My Lords, these regulations amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. This instrument was laid on 19 May under powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The measures in this instrument, subject to the “made affirmative” parliamentary procedure, entered into force on 20 May.
Since coming to power, this Government have been clear that Russia must not be allowed to succeed in its illegal war and have been steadfast behind Ukraine. Russia represents not just the obvious threat to Ukraine but a threat to the UK and our allies. As part of that, the UK has sanctioned more than 3,300 individuals and entities under the Russia sanctions regime, with over 1,300 sanctioned under this Government. Just last month, we introduced a new package that sanctioned 18 individuals and entities under the UK’s Russia sanctions regulations. This included cryptocurrency exchanges active in Russia and entities and individuals we suspect are linked to the UK-sanctioned A7 network, which has embedded itself in the Kyrgyz financial sector. This marks a further step in the UK’s sustained effort to erode Russia’s ability to fund its illegal full-scale invasion, ramping up pressure on Putin’s war chest.
Last month, Russia slashed its economic growth forecast for 2026 from 1.3% to just 0.4%. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister ascribed this downgrade to the impact of sanctions, among other factors, and Vladimir Putin admitted that Russian GDP contracted by 1.8% in January and February, with a decline in areas critical to the war effort, including industrial production.
My Lords, I am grateful to be able to contribute to this debate. I should say that I welcome these regulations. After all, they introduce a number of new sanctions into the Russia sanctions regime, which aims to encourage the Russian Government to cease their invasion of Ukraine—a noble aim. My concern, however, is about not so much the regulations themselves but the licences that were put in place on the same day to help mitigate some of the impact in the UK. It is to that end that I want, if I may, to ask the Minister a few questions.
First, I ask for clarity on the overall strategy between the pressure of the sanctions and the flexibility introduced by the licences. The Government have set out that these measures are intended to increase pressure on Russian energy resources and revenues while temporary licences are used to manage the market disruption. Can the Minister set out how the Government will evaluate the effectiveness of that balance in practice? What indicators will they use to demonstrate that that pressure on Russia is being materially sustained despite the use of these flexibilities? The Government have also stated that these measures will reduce Russia’s energy revenues. Can the Minister provide an estimate, even at a high level, of the anticipated scale of that impact once the measures are fully operational?
I also ask for clarity on the end state of the licensing approach. The licensing framework is described as a temporary and phased implementation mechanism. Can the Minister clarify the intended end state of the policy? She mentioned an end time but not necessarily the specific market conditions under which the Government expect the prohibitions to operate and fall without licences.
On the review process and accountability, given that the licences are subject to ongoing review, can the Minister elaborate on the governance of that process? Who takes decisions on continuation or revocation? What evidential thresholds are applied? How frequently are reviews undertaken in practice? Will the outcomes of those reviews be systematically communicated to Parliament?
My Lords, I declare my interest as the chief engineer working for AtkinsRéalis. It is wonderful to be back in your Lordships’ House after a fairly brief hiatus, and it is very good to see the Government bringing this legislation forward.
I shall focus my remarks on new Chapter 4KA, to which the Minister referred and which concerns uranium and the nuclear fuel supply chain. I have been working on this for several years with other noble Lords across both this Government and the previous one, so it is really good to see this action being taken on nuclear fuel imports. Of course, the Government were very quick to sanction and take action on hydrocarbons, but, on nuclear fuel, we have been in a similar position in that Russia has dominated that market. For example, some 50% of the world’s uranium conversion capability was undertaken by Russia, so there has been a bit of a gap there in terms of our focus on energy. We have brought the focus on to hydrocarbons, but nuclear fuels have been affected; that is now fixed by this legislation.
I will come on to our own supply chains in a minute, but I have an initial question for the Minister. Sizewell B is the nuclear power plant currently impacted in terms of Russian material. I would like to clarify whether the measures in this statutory instrument will, in effect, stop that route for Russian material going to Sizewell B through the existing contracts with a Russian supplier. I would be grateful if the Minister could let me know about that.
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More broadly, there is a fantastic opportunity here, because a range of companies want to invest in the UK and in our domestic fuel supply chains. This statutory instrument provides certainty for investing businesses. We have had a number of fairly high-level commitments from Governments over the years, but having it written down in legislation gives a route to getting more investment into the UK. This is important legislation from that perspective, and we are seeing investment coming in. Westinghouse, Urenco and Framatome all have plans in this area. However, there are a number of gaps to be filled. When we look at the nuclear industry in general, the recent focus on reactor technology has been brilliant, and we have had good decisions on small modular reactors and Sizewell C, but alongside that there needs to be a focus on ensuring that as much of the supply chain as possible is located within the UK so that we maximise the economic benefit.
We in the UK have historic strengths in getting end-to-end nuclear fuel supply chains together, so there is a possibility of a real win here in building up our own supply chains, seizing all the export opportunities for the nuclear industry and using the locations of those plants and investments as a spur to regional growth. I welcome the legislation, but will the Minister say how the Government are going to seize the opportunity enabled by it to bring forward additional end-to-end fuel services in the UK, with all the attendant export opportunities and skilled jobs, and use it as a tool to regenerate the regions?
My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, back from his brief sabbatical; his contributions will continue to be welcome. I also welcome the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, many of which have been playing on my mind over the past couple of weeks, and which I will refer to a little later.
On Friday, the Russian war on Ukraine became longer than the First World War. Today, it is likely that 1,000 Russians will be killed or wounded in the prosecution of that aggression. Also today, the first negotiating cluster opens between the EU and Ukraine, signalling a prospect of a much more prosperous and secure future with Ukraine in the European Union. What will assist this future is no lifting of economic and trade pressure on Russia. It is why tackling the Russian oil and energy sector—which is controlled by those close to, or who are financial backers of, President Putin—remains critical, and why these measures should be supported.
Russia has, frustratingly, managed to exploit some resistance to act over the past few years, especially on secondary sanctions, and has too easily circumvented the sanctions that have been put in place. In March 2022, more than four years ago, in the Chamber I asked the previous Government to target the rouble/rupee swap that allows Russia to continue to trade in oil products by allowing countries to trade and refine and then sell on. I raised this eight subsequent times—five times during the period when the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, was an Energy Minister in the previous Government. When I challenged the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, in the Foreign Office, I always got the slight impression that the FCDO would probably have liked to have acted, but the Energy department and the Treasury were more reticent. Because of this and because I have pressed on this issue for so long and so consistently, I was genuinely delighted to see the tranche of sanctions we are considering today.
My Lords, Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine is an indefensible act of aggression. The previous Government were both steadfast and consistent in their support for Ukraine and their opposition to the invasion and I am grateful that the current Government have continued that policy. With the support of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, whose comments I agree with, that makes all three major parties in the UK united in this endeavour, although we sometimes have differences on points of detail. It is in that context that I support the Government’s policy of tough sanctions against the Russian state and individuals linked to the Russian war machine. We will always welcome that approach and support the Government in this.
These sanctions are the right step and we must continue to keep them under review to ensure that they are appropriately tough and have the proper effect of putting pressure on Putin to bring an end to the invasion, just when it looks as though Ukraine could be making some progress, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said; I hope that is the case. Like him, I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the brave men and women of the Royal Marines, the RAF and the Royal Navy, as well as the NCA officers, for their skilful seizure this weekend of the Russian shadow fleet vessel, “Smyrtos”. The Government are right to have taken this action. Russia’s shadow fleet should not be permitted to operate with impunity. The permission for this action was originally announced more than three months ago, and many of us have been wondering why the announcement was made then but nothing happened. It is estimated that 200 to 300 tankers have gone through the English Channel since then, without being apprehended. It is nice to see that one has now been stopped. Can the Minister update the Committee on whether further actions will be permitted? What will happen to other tankers that are apparently on their way towards the channel at the moment? I believe that some have turned back.
My Lords, I am grateful that we have come as close to a broad consensus as we ever normally achieve and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part for their constructive contributions. The measures introduced by this instrument show how the UK continues to use its powers to apply further pressure on Putin to help secure an enduring peace and that we remain fully behind Ukraine. At the same time, the instrument is just one part of a broader cross-government effort on sanctions.
The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, asked a number of questions on how we evaluate the scale of the impact. We keep a very close eye on what is happening in Russia and on the impact of our sanctions. When we need to, we are prepared to go further. I have described our aims, and we will continue to pursue them until we see an end to the war.
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I appreciate the noble Lord’s point that when these things are announced, there are the issues of sanctions and of licences, which are slightly separate. Perhaps it would be helpful to present these in a way that enables noble Lords to examine them as a single package. I will take away that constructive suggestion.
The noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, asked about uranium supply chains and Sizewell B in particular. We work with the sector to make sure that it gets what it needs. I support what he said about trying to make sure that the UK can benefit to the maximum extent from this, and we will continue to do that.
To the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I commend the intervention—
On Sizewell B, I wonder whether the Minister can write to me with more specifics about the supply chain and whether that which currently supplies Sizewell B will come to an end as a result of the legislation. I would appreciate that specific commitment.
I cannot tell the noble Lord today, but I am happy to write to him. My understanding is that the global supply is secure and that the industry gets what it needs without having to use Russian product. I do not know specifically about Sizewell B, but I will write to him and get him the information he requested.
It is good that we can work together and have these conversations. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is able to speak with me and my honourable friend Minister Doughty on these issues and that we can come to a better place. The outcome proves that when this House does its job well, it does a good job of improving legislation, and it certainly has in this case.
The licences will be regularly reviewed. They can be amended, suspended or revoked. Businesses need to declare when they are using one of these licences. I do not have the exact number, but it is very small at the moment and I do not anticipate that changing.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asked whether we could bring the end date forward. In theory, we could. Nobody wants to see the current situation last any longer than is absolutely necessary, but it is important, in order to see sanctions adhered to and implemented, that we give some clarity and certainty.
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To phase the implementation of these measures, we issued two targeted licences intended as a temporary measure. The licences are subject to ongoing review, with fortnightly checkpoints, and may be amended, suspended or revoked as appropriate. The first licence is for the new LNG maritime services ban. This temporarily authorises spot market trade from Russian LNG projects Sakhalin-2 and Yamal until 1 January 2027. The second licence applies to the refined oil import ban and authorises imports of diesel and jet fuel refined in third countries from Russian crude oil.
The process of review involves continually assessing the impact of the licence on energy supply, market conditions and other relevant considerations against our overarching objective of ramping up pressure on Russia through our sanctions regime and, in light of this assessment, determining what steps are appropriate at each review point. As part of that review process, the Government have now set a clear end date for the refined oil licence of 1 January 2027. This is in line with the liquefied natural gas maritime services ban spot licence. While markets remain tight and sensitive, we recognise the need to give certainty to industry on the limited timeframe in which the licence may be used and to provide a clear, time-limited exit pathway.
I will now turn to each measure within this instrument in more detail. I want to be clear that this is a strong enhancement of our Russia sanctions regime. To reiterate what the Prime Minister and Minister for Trade said on 20 May, we have not lifted or eased sanctions; our sanctions are stronger now than they were a month ago. This legislation is sanctioning previously unsanctioned goods and services. The package includes multiple measures targeting Russia’s energy sector.
First, we have imposed further export restrictions that fall into the following four categories: items sanctioned by the EU, including certain types of industrial chemicals, metals and machinery that have potential battlefield use; goods recommended for sanctions by the Government of Ukraine, including additional forms of metals and articles of carbon fibre that are frequently used in the manufacture of drones; a more expansive list of individual chemicals and chemical precursors that may be used in riot-control agents that have been found on the battlefield or goods for internal repression; and, lastly, goods related to emerging technologies, such as quantum, semiconductor and engineering biology technologies, including new goods and those not already clearly subject to existing sanctions, to reduce the risk of circumvention.
Secondly, the legislation bans the import into the UK of oil products refined in third countries that have been made from Russian crude oil. It also introduces a new maritime services ban on Russian liquefied natural gas, restricting Russia’s access to the UK’s world-leading maritime services. Certain existing long-term contracts are exempt from these prohibitions until the end of the year, in line with the EU’s LNG measure. It also bans the import of uranium that is consigned from or originates in Russia and restricts UK involvement in the global trade of Russian uranium. Exceptions are in place to mitigate risks to energy security in third countries, including to the supply of uranium to operational nuclear installations.
The legislation also introduces a prohibition on providing construction services to persons connected with Russia. This prohibition will complement the other restrictions that we have in place on architecture and engineering, ensuring that UK construction businesses cannot support infrastructure and building projects that benefit Russia.
In addition, we have expanded the criteria for specifying ships to include ships carrying liquefied natural gas that originated in Russia and ships carrying coal and coal products that originated in Russia. The aim of this is to make it easier to sanction ships for a wider range of activity. We have also strengthened the trade and shipping sanctions that can be applied to specified ships by introducing additional prohibitions. The new trade sanctions enable the Government to prohibit persons from providing and procuring certain maritime and financial services in relation to specified ships. Additional shipping sanctions prohibit persons from operating or chartering specified ships and require the UK ship registrar, who maintains the UK Ship Register—part of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency—to refuse to register specified ships.
Lastly, the legislation will close a gap by prohibiting the acquisition and purported acquisition of a detained transport asset from, or for the benefit of, a designated person or person connected with Russia. This instrument amends the enforcement provisions of the 2019 Russia regulations, as well as the Trade, Aircraft and Shipping Sanctions (Civil Enforcement) Regulations 2024, to provide the enforcement of the new prohibitions introduced by these regulations.
To conclude, this is a wide-ranging, impactful package that shows that this Government take seriously our commitment to supporting Ukraine and targeting Russia to combat Putin’s attempts to prolong this barbaric war. Our sanctions, alongside those of our allies, have hit Putin hard. We will not let up and will continue to go further. I am grateful for the constructive and ongoing engagement with Parliament, especially the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on the issue of licensing, as well as for the strong, unified support for sanctions on Russia and steadfast backing for Ukraine. The Government welcome noble Lords’ shared determination to maximise pressure on Putin’s war machine and recognise the concerns that they have raised. I beg to move.
The Minister mentioned alignment with international partners, but can she update the Committee on the extent to which allied jurisdictions are adopting comparable approaches to licensing? How far is there convergence on managing the balance between sanctions pressure and market stability?
On the transparency of policy presentation, key elements of the implementation, in particular the licences, were not fully reflected in the Explanatory Memorandum. Can the Minister outline how the Government intend to ensure that future regulations are presented to Parliament with a complete picture of both the restrictions and the practical mechanisms used to phase them in?
On the oil licence only, what assessment has been made of the risk that the licensed categories—in particular, diesel and jet fuel refined from Russian crude oil—could create unintended pathways for sustained Russian revenue, contrary to the stated aims of the regulations?
I should declare—perhaps it is not an interest, but I should make it clear—that I myself am sanctioned by Putin’s Government. It is a badge of honour to some degree. These measures rightly tighten the restrictions on UK businesses involved in facilitating, providing assistance to, or providing crews, brokering services or financial services to ships seeking to circumvent sanctions. We therefore support the powers, as the Explanatory Memorandum states, for
“more shipping, trade, and transport related activity in scope of sanctions, making it more difficult for Russia’s shadow fleet to obtain services and limiting UK involvement further”.
I welcome the Explanatory Memorandum and I commend the Government for its clarity. After the recent news, I also strongly commend the Royal Marines and all those involved in the action on the vessel that was flagrantly passing through the channel as part of the shadow fleet. I hope that we are progressively bringing more light on the shadow fleet and acting on it.
All this considerable support made me even more disappointed by the then open-ended licence to exempt a key part of these measures, to which the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, referred. The Government put in place an open-ended licence for processed oil products—jet fuel and diesel. This was met with similar disappointment by our Ukrainian friends, and the open-ended nature of the exemption was something that I found unacceptable. I spoke to and then wrote to Minister Stephen Doughty on 4 June, outlining my very serious concerns. I said that I would consider moving consideration of these measures out of Grand Committee to the Chamber, so that the whole House would be able to decide whether an open-ended licence was the correct way forward. This was not a light thing to do, because I have been a willing and enthusiastic part of the cross-party consensus on these sanctions, but I nevertheless found the open-ended nature of that measure unacceptable.
I am grateful to Ministers for facilitating me meeting with cross-departmental officials on 10 June, and I received a letter on 11 June from Minister Doughty indicating that the Government had changed their mind and would bring forward an endpoint to the licence—a sunset clause, in effect. This was welcome and that concession has also been welcomed by many of our Ukrainian friends. The Minister referred to that acknowledgement today and I thank her for it.
I have a couple of questions relating to it, which are linked to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster. My understanding is that any British businesses continuing to trade under this licence until the end of the year have to declare to the Government that they are so trading. I would be grateful if the Minister could say, whether today or in writing, how many British businesses are now operating under this licence. This licence should ideally not be in place, but if the Government’s intent is that there should be clarity on when the policy will end, we should have clarity on how many British businesses are operating under it.
On the point from the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, the fact that this now has a clear endpoint to it suggests that the Government have moved away from saying that they will decide on the end of the exemption based on market conditions, because they are now clearly phasing in a policy determination. Ultimately, we want to see this licence removed and revoked as soon as possible. As far as I am concerned, the target point should not be 1 January; that should be the backstop. If the licence could be removed sooner, I would welcome it and I would ask the Minister to bring a Statement to Parliament indicating that that is the case.
We need these measures in place to ensure that our Ukrainian allies know that we will not allow any let-up in our support for adding even more pressure on the Putin regime, at the very point when the Ukrainians seem to be gaining some form of advantage. At this critical point, we need to turn the screw and not loosen it.
We support the Government’s policy of sanctions against Russia, although, like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, we have raised concerns that Ministers have temporarily approved the purchase of Russian oil products refined in third-party countries. Like my noble friend Lord Lancaster, we are concerned about this. The Government have now said that they will keep this under review every two weeks, which is welcome, but we would like to see these licences ended as soon as possible. In her introduction, the Minister said that the temporary licence for phasing in the ban will expire by 1 January 2027. It is good that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has put the pressure on to enable that to happen—I support that—but could the Minister reply to the question that I asked her earlier, in the Chamber, about whether that could be brought forward if circumstances change, such as if the Strait of Hormuz were reopened? What assessment have the Government made of the impact of this licence on Russia’s finances? It is surely not right that the UK is buying oil products derived from crude oil originating in Russia. Does the Minister accept that this feels like a softening of our position on Russian oil?
We would like to see these sanctions toughened up and the temporary licences ended as quickly as possible. I look forward to the Minister’s answers to the questions asked today.
I conclude by saying that the UK has transformed its use of sanctions. We continue to lead internationally on sanctions implementation, and our objective remains unchanged: to increase pressure on Russian revenues that fund its illegal invasion of Ukraine. We will continue to explore further ways to constrain Russia’s ability to sustain the war. Once again, I thank the Committee for its insightful contributions and for the continued cross-party support, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, mentioned, for our sanctions regime and for Ukraine. I beg to move.