Planning and Infrastructure Bill

The second question relates to the issue of whether the clause can be used for the temporary acquisition of the ownership of land—that would be something akin to requisitioning in the Second World War, and it would be totally new—or whether it relates to the possibility of occupying land, traditionally done by means of a licence, a way leave or something of that sort, so that you have rights over somebody else’s land for a period but the land remains their property throughout. It is unclear which of those two it allows—or is it both?—because the clause refers specifically to “possession or occupation”, suggesting that there is a difference in the minds of the drafters between possession and occupation.

That question is tested by the wording of my amendment, which would leave out the words “possession or”. That would test whether this is tautologous or there is a genuine distinction. If there is a genuine distinction, could the Government explain what it is and whether it includes the temporary acquisition of the title to land in some fashion or other? That would be completely new and definitely worth closer scrutiny. If they are tautologous and there is no distinction, could the Government accede to the proposal in my amendment that one of them be left out, so that we have one that is operative and works?

The third thing is that there is no promise of any guidance to accompany this. In creating this new power—I assert, on advice, that the power is new and does not put something that exists beyond doubt—questions of a practical character arise that should be covered by guidance before it becomes operative. For example, how long can somebody temporarily acquire land for? How long beyond completion of the works are they allowed to keep occupation of the land? It might be as simple as: how long can construction huts be left on the land beyond the point when they are actually needed? What is the state in which the land is to be returned if it is temporarily acquired? That would all be useful to know in strong guidance from the Government that would accompany this new power. Again, that is all completely absent.

Temporary occupation, on the other hand, as the sole remaining power under the amended clause, would not confer the right to exclude others. This would pose serious safety risks and could undermine project delivery. Without clear powers, authorities would be unlikely to use the amended provision. It would risk introducing legal uncertainty, prolonging negotiations, leading to an increase in objections and public inquiries, all of which would increase costs and could delay delivery.

The Highways Act 1980 already contains powers covering the compulsory acquisition of land and rights in and over land. Clause 33, as I have said, would make it explicit that those powers can also authorise temporary possession. Clause 33, as currently drafted, provides the legal certainty, operational clarity and safeguards necessary for the safe and timely delivery of infrastructure projects. It does not create a new power; it is about ensuring that highways infrastructure can be delivered safely and proportionately.

Having, I hope, clearly defined the difference between possession and occupation, I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that this is not an attempt to own the land. In fact, it is clearly designed not to own the land, so that the title to the land would not change; it would be a right to occupy the land.

Finally, the noble Lord raised the question of how long it would be after works finish that the land can be possessed and whether there would be a need for guidance. That clearly is a subsidiary matter; I will take that subject away and write to him on it afterwards. I therefore kindly ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.