Following the horrific attack in Southport in July 2024, I announced that a new, dedicated permanent oversight function for Prevent would be created. This would provide continual independent scrutiny of Prevent legislation, policy, and delivery, to assess Prevent’s effectiveness and to ensure proper standards are met.
Lord Anderson KC was appointed as interim Prevent commissioner to provide that independent scrutiny. He was tasked specifically with scrutinising the Southport attack and the murder of Sir David Amess, examining whether Prevent had failed to intervene effectively in those two cases. Lord Anderson was also asked to consider the improvements that have been made since the perpetrators were referred to Prevent, and to identify areas for further reform. Today he has published his findings, and a copy of the report will be placed in the Library in both Houses. The report will also be available on gov.uk.
I would like to express my gratitude to Lord Anderson and his team for the progress they have made in a short space of time. The report clearly highlights the failings of Prevent in both the Southport case and that of Sir David Amess, while also recognising the energy and urgency that has been shown in making changes to strengthen Prevent.
Lord Anderson’s findings
On the tragic murder of Sir David Amess, Lord Anderson has upheld the conclusions of the Prevent learning review—PLR—that was published on 12 February 2025. He explains that once the case was adopted into Channel in 2014, several failures took place, including poor communication with the intervention provider and the lack of a six-month review.
With regards to the perpetrator of the Southport attack, Lord Anderson agreed with the findings of the PLR that was published on 5 February 2025. The first referral should have been passed to the local authority Channel co-ordinator for information gathering—the process in place at the time. He comments that
“it is hard to see how the test of ‘reasonable grounds to believe that there are no Prevent concerns’ could have been satisfied on the known facts of the case”.
Lord Anderson also agreed with the PLR finding that there were sufficient concerns to warrant progression to Channel.
Lord Anderson concludes that in both cases their schools referred the individuals to Prevent
“for the best of reasons—but Prevent failed to provide what might have helped them. Whether different decisions might have spared their victims will never be known: both attacks came years later, and many imponderables intervened. But wrong decisions were taken; more should have been done; and from these failures, lessons must continue to be learned”.
Lord Anderson also outlined the importance of having a prevention programme like Prevent in place for tackling radicalisation. While Prevent cannot stop every attack, we must continue to drive reform where it is found lacking.
Lord Anderson made a series of recommendations on how Prevent can be further strengthened or areas that require further exploration. These include:
Prevent should remain open to individuals falling within the existing category of “fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks”. Alongside this, consistent efforts should be made to improve the quality of referrals and encourage those that are appropriate, including by providing clear and consistent messaging to potential referrers and to Prevent practitioners.
A task force should be established to lead exploratory work into the possibility of formally connecting Prevent to a broader safeguarding and violence prevention system.
Compliance with respective agency mandates to share information should be more closely monitored by their regulators and inspectorates. Consideration should be given to introducing a duty to co-operate with speed and candour in reviews after adverse incidents.
Public transparency about the structures and systems of Prevent should be the default position. The Home Office and CT Policing should adopt a proactive approach to the release of such information and be ready to publicise the successes of Prevent.
All feasible and rights-compliant avenues should be explored as a matter of priority to enable evidence of online activity to be more effectively used:
to gauge risk factors, assess risk, identify clusters and escalation and activate and manage responses;
to assist in the identification of potential subjects for Prevent; and
to evaluate and address the risk factors attaching to individuals referred to Prevent.
The Government welcome the findings of this rigorous review and will immediately act on its findings. We will:
Clarify Prevent thresholds in guidance and training to ensure that frontline public sector workers subject to the Prevent duty understand that those “fascinated with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks” should be referred to Prevent. We will complete this work by the end of September.
Improve transparency and information sharing, including by upskilling and training Prevent practitioners, frontline workers, and civil society organisations. We will complete this work before the end of the year.
We will take steps to strengthen our approach to tackling online radicalisation, through work with tech companies, like-minded international partners, and considering new approaches to identifying and supporting susceptible people online. This includes developing new capabilities to better equip Prevent to manage online radicalisation risks.
Continue exploratory work on how Prevent connects into wider safeguarding and violence prevention pathways to ensure no one can fall between the cracks.
While we must look immediately at how Prevent works alongside wider safeguarding mechanisms to stop further missed opportunities, we also look forward to the outcome of the first phase of the Southport public inquiry, led by Sir Adrian Fulford, which will publish its findings later this year. Where Lord Anderson’s review has identified the need to explore broader and long-term reforms to safeguarding and violence prevention, we will consider this alongside the inquiry’s recommendations. The inquiry will comprehensively examine all aspects of the events that led to the Southport attack, and identify where further changes should be made.
Alongside the work we will take forward in response to this report, swift progress has already been made on the reforms to strengthen Prevent that I announced in December 2024:
Prevent has launched new guidance which is designed to ensure that repeat referrals to Prevent get the multi-agency consideration they require;
The end-to-end review of Prevent thresholds has concluded. Its recommendations will strengthen our approach to the assessment and management of Prevent referrals. It will ensure that clear and unambiguous policy, guidance, and training is in place, so that Prevent can offer the right interventions to the right people. It includes specific action to improve our approach on Islamist extremism and for those individuals who are being radicalised into extreme violence;
The first stage of the strategic policy review into how Prevent manages people with mental ill health or who are neurodivergent has also concluded. Action is under way to implement those findings;
Pilots are now running across the country to ensure that where people do not meet Prevent thresholds, they receive the support they need from wider services; and
From 1 August, we will pilot new practical mentoring interventions for people at risk of radicalisation in Channel, to enable Channel panels to better support individuals without a clear ideology.
Prevent training is being rolled out at pace to educate frontline professionals about the ideologies, such as Islamist extremism, that drive terrorism.
In addition, to enable the vital independent oversight of Prevent to continue while a recruitment process is under way for the permanent commissioner, I am delighted that Lord Anderson has agreed to extend his tenure as interim commissioner until the end of the year.
My Department remains steadfast in its commitment to keeping the public safe and safeguarding people at risk of radicalisation.
The victims, their families and those who survived the Southport attack but continue to live with the physical and emotional pain, and Sir David Amess’s family remain in our hearts and prayers.
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