My Lords, I rise to support this amendment, to which I have added my name. There are four fundamental legal principles which show the need for this amendment and why it should be supported by the Members of the House. Section 1 of the Charities Act 2011 states:
“For the purposes … of England and Wales, ‘charity’ means an institution which … is established for charitable purposes only”—
the emphasis there is “only”. Before that well-established proposition of law was incorporated in statute, lawyers would refer to the need for the institution, if it is to be a charity, to be wholly and exclusively charitable.
Secondly, Section 2 of the Charities Act 2011 says that a charitable purpose is a purpose which is “for the public benefit”. Sadly, the present position does not satisfy these two fundamental requirements, because the management structure of the Royal Albert Hall enables a sizeable group of seat-holders, which as we have just heard amount to the owners of some 25% of the seats in the hall—and they are the best seats—to potentially earn huge private profits for themselves from the performance of the charitable objects of the hall.
We all wish the Royal Albert Hall to be a thriving charity, enjoying all the fiscal benefits of charitable status. To maintain that status, however, requires, for the reasons I have briefly summarised, a radical change in the management of the hall so that it becomes, to all intents and purposes, a corporation wholly and exclusively charitable, operating solely for the public benefit. That is enough to warrant the amendment now being considered, but the matter goes further and concerns the legality of the role of the seat-holder council members.
The members of the Albert Hall council are charity trustees because they have
“the general control and management of the administration”
of the hall. That is the test laid down in Section 177 of the Charities Act 2011. As charity trustees, they are in the same fiduciary position as any other trustees: they must exercise their powers in good faith and as would most likely further the purposes of the hall. Their powers must be exercised for the purpose of advancing, directly or indirectly, the public benefit.
Furthermore, in accordance with the ordinary principles relating to fiduciaries, each member of the council, as a charity trustee, is not permitted to put themselves in a position where their interests and their duty conflict or may conflict. The majority of the council members of the hall are seat-holders, who face an obvious actual or potential conflict of interest and duty in exercising their powers under Clause 4. These are the reasons why the amendment introducing a committee, the majority of whose members are not seat-holders, to state whether it approves or disapproves of decisions by the council under Clause 4 is not only desirable but essential for maintaining the charitable status of the hall and the observance by the council member seat-holders of their legal duties.