My Lords, it may not surprise noble Lords that, before we start the debate on the first group, I again remind the Committee of the protocol around declaring interests. As I mentioned last week, noble Lords should declare relevant interests at each stage of proceedings on a Bill. That means that in Committee, relevant interests should be declared during the first group on which a noble Lord speaks. If a noble Lord declared an interest during the previous two days in Committee, that is sufficient, but if this is their first contribution, any relevant interests should be declared.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for what he has just said, reminding us of the importance of declaring interests in Committee if they have not been declared so far, but will he make a statement to the Committee about the Government’s plans for further consideration of this Bill, given that we were promised six days of consideration? We lost more than two hours last week through dinner-hour business, and today—for extremely good reasons—we have now lost more than five hours of consideration. I hope the Government have now decided that they must give this Committee an extra day, because we were promised six days and we have not had six days. I hope the Government’s intention is not simply to go through the night tonight and through the night on Wednesday. This would not mean reasonable discussion of the 132 amendments that still stand to be debated in your Lordships’ Committee.
I thank the noble Lord for those comments. We will try to resolve this through the usual channels, but there are six days and this is the fifth day. We want to make progress today and we want to complete Committee on the sixth day, which is Wednesday this week.
Clause 17: Landlords etc: financial penalties and offences
145: Clause 17, page 26, line 24, leave out “beyond reasonable doubt” and insert “on the balance of probabilities”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Baroness Scott of Bybrook, seeks to apply the normal standard of proof for civil cases for these fines and probes the Government’s reasons for applying the criminal standard of proof.
My Lords, I want to make it very clear that we will not have had six days in Committee. I quite agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shipley.
I do not feel that I can open this group without paying tribute to the late noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. His amendments are why we are debating this important issue tonight. We will miss his insightful contribution to this Bill and to the House more broadly. We are a poorer place without him, and I send my heartfelt sympathies to his partner, his friends and his family for their loss. May his memory be a blessing.
This group follows on from a group on the previous day in Committee, but it focuses more specifically on the burden of proof applied in the determination of penalties. I will be brief, as on these Benches we simply have two questions for the Minister. I draw your Lordships’ attention to probing Amendments 145 and 152. We are concerned about the Government’s proposal to grant local housing authorities the power to determine whether a person is guilty of an offence under Section 16 without proper due process. Can the Minister kindly set out for the Committee how this provision is intended to operate in practice, and whether it will be subject to any appeal or review process?
I wish to draw attention to the principal reason for these probing amendments—the selected standard of proof. We are seeking to understand why there appears to be a lack of consistency in the standard of proof applied across different parts of the Bill. I have no doubt that many distinguished lawyers in your Lordships’ Committee will address this matter with far greater clarity and precision than I can. However, the question remains: why should different standards of proof apply within the same piece of legislation?
I appreciate that the Minister is herself not a lawyer and may wish to take some time to reflect and return to the Committee with a considered response, but can she kindly set out, either today or at a later stage, the rationale behind this apparent inconsistency? I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 148, 197, 200 and 242 on behalf of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull.
First, I join my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook by expressing my sincere condolences to the family and friends of the late noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. His reputation as an exceptional legal mind represents the very best that this House has to offer.
Secondly, I remind noble Lords of my own interest as a practicing solicitor.
These four amendments seek to make two substantive changes to the Bill. First, the removal of “reckless” would ensure that a landlord is guilty of an offence only if it can be proven that they wrongly relied on a ground for possession with actual knowledge of the offence. Secondly, the replacement of
“on the balance of probabilities”
with “beyond reasonable doubt” raises the standard of proof for these offences when the local authority is determining a case.
I expect that the Minister will oppose these amendments on the grounds that they will make it less easy for a local authority to find a landlord guilty of an offence. But surely the crucial point is that they would put a proper check on the incorrect prosecution of landlords that may arise from the new system of penalties that will be imposed by local authorities.
There is also a legitimate question about how we can be certain that local authorities will have the resources they need fairly to assess cases in which landlords are accused of an offence. We need a system that ensures that landlords are held to high standards, but surely that system has to be seen to be fair. Any system that makes landlords feel that they are perennially at risk of being found guilty of an offence, even without their knowledge, will only add to the chilling effect of the Bill on our rental market.
My Lords, first, I echo from our Benches the sincere condolences to Lord Etherton’s husband, Andrew, and their family. They really do have our most sincere condolences.
I also echo the concerns that were delivered in a rather measured way by my noble friend Lord Shipley regarding the way that things have gone along. I have also communicated that to the Minister.
We come to another key plank in the Bill, perhaps one less explored or spoken of but, in our view, massively important, that of enforcement. It is important to remind ourselves of the current state of affairs in the enforcement world, albeit very briefly, as this is not Second Reading. The reality is, as the noble Lord has just mentioned, that after decades of cutbacks, councils have gradually been reducing the number of staff in the areas of housing enforcement, decent homes and tenant matters. It is arguable that, as a result of this, they have failed over that same time to carry out proper proactive enforcement work, inevitably leading to more substandard housing, as, let us be blunt, the rogue landlords know they can likely get away with it.
The big change is, of course, Clause 107. It is an important section in the Bill and, in short, it very boldly states:
“It is the duty of every local housing authority to enforce the landlord legislation in its area”.
That is a very powerful change—it is not optional nor desirable, it is mandatory. The landlord legislation wraps up, of course, other requirements from other Acts, such as the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 and various housing Acts. It is a real step change from the current situation and it cannot happen too soon.
However, our concern is whether local authorities are tooled up for this. Are they ready and will they have the right resources? This is not a blame game; it is the reality. The Bill, as we discussed in a previous group, allows for two main activities to fund their enforcement activities—civil penalty notices, as previously discussed, and rent repayment orders, which we will get to sometime later. The importance of these funding streams is why we opposed any reductions in the previous group and why we have amendments in the next.
My Lords, may I say how sorry I am to have to deal with Lord Etherton’s amendments after his sad passing? I did not have a long time to get to know him, but during my time in this House, I truly appreciated both his engagement and his wisdom on this Bill and his courtesy and kindness. I know that he will be greatly missed by the House and I add to what other noble Lords have said in sending my condolences to his husband and his close friends and family. I understand that his wonderful legal brain will be a sad loss to this House, and we will all miss him. I am very sorry that he is not here today to complete the work that he started on the Bill. As the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, said, may his memory be a blessing to all those who knew him.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for speaking on behalf of Lord Etherton in this debate on the amendments on financial penalties, and also the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for her comments on these. I will make the declaration up front that I am not a lawyer either, so I rely on others for legal advice on this part of the Bill.
Starting with the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, Amendment 145 would replace the criminal standard of proof with the civil standard of proof for breaches of the tenancy requirements which are not criminal offences. These breaches can, by virtue of continuing or being repeated, form part of a criminal offence. We consider that it is necessary, therefore, for the criminal standard of proof to apply.
Amendment 152 would reduce the standard of proof from “beyond reasonable doubt” to “on the balance of probabilities”, where local authorities are imposing civil penalties as an alternative to prosecution for tenancy offences. Where civil penalties are imposed as an alternative to criminal prosecution, it is necessary for the same criminal standard, “beyond reasonable doubt”, to apply. That is already the case, for example, for civil penalties imposed as an alternative to prosecution for offences under the Housing Act 2004, such as failure to comply with an improvement notice. For these reasons, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.
My Lords, first, I am really disappointed because a number of noble Lords who have been involved in all these debates over the past four days in Committee are unable to be in their seats because of the later time of day. That will not help us scrutinise this Bill as we should.
I thank all those who have contributed on Amendments 148, 197, 200 and 242, which are now in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. Noble Lords are absolutely right to highlight the issue of consistency —an issue we on these Benches intended to raise today —but my noble friend Lord Hunt also introduced an important new concern: the threshold of proof required by local authorities before a financial penalty can be imposed. On matters such as these, it is vital that we draw on the expertise of the legal profession to improve the Bill’s drafting, and I hope the Minister will seek the wise counsel of noble Lords such as my noble friend as these matters are taken back to the department.
As noble Lords have rightly pointed out, the financial penalties under consideration are significant. Many landlords are small-scale or so-called accidental landlords, who may not be in a position to absorb such fines. It is therefore entirely appropriate that the Committee seeks clarity on the methodology, consultation process and factors, such as the ability to pay, used in determining these thresholds.
Given the scale of these penalties, the standard of evidence and the threshold for their imposition must be carefully examined, and my noble friend set out with clarity the issues that may arise without a sufficient burden of proof, and the legal argument underpinning these amendments. There is legitimate concern about penalties being applied without adequate legal scrutiny, potentially undermining due process. We therefore welcome these amendments and believe my noble friend Lord Hunt has made a compelling case. When large fines are at stake, a high level of rigour and certainty must be reflected in the legal standard applied. What is more, any concerns expressed on these matters should not be dismissed too readily and should be carefully considered, but at this point I withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 145 withdrawn.
9:00 pm
Amendments 146 to 162 not moved.
Clause 17 agreed.
Clause 18: Financial penalties: procedure, appeals and enforcement
20 of 308 shown
I also agree that the standard of proof where a local authority is making a decision on a case without recourse to the courts should be high. Local authority officers should be absolutely sure when making these decisions.
I have two questions for the Minister. First, will she take this opportunity to explain how a landlord who has been found guilty of an offence by a local authority will be able to appeal that decision? Secondly, will she please answer the question about appropriate local authority resources to enable them to administer these offences?
The amendments in this section centre around the burden of proof that local authorities can apply when taking civil action. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, that we need to understand the rationale for using the criminal standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” as opposed to the civil standard “on the balance of probabilities”, and vice versa—all the more so given the increased powers that are being granted under the Bill. It needs to be stated that there are many and they are quite complex. I confessed earlier that I am no lawyer, but even I could see that some of our officers might need to get their heads around some of these changes.
Given that I have argued previously that local authorities will need this money to fund enforcement activities, Amendments 145 and 152 seek to lower the burden of proof to
“on the balance of probabilities”,
thus making it easier for local authorities to impose civil penalties, whereas Amendments 197 and 200 seek the opposite.
I also note that in the Renters (Reform) Bill, Clause 15 had the higher proof. I look forward to hearing the reasoning as to why there has been a change. In short, these are legitimate questions. Consistency and clarity are essential and I look forward to the Minister’s replies, particularly on the notion of recklessness and the culpable mind in Amendments 242 and 148.
I now turn to the amendments tabled by Lord Etherton, and spoken to on his behalf today by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Amendments 197 and 200 would, conversely, require local authorities to meet the criminal, rather than civil, standard of proof when imposing civil penalties for rental discrimination and rental bidding breaches.
The standard of proof is lower than that which applies to the imposition of financial penalties for breaches of other requirements introduced by the Bill. This is because, unlike those other breaches, rental discrimination and rental bidding breaches cannot lead to a criminal offence if the conduct is repeated or continued. As such, rental discrimination and rental bidding cannot result in the landlord being prosecuted or given a £40,000 civil penalty, and are subject only to the lower £7,000 penalty. We therefore think it appropriate that local authorities need to prove these breaches to the civil standard, “on the balance of probabilities”, rather than the criminal standard, “beyond reasonable doubt”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raised the issue of resources, and I will answer that with two points. One is that the Government have committed to assess the financial impact of this on local authorities, and have committed to new burdens funding. Secondly, those fines will be available for local authority use for this purpose, or other purposes, if they wish to use them in that way.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about appeals. Local authorities can consider evidence and decide whether, for example, the individual concerned was aware that the information they provided might be false or misleading, and if so, whether it was reasonable for them to submit it, or if they took an unjustified risk in doing so; that is the point about recklessness.
The legislation also provides safeguards. In the case of prosecution it would be for the court, not the local authority, to decide whether the accused had been reckless. In the case of a financial penalty, the landlord has the right to make representations before a penalty is imposed, and a right of appeal against the imposition or the amount of the penalty.
Amendment 148 would narrow the offence of misusing a ground for possession to evict a tenant when possession would not be obtained on that ground. It would do so by removing the element of recklessness from the offence. Amendment 242 would narrow the offence of providing information to the database operator that is false or misleading in a material respect in the same way.
To commit the first of these offences, a landlord, or person acting or purporting to act on their behalf, would need to know that the landlord would not be able to obtain possession on that ground. If a landlord, or person acting or purporting to act on their behalf, was simply being reckless as to whether the landlord would be able to do so, it would not amount to an offence.
I do not think that limiting the offence in this way is necessary or helpful. Clearly, landlords should not be penalised for minor mistakes, but recklessness goes beyond making a mistake. It entails taking an unjustified risk, and landlords should not take an unjustified risk when their action may result in someone losing their home. It is, of course, the case that the offence is committed only if the tenant actually surrenders possession. Making enforcement in every case dependent on being satisfied to the criminal standard that the landlord, or those acting or purporting to act on their behalf, knew that the landlord would not be able to obtain possession using a ground for possession, would make it too easy for unscrupulous landlords and agents to escape enforcement.
Similar arguments apply in relation to the database offence. To require knowledge to be proved in every case would make it too easy for unscrupulous landlords to submit false or misleading information in purported compliance with database requirements.
It is well-established in legislation for offences relating to the provision of false or misleading information to include the mental element of recklessness, including in housing legislation. It is used, for example, in relation to the provision of false and misleading information to local authorities in connection with their functions under the Housing Act 2004—an offence that is prosecuted by local authorities.
In short, we consider that the mental state of recklessness is appropriate to apply to these serious offences, so I kindly ask that the noble Baroness considers withdrawing her amendment.