Proposed Chinese Embassy

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs if she will make a statement on representations made to Five Eyes partners on the potential risks posed by the proximity of sensitive cabling infrastructure to the site of the proposed new Chinese embassy.

I thank my hon. Friend for her question, and I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to it. She will know that discussions with Five Eyes partners relating to domestic security matters are primarily a responsibility for the Home Office. The decision on planning permission for the proposed Chinese embassy at Royal Mint Court rests solely with the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government in his quasi-judicial capacity. He has set 20 January as the target date for his decision, and I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham will agree that it would not be appropriate for me to cut across that process.

I appreciate that there has been significant interest in our engagement with allies and partners on this matter. As my hon. Friend knows, we never comment on conversations with allies regarding intelligence matters. I can nevertheless reassure her and the House that we continue to work closely with our Five Eyes partners and other like-minded countries on a wide range of issues, including those pertaining to domestic security. These partnerships are essential for our shared security.

We have been consistently clear that national security is the first duty of Government, and it has been our core priority throughout the embassy process, with the close involvement of the security and intelligence agencies. Our intelligence services have been involved throughout, and a range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect national security. The Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary also publicly identified two issues: the consolidation of China’s diplomatic estate in London and public access. Those require resolution before a decision could be made. In November, they wrote to confirm that appropriate resolutions to those issues had been reached. As the director general of MI5 commented last month, our security services have over a century of experience of managing the risks that arise from foreign embassies on UK soil, and I have full confidence in their ability to do so effectively.

I hear what the Minister has said, but I am not reassured and neither are our partners. We have now had interventions from the Dutch Government, the Swiss Parliament, and the Swedish Parliament, and we have had two interventions from the White House on the risks posed to UK infrastructure by the cabling that runs along Royal Mint Court. Last year, a Minister said that reports regarding the cables were inaccurate. Does the Minister still believe that to be the case? I understand that we are now briefing Five Eye partners that

“no sensitive government data is transmitted through cables”.

Would the Minister confirm that? Surely, that line is a tacit admission that financial services based in London could be affected by Chinese proximity.

Minister, what were the mitigations that MI5 and MI6 suggested to avoid espionage risks, and will their implementation be conditional for planning approval? I remind the House that the US has confirmed three major infrastructure hacks in the past 18 months, while we have faced hacks on the Electoral Commission, the Foreign Office and parliamentarians, to name just a few. A Chinese mega-embassy in the heart of London is an issue of national significance, not purely a planning issue as the Government try to present it. Combined with the heightened risk to dissidents, campaigners and the wider public, is this really a risk we should be taking? Can the Minister offer reassurance to my British Hong Kong constituents that transnational repression will not increase if this mega-embassy is approved? Once planning permission is given, we cannot take it back; we will have lost control. I know I speak for colleagues across the House and the wider country, because they have contacted me, when I say that this is not a risk we can afford to take and the Government should refuse this disastrous plan tomorrow.

I thank my hon. Friend for her remarks. I reiterate that our intelligence services have been involved throughout. A range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect national security. She will also know that the Government are still to make a decision. That planning decision will be made independently by Ministers from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on planning grounds.

It is also important to recognise that we have set clear red lines through this process. That has included, for example, the consolidation of the diplomatic presence of China from seven buildings to one, which will have security benefits. It is also important to say that we do routinely engage with our allies, including the US, which is our closest ally, on a range of issues, including security and intelligence in relation to China. It is important to recognise that we do that routinely and that it is important to discuss national security factors that we may consider.

My hon. Friend referred to transnational repression. She will know that the UK Government will not tolerate any attempts by foreign Governments to coerce, intimidate, harass or harm their critics overseas, especially in the UK. We continually assess potential threats in the UK, and we take the protection of individuals’ rights, freedoms and safety very seriously.

I call the shadow Minister.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) on her question. One could be excused for feeling that this is groundhog day, because once again the House has gathered to share our collective concern about plans to approve the Chinese Communist party’s mega-embassy and once again the Home Office has declined to answer. I did consider rereading my speech from last week, but as I hope we will get some answers, I have gone back to the drawing board.

The Chinese Communist party’s plans are not normal diplomatic renovations, and it would be laughable to suggest that they are, given the location. Did the Minister see the unredacted plans before their publication, and can she genuinely say that she would have no concerns about her Government approving this shadowy network of 208 secret rooms? Given the claims that the Government and Ministers had not seen these plans until last week, surely the Government need time to review them. Would the Minister confirm that there will be a delay to the decision, which is due tomorrow? No one would seriously suggest that, in the week that has passed, the Government have identified all the mitigations needed to protect our cables and militate against these secret rooms.

The Government have so far shielded themselves behind the mundane language of planning policy, but this is not a normal application. Can the Minister confirm whether our allies have been consulted on the unredacted plans, and if so, who? Can she confirm whether UK Government officials previously denied the existence of these cables to the United States in discussions?

Last week, I asked whether the Chinese Communist party’s ambassador had been démarched and forced to explain his party’s duplicity in the application. The Minister declined to answer. It has now been a week. Has the Minister—not officials—finally found time to prioritise national security and haul in the Chinese ambassador? If not, why not, and what message does that send to China? Not once have this Labour Government démarched the Chinese ambassador since they came to power, despite cyber-attacks, spies in this place and bounties on the heads of Hongkongers. What does the Chinese Communist party have to do for this Government to defend us and act to deter future hostile acts? The Government tell us that security concerns have been addressed, including ones that they only knew about a week ago. Tell us how.

I thank the shadow Minister for her remarks. First, in relation to the Prime Minister’s visit, any prime ministerial or ministerial travel will be confirmed in the usual way. Secondly, it is right, and we are clear, that the planning decision is one for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government to take independently and that that decision is made in a quasi-judicial capacity. It is also important to say that the decision on the embassy will be taken in the proper way, regardless of any attempts at pressure from anyone, and we have been clear throughout that this is a planning decision for MHCLG Ministers.

It is important to recognise that national security is the first duty of Government—the shadow Minister will understand that more than anyone, given her own background—and we will always act to protect it. It is taken extremely seriously by the Home Office and the Foreign Office. It will be important that we continue to ensure that we have conversations, as we do routinely, with our allies and with the US, and that we take into account any security and intelligence, which we also share on a routine basis, in relation to China. As I have already mentioned, where there are concerns about national security, it is important that our intelligence services are involved throughout, and a range of measures have been developed and are being implemented.

I am sure that these matters will continue to be part of the debate, and that the Minister for Security, my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), will address them further. It is also important that we continue to ensure that there is a focus on security and, in relation to concerns about those who may experience attempts under transnational repression, that we continue to stand up for the safety and security of all our people in the United Kingdom.

My hon. Friend will be aware that the site of the proposed embassy is in my constituency. I have relayed the concerns of my constituents to the Government on a number of occasions. They are concerned about the security issues, about the human rights record of the Chinese Government and about local disruption as a consequence of the development. As she will be well aware, these concerns have been highlighted on several occasions, including in statements in the House. What assurances can the Government provide to my constituents and others with serious concerns about the proximity of the proposed embassy to critical and sensitive communication cables serving the City of London and the local area? I would be grateful if she could take that into account.

I know that my hon. Friend has raised her concerns a number of times. I reiterate that national security considerations are always the first duty of any Government, and the security and intelligence agencies have been involved throughout this process. As I noted in my opening remarks, the two national security issues that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Home Office made public as part of the planning process have now been addressed. If the planning application for a new embassy in Tower Hamlets is approved, China has committed to replace seven sites that make up its diplomatic footprint in London with the new embassy, which will also bring clear security advantages. I am sure that my hon. Friend will continue to have conversations with her local council and with the Government in due course.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

The Liberal Democrats have made it clear from the beginning of this saga that the approval of China’s super-embassy would be a terrible betrayal of Hongkongers who moved to the UK to escape the very repression that the Government are now inviting to their doorstep. The Government must halt the application and summon the Chinese ambassador to make it clear that we will not accept Beijing’s efforts to spy on our Parliament or to intimidate and harass Hongkongers in our community.

On the specifics of the application, in a 2018 letter the then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson granted diplomatic status to Royal Mint Court. That letter made no mention of a condition relating to planning permission and, under section 1 of the Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act 1987, represents a fulfilment of the condition to provide express consent. Eight years later, we are now being told that consent was somehow conditional on planning permission, based on a secret note verbale from May 2018 that has not been published. Will the Government release that note verbale, which is the only evidence that diplomatic status was provided conditional on planning permission and, therefore, that the application was not prejudged by the Government?

It is important to agree that the decision to provide China with consent to use the Royal Mint as diplomatic premises was made in 2018 by the previous Government under the former Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, and was subject to planning permission. China purchased the site on that basis. That is what my colleague Baroness Chapman has also shared. It is important to recognise that the decision will be an independent one made by MHCLG through a quasi-judicial process.

I think I heard my hon. Friend say clearly that the Government would not stand for coercion by the Chinese diplomatic service. Has the Foreign Office not been looking at what has been going on over the last 10 years? At the consulate in Manchester, people who were demonstrating against the Chinese Government were dragged into the grounds and beaten up, and the diplomatic staff were left alone, with nothing happening to them. There are pop-up police stations all over the country that intimidate members of the Chinese community, whether they are British citizens or from Hong Kong or other parts of China. There should be a simple answer to this application. There is no need for an embassy of this size for the Chinese diplomatic community in this country. It is there to intimidate Chinese people and undermine the elected representatives in this Chamber.

My hon. Friend is right that we must not tolerate any attempts by foreign Governments to coerce, intimidate or harass. He has highlighted some examples that have caused great concern and that we take extremely seriously. We continue to assess potential threats in the United Kingdom, and the protection of individual rights and freedoms is a matter of great concern for the Government. Indeed, freedom of speech and other fundamental rights of all people in the UK are protected under domestic law. The police and security services monitor these issues closely.

The UK has a broad suite of powers available to counter foreign interference, including acts that amount to transnational repression. We continue to implement measures in the National Security Act 2023, which strengthens our legal powers and makes the UK a harder target for states that seek to conduct hostile acts. The Security Minister announced last year that counter-terrorism policing is offering training and guidance on state-threats activity to all 45 territorial police forces across the UK. This will enhance the ability of frontline police officers and staff in the identification of state-directed crimes and the actions that can, and must, be taken to escalate matters and mitigate such activity.

The Intelligence and Security Committee was set up specifically to fill a gap in oversight whereby this House could not directly look at highly classified and sensitive information. Having chaired that Committee throughout the previous Parliament, when we undertook our very detailed and sensitive inquiry into China—the published version of which was quite well received, to put it mildly—I can assure the Minister that absolutely no aspect of this matter could not be shared with the ISC. Can she tell the House whether the National Security Adviser has discussed with the ISC and briefed it on the security aspects of this proposal, the proceeding of which enjoys such hostility on both sides of the House?

I recognise and acknowledge the right hon. Member’s deep experience in the House and from chairing the ISC. Matters of security and intelligence continue to be the first priority of this Government. In relation to national security and in respect of the National Security Adviser, our partners abroad and Five Eyes—which was included in the urgent question—it is important to recognise that we continue to have conversations about security and intelligence in respect of all areas of concern to the United Kingdom and, indeed, in relation to China.

The Speaker of the US Congress, Mike Johnson, was here today in Parliament. Last night, when asked about the Chinese embassy application, he said:

“I’m concerned about it…But if it were me, I would be very cautious about that.”

The Minister has heard the caution in this House and from the US Speaker, the White House and many others about the proposed Chinese embassy, which would give China a much greater ability to undertake transnational repression and espionage and to attack our critical national infrastructure. I ask the Minister again: are she and the Government listening to all the voices before making this decision? Once Pandora’s box is open, it cannot be put back.

My hon. Friend will know from his own discussions that we continue to routinely engage with and discuss a wide range of national security issues with the US. Indeed, the US has also had its own relatively recent experience of China building a new embassy in its capital. I recognise the importance of ensuring that views across the House are heard, and we have had a number of debates on this issue, but it is also important to recognise that we have made it clear throughout the process that this is a planning decision that is for MHCLG Ministers to make in an independent, quasi-judicial capacity.

Circumstances have changed dramatically since 2018, and the Minister cannot simply dismiss this as a planning application, just like it were a conservatory—it is a matter of national security. Will the Government at least concede that if the building goes ahead all the cabling along Mansell Street at the Wapping exchange should, as a condition of any planning permission, be relocated at the applicant’s expense?