories do not have the financial or legal infrastructure to enforce sanctions, and they often turn a blind eye to, or are even tempted to encourage, the avoidance of sanctions.

We need clear assurances from the Minister, and I hope he will give them to us. First, what assurances have been sought, and received, that each territory will rigorously enforce sanctions—at the very least in the same way as we do it here in the United Kingdom? Is he satisfied with these assurances? Secondly, what confidence does he have that each territory has the infrastructure in financial supervision, legal checks and procedures for prosecution necessary for enforcement, and what help has been offered to those territories which are not properly equipped?

We will have to trust the Minister to answer all these questions in his reply, since we will not be able to properly or effectively intervene if he fails to do so, notwithstanding the opportunities that we do have. But if he does not provide satisfactory assurances, we will need to find other ways to ensure that they are answered and to pursue the matter further. I otherwise support the regulations.

On sanctions more widely, I would like to press the Government on a number of areas. What more can be done to combat the Putin regime in Russia? Under him, the Russian state has, sadly, become more and more lawless, both domestically and in its aggression abroad. We have seen the outrageous treatment of Alexei Navalny, which is symptomatic of the way in which any dissent is dealt with under this authoritarian regime, with its gross violations of human rights. The UK has been the subject of attack by Russia and is now in a position to take more effective action against the Russian regime and those with close links to it. How will that become evident?

Recent events in Hong Kong have seen China try blatantly to stamp out the flickering light of freedom of speech and democracy in all its forms. The treatment of the Uighur minority has been utterly appalling. These are but two examples—many more could be related. Can the Government indicate what more can be done to ensure that China is held to account?

Recent events in Myanmar have also been mentioned. The actions of the military there represent a massive backward step for democracy in that country. While all was not well under the previous democratically elected regime, the setting aside of the election results in such a draconian way surely demands the most robust response.

Then there is Libya, where the Government have frozen assets from the previous Gaddafi regime. The Government will be well aware of the campaign to call Libya to account for its support for IRA terrorism in Northern Ireland and its supply of illicit weaponry, including deadly Semtex, which resulted in the murder of, and injury to, thousands of innocent people. Will the Government elaborate further on the action that they will take to ensure that the assets that are currently frozen in this country can be used to provide compensation to the innocent victims of Libya-sponsored IRA terrorism in Northern Ireland and across the United Kingdom? This Government, and previous ones, have looked at this issue, but action seems to be in short supply. There are over £12 billion of Gaddafi assets frozen here. Last year, £17 million was raised in tax from these assets. Surely some of this could be used to pay the victims of Libya-sponsored terrorism. Will the Government commit to publishing the Shawcross report into this whole area? The Government had it last May, but various reasons have been rolled out for non-publication. Will the Government now move to publish it? Victims have had enough of procrastination and prevarication. I look forward to the Minister’s reply to this and to other issues raised by noble Lords.

The United Kingdom has many close ties with Bosnia-Herzegovina, helped by two excellent ambassadors—the Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador here, Vanya Filipović, and the UK ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo, Matt Field—as well as strong parliamentary activity, with all-party groups for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for remembering Srebenica and against genocide, all helping to build a better future by supporting that country.

Can my noble friend tell us when the guidance on prohibitions and requirements previewed by the Explanatory Memorandum will be published? It is important for people to be aware of how it will operate. Will he please also say, as called for by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, what joint action on sanctions we will be taking alongside the EU? Will we be working with our EU partners, continuing to co-operate on sanctions regimes, or do we intend to do something different and strike out on our own? I am not quite clear on the long-term position. Clearly, in the short term, there will not be a massive difference. I appreciate that it allows us some freedom for manoeuvre, but how will that operate within working with our allies? That will also apply to other like-minded states. I think, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the United States, which has a particular significance given the Dayton peace accords and their role in bringing the war in Bosnia to a conclusion.

With those comments, I lend my support to the regulations. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that it is undesirable that we are looking at them in the rear-view mirror. It would be far better if we did not have to do that and could consider them in a more timely way. I appreciate that, on some matters Covid-related, that is not always possible, but I cannot see that that excuse—that reason, perhaps I should say—operates here.

In his statement accompanying the most recent travel restrictions and financial measures against Zimbabwe security sector chiefs, the Foreign Secretary stated that the Zimbabwe sanctions regime

“seeks to encourage the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and institutions; refrain from the repression of civil society; and to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights.”

If that has been the objective of the sanctions regime over the past two years, who can claim that it has been anything but an abject failure? The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is as great as it has ever been, the economy has been looted to a state of collapse, corruption is rampant, the rule of law is practically non-existent and gross human rights abuses are routine.

Today, journalists such as Hopewell Chin’ono, who expose corruption, are constantly harassed and regularly imprisoned, while the Ministers they expose walk free. Trade unionists, opposition MPs and activists are abducted, beaten, tortured and then jailed for daring to speak out. As we speak, MDC youth leaders Joana Mamombe and Cecilia Chimbiri languish in the notorious Chikurubi maximum security jail on trumped-up charges, simply for speaking out for a better life for the people of Zimbabwe. The courage and integrity of these individuals cannot be overstated and is testimony to the country that Zimbabwe can become again.

Fundamentally, change in Zimbabwe will come about as a result of the actions of the Zimbabwean people, but we could play a much more constructive role in supporting the rule of law, the restoration of constitutional government and a return to economic prosperity if, instead of signing the latest sanctions regulations and then complacently turning to other matters, we committed to a joined-up economic and political strategy that could give succour to the valiant Zimbabwe people that when they achieve change, their friends in the international community will be there to help them with a comprehensive support package, so that everybody in the region and around the world can see the dividends that democratic government and the rule of law bring.

By all means, let us have sanctions against individuals who brutalise their fellow citizens and loot their country, but let us not pretend that they can deliver a return to democratic norms in the absence of a long-term and creative strategy for democratic renewal in the region. We could start by putting together an internationally agreed Marshall plan, ready to be implemented as soon as constitutional government returns to Zimbabwe. That would offer hope to the people of Zimbabwe as they continue their heroic struggle for freedom.