1: Clause 1, page 1, line 5, leave out “a thing in” and insert “capable of”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to another in the name of Lord Holmes of Richmond, seeks to provide a statutory basis for recognising digital assets as property, while removing any presumption that these assets cannot be accommodated by the existing two categories of personal property rights.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, in my name, I will speak to Amendments 2 and 3 in this group.
It is a pleasure to open Report of the Property (Digital Assets etc) Bill. In doing so, I declare my technology interests as set out in the register, not least as adviser to Ecospend and Members Capital Management. I take a brief moment to thank all of those who have got the Bill to this stage, including Professor Green and her team at the Law Commission, everyone who was involved with our Special Public Bill Committee—particularly the clerk, Matthew Burton, and all his staff—and all colleagues who have shown an interest in and engaged with the Bill.
There is an extraordinary opportunity when it comes to digital assets and delivering clarity, consistency and certainty around their property classification. By 2030, it is estimated that somewhere between 10% and 14% of GDP will come from digital assets. To put it another way, transactions in 2030 involving digital assets will range between £10 trillion and £24 trillion. That is a huge opportunity for the planet and for the UK, not least because of our excellence in financial services and in fintech—financial technology—but, crucially, because of the great good fortune of English common law.
What we see with the Bill is the leading-edge deployment of that great tradition in the most modern of contexts. To take just one example, if we get effective dematerialisation of the capital markets, that will save £20 billion year-on-year in reduced costs and speeded up transactions. Clarification of digital assets will not only help capital markets but will assist with financial inclusion and financial market infrastructure transformation, impacting positively on our economy and, through that, our society. We should note that the world is watching as we pass this Bill—following, as it does, a suite of Bills from the Law Commission, not least the recent Electronic Trade Documents Bill, now Act.
My Lords, I am a great admirer of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and his passion for all things digital. But this is a good yet very modest Bill, and I not sure that we need stress-testing at this point in the proceedings. Through the Special Public Bill process that we have all been through over the last few months, we have kicked the tyres pretty hard already on this. We have taken evidence and had amendments in Committee, so I will be extremely brief and perhaps disappoint the noble Lord by not being in favour of any of his amendments.
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A previous draft of the Bill used the terminology
“is capable of being an object”,
but this was amended to the current
“is not prevented from being”.
The core purpose of the Bill, as supported by the Law Commission and many stakeholders, is to provide certainty by confirming in statute that a thing is not prevented from having legal status as an object of personal property rights simply because it falls outside the traditional category of things in action and things in possession. The current drafting achieves this, so we do not need to change anything.
Amendment 2 proposes a narrower statutory definition of a thing in action within the Bill. This goes against the general approach of the Bill, and the Law Commission’s approach, which is to avoid dictating categorisation or defining the boundaries of existing categories. Again, it is not consistent with our deliberations over the past few months. As far as Amendment 3 is concerned, on the publication of guidance, the Law Commission deliberately chose not to include specific criteria for a third category in the Bill, and having explored this during consultation, nor did we agree that this was necessary. Requiring the Secretary of State effectively to create and publish such criteria or guidance for judicial consideration resurrects the complexity that we have rejected.
I must therefore disappoint the noble Lord. I know that he was just being provocative by tabling these amendments, so that he could make a jolly good speech about digital assets.
My Lords, traditionally, English common law has recognised two forms of property: tangible things in possession and intangible things in action, such as debts and shares. However, as we have heard, with the rise of digital assets such as crypto- currencies, tokens and non-fungible tokens we encounter items that do not fit neatly into either category. These assets are becoming essential in modern commerce, and it is vital that English law remain at the forefront of international trade, safeguarding London’s position as a legal and financial hub.
The Law Commission looked at this and proposed a third category of property to accommodate such digital innovations, allowing for legal evolution without imposing rigid definitions that might exclude future technologies. The commission emphasised that statutory intervention must not undermine the existing legal clarity or introduce unnecessary complications. The flexibility of English common law is a strength; it has already adapted to address key questions in the digital sphere. The current regime offers a balance of predictability and adaptability, making our jurisdiction well positioned to lead in this space.
The Bill the commission drafted, which is now before us, does just that. We have tested it thoroughly in Committee. I have listened carefully to the concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, and while I recognise them, the Bill has been carefully drafted and it is not necessary to amend it—save for Amendment 6, which we will come to later.
Addressing Amendments 1 and 2 in a little more detail, it will be for the courts to develop the law on the treatment of this category or to widen existing categories—whichever way one wishes to look at it. The proposed wording of Amendment 1 goes too far. The Bill’s wording is elegant and encompasses digital assets, which are not easily categorised in the conventional classifications. It also encompasses other things not yet contemplated or in our imagination but which, when they do come into existence, will be thought by the courts to deserve rights. That is what the Bill is doing; it is expressly not limited by over-definition. It achieves protection for these as yet unimagined things, while making it clear that existing digital assets will be protected.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, for raising these issues. They get to the heart of the Bill: whether there is a need to recognise a further category in statute, and whether it is helpful to provide further guidance to the courts on the attributes to consider.
On the first of these points, the Government’s firm view is that the Bill’s current approach is the right one. Some stakeholders hold to the two-category view and say that there can be no further category beyond things in action and things in possession. This view is understandable but has its roots in history, including in an influential statement in a 19th-century case. That statement was made at a time when assets such as crypto tokens simply could not have been conceived of. The world has moved on, and the law needs to move on with it.
The Special Public Bill Committee heard from stakeholders who would prefer to see these emerging assets categorised as things in action, on the basis that their approach would give more legal certainty. However, the need for new solutions is the result of the unique features of these assets and not of their categorisation. For example, the existing rules on transfer of things in action, or on remedies for interference in things in action, are simply not adequate for assets such as crypto tokens. Either way, the law, through the courts, will have to respond to their new features.
The Bill is the result of a three-year project by the Law Commission during which all arguments, including the arguments in favour of this amendment, were considered in full. A strong majority of consultees to both consultations undertaken by the commission expressed a preference for a further category. Most respondents to the committee’s call for evidence also supported this approach. This approach came from a wide range of stakeholders—from legal professionals to industry bodies and academics.
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This is a very good Bill, which does a very simple task of enabling a third category of property: taking a “thing in possession” and a “thing in action” and enabling a potential third category to accommodate digital assets which do not neatly fit within either of those current property classes. It is a good Bill, and it has been through an excellent Committee and Special Public Bill Committee procedure, but I believe it is worthy of stress-test through these amendments this evening.
Amendments 1 and 2 go to the very heart of the Bill and propose that the presumption that digital assets cannot be fitted within the existing two categories of property be reversed. Consider something such as an NFT, a non-fungible token. To put it in simpler terms, it is largely a piece of electronic software on the hardware of a digital ledger. It has an existence beyond its legal form, but it is difficult to possess in the way you would possess, for example, a bag of gold. In that sense, the Bill is structured to enable this third category. The amendment seeks to stress-test that and reverse that presumption, as we have seen in some of the recent judgments in Australia and Singapore.
I am not suggesting that this amendment is the right amendment; it is merely put to stress-test how the Bill is set out. It seeks to stress-test the claim made by Professor Green, when she gave evidence to our Special Public Bill Committee, that this amendment would take the bite out of the Bill. If indeed it would take the bite out of the Bill, then it would not satisfy my three Cs test of what the Bill needs to achieve if we are to realise the opportunities and the economic benefits from digital assets. Those three tests are: clarity, certainty and consistency.
Amendment 3 seeks to assist with this by suggesting codes of practice that could be brought to bear to assist the courts when they come to consider issues around digital assets. With that, I beg to move Amendment 1.
We would be bold to depart from the views of Professor Green, chair of the Law Commission report, who is very hostile to this sort of amendment. When asked about one such suggested amendment, she said:
“That would really take away the whole bite of the Bill … the whole mischief that it addresses is that we no longer have to be stuck with these categories”.
Therefore, we cannot support Amendments 1 and 2.
Turning to Amendment 3, on codes of practice, we follow the reasoning which I have outlined. Any code of practice risks definitions which do not accommodate a new type of activity or entity outside its scope, but which is worthy of protection. Equally, the code might suggest that property rights be given to an activity which, after the detailed investigation that a trial can give, a court rightly decides should not be so protected. It is best left to the courts, which will receive evidence, hear arguments from competing parties and be able to resolve those matters. The six-month period is too soon. If the Law Commission had thought this a good idea, it could have said so. It is contrary to the tenor of its lengthy report. If the Act would, in five years’ time or whenever, benefit from amendment, it should be done with the benefit of hindsight and experience. Meanwhile, such amendment is premature.
Another advantage of the Bill’s approach is that it is technologically neutral. As the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, excellently put it in Committee, the Bill
“encompasses other things not yet contemplated or in our imagination”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 16.]
The Bill future-proofs our law in the way the other two categories do not. As Professor Green put it in her evidence, as quoted by the noble Lords, Lord Holmes, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Sandhurst,
“the whole mischief that it addresses is that we no longer have to be stuck with these categories”.
By removing any uncertainty around a possible further category, we will give the courts the freedom to develop our common law. This approach allows them to consider and respond to the unique features of digital assets, and other assets that we cannot yet foresee.
This flexibility is also relevant to the question raised by Amendment 3: whether the Secretary of State should publish codes of practice about the attributes of digital things that confer personal property rights. The Government’s view is that requiring the publication of codes of practice could undermine the flexibility that the current drafting affords the courts. The Law Commission considered the features of assets that have characteristics of property but do not fit into the existing categories. However, City law firms, senior barristers, financial industry groups and crypto industry groups gave clear feedback that a more detailed statutory provision incorporating these features could be counter- productive.
The Government are concerned that the same issues could stem from publishing a code of practice. It could create unhelpful boundary challenges, lead to undue complexity, and prevent the common law being able to respond flexibly and dynamically to new technologies and unforeseen challenges. This feedback was reflected in some of the written evidence submitted to the Bill Committee.
As noble Lords will remember, the Bill Committee was firmly in favour of maintaining the Bill’s current approach. My noble friend Lord Stansgate got to the heart of the matter when he said:
“The whole point of the Bill is to set out something relatively simple, to take into account new technology and to enable judges to develop common law”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 19.]
As the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, so eloquently put it:
“The relative silence of the current Bill is golden”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 20.]
The Bill deliberately does not try to define the types of assets that may fall within its scope. Rather, it unblocks the common law and leaves it to the courts to develop the appropriate principles, building on centuries of world-renowned common-law development. By doing this, English and Welsh and Northern Ireland law can remain dynamic, globally competitive and a useful tool for those in the digital asset market. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.