Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

I now turn to each measure in this instrument. First, the instrument introduces new export prohibitions on a wide range of goods, including chemicals, plastics, metals, machinery and electronics. These prohibitions will deny Russia the means to procure products that have military and industrial uses. Secondly, we are extending our prohibitions on the transfer of technology, applying the prohibitions to a broader set of technology related to goods that are important for Russia’s military-industrial sectors and for its economic development. Through these measures, we are removing UK expertise, whether that is contained in intellectual property, blueprints or industrial know-how, from critical supply chains.

Thirdly, the instrument will ban the transfer of software relating to business enterprise, industrial design and oil and gas exploration and production. Putin relies on energy production and exports to fuel his war economy. Therefore, the aim of these sanctions is to make key sectors of the Russian economy less productive.

Fourthly, we are banning the import of Russian synthetic diamonds that have been processed in third countries, and helium. These target future funding sources that Russia is developing, as well as potential circumvention routes.

Finally, this instrument clarifies the enforcement responsibilities for a small number of trade sanctions on Russia. This will enable DBT’s Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation to enforce certain trade sanctions offences and refer serious offences to HMRC for criminal enforcement consideration.

To conclude, the Government remain committed to European security, and committed to standing up for the values of democracy and the rule of law, values which continue to be attacked by Russia. Sanctions, including this trade package, are a key part of our efforts. I beg to move.

On import bans, we note the Government’s decision to sanction synthetic diamonds processed in third countries, building on the ban already in place for natural stones. While I suspect that Russia is not a major producer of synthetic diamonds, this appears aimed at closing a circumvention route. What evidence does the Government have that synthetic diamonds are being used to sidestep the existing sanctions on natural stones? How are we working with allies to enforce traceability and verification?

We also note the inclusion of helium and helium-3 in the list of banned imports. This, too, is framed as a pre-emptive step, anticipating the growth of helium as a potential revenue stream for Russia in future. Will the Minister please confirm whether there is current evidence of Russia scaling up helium exports, or is this purely a precautionary measure?

There are also some important technical clarifications in the SI, including the correction of omitted offences and clearer enforcement responsibilities across government departments. Although these may seem fairly minor, such details are vital to effective enforcement. Will the Minister please confirm whether further regulatory gaps are under review, particularly given the pace at which circumvention technology is evolving?

With those few questions, we support the intent behind these measures. They reflect an ongoing commitment to tightening the UK’s sanctions regime and maintaining pressure on the Russian Government. But sanctions can be only as effective as the enforcement and adaptation measures. As Russia continues to develop complex workarounds—from third-country trade to its unregulated shadow fleet—we, the sanctioning countries, have to be equally agile. That includes reviewing measures regularly, ensuring that departments have the capacity to act and strengthening international co-operation. In that spirit, will the Minister please say more about how the Government are assessing the real-world impact of sanctions—not just in terms of goods restricted but in terms of their broader economic and strategic effect on Russia’s capacity to wage war? We believe that these regulations are a step in the right direction, but they must be part of a broader, joined-up and rigorously enforced sanctions strategy.

We work very closely with partners on the shadow fleet. The noble Lord alluded to diplomatic efforts. We raise these issues constantly; I myself have raised them with partners who have had vessels involved in this, and they have taken action as a consequence of that. Sanctions are an important tool that we have, but they are far from the only tool.

Both noble Lords were quite right to remind us how important enforcement is. Although we do not comment on future designations, clearly, we keep all of this under review. We are looking at any regulatory gaps that there may be, and we will continue to take further measures as and when we need to; I do not anticipate that this is the last time we will stand here introducing these sorts of measures. I thank both noble Lords for their consistent support on these issues. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said on the issues of the ceasefire and the behaviour of Putin. I thought that his remarks about Zelensky were well made, and I agree with them.

The UK has transformed its use of sanctions. The Government are committed to continuing to strengthen the effectiveness of our sanctions regimes, their implementation and enforcement; and to reviewing their ongoing appropriateness in changing foreign policy contexts. We will continue to put pressure on Russia, as it is now time for Putin to come to the table and for Russia to show that it is serious about ending the war—or face the consequences. Once again, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and for the continued cross-party support for the sanctions regimes.