Public Prosecution Service and Legacy in Northern Ireland

While I will always be in awe of the stunning bravery and humanity of the vast and totally overwhelming majority of those who served the state in Northern Ireland, it is clear that not every action met those standards. If we are to progress, we must accept that, for it is an undeniable truth, and to deny it prolongs the pain of those who were affected.

However, we must be equally honest about how difficult it is satisfactorily to redress these issues through the courts today in the 2020s—so difficult, it is impossible in the overwhelmingly vast majority of cases. The standard of investigations into many of the cases were unacceptably poor. We must deal with the world not as we want it to be, but as we find it. Those deficiencies have been exploited by a small but very vociferous and very aggressive group in Northern Ireland who operate predominantly but not exclusively in the legal and political systems. They place the interests of both groups of protagonists, both victims and veterans, far below their own interests, be they financial or electoral, and have built a grievance industry on these issues, which serves no one but themselves.

It is inevitable, given the studious record keeping of the state in Northern Ireland when contrasted with the murderous chaos conducted by the terrorists, that this pursuit of political and financial gain was inevitably going to be conducted only one way: against those who strived night and day to prevent civil war in Northern Ireland, and not against those who woke up in the morning and made deliberate and conscious choices to go and kill women and children in pursuit of their aims. There will never be any moral equivalence between the two. The people of these islands will never accept any moral equivalence and those who push that narrative are doing the terrorists’ work for them.

It is also a fact that when the Good Friday agreement was entered into, it was decided that the price worth paying for peace in Northern Ireland was to permit those who had previously led and directed that terrorist activity to enter Government. This applied equally across the board. Thus the leaders of the IRA and loyalist groups entered politics, exercising control over the Executive and, crucially, permitting these extremists and their associates to use the powers of the state to prolong their grievances—and while doing that, of course, concealing their own murderous behaviour. They seek to prosecute the very security forces that fought them and thereby won the peace. All this is very predictable and very inevitable.

Where is the evidence? Well let me give the House a couple of examples. I will stick to what you said earlier, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will stick to facts that are in the public domain and only comment on public officials. I am determined not to rely on the parliamentary privilege you have granted today and I will be very careful.

It is a fact that when the five cases—none of which has resulted in a conviction—that came before the courts this year were decided on, the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland was an individual named Barra McGrory. I make no assertions on his motives at all, but it is a fact that Barra McGrory was, previous to his appointment, a long-term solicitor in Northern Ireland for the republican cause. His family members were present at the peace talks in Northern Ireland at the behest of the IRA. He represented Martin McGuinness at the Bloody Sunday inquiry and he represented Gerry Adams over many years.

It was Barra McGrory who decided to prosecute soldiers A and C in April this year, the trial that precipitated my leaving Government. It was the same Barra McGrory who asserted soldiers A and C had murdered a friend of Gerry Adams, the murderer and terrorist Joe McCann. I say murderer and terrorist, because it was accepted in court that Joe McCann had shot 15 soldiers. It is clear to any straightforward individual that Barra McGrory should have never been involved in this case in any way. Indeed, soldiers A and C were duly acquitted earlier this year because there was no admissible evidence against them. The judge said he was “surprised” this had not been realised before trial, clearly referring to the prosecution.

The problem with evidence was again raised in the recent trial of my friend Dennis Hutchings, when Barra McGrory, in almost total isolation and against advice, decided to prosecute Dennis. I say in isolation, because since Dennis has died the senior police officer charged with reviewing the evidence in that case has come forward and confirmed that he was very clear that this case should not be pursued, only to be overruled personally by Barra McGrory in his role as Director of Public Prosecutions. This happens everywhere in Northern Ireland. The Police Service of Northern Ireland, one of the most stretched and tested police forces in this nation, is overseen by the Northern Ireland Policing Board. Sitting on that board, holding the PSNI to account, is Gerry Kelly, who in a previous life shot a prison officer in the head and was convicted of causing a series of explosions in London.

I could go on about the total infiltration of the justice and political systems in Northern Ireland by those who, given their convictions, in any other country would be prevented from going anywhere near elected office or public service and handed the levers of state to re-write history in their image. It is madness. It destroys lives and it is preventing Northern Ireland from really coming to terms with its past and moving on to the bright future that almost everyone I have met there over the last year is eager to embark on.

During that time, the Northern Ireland Secretary promised draft legislation over and over again—I have written this all down but will not go through it now, because it bores even me. It is safe to say that this is the eighth self-imposed deadline that he has missed for coming forward with that draft legislation. He has produced the Command Paper detailing his thoughts, which came out in the summer. It should be noted that a Command Paper is not legislation. I welcome anything that shows that thought is being put into this matter, but I and countless others far more qualified and knowledgeable in this space than me were dismayed by its contents. I wanted to understand where these proposals had come from. I spoke to countless groups, including victims, veterans and political parties, and not only could I not find anyone who advocated the approach set out in the Command Paper, but I could not find anyone from any of these stakeholder groups who had been actively engaged.

Any proposals must have some degree of consent from those in Northern Ireland. Of course there will be no rapturous applause whatever is done in this space, but equally, people in Northern Ireland—victims, veterans and other groups—are not stupid; they understand the nuances of what can and cannot be achieved in legacy. To cut off pathways to justice for British citizens who have had their children murdered by terrorists is too much to ask. Releasing convicted murderers was one thing, and on-the-run letters were another, but denying any hope of answers for those who lost loved ones, from whatever background, is a step too far.

There is an almost childlike naivety in these proposals. Does the Secretary of State seriously think that those who have answers for the families—I remind the House that 90% of those killed in the troubles were killed at the hands of terrorists—and who are now off living a comfortable life in places like the Republic of Ireland or the United States will suddenly discover their soul and take part in the process?

The Secretary of State says that he has heard no alternatives. Even a cursory glance would show that there are many alternatives to that approach and many actors trying to influence his thinking. He may not choose to listen—that is his prerogative—but that is a different thing from saying that there are no alternatives.

Look at Op Kenova, for example, and the work of Chief Constable Jon Boutcher. Investigating one of the hardest parts of the conflict—agent handling—he has worked hard to bring both families and security forces with him. It is his life’s work, with no allegiance to either side but a relentless focus on the truth and on what is within the art of the possible in the justice space. To say that he has not prosecuted anyone completely misses the point; 22 files are currently with the prosecution service, but he does not have the resources to process them in a timely manner.

Finally, legacy is not an amateur sport. We cannot just charge at it with a set of election slogans and tough it out; victims, veterans and the nation deserve far better. There are plenty of options other than those in the Command Paper. We can give far more flexibility to prosecutors in the factors that they must take into consideration before proceeding to prosecution, including the recovery of key information for families. We can ensure more rigour in the process to arrive at better decisions than those that are currently being made, and of course, as I outlined in the first part of my speech, we can be far more fair-minded about who actually makes these decisions.

The issue must lie with the legacy professionals. We must take the politicians out of it and do right by the victims and veterans. It is difficult but absolutely possible to deal with legacy in Northern Ireland in a professional, courteous and fair manner, but it requires a political commitment and skill that we have simply never seen from the UK Government. I am calling on them for it today. The victims deserve it, the veterans who served at the command of this House deserve it, but chiefly the young people of Northern Ireland deserve it. They want to grasp their future with both hands, unmolested by the quarrels of an older, more violent generation. We should be on their side and get this done.